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Abstract
The problem facing the Cuban Revolution after 1959 was how to increase productive 
capacity and labour productivity, in conditions of underdevelopment and in transition 
to socialism, without relying on capitalist mechanisms that would undermine the 
formation of new consciousness and social relations integral to communism. 
Locating Guevara’s economic analysis at the heart of the research, the thesis 
examines policies and development strategies formulated to meet this challenge, 
thereby refuting the mainstream view that his emphasis on consciousness was 
idealist. Rather, it was intrinsic and instrumental to the economic philosophy and 
strategy for social change advocated.
Analysing the evolution, impact and institutionalisation of his ideas, this thesis fills 
several gaps in the history of economic thought, Cuban economic history and the 
literature on Guevara. Highlighting his study of Marx’s Capital, recourse to the 
technological and managerial advances of capitalist corporations and critique of 
Soviet political economy, the research offers a stimulating new contribution to the 
field of socialist theory. It examines the organisational structures and control 
mechanisms Guevara created, demonstrating how they link to his Marxist formation. 
It provides the first record of Guevara’s role in several critical areas: promoting 
education and training; establishing accounting, investment and supervision systems; 
forging workers’ participation in management; founding research and development 
institutions; formulating policies to raise consciousness and integrating psychology 
as an economic management tool.
The research is based on new archival and interview sources. The thesis concludes 
that Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara made an indispensable contribution to socialist political 
economy and played a vital role in industrial organisation and economic 
development in Cuba. It connects these two contributions, demonstrating how 
Guevara’s analysis of the law of value was integral to the economic management 
system he created as Minister of Industries.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Popular biographies, memoirs, academic articles and political tracts have focussed on 
Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara’s military commitment to revolutionary social change; the 
influence of his travels in Latin America, his participation in guerrilla warfare in 
Cuba 1956-1959, the Congo 1965 and Bolivia 1966-67. Four decades after his death, 
Guevara is still both admired and derided, testimony to the fascination his persona 
continues to hold. Yet his most significant contribution remains largely unknown. 
His economic ideas and work in the Cuban government 1959-1965 have received 
scant attention from historians, social scientists and other commentators.
Analysing the evolution of Guevara’s economic analysis, its impact and 
institutionalisation through the Department of Industrialisation, the National Bank 
and the Ministry of Industries, this thesis fills several gaps in the history of economic 
ideas, Cuban economic history and the literature on Guevara. It demonstrates that 
Guevara made an indispensable contribution to socialist political economy and 
played a vital role in industrial organisation and economic development in Cuba. It 
connects these two contributions, demonstrating how Guevara’s Marxist analysis of 
the law of value was integral to the economic management system he created, known 
as the Budgetary Finance System (BFS).
The problem facing the Cuban Revolution after 1959 was how to increase productive 
capacity and labour productivity, in conditions of underdevelopment and transition to 
socialism, without relying on capitalist mechanisms that would undermine the 
formation of new consciousness and social relations integral to communism. 
Locating Guevara’s economic analysis at the heart of the research, the thesis 
examines policies and development strategies formulated to meet this challenge, 
thereby refuting the mainstream view that his emphasis on consciousness was 
idealist. Consciousness was intrinsic and instrumental to the economic philosophy 
and strategy for social change.
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The projects and institutions guided by Guevara cannot be understood without 
reference to his economic ideas. The BFS began as a practical measure to solve 
concrete problems, principally those created by the sudden nationalisation of industry 
and the exodus of qualified personnel. However, the BFS was broadened and given a 
theoretical base as Guevara immersed himself in Marx’s analysis of the capitalist 
laws of motion, thus strengthening his conceptions about the transition to socialism. 
Highlighting his study of Marx’s Capital, recourse to the technological and 
managerial advances of capitalist corporations and critique of Soviet political 
economy, the research offers a stimulating new contribution to the field of socialist 
theory. Marx had illustrated that the law of value is central to the capitalist mode of 
production which led Guevara to challenge the Soviet insistence on using and 
developing that economic mechanism in the construction of socialism. His 
conception was integral to the apparatus developed under the BFS and his vision of 
Cuba socialista as one big factory. The thesis illustrates Guevara’s claim that in the 
long term an emphasis on consciousness would lead to greater economic efficiency 
and productivity than the use of material incentives, capitalist categories and levers.
The thesis also examines the organisational structures and control mechanisms 
Guevara created, demonstrating how they link to his Marxist formation. It provides 
the first record of Guevara's role in several critical areas: promoting education and 
training; establishing accounting, investment and supervision systems; forging 
workers’ participation in management; founding research and development institutes 
to apply science and technology to production; and formulating policies to raise 
consciousness and commitment to the Revolution, whilst institutionalising 
psychology as an economic management tool.
The thesis is based on new archival and interview sources: ministerial transcripts; 
manuals; annual reports; personnel assessments; management board reports; factory 
inspection reports; economic perspectives documents; technical, economic and 
theoretical journals; speeches; unpublished conference papers, articles and 
presentations. Most of this material has never been published commercially nor 
translated from Spanish. In addition 60 interviews were carried out with nearly 50 of 
Guevara’s closest collaborators and another 12 oral sources gathered from
9
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presentations and seminars. Finally, a significant quantity of contemporaneous 
Cuban newspapers and magazines was collected.
RESEARCH PROCEDURE
Given the lack of material about Guevara’s work as Minister of Industries, the first 
task was to track down those linked to him via industry or engaged in the theoretical 
debate about socialist transition, 1963-1965. Bertram Silverman compiled 17 articles 
from ten authors who participated in what is known as the Great Debate.1 The ten 
include Guevara (deceased), the French Marxist Charles Bettelheim (deceased), and 
the Belgian Marxist Ernst Mandel (deceased). There was no information about the 
status of the other participants, whether alive and/or in Cuba. In 2001, Orlando 
Borrego, his closest collaborator in the sphere of industrial organisation, published a 
long-awaited account of Guevara’s work in Cuba. In February of the same year, a 
conference was held in Havana to mark the 40th anniversary of the establishment of 
the Ministry of Industries (MININD). All but one of the panellists had been a 
member of MININD’s Management Council. Their presentations were published in a 
limited edition pamphlet.3 From the content it was clear what the speakers’ areas of 
specialisation had been. As well as providing the names of key players, these two 
publications provided the first outline of practical policies within MININD, 
particularly concerning technology and metallurgy development projects.
In August 2004, the British government declassified two documents written by the 
British embassy in Havana: the 1967 and 1968 reports on Top Personalities in Cuba. 
This coincided with the mainstream cinema felease of The Motorcycle Diaries about 
Guevara’s travels in Latin America in 1952. In 1967 the British embassy had 
described Guevara as the: ‘bearded Argentinian, with his Irish charm and his 
inevitable military fatigue uniform, [who] has exercised considerable fascination
1 Bertram Silverman, Man and Socialism in Cuba: The Great Debate. New York: Athenaeum, 1971.
2
Orlando Borrego Diaz, El Camino del Fuego, La Habana: Imagen Contemporanea, 2001.
3 Enrique Oltuski, Angel Arcos Bergnes, Angel G6mez Trueba, Tirso Sa6nz. The last exponent was 
Maria del Carmen Ariet Garcia, scientific coordinator of the Centro de Estudios Che Guevara in 
Havana. Published as 40 Aniversario Ministerio de Industrias, La Habana: Editora Politica, 2001.
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over many men and women.’4 The documents list 65 and 58 names respectively, 
summarising their involvement in the revolutionary process and contemporaneous 
position in government. This indicated who had relevant interaction with Guevara, 
for example, as colleagues on the Economic Commission of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party, as a relevant co-minister of Labour, Social Security, 
Education, Domestic or Foreign Trade; or who accompanied Guevara on 
international trade missions and attended overseas events with him. These names 
were added to the ‘interview wish-list’. Again, there was no further information as to 
their current status.
A semi-structured interview technique was adopted for the research. Two standard 
questionnaires were devised; one for Guevara’s colleagues in MININD, the other for 
his co-ministers and participants in the Great Debate.5 The first questions were 
identical, designed to obtain information about the interviewee and enable an 
assessment of their understanding and positions taken at that time: their class 
background, educational status, employment history and political affiliations before 
the Revolution of 1959. Questions for Guevara’s colleagues aimed to establish their 
degree of interaction with him, their understanding of theoretical issues raised in the 
Great Debate and how they were informed about the conceptual and organisational 
structures of the BFS. Questions for those with a higher political or theoretical level 
at that time aimed to establish the severity of ideological differences within the new 
regime, how early these arose, what position they had personally taken, with which 
tendency that placed them and the extent of Guevara’s influence on theoretical and 
organisational structures in Cuba.
Other standard questions required interviewees to reflect back on the Great Debate 
and react to the view that Guevara had left Cuba because of the relative failure of his 
economic policies. All interviewees were asked to specify Guevara’s most important 
contribution to the Revolution. Research into the biography of each interviewee 
generated specific additional questions based on their individual expertise and 
experience. This yielded detailed responses, focussed on issues relevant to the thesis,
4 National Archives, FCO 7/529 211465, Top personalities in Cuba, (1013/21/67), Despatch No. 36, 
British Embassy, Havana, 20 September, 1967.
5 See Appendix 2.
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and helped to avoid hagiographic or nostalgic accounts.6 Any documents or other 
contacts mentioned during these meetings were pursued. Many names were deleted 
from the interview wish-list once it was known that they had died, including several 
during the research field trips.7 In total over 70 oral recordings of interviews, 
seminars and presentations, from nearly 50 of Guevara’s closest collaborators were 
collected. Specialists who had carried out work relevant to the topic were also 
contacted and consulted, including economic historians,8 psychologists,9 political 
scientists10 and economists.11
Unpublished documents and original interviews
The thesis bibliography demonstrates the variety of primary and archive material on 
which this thesis is based. Most significant are:
• From the Ministry of Sugar [MINAZ] in 1967 Borrego published a seven-volume 
compilation of Guevara’s works. Just 200 copies were printed and distributed 
selectively. Much of this material has been published in Cuba and some even 
translated and published abroad. The contents of volume six concerns MININD. 
It was never published and is relatively unknown. It includes: ‘bimonthly 1962 
meeting’ transcripts, 13 meetings of MININD management between January and 
December 1964; MININD Management Council reports, factory visit reports and 
annual reports.
• MININD’s Manual for Factory Administrators, demonstrating administrative 
norms and procedures for cost control, accounting and supervision. It expounds 
political economy concepts and offers guidance to administrators on management 
.techniques.
6 Transcripts of the interviews will be made available pending submission of the thesis and possible 
publication of the material, with the agreement of the interviewees.
Most important among them Angel G6mez Trueba, MININD’s Vice Minister of Industrial 
Construction, Dr Gustavo Torroella, founder of the Psychology Group, Marcelo Fem&ndez Font, 
President of the National Bank and opponent of Guevara’s in the Great Debate and Demetrio Presilla 
head engineer at Nicaro nickel mine.
8 Ernesto Molina Molina.
9 Josd Ldzaro and Juan Carlos Campo from the Centro de Psicologfa y Sociologla.
10 Dario Machado, Jesus Garcia, Maria del Carmen Ariet Garcia, Carlos Tablada P£rez and Fernando 
Martinez Heredia.
11 Alfredo Gonz&lez Gutierrez, Fidel Vascos, Juan Triana Cordovl and Rafael Sorhegni.
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• A guidebook on the ‘model socialist enterprise’, written by Guevara’s team of 
advisors under his instruction. Less than ten copies were printed. This was an 
unfinished project and did not constitute policy guidance.
• Reconstruction and Analysis of Cuban Economic Statistics 1959-1976, compiled 
in 1976 to facilitate Cuba’s entry into the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance and declassified in 1989.
• Contemporary magazines and journals consulted and/or collected, including: 
Nuestra Industria, Cuba Socialista, Bohemia, Granma, and Juventud Rebelde.
Strengths and weaknesses of resources
First hand accounts
Any study of an individual must avoid hagiography. Reliance on personnel accounts
increases the danger, particularly if the subjects are admirers of the individual, as in
this case they invariably are. This does not mean that interviewees have not criticised
Guevara, the thesis narrative shows that they have. Guevara’s closest collaborators
were profoundly affected by his methodological approach to problems, which
emphasised honesty in assessment, self-criticism, and the constant struggle for self-
improvement. Annual reports for production units in MININD had a section for
criticisms of the minister, not just the ministry. This encouraged employees to think
critically about their leader, as well as to accept criticism themselves. Those who
were ministerial equals and/or opponents of Guevara in the Great Debate also
criticised him, not least to validate their contemporaneous disputes. Interestingly, the
one published opponent still alive in Cuba stood by disagreements with Guevara over
the political economy of socialism, despite the collapse of the Soviet model which he 
10defended. Indeed, determined to undermine the commercialised and commodified 
image of the revolutionary idol, interviewees had a vested interest in portraying the 
‘real’ Guevara. Hence they revealed a more complex and difficult man; demanding 
and unrelenting, sometimes cutting and never frivolous.
Interviewees from MININD were clearly moulded by their proximity to Guevara and 
adopted many of his values.13 Their replies about Guevara reflect their high esteem
12 Joaquin Infante.
13 This is not to claim that all those around him did. Many will have left his orbit, at that time and 
during the following years.
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for him. Nostalgia may have romanticised the experience of working with Guevara, 
whose posthumous glory has rubbed off on them. However, none of them attached 
traditionally nostalgic values to the experience, such as fun, happiness or being made 
to feel special. The questions devised were designed precisely to avoid the analysis 
being skewed by nostalgia and instead assess Guevara’s success in communicating 
his ideas on socialist transition to colleagues with an inferior educational and 
political level. Standard questions revealed a remarkable degree of corroboration 
between the interviewees concerning projects, structures, events and interpretations. 
Emphasising Guevara’s intellectual superiority, many interviewees admitted they had 
lacked a profound understanding of his theories. However, they appreciated the 
practical policies and adopted certain stylised points of theory. This response reveals 
the intellectual isolation in which Guevara operated.
Another issue raised by the use of interview material is in the style of responses 
given, which reflect the personality of the interviewees as much as insights. For 
example, Borrego adopted a more formal approach to his responses, without 
distinguishing between his own important contribution and official policies. Other 
interviewees spoke as protagonists, highlighting their personal roles. In addition, the 
rich detail provided by interviewees may have skewed the research in detailing the 
areas in which they were involved. Other aspects of the history of MININD may be 
underdeveloped because the thesis could only work with the material available. 
History is written by victors. In this case they are those who are alive in Cuba and 
were interviewed for the thesis.
This thesis focuses on the intellectual product of Guevara’s involvement with the 
Cuban Revolution: the BFS and his challenge to Soviet orthodoxy. Therefore, 
romanticised rhetoric about Guevara as exemplary leader does not serve the research, 
whereas practical information concerning how study groups were organised, for 
example, or what instructions Guevara gave in setting up the Institute of Mineral 
Resources have been fully exploited. Ultimately the search for corroboration of 
interviews lies in the documentation from MININD.
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Unpublished material
Volume six of Borrego’s compilation, the MININD material, is raw and dense, 
hundreds of pages of meeting transcripts and reports without introduction, 
explanation or references. To exploit fully this material it is essential to have a 
comprehensive knowledge of the changing historical circumstances, month by 
month. Persons, institutions, projects and events are mentioned which necessitate 
constant cross checking and further enquiries. The material lacks the historical 
hindsight necessary to know whether the projects discussed were implemented. The 
Manual for Factory Administrators introduces similar problems. The MININD 
transcripts reveal the motivation for writing the manual, in discussions about 
administrative and conceptual deficiencies. However, there is nothing to indicate the 
impact of its introduction. Therefore, it was necessary to carry out further interviews, 
review memoirs and annual reports, using the materials in concert to determine how 
Guevara’s theoretical analysis was institutionalised in MININD and with what 
results.14
Having originally intended to produce a comparative macroeconomic assessment of 
Guevara’s BFS and the economic management systems operating in other ministries, 
it quickly became obvious that this would not be feasible given the existence of too 
many variables to allow comparison between different institutions and because the 
time scale was too short for useful assessment. Guevara implemented the BFS as 
minister of industries for just over four years, during which time Cuba was 
blockaded, invaded and embroiled in nuclear confrontation. The system itself was 
new, original and evolving. For these reasons the statistical economic analysis 
consulted is of limited independent value. The problem of the format, compatibility 
and reliability of macroeconomic statistics for Cuba is discussed in detail in the 
following historiography chapter.
Dividing the field research into two periods was extremely useful. It meant that 
material could be assessed after the first trip to uncover the gaps in knowledge before 
returning to the field to pursue relevant information. This process strengthened the 
technique of searching for corroboration between and within documentation and 
interviews.
14 See the example of specific interview questions in Appendix 2.
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This thesis rides on a wave of interest in Guevara. Much of the new literature also 
challenges the stylised image of the revolutionary idol. However, none of it contains 
a serious analysis of his contribution to socialist political economy in dynamic 
interrelation with his practical work in charge of Cuban industry. Where Guevara’s 
own material is published, it lacks the interpretation and historical contextualisation 
which this thesis brings to the field. It also lacks information about how his ideas 
were applied in practice in the development of the BFS.
Whilst this thesis provides an analysis of the dynamic between Guevara’s theory and 
practice, there are nonetheless several important and related themes which are 
beyond its scope. The initial intention was to examine the application of Guevara’s 
economic ideas in Cuba in two periods of crisis: the early 1960s, under Guevara’s 
direction; and the period known as Rectification from the mid-1980s, when his 
approach was revisited as Cuba pulled away from the Soviet model. During the first 
research field trip, however, it became clear that the quality and abundance of 
materials uncovered relating to the first period would make it unfeasible to extend 
the analysis to the second period. An examination of how policies introduced during 
Rectification link to Guevara’s theory of socialist transition remains an area of 
potential future research. Similarly there is the need for an investigation into the 
proximity or otherwise of Fidel Castro and Guevara’s theories of socialism. Future 
research could also extend to examine how Guevara’s analysis of the operation of the 
law of value in the period of socialist transition influenced his view of international 
relations; particularly within the socialist bloc countries and between the bloc and the 
underdeveloped countries.
In addition, although the thesis analyses Guevara’s emphasis on socialist 
consciousness it does not discuss a Marxist theory of consciousness. Guevara’s 
understanding of consciousness is clearly defined as social conscience and 
commitment to the aims and objectives of the Revolution. He was interested in how a 
change in the mind was manifested in changing socio-economic and political 
behaviour. This thesis is not concerned with issue of ideology, the formation of ideas 
or the study of reflexive processes as such. It illustrates how the tools of psychology 
were integrated as an economic management tool, but does not extend to the 
psychology of Guevara’s approach. Consciousness and psychology are treated as 
aspects of his analysis of the law of value and of his BFS.
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Since 2004, Orlando Borrego has been invited to Venezuela several times to lecture 
on the BFS. He addressed a special session of the National Assembly dedicated to 
Guevara’s economic ideas on socialist transition. Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chavez Frias has declared the importance of Guevara’s contribution to this field. 
This apparent vindication of Guevara’s approach to socialist economic development, 
along with the publication of his works and the new wave of auto-biographies by his 
contemporaries, serves to increase the general interest in a re-examination of his 
contribution, both to the Cuban Revolution and to the political economy of socialism. 
This thesis will offer an original and specialised contribution to a field of study that 
is assuming new and significant status.
THESIS STRUCTURE
The structure of the thesis reflects the dynamic interaction between theory and 
practice which characterised Guevara’s own work. Part One continues with a review 
of existing literature. Chapter 2 highlights the polemical nature of Cuba studies and 
Chapter 3 focuses on the literature on Guevara. Both sketch out the lines of debate 
and illustrate the originality of this work and its contribution.
Part Two of the thesis explains how the BFS evolved, exploring the practical 
experiences which contributed to its formulation, as well as the theoretical 
conceptions. Chapter 4 presents a thematic summary of Guevara’s responsibilities 
with the Revolution from 1 January 1959 until the foundation of the MININD in 
February 1961, exploring the impact and consequences of his experiences: overseas 
trade missions, the agrarian reform laws, nationalisations of industry, his work as 
President of the National Bank and as head of the Department of Industrialisation. It 
underlines his key role in the military and political consolidation of the Revolution 
and economic transformation. Chapter 5 examines Guevara’s written contribution to 
the Great Debate on socialist transition which took place in Cuba 1963-1965. It 
establishes the conceptual framework necessary to appreciate his practical policy 
formulations. It demonstrates that Guevara embraced debate as a tool in the process 
of searching for dynamic solutions to practical problems, avoiding formulaic 
prescriptions. This part serves as a bridge to the following substantive part on the 
economic history of MININD.
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Part Three, the core of the thesis, examines Guevara’s solutions to the problem cited 
at the beginning of this introduction: transition to socialism in conditions of 
underdevelopment with limited recourse to capitalist mechanisms. It examines the 
practical policies, projects and structures which he developed in MININD, 1961- 
1965. Although all these policies were concurrent, the part is divided into an 
introduction and five chapters in order to focus the investigation and organise the 
narrative. The chapters are: 6) education, training and salaries; 7) administrative 
control, supervision and investment; 8) collectivising production and workers’ 
participation; 9) science and technology; and 10) consciousness and psychology. 
Each section will illustrate the practical problems which those specific policies were 
designed to overcome, the obstacles encountered in their application and demonstrate 
how they linked to Guevara’s analysis of the operation of the law of value and his 
conceptions about socialist transition.
Part Four provides conclusions and assessments, both Guevara’s and those of the 
thesis. Chapter 11 returns to Guevara’s theory, examining his critique of the Soviet 
Manual o f Political Economy, written after his departure from Cuba in 1965. 
Following six years of work in the service of the Cuban government, this critique 
provides evidence of how his theoretical ideas had developed through the practical 
experience of implementing the BFS and since his earlier theoretical articles as part 
of the Great Debate. Chapter 12 presents the assessment and conclusion of the thesis, 
summarising Guevara’s contribution to both socialist political economy and 
economic management in Cuba 1959-1965. It thematically summarises the structures 
and policies which Guevara introduced as part of this BFS.
Note on footnotes:
Full information on interviews is cited the first time of mention in each chapter. Subsequent citations 
are recorded as ‘Interview’ without the date. Where two or more interviews have taken place with the 
same person in different years, the year is stated. Where two or more interviews have taken place in 
the same year, the full date is used.
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PART ONE
Historiography and literature
Chapter 2: Cuba: historiography
CHAPTER 2
Cuba: historiography -  the politics of 
Cuban Studies
Since 1959 writing on Cuba has been shaped by the Revolution. Revolutions present 
a challenge, not just to the institutions which they rise up to tear down, but also to 
theoretical and philosophical interpretations of the world, human society and 
development. Academics and commentators are probed by the bloody hand of 
revolution as they sit at their desks, pens poised to interpret, analyse, narrate and 
predict. In this sense, as English historian EH Carr explained, there can be no 
objectivity in history: ‘history is movement; and movement implies comparison.’1 
Movement is understood as the dialectical relationship between human activity and 
objective context; cause and effect; conflict and resolution. Carr cited Meinecke’s 
assertion that: ‘The search for causalities in history is impossible without references 
to values.’ The search for causalities involves a subjective interpretation of those 
conflicts. Scholars interpret events through spectacles tainted by their own interests 
and principles, usually rooted in their own material realities. The impact of political 
and ideological differences is such that even methodological procedure is disputed. 
Against Carr’s assertion of a need for a relativistic and sociological approach to 
history, GR Elton argued that historical work should focus on documentary record 
and fact with a backbone narrative of political events. The extent to which ‘facts’ 
speak for themselves, the context in which the facts take place, or why some facts 
may be more significant than others also reflect the motives of the historian who has 
presented them. As Cuban-American historian Nelson Valdes stated: ‘Empiricism
1 Edward Hallet Carr, What is History?, London: Penguin, 1970,129.
2 Meinecke, quoted by Carr, History?, 107.
3 See Richard J Evans, In Defence o f History, London: Granta Publications, 1997, for a summary of 
these views.
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does not free us from philosophical assumptions or from ideological preferences; it 
merely hides them from the reader and perhaps even from the writer.’4
The post-1959 literature on Cuba has been particularly subject to interpretative bias 
for several reasons: the historical proximity of the Revolution, the context of a 
broader ideological confrontation between capitalist and socialist world systems and 
because the geographical closeness of Cuba to the United States brings those 
conflicting ideologies together on a geographical battlefield. The stakes remain high. 
There are few overviews of the historiography of Cuba. Fewer still which include an 
explanatory statement of the values motivating the authors. This chapter of the thesis 
sets out to unravel and expose the political tendencies prevailing in post-1959 Cuban 
studies. Therefore, rather than providing a general historiography of Cuban history 
writing, it focuses on the dichotomy between the Cubanology and Cubanist schools 
by examining their political motives and institutional frameworks.
In his critical assessment of Cuban studies Valdes complained that:
‘Scholars dealing with the Revolution, or those reviewing their work, 
have shared a strong aversion to considering or even discussing the 
premises, concepts, logic, framework, or theoretical perspectives their 
works had. This is not surprising. The literature on Cuba has been 
permeated by so much political polemic that scholars have preferred to 
remain silent about the method they have utilized or the paradigm 
guiding their investigation and analytical logic... Thus, theoretical 
paradigm and political positions have been defined as identical.’5
Valdes described a paradigm as a single generally accepted view about a phenomena 
and the correct procedure for researching it. Once a paradigm is accepted, he added, 
it is assumed to be scientific and objective. Those who do not accept the paradigm
4 Nelson P Valdds, ‘Revolution and Paradigms: A Critical Assessment of Cuban Studies’, in Andrew 
Zimbalist (ed) Cuban Political Economy: Controversies in Cubanology, London: Westview Press, 
1988,185.
5 Valdes, Paradigms, 184-185.
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are marginalised from the community of scholars, their ‘dissident’ work seen as 
naive or even ideological, by the mainstream scholars.6 This is arguably the case in 
Cuba studies where the English language paradigm has been set the Cubanologist 
school. Valdes explains how subtle forms of political censorship can be applied to 
‘dissident’ views, compounding the obstacles to clear-headed and politically 
unbiased study of the Revolution. Such censorship can be imposed by withdrawal of 
state sanction; ensuring that dissenting opinion cannot get published and divulged 
and that ‘dissident’ scholars cannot find academic employment. In Cuba studies 
there has been little mention or recognition of these issues.7 Operational problems for 
foreign researchers, such as access to Cuban archives and society, have further 
reduced the possibility of interpretations based on hard evidence to challenge the 
predominate paradigm.8
The main controversies in interpreting the Cuban Revolution can be summarised as 
follows: 1) historical discontinuity versus historical continuity of the Revolution of 
1959: 2) the Revolution betrayed by the move towards socialism versus socialism as 
the fulfilment of Cuba’s struggle for independence, with particular reference to 
national hero Jose Marti; 3) the economic prosperity of pre-revolutionary Cuba and 
progressive role of the US versus the economic stagnation and neo-colonial 
dependency prior to 1959; 4) the weakness of Cuban economic growth since the 
1959 versus development and equity resulting from the Revolution; 5) the personal 
domination of Fidel Castro and the absence of civil society in Cuba versus the mass 
participatory character of society and the regime; 6) Cuba's subordination to, and 
economic dependency on, the Soviet Union versus the autonomy of Cuba’s domestic 
and foreign policy.
6 Valdes, Paradigms, 188.
7 This is reflected by the range of sources cited in this chapter of the thesis.
8 Valdds, Paradigms, 188.
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CUBAN HISTORIANS
Partisan scholarship has a long tradition in Cuba. Robert Freeman Smith states that: 
‘Cuban historical scholarship matured during the century of conflict concerning the 
status of Cuba, and the works of Cuban historians reflected the various aspects of the 
conflict... Reform, autonomy, independence, annexation to the United States, and 
the status quo of Spanish rule were advocated by various men as being the true 
direction of Cuban historical development.’9 The threat of fundamental structural 
transformation existed throughout the cien ahos de lucha [one hundred years 
of struggle] for independence before 1959. Scholars and other intellectuals played a 
vital role in defining the theoretical and moral grounds of social and political 
debates.
At the beginning of the 20th century, Cuba’s ‘liberal’ historians set the dominant 
paradigm, celebrating ‘independence’ from Spanish and admiration of the United 
States, which was seen as a liberating and modernising force.10 However, as US 
imperialist interests increasingly asserted themselves, via military interventions, 
political machinations and economic penetration, a more critical current of Cuban 
scholars and revolutionary intellectuals emerged.
Revisionism became a powerful intellectual force in the 1920s. With recourse to the 
anti-racism and anti-imperialism of Jose Marti, historians reinterpreting the Cuban 
struggle for independence and relations with the US reflected the general political 
turmoil and unrest of society at large. They forged the concept of cubanidad, a sense 
of national identification transcending differences in heritage, race, religion or class. 
Louis A Perez explained the significance of this new trend: ‘In repudiating the 
organic foundations of the state, specifically the constitution of 1901 and the 
appended Platt Amendment, revisionist writers withheld from the republic the
9 Robert Freeman Smith, ‘Twentieth Century Cuban Historiography’, The Hispanic American 
Historical Review, Vol. 44: 1 (1964), 45.
10 Smith, Historiography, 46.
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historiographical corroboration necessary to underwrite its claim to legitimacy.’11 
They attacked the heroes of liberal historiography, those Cuban leaders who had 
signed the Platt Amendment, portraying them as national traitors. Citing the work of 
a Cuban Marxist Julio Cesar Gandarilla, Contra el Yanqui in 1913, as the earliest
published attack on the US, Smith claims that revisionism provided the theoretical
12vehicle via which a: ‘few historians became converts to communism’
The Revolution of 1959 ruptured Cuban social, economic and political institutions as 
it radicalised and consolidated to the left, being declared socialist in 1961. Cuban 
society as a whole became increasingly polarised. Many historians joined the exodus 
following the Revolution, settling in the US. For others the adoption of socialism was 
the vindication of their interpretation of history; the culmination of cien ahos de 
lucha. Revisionist historians evolved into revolutionary historians, emphasising 
continuity in the struggle against imperialism and for social and economic justice to 
legitimise, authenticate and indigenise the historicity of the adoption of socialism and 
the Revolution’s leaders.13 The assertion of continuity was not concocted after the 
Revolution in 1959, but had featured throughout the 1950s struggle against Batista. 
Political groups competed to claim their legacy in the struggle for independence. 
They nominated themselves as Martianos, faithful to Jose Marti’s vision of an 
independent, socially just and economically independent republic.14
Since 1959, the regime’s emphasis on full social inclusion and participation has 
encouraged studies on minorities and oppressed groups in Cuban history; women, 
black people, workers and communists. Perez asserts that: ‘Throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s, new methodological approaches, including oral history, ethnology, and 
folklore studies, developed and enjoyed extensive application. Greater emphasis
11 Louis A P6rez Jr, ‘In the Service of the Revolution: Two Decades of Cuban Historiography 1959- 
1979’, Hispanic American Historical Review. Vol. 60: 1 (1980), 81.
12 Smith, Historiography, 48, fii 19.
13 P6rez, Service, 82.
14 P6rez, cites Marx who observed back in The Eighteenth Brumaire o f Louis Bonaparte in 1852 that 
‘just when [men] seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things in creating something that 
has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the 
spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries, and costumes in order to 
present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language.’ 
P6rez, Service, 80.
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devolved upon the history of the inarticulate.’15 However, not all those previously 
consigned to the dustbin of history have been rescued by revolutionary historians. 
For example, little has been recorded about the contribution of anarchists and 
anarcho-syndicalists who played a decisive role in the radical workers movement in 
the first two decades of the 20th century, before the formation of the Cuban 
Communist Party in 1925. While the post-1959 regime can be depicted as 
representing the interests of these other minority and oppressed groups [los humildes] 
it is arguably the negation of the anarchists struggle for a stateless society.16
As a mechanism to defend the paradigms established outside the island, Cuban 
academics are often viewed from abroad as the personification of the state; a non­
person. Cuban historian Rafael Hernandez complains that: ‘According to this view, 
Cuban intellectuals lack their own perspectives and capacity for reflective thought. 
Either they are fainthearted or they are mere bureaucrats repeating official
1 7discourse.’ He does not deny that intellectuals have been obstructed by 
bureaucracy, censorship or dogmatism in Cuba, but argues that applying a degree of 
‘self-censorship’ is no less a contrived approach then joining the exile community in 
the US in order to gain access to bourgeois academic circles, the international 
marketplace and benefiting from finances and status as an exile. Success there also 
depends on accepting and perpetuating the dominant paradigm. As an example of 
this view, Perez states that since the Revolution, Cuban historiography: ‘has tended
1 ftto reflect faithfully the internal development and the prevailing needs of the state.’ 
Such a statement is loaded with assumptions, for example, about what constitutes the 
Cuban state. Peter Johnson, while acknowledging that: ‘Cuban publishing is far more 
diverse than conventional wisdom would have it’, also concludes that the publishing 
industry has an ‘undivided commitment to serving state objectives.’19 For 
commentators outside Cuba, explained Hernandez:
15 P6rez, Service, 87.
16 Actually many anarcho-syndicalists joined the Cuban Communist Party after its foundation in 1925.
17 Rafael Hernandez, ‘Looking at Cuba: Notes towards a discussion’, Boundary 2, (2002), 125-6.
18 P6rez, Service, 89.
19 Peter T Johnson, ‘Cuban Academic Publishing and Self-Perceptions’ in Cuban Studies 18, Centre 
for Latin American Studies, Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1988.
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‘Cuban society is dormant, which is to say that it hardly exists. They 
make it appear as if Cuban reality were made up of “the government”,
“the Party”, and “the elite” on one side, and a passive multitude on the 
other... The tendency to underestimate Cubans’ level of political culture 
is reflected in the vision predominant outside... In other countries, 
reference to civil society tends to mean the middle class, the intellectuals, 
the entrepreneurial elite, certain influential social movements and 
organizations, et cetera. Some of those conceptions are applied to 
evaluating the current situation in Cuba.’20
This analytical and interpretive dilemma stems from the formulation of paradigms 
based on set assumptions. When scholars who accept the political-economic model 
of bourgeois democracy assess Cuba they tend to search for what they recognise. 
They will find most elements of this model missing, because Cuban society is 
developing according to different precepts, and conclude that Cuba is deficient or in 
some ways wrong. To understand and evaluate Cuba since 1959, scholars should 
extricate themselves from the constraints of opposing social constructs. Hernandez 
describes as Eurocentric: ‘this vision of intellectuals’ exclusive role as culture’s 
“critical conscience” in a confrontation with power, equidistant from all political 
positions, a vestal virgin of some sterilized objectivity -  as opposed to the 
intellectuals (as in our Latin American case) who act in history with their criticism 
and their polemics, contributing to concrete social change and taking sides in favor 
of social justice and independence.’21 Intellectuals, particularly historians have 
always contributed to real social and political movements in Cuba. This tradition 
continues today despite pressure from the ‘state’ for ideological cohesion and serious 
considerations of national security.22
20 Hernandez, Looking, 128-129.
21 Hemdndez, Looking, 130-1, fii 4.
22 British Cubanist Antoni Kapcia has argued that dissent and debate have been permitted and at times 
encouraged in Cuba since 1959, except when it is politically or financially linked to US agencies and 
becomes an issue of national security. Talk by Kapcia. Institute of Latin American Studies, London. 
November 2002.
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HISTORIANS OUTSIDE CUBA
Prior to 1959, US historians were far more interested in Cuba-US political-economic 
relations than in Cuban society and development, focussing on the causes for 
American involvement and intervention. Smith states that: ‘This “historiographical 
imperialism” of American historians produced the term Spanish-American war, and 
helped to inculcate in many Americans a paternalistic view of Cuba.’23 Indeed, not 
until 1964 did the first US historian acknowledge that two decades earlier Cubans 
had renamed it the Guerra Hispano-Cubanamericana [Cuban-Spanish-American 
War].24
The Revolution of 1959 destroyed Cuban institutions modelled on and integrally 
linked to US institutions, jolting US scholars into a critical examination of the 
impetus for change and its future trajectory. Understanding Cuba became vital in the 
context of the Cold War, with socialism arriving on the doorstep of the US. Scholars 
began a probing examination of Cuban society.
DISSIDENTS
In 1964, Smith wrote that the quantity and quality of Cuban history produced had 
declined since the Revolution and that no ‘exile school’ had emerged. By 1978, 
however, Anthony Maingot described the post-1959 US literature as ‘massive’.26 
‘Dissident’ intellectuals who settled into long-term exile carved out a special status 
and niche in anti-communist US institutions. In the academic arena, to qualify as a 
‘dissident’ a Cuban had to have abandoned a position as an official or intellectual 
within the revolutionary regime, leaving the country without official sanction.
23 Smith, Historiography, 67.
24 The Cuban Society of Historical and International Studies voted to institutionalise this term in 1943. 
The title was approved by the Cuban Congress in 1946, demonstrating the predominance of the 
revisionist paradigm by then.
25 Smith, Historiography, 51.
26 Anthony P Maingot, ‘A Question of Methodology: Review Essay on Recent Literature on Cuba’, 
Latin American Research Review, Vol 13: 1 (1978), 227.
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Dissidents came to enjoy a special status in the academic community, regardless of 
their previous ideological persuasion or positions: followers of the Soviet hard-line, 
experts in propaganda and advocates of censorship, Maoists, informers, intelligence 
agents, or professors who incorporated the dogmas of Socialist bloc manuals into 
their academic careers. All if they renounced political commitment to the regime and 
signed up to undermine the moral or economic viability of the Revolution, as 
Hernandez pointed out: ‘Overnight, they become independent intellectuals with the
77keys to credibility in their pockets’.
The moral and intellectual infallibility awarded to dissidents is evident in Sergio 
Roca’s work on the Cuban planning system. Roca based his analysis on anonymous 
interviews with Cuban exiles resident in the US, all of whom previously held 
managerial, technical and other professional positions with the Revolution. Roca 
admits that: ‘the subjects may have concentrated their comments on the short 
comings of Cuba’s economic organisation’, but justifies his reliance on these 
interviewees simply by denying that: ‘they uniformly displayed a negative attitude
7 8toward the socialist system.’
Collating and publishing dissident opinion can serve some valuable function in its 
own right. However, claiming to ‘objectively’ assess an operational economic system 
on the basis of subjective testimony, distorted by vested interests, implies numerous 
methodological weaknesses and undermines the value of conclusions reached. 
Granted anonymity, the interviewees are unaccountable for their comments. 
Economic History Andrew Zimbalist claims that such methodological leniency
70would hardly be tolerated in another field of social science. However, the result of 
the political antagonism between the US and Cuba and the intellectual’s role in 
legitimising the positions of each, is that scholars have passed off work with sloppy 
methodology, such as Roca's, with little criticism from within their own school.
27 Hernandez, Looking, 125.
28 Sergio Roca, ‘State enterprises in Cuba under the New System of Planning and Management’, in 
Mesa-Lago (ed) Cuba Studies 16, Pittsburg: University ofPittsbury Press, 1986, 156..
29 Andrew Zimbalist, ‘Interpreting Cuban Planning: Between a Rock and a Hard Place’ in Zimbalist 
(ed), Controversies, 74.
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CUBANOLOGISTS
Dissident intellectuals joined forces with mainstream bourgeois historians and social 
scientists to form a Cubanology school. The label has political connotations. Cuban 
historian Jose Luis Rodriguez described this group as playing: ‘a central role in the 
studies of Cuba in the context of the ideological and political battle mounted against 
the Revolution.’30 This group defines the predominant paradigm for English 
language texts on Cuban history and contemporary society. Key tenets of this school 
are: the Revolution of 1959 presents a rupture in Cuban history, partly explained by 
mistakes made by the US administration; Fidel Castro is synonymous with the 
Revolution personally dominating developments on the island; civil society in Cuba 
is repressed, there is no democracy; Cuba’s economic growth since 1959 has been 
negligible; and pre-1959 dependency on the US was substituted by dependency on 
the USSR. To understand both the content and purpose of the Cubanology paradigm, 
it is necessary to assess these scholars own historicity through an examination of how 
their school developed from its base in the US.
Between 1959 and 1961 no institutional or academic studies of Cuba were
undertaken in the US. The works which were published were mainly journalistic or
narrative commentaries and polemics from radicals within the New Left, peripheral 
^ 1
to the mainstream. The US government was confident that the new regime would 
soon be overthrown. However, after the Bay of Pigs debacle in April 1961 it was 
apparent that the Revolution had obtained a degree of permanency. It was a more 
complex enemy which demanded to be studied and understood in order to be 
defeated. That year the Pentagon commissioned the Rand Corporation to carry out 
two investigations: US Business Interests in Cuba and the Rise o f Castro and The 
Course o f US Private Investments in Latin America since the Rise o f Castro. 
Meanwhile, similar studies were organised by the Special Operations Research 
Office of the American University and published as: Case Studies in Insurgency and
30 Luis Jose Rodriguez, ‘The Antecedents and Theoretical Characteristics of Cubanology’ in Zimbalist 
(ed), Controversies, 27.
31 Work by Leo Huberman, Paul Sweezy, Paul Baran, Robin Blackburn, for example.
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Revolutionary Warfare: Cuba 1953-1959. Rodriguez said: ‘In effect, midway 
through the 1960s, a Center for Cuban Studies at the CIA was formed.’32
In 1964 the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Pittsburgh was 
founded under the National Defense Education Act, financed by the Ford Foundation 
and the US government, among other sponsors. The Centre played a dominant role in 
the study of Cuba outside the island. According to Rodriguez, its objectives were two 
fold: compile information to help plan future actions against the Revolution; and 
develop an analytical paradigm to depict the Revolution in a negative way for a 
global audience. All positive achievements were denied, official Cuban sources of 
information derided and misinformation disseminated about life in Cuba. In April 
1970, the US Library of Congress organised the International Conference on Cuban 
Acquisitions and Bibliography. It was decisive in consolidating the paradigm of 
Cuba studies and committed to extending the coverage and methodology of Cuba 
studies. The school was self-denominated ‘Cubanologists’ from this period and 
evolved more sophisticated and a supposedly ‘impartial’ approach to presenting the 
study of socialism in Cuba. Following the conference, the Center for Latin American 
Studies at the University of Pittsburgh became the co-ordinator and leading publicist 
of US academic studies of Cuba. The Center was directed by Cole Blasier, until 
Cuban exile Carmelo Mesa-Lago took over in 1974.
In 1969 the Institute of Cuban Studies (IEC) was established at the University of 
Miami for Cuban exiles scholars, claiming to promote: ‘a dialogue among Cuban 
intellectuals of different points of view, on the analysis and the search for possible 
solutions to the fundamental problems of the Island and its Diaspora.’34 Works were 
discussed within the group before publication, ensuring cohesion of the paradigm.
32 Rodriguez, Cubanology, 23.
33 Rodriguez, Cubanology, 23-24.
34 From IEC website: www.ieccubanos.org. The IEC’s slogan is: ‘Cuba unites us on foreign soil.’ It 
included key Cubanologists such as Mesa-Lago, Jorge Dominguez, Roca, P6rez-L6pez, Aguilar and 
P6rez Stable. In the late 1980s, the IEC allowed non-Cuban members. Today its website has links to 
counter-revolutionary organisations within Cuba.
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During the Carter administration relations with Cuba thawed slightly. Reflecting this, 
in 1976 the Informe Linowitz II study recommended normalising relations with Cuba, 
concluding that: ‘the North American policy of isolation with respect to Cuba did not 
promote the interests of the United States in any significant manner, and that these 
would be better served if the participation of Cuba in the constructive pattern of 
international relations were facilitated.’35 Carter’s approach was to undermine Cuban 
socialism through engagement with US capitalism. Cubanologist Jorge Dominguez 
participated in drafting this and subsequent reports.
The Reagan presidency in 1980 coincided with a juncture of revolutionary upheaval 
in Central America and the Caribbean, so that counterinsurgency theories resurfaced. 
Again Cubanologists became particularly influential in the formulation of US policy 
towards Cuba. The Reagan administration backed a new Institute for Cuban and 
Cuban-American Studies (ICCAS) at the University of Miami, directed by 
Cubanologist Jaime Suchlicki.36 This ‘conservative’ Institute had close ties to the 
CLA-financed Radio Marti programme, which broadcasts over Cuba promoting 
counterrevolution.
Meanwhile, the Center for International Policy’s [CIP] Cuba Program was set up and 
directed by Wayne S Smith, from the Latin American Studies department of John’s 
Hopkins Univeristy. A former US diplomat in Cuba in 1959 and again during the 
Carter years, Smith left Havana in 1982 in protest at the Reagan administration’s 
belligerent foreign policy. CIPs aim was also the normalisation of relations between 
the US and Cuba.37 Lifting the blockade and integrating Cuba into the ‘free’ market 
was the best way to undermine the socialist Revolution and restore capitalism. CEP 
represented the ‘liberal’ trend in Cubanology.
35 Informes Linowitz Documentos, cited by Rodriguez, Cubanology, 28.
36 The Institute is currently housed in Casa Bacardi, linked to the Cuban Transition Project which, 
according to the Institute’s website is: ‘an important project to study and make recommendations for 
the reconstruction of Cuba once the post-Castro transition begins in earnest. The project started in 
January 2002 and is funded by a grant from the US Agency for International Development.’ 
http://www6.miami.edu/communications/mediarelations/special/cuba/historicall.html.
37 http://ciponline.org/aboutus.htm.
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Cubanology became more diverse, with institutional challenges to the original 
paradigm. In 1988 Nelson Valdes noted:
‘Thus, the search for “impartiality” represented by Pittsburgh was 
challenged by a liberal program at John’s Hopkins and a conservative 
one at the University of Miami... It remains to be seen, nonetheless,
. which of the three programs determines the agenda of Cuban studies in 
the future. If money is to be the key determinant, then the University of 
Miami should be in command. It should be noted that the program 
directed by Mesa-Lago [in Pittsburgh] publishes the highly regarded 
Cuba Studies. John Hopkin's University produces occasional papers. The 
University of Miami seems to be much more active, sponsoring 
conferences, symposia, and a monograph series.’
This demonstrates that the Cubanology paradigm is broad enough to incorporate 
different trends within the same political standpoint. In 1982, Edward Gonzalez, on 
the extreme right of Cubanology, a researcher at the Rand Corporation and professor 
at the University of California Los Angeles, wrote in a study for the State 
Department and the US Armed Forces, that:
‘Although the Castro regime continues to be viable, there are now new 
opportunities for the United States to exploit Cuba’s interests and 
weaknesses, and as such, to moderate the behavior of Cuba. Recent 
international and internal changes have heightened Cuba’s vulnerability 
and provide the United States with more possibilities for its 
exploitation... future transmissions of Radio Marti may create an 
instrument for the exploitation of political vulnerabilities and for putting 
the regime on the defensive.’39
38 Valdes, Paradigms, 187.
39 Cited by Rodriguez, Cubanology, 29.
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A key sponsor of the renewed belligerence of Cubanology in the 1980s was the 
extreme right-wing Cuban American National Foundation (CANF),40 whose Bureau 
for Conferences includes Cubanologists Hugh Thomas, Irving Horowitz, Juan Clark, 
Luis E Aguilar, Sergio Dias-Briguets and Carlos Rippoll. ‘Academic’ events 
anticipating ‘transition’ in Cuba, were given legitimacy by the participation of 
Cubanologists. They have been held frequently up to this day.
It is clear that Cubanologists are not homogeneous. Even the use of language 
delineates clear differences among them. For example, Jorge Dominguez describes 
Cuba as a ‘consultative oligarchy’, while Edward Gonzalez refers to ‘Castro's 
dictatorship’. It is a question of degrees. Essentially, as Rodriguez explains, the 
political goal remains: ‘to prove the inviability of socialism as a political system for 
Cuba and to portray this system as totalitarian or, at least, undemocratic’. He adds 
that: ‘all Cubanologist work stems from the bourgeois concept of democracy. 
Cubanologists limit themselves to emphasizing the absence of the formal features of 
democracy, those present in some capitalist societies.’41
Cubanologists frequently assert that both internal and foreign policy of Cuba is 
determined according to Fidel Castro's charisma, ego or psychological state. Mesa- 
Lago, for example, states that: ‘Castro's record shows that, whenever there has been a 
choice between his country’s independence and his own power, he has sacrificed the 
first for his own gains.’42 Edward Gonzalez states that: ‘Castro's imperial ambitions 
are at the heart of Cuba's interventionist imperative.’43 Valdes points out that this 
view assumes:
40 CANF’s predecessor was the Cuban Representatives in Exile (CRE), set up by Pepin Bosch, head of 
the Bacardi-family Corporation, with members of the CIA, in Miami 1964. CRE was forced to 
disband in the late 1970s after evidence about its involvement in acts of terrorism against Cuba. 
CANF has since been linked to similar activities as well as serving as a conduit for funds from the 
CIA to mercenaries in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Angola. See Hernando Ospina Calvo, Bacardi: The 
Hidden War, trans Stephen Wilkinson & Alasdair Holden, London: Pluto Press, 2002. In 2000 CANF 
was involved in holding Cuban child Elian Gonzalez in Miami before he was seized by the INS and 
returned to his father in Cuba.
41 Rpdrfguez, Cubanology, 30.
42 Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970s: Pragmatism and Institutionalization, New Mexico: 
Albuquerque, 1974, 136.
43 Cited by Valdes, Paradigms, 195.
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‘...that Cuba’s foreign policy is guided by the logic of personalism, but 
the foreign policies of superpowers are not... How these authors know 
what the perceptions of the Cuban authorities are we are not told. How 
these authors know whether those perceptions are erroneous or correct is 
never discussed... Instead of national security, personal power is the key 
to foreign policy... To imagine the subjective and unconscious influence 
that hidden drives may have on nationalism apparently is much more 
interesting than studying the concrete impact that US foreign policy has 
exerted over this small island. This is the poverty of subjectivism.’44
The works of Cubanologists such as Mesa-Lago and Gonzalez are widely known. 
Anthony Maingot asserted that: ‘Mesa-Lago and Gonzalez are experienced students 
of Cuban affairs; this is reflected in the sober and pondered manner in which they 
analyze and caution their predictions. They are testimony to the value of area studies, 
a sense of history, and the interdisciplinary approach.’45 In reality, however, these 
scholars are linked to US government and extremist organisations who work to 
destroy the Cuban Revolution. This fact undermines claims to impartiality and the 
utility of their material in this thesis which is set outside the Cubanologist paradigm.
CUBANISTS
The mainstream paradigm set by Cubanologists was inflexible. Scholars were left 
struggling to explain key events within the paradigm assumptions, in foreign policy 
for example: Cuba’s conflict with China in 1966, and with the communist parties of 
Latin America, 1967-1968 and the brief clash with the USSR in 1968. Valdes 
explained the reactive nature of this scholarship:
‘The fact that Cuba had an African foreign policy was not obvious until 
troops were sent to Angola. Then many scholars rushed to look at this
44 Valctes, Paradigms, 190-3 & 206.
45 Maingot, Methodology, 244.
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matter. The relations between Cuba and the nonaligned countries began 
in 1959. We did not notice for almost twenty years. Fidel Castro had to 
become the head of the Nonaligned Movement before any studies were 
produced on the subject. And even now the gaps remain extraordinary.
We do not have any works on Cuba's relations with Latin America, 
Western Europe, or Eastern Europe. The Cuban role in international 
organizations, including the United Nations remains a virgin region. The 
reactive nature of scholarship is fairly evident in the flurry of current 
works [from the mid-1980s] concentrating on Cuba and Central America.
Once a crisis disappears, the number of works on the subject dwindles.’46
The inadequacy of the Cubanology paradigm, in addition to the Cuban efforts to 
disseminate information about its economic and social welfare successes from the 
1970s and the consequently improved access to Cuban society and archives, 
contributed towards the formation of a new school in the field -  Cubanists. Their 
distinction from Cubanologists is political and in research methodology rather than 
geographical. An early step in the institutionalisation of this school was the 
foundation of the Center for Cuban Studies (CCS) in New York in 1972 by scholars, 
writers, artists and other professionals to support Cuba, counter the US blockade by 
providing information and organising tours of the island and urging the normalisation 
of relations between the United States and Cuba 47 Yet this group remained on the 
margins of the mainstream.
In 1988 Rodriguez complained that: ‘Cuba is not the transfiguration of a doctrine, 
nor the reification of a totalitarian philosophy. It is a country. Little is written and 
even less is published about this real country, whether inside or abroad.’ Cubanists 
are in the process of filling this void. Cubanists include researchers from across the 
social science disciplines, as well as historians. Their focus has tended to reflect 
earlier Revisionist historians’ preoccupation with minority and oppressed groups in 
Cuba, as well as regional and sectoral studies. They tend to be more sympathetic to
46 Valctes, Paradigms, 195.
47 www.http://www.cubaupdate.org
48 Rodriguez, Cubanology, 128.
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the social and economic achievements of the Revolution, stepping back from the 
ideological battle between capitalism and socialism. The Forum for the Study of 
Cuba, for example, set up by Antoni Kapcia at Wolverhampton University has a 
Directory of Cubanists whose specialist areas cover art history, biography, cultural 
studies, economics, gender studies, history, history of ideas, international relations, 
labour history, legal studies, linguistics, literature, media studies, music, politics, 
social policy, sociology, translation studies and women studies.49 ‘Emerging from a 
variety of ideological perspectives, this work has helped make the shortcomings of 
the Cuban social and human sciences clear to us’, stated Cuban political scientist 
Hernandez: ‘thus serving as a stimulus. It has also contributed to the sum knowledge 
about Cuban problems.’50
On the other hand, the distinction between Cubanologists and Cubanists is by no 
means clear cut. Authors identified with the separate schools are found on the same 
contents lists. Direct confrontation between the schools is rare, and differences 
usually coached in terms of methodology. Although Cubanists may not be so overtly 
linked to a political regime or ideological battle, they still carry the constraints of 
their own social and political values and assumptions. Hernandez warned that ‘many 
of those studies are linked to a process of ideological positioning and find their 
niches within a given marketplace. To that extent, they share some of the 
characteristics and paradoxes [of the Cubanologists].’ Additionally, he asserted that: 
‘among those who do come to Cuba to gather information, some end up collecting 
merely what they want to find, usually what they need to characterize the system as 
Stalinist or Fidel Castro as a figure down to his last days in power. Others complain 
that they are not given the information they need to write in a believable manner 
about an imperfect society.’51 Researchers’ access to Cuban society, historical 
archives and economic data has improved significantly. Nonetheless, methodological 
problems continue to compound the problems of political bias. Given the highly 
polemical character of this field, the researcher on Cuba should make a self-
49 Kapcia and the forum have relocated to the University of Nottingham. The Forum has been 
renamed the Cuba Research Forum. http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/hispanic/CRF/Cuba.
50 Hemdndez, Looking, 124.
51 Hemdndez, Looking, 124 & 129.
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conscious appraisal of their own assumptions, intentions, material and 
interpretation.52
POLITICAL ECONOMY
The principal and relentless battleground between Cubanologists and Cubanists has 
been Cuba's economic history, both pre and post-1959. For example, Cubanologist 
Jaime Suchlicki claims that: ‘Batista encouraged the growth of Cuban capital and his 
return to power stimulated foreign investment... By the end of Batista's rule, Cuba's 
economy was well into what Walter Rostow has characterized as the take-off 
stage.’53 In contrast, Cubanist Fred Judson describes the structural weakness of the 
Cuban economy. ‘Batista's own paternalistic economic policies and the state of the 
economy in 1955-57 also created ambiguities... The general situation can be 
described as a multi-layered series of crises. Long-term crises characterized the 
economy, which had a surface and transient prosperity.’54 A scholar’s assessment of 
the pre-1959 Cuban economy has a bearing on whether they regard the Revolution to 
have been accidental: ‘at the margins of all objective historic determination’, as 
Rodriguez expressed it, or rather, driven by an economic imperative, the culmination 
of cien ahos de lucha.55 It also influences their evaluation of the post 1959 economic 
development strategy. For Suchlicki the Revolution interfered with an organic 
process of economic growth. For Judson it was necessary precondition to removing 
US penetration as an obstacle to development.
In the 1980s, Cubanists including Andrew Zimbalist and Claes Brundenius set out to 
challenge the mainstream view that Cuban economic development has been 
negligible since 1959. Their articles were first published in the by-then ‘objective’ 
Pittsburg University’s Cuban Studies, edited by Mesa-Lago, who they called: ‘the
52 This thesis has endeavoured to do so in the concluding comments of this chapter.
53 Jamie Suchlicki, Cuba: From Columbus to Castro. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986, 135.
54 Fred C Judson, Cuba and the revolutionary myth: the political education o f the Cuban Rebel Army, 
1953-1963, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, 95.
55 Rodriguez, Cubanology, 31.
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most prolific and prominent US interpreter of the Cuban economy’ whilst setting out 
to undermine the scholarly value of his work.56 In 1988 they published a 
comprehensive challenge to the Cubanologist paradigm, focussing on political 
economy.57 In exposing the assumptions and undermining the methodology of 
mainstream Cubanology, their book, intentionally or not, takes a political position in 
support of Cuba. The timing of this publication was decisive. It was 1988 when 
Cubanology had propelled to the right under the ascendancy of Reaganism which 
arguably saw US-Cuba relations at their most confrontational since the Cuban 
missile crisis of October 1962.
Zimbalist and Brudenius reviewed three economic history papers by Mesa-Lago and 
Jorge Perez-Lopez, pointing out numerous methodological and conceptual mistakes 
and producing their own statistical series depicting a far more optimistic picture of 
Cuban industrialisation and export diversification, much closer to official Cuban 
statistics which the Cubanologists claim are manipulated to overstate economic 
growth. This debate over economic data is partly a result of Cuba’s adoption of the 
Material System of Balances system of national incomes accounting, in line the 
centrally-planned economies of the Countries for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA).
The first study under review was co-authored by Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez for the 
World Bank: Study o f Cuba's MPS, Its Conversion to SNA and Estimation o f  
GDP/capita and Growth Rates, published in November 1982. The authors dismissed 
official Cuban statistics, Soviet statistics, CIA estimates, estimates made by the US 
Arms Control Development Agency (ACDA), and the World Bank Atlas estimates. 
Attacking their methodology, Zimbalist and Brundenius complain that: ‘To run the 
test, get an estimate not to your liking, and then find a post hoc rationalization why 
the test was inappropriate in the first place obviously cannot be justified even by the 
most liberal interpretations of the scientific method.’58
56 Claes Brundenius and Zimbalist, ‘Cubanology and Cuban Economic Performance’, in Zimbalist 
(ed) Controversies, 39.
57 The following section draws on Zimbalist and Brundenius’ book which presented a key challenge to 
the Cubanologist paradigm, as represented by Mesa-Lago and Pdrez-L6pez.
58 Brundenius, Performance, 41.
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Perez-Lopez authored the second study with the Wharton Econometrics Forecasting 
Associates (WEFA) under contract to the US Department of State in November 
1983: Construction o f Cuban Activity and Trade Indexes (Final Report of Study to 
Develop a Methodology for Estimating Cuba’s GNP). Zimbalist and Brudenius 
question the: ‘puzzling decision to weigh the non-productive service sector as 13.8 
percent of the gross value of output. This share is out of line with the estimate made 
by Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez in their November 1982 World Bank study that this 
sector’s share in 1978 GDP was 30 per cent. Because the authors acknowledge that 
this sector grew at a considerably faster pace than the material goods producing 
sector, this lower weight diminishes the aggregate growth estimate.’ Criticising one 
of the central premises of the study, the Cubanists state that: ‘There is no a priori set 
of prices that is more “meaningful” than another’, and they question the reliance on 
1973 Guatemalan prices as proxy for Cuban prices: ‘Why did WEFA choose 
Guatemala of all countries? The answer can only elicit wonderment’.59 Zimbalist and 
Brundenius closely scrutinised the data inputs to reveal numerous problems, outright 
mistakes as well as methodological weaknesses, leading them to conclude: ‘We do 
not claim that the data have been deliberately manipulated in order for WEFA to 
prove the point that growth in Cuba has been slower in the 1970s than claimed by 
official statistics and other authors, but the errors previously discussed are 
sufficiently serious to disqualify the report.’60
Finally, the Cubanists reviewed Mesa-Lago’s paper to the Vanderbilt Conference in 
November 1983 which claimed that Cuba has sacrificed economic growth to achieve 
equity: ‘The problem with Mesa-Lago's calculations in this instance is 
straightforward’, stated Zimbalist and Brundenius, asserting that his findings: ‘are 
purely a result of accounting practices and do not represent a real structural shift in 
the economy... He supports this contention with two misleading claims.’61 
Nonetheless, the paper’s claim that the Cuban economy was less industrialised by the
59 Brundenius, Performance, 49-50.
60 Brundenius, Performance, 52.
61 Brundenius, Performance, 59-60.
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early 1980s than before the Revolution was reproduced in a Wall Street Journal 
article.62
Zimbalist and Brudenius conclude that: ‘Mesa-Lago and Perez-Lopez present a 
distorted picture of Cuban economic performance. It is our hope that the foregoing 
discussion will help to redress these distortions and contribute to a more 
dispassionate and rigorous analysis of the Cuban economy.’63 Clearly no set of 
statistics and extrapolations in Cuba studies can be accepted without circumspection. 
It is also clear that, however carefully formulated, no set of statistics produced will 
be accepted by all schools within Cuba studies.
SOVIETISATION THESIS
Linked to this economic history debate, because of the level of trade and financial 
support from the Soviet Union, is the Sovietisation thesis. In the Cubanologists’ 
paradigm, Cuba was financially and politically dependent on, and dominated by the 
Soviet Union which had a patron-client relationship with Fidel Castro. Cuba 
operated: ‘within parameters set by the Kremlin’.64 Cuba was portrayed as a 
‘satellite’ and its foreign policy, particularly intervention in African, as a proxy of the 
USSR’s foreign policies; This interpretation pervades both scholarly and popular 
understanding of the Cuban Revolution. Another view echoed across the 
historiographical schools is that post-1959 Cuba is as economically dependent on the 
USSR as it was before the Revolution on the US. William Leogrande and Julie M 
Thomas, for example, state that while overcoming dependency was a high priority 
for Fidel Castro in 1959, Cuba’s efforts to do so have been unsuccessful: ‘the 
decision to concentrate on sugar and to trade primarily with the Soviet bloc left Cuba 
as vulnerable and dependent as it had been prior to 1959.’65 This statement assumes
62 Brundenius, Performance, 59. Roger Lowenstein, ‘Sugar is Cuba’s Triumph and Its Failure’ in Wall 
Street Journal, 3 August 1984.
63 Brundenius, Performance, 62-3.
64 Raymond W Duncan cited by Valdds, Paradigms, 207.
65 William Leogrande and Julie M Thomas, ‘Cuba's Quest for Economic Independence’, Journal o f 
Latin American Studies, Vol. 34 (2002), 339.
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that Cuba had far more choice of trading partners and export commodity than the 
reality of underdevelopment, the US blockade and the Cold War allowed. This 
doctoral research provides rich material to challenge that assumption and illustrates 
how development strategies had to be adjusted to these obstacles.
Cubanologists who have recognised Cuba’s social welfare achievements or economic 
growth have attributed these to the massive Soviet aid received. Whilst agreeing that 
the Cuban economy would be different without significant Soviet aid, Andrew 
Zimbalist stipulated that:
‘First...the magnitude of this aid is vastly overstated by false 
methodology. Second, even if the exaggerated aid figures were accepted, 
on a per capita basis Cuba would still be getting less in CMEA aid than 
many other Latin America economies receive in Western aid. Third, if  
one is attempting to disentangle the sources of Cuban growth and to 
isolate its domestic and foreign components, it is hardly sufficient to 
consider only the beneficial effects of Soviet aid. One must also consider 
the monumental and ongoing costs to Cuba of the US blockade. In 1982 
the Cubans estimated these cumulative costs to be approaching $10 
billion.’66
The doctoral research adds to Zimbalist’s analysis by highlighting the problems 
associated with the shift of trade to the socialist bloc. The Sovietisation thesis depicts 
a trade-off whereby Cuba allowed both domestic and foreign policy to be determined 
by the requirements of the Soviets in exchange for massive aid and favourable 
trading conditions. Changes in economic management structures in Cuba are 
understood to be the result of Soviet pressure to copy its own socialist system. This 
thesis gained strength when Cuba adopted the Soviet Planning and Management Plan 
in the 1970s. Sovietisation meant the institutionalisation of the Cuban Revolution, 
along the lines of the Soviet Union. Thus in the mid-1970s, Irving Louis Horowitz
66 Andrew Zimbalist, ‘An Overview’, Zimbalist (ed) Controversies, 8. By 2002 the Cuban 
government claimed the cost of die blockade had reached $50 billion.
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stated that: ‘The Cuban Revolution begins to identify with the needs of Soviet 
foreign policy’.67 While Mesa-Lago stated that the Soviets’ increasing influence over 
Cuba: ‘has helped to moderate the island’s foreign policy.’ And concluded that: ‘Sad 
as it is, the United States is better off dealing with a Soviet-dependent Castro than 
with him loose.’68 Valdes retorted that: ‘This Manichean approach (Castroite 
independence with irrationality versus Cuban dependence on Soviets with 
rationality) put scholars in an unenviable and ridiculous position... Sovietization as a 
moderating influence did not last long as a thesis. It simply made everyone working 
on Cuba uncomfortable.’69 The collapse of the Soviet bloc has left Cubanologists 
struggle to explain Cuba’s survival and development.70
CONCLUSION
In 1978 Anthony Maingot complained that: ‘sixteen years after the Cuban 
Revolution was declared Marxist-Leninist there is yet to be available in English any
71significant body of literature on the Revolution that is Marxist in methodology.’ 
Almost three decades later there are still few such contributions which can boast the 
methodological rigor of academic social science research. Most ‘Marxist’ material is 
marginalised by existing scholarly paradigms, circulating in non-academic fields 
among leftists, whether critics or supporters of the Cuban Revolution. However, 
Maingot’s statement about Marxist methodology needs to -be qualified, because the 
distinction between bourgeois and Marxist paradigms is not so clear.
Marx’s analytical methodology is based on historical material. Eric Hobsbawm gave 
personal testimony to the power of historical materialism which, he said: 
‘represented concentrated charges of intellectual explosive, designed to blow up
67 Irving Louis Horowitz, ‘Authenticity and Autonomy in the Cuban Experience’ in Cuban Studies, 
Vol 6, 1 (Jan 1976), 71.
68 Mesa-Lago, Pragmatism, 135.
69 Valdes, Paradigms, 207.
70 For example, Lawrence Whithead, On Cuban Exceptionalism. Paper presented to the conference on 
Cuba’s Integration into the International System, 23 March 2003.
71 Maingot, Methodology, 227.
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crucial parts of the fortifications of traditional history...[it was an] immense 
liberating force’.72 However, Marx himself pointed out that he did not ‘discover’ 
many of the formulations which are associated with his paradigm:
‘Bourgeois historians had described the historical development of class 
struggle long before I came along, and bourgeois economists had laid 
bare the economic anatomy of this struggle. My contributions were to 
prove (1) that the existence of classes is directly linked to specific 
historical stages in production methods, (2) that class struggle will 
inevitably lead to a dictatorship of the proletariat, and (3) that this 
dictatorship itself forms only a transition to the abolishment of classes 
and to a classless society.’73
Pointing out that much of what goes under the banner of Marxist analysis is actually 
the product of bourgeois thought, Ernst Nolte stated that the irreconcilable difference 
is that bourgeois historians do not believe in Marx’s prediction of a classless society: 
‘Scepticism toward this idea of a classless society -  an idea that is at the heart of 
Marxism -  forms the one real dividing line between bourgeois and Marxist 
historiography.'74
This thesis, then, adopts many concepts which are generally assumed to be Marxist, 
but are not necessarily so. It frames development through the panorama of class 
struggle and stages of development of the productive forces. It adopts vocabulary 
such as ‘bourgeois’, ‘petit-bourgeois’, ‘working class’, ‘vanguard’, ‘counter­
revolutionary’, ‘dialectics’, ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ and ‘surplus value’. In 
addition it uses terms which formed part of the language of the Cuban 
revolutionaries, such as ‘cadre’ [leader], ‘companero’ [colleague -  used in the sense 
of ‘comrade’], ‘nucleus’ [leadership group] and ‘consciousness’ [social conscience 
and commitment to the Revolution]. Arguably, the sense in which this thesis can be
72 Eric Hobsbawm, On History, London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1997, 147.
73 Karl Marx, ‘Letter to Weydemeyer’, 5 March 1852, cited by Ernst Nolte, ‘The Relationship 
between “Bourgeois” and “Marxist” Historiography’, in History and Theory, Vol 14: 1 (Feb 1975),
66 .
74 Nolte, Relationship, 66.
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said to adopt a Marxist methodology is in the basic premise that to understand 
Guevara’s contribution to economic management in Cuba, it is also necessary to 
analyse his contribution to socialist political economy, and vice versa. In other 
words, it presents his theory as a dialectical function of his action. Hobsbawm said:
‘Marxism, the most practically influential (and practically rooted) school 
of theory in the history of the modem world, is both a method of 
interpreting and of changing it, and its history must be written 
accordingly. .. It must also deal with the movements inspired, or claiming 
to be inspired by the ideas of Marx, and with the revolutions in which 
Marxists have played a part, and with the attempts to construct socialist 
societies by Marxists who have been in a position to make such 
attempts.’75
To write such a history is the goal of this thesis. It presents an immanent critique, 
accepting the basic assumptions articulated by Guevara and post-1959 Cuban 
leaders, and assesses developments and achievements on the basis of the aims and 
objectives as set out by the Revolution itself. Thus, a concern with GDP statistics is 
replaced by a focus on the desired outcomes: national independence with economic 
and social justice, a new consciousness and social-relations integral to the 
construction of socialism.
The following chapter in Part One reviews the existing literature on Emesto ‘Che’ 
Guevara, demonstrating that despite huge popular interest in this Argentinian 
revolutionary, there remains a gap in our knowledge of his life and contribution from 
1959 to 1965, which this thesis has set out to fill.
75 Eric Hobsbawm, The History o f Marxism, Vol 1, London: Harvester Press, 1982, vii-viii. My italics.
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CHAPTER 3
Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara: the existing literature
‘.. .what I ask, modestly, in this 20th anniversary [o f Guevara’s death], is 
that the economic ideas of Che be known; be known here, be known in 
Latin America, be known in the world: in the developed capitalist world, 
in the Third World and in the socialist world.sl
‘Che was more than just a martyr, more than just a heroic guerrilla 
fighter, he was also a Minister in the Cuban government and developed 
many ideas on how to build the new socialist society...we must study and 
learn from his thoughts. ’
In 1973, Michael Lowy wrote that it was: ‘necessary and urgent to suggest the initial 
outlines of a systematic study of Che’s thought, which is both orthodox Marxist and 
at the same time fiercely anti-dogmatic.’3 However, his own book on The Marxism of  
Che Guevara thematically summarised several articles by Guevara, but did not 
juxtapose these theoretical ideas with his practical work in Cuban industry 1959- 
1965. Two decades later, Matt Child echoed this concern: ‘Guevara’s works have not 
been subjected to scholarly criticism, most commentary simply referring to his 
unorthodox Marxism.’4 This thesis sets out to conduct such a scholarly study, based 
on access to new archive material and interviews. It examines Guevara’s contribution 
to socialist political economy in the context of his role in industrial organisation and 
economic development in Cuba. An overview of the existing literature about 
Guevara demonstrates the importance and originality of this contribution.
1 Fidel Castro Ruz. ‘Discurso pronunciado por Fidel Castro el 8 de Octobre de 1987’, in David 
Deutschmann and Javier Salado (eds), Ernesto Che Guevara: El Gran Debate: Sobre la Economia 
Politico, Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2003,406.
2 Venezuelan President Hugo Chdvez Frias, speech on May Day 2005.
3 Michael Lowy, The Marxism o f Che Guevara: Philosophy, Economics, and Revolutionary Warfare, 
trans. Brian Pearce, London: Monthly Review Press, 1973,9.
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GUEVARA AS GUERRILLA
Popular hagiography, political discourse and academic presentation has stylised 
Guevara as a guerrilla commander and armed internationalist. Guevara himself 
contributed to this caricature, by writing numerous accounts of the war against 
Batista in the Cuban press and publishing Guerrilla Warfare in 1961 to promote his 
foco theory that a ‘vanguard’ of armed fighters could spark successful revolutionary 
movements in Latin America. This was formalised by the French Marxist Regis 
Debray and years of debate over the foco theory and the Cuban road to socialism, 
fuelled by attempts to apply it elsewhere in Latin American, cemented Guevara’s 
immortalisation as an armed revolutionary. His disappearance from Cuba, the 
reading of his farewell letter to Fidel Castro in 1965, his message to the 
Tricontinental calling for ‘many Vietnams’ and his capture and execution in Bolivia 
where he was leading a foco group in 1967, have placed blinkers on history, blinding 
it to other aspects of this multi-faceted man. Guevara’s nationality Latin- 
Americanised the impact of this image; his contribution to the war in Cuba was 
reminiscent of the continent’s independence heroes, such as Sim6n Bolivar and 
Maximo Gomez, thus strengthening Guevara’s claims about the universality of the 
Cuban model. In his critique of the foco theory, Matt Childs emphasises the impact 
on the Latin American left of Cuba’s revolutionary socialism, which undermined the 
communist parties engagement with parliamentary politics as the road to power and 
the broad alliances to the right which emerged from the 1940s popular front tactics to 
oppose fascism.5
4 Matt D Childs, ‘An Historical Critique of the Emergence and Evolution of Ernesto Che Guevara's 
Foco Theory’ in Journal o f Latin American Studies, Vol 27: 3 (1995), 599.
5 Childs argues that the foco theory evolved between 1960 and 1967, in line with Guevara’s own 
experiences. First, ‘Sierraisation’ (1960-2) when Guevara incorporated peasant and working class 
compafleros from the Rebel Army into his new tasks in government and over-stressed the contribution 
of the Sierra forces in the revolutionary struggle in relation to that of the more middle class forces in 
the cities -  thus strengthening the left wing push for the radicalisation of the Revolution. Second, 
‘Marxianisation’ (1962-5), when Guevara was involved in the Great Debate with proponents of the 
Soviet economic management system. Third, ‘Internationalisation’ (1965-7), when he joined the 
struggle in the Congo and Bolivia. Childs concludes that: ‘The theoretical distance travelled by the 
foco theory from the Cuban Revolution to Guevara’s death in Bolivia reflects a considerable distortion 
of the Cuban experience.’ Childs, Foco, 622,
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Arguably, it served the Cuban government that Guevara was consigned to history as 
guerrilla strategist in his combat uniform; the hero who sacrificed his life to fight US 
imperialism, whose attacks continued. Guevara as minister had confronted just not 
the imperialist enemy, but also the socialist allies, over their approach to socialist 
construction. In the context of Cuba’s political and economic integration into 
socialist bloc it was hardly expedient to portray ‘Guevara the Marxist theorist’, who 
is also ‘Guevara the critic of Soviet political economy’. However, from the second 
half of the 1980s as Cuba pulled away from the Soviet system in a period known as 
Rectification of Errors and Negative Tendencies, Guevara the economic theorist and 
Soviet critic found a voice in Cuba. His criticism of the Soviet economic 
management system legitimised the rejection of that model.
GUEVARA’S WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
The publication of writings and speeches by Guevara has done little to challenge the 
characterisation of Guevara as guerrilla. During his public life, Guevara made around 
200 speeches and interventions at conferences in more than a dozen countries.6 A 
very small proportion of those are published in English, mainly his Reminiscences of  
the Cuban War and Guerrilla Warfare and speeches from international meetings 
calling for anti-imperialist solidarity and resistance. A greater selection of his work 
has been published within Cuba. In his thematic dictionary of Guevara, Carlos Jesus 
Delgado Diaz estimated that nearly 540 documents from Guevara have been 
published on the island: speeches, articles, poems, prologues, editorials, articles, 
books, dedications and letters.7 Dividing the content into four themes, Delgado 
demonstrates that: 41.5% concerned the history of the Cuban Revolution; 20% 
guerrilla warfare; 13% socialism; and 25% other themes. That means that over 60% 
related to military issues. Almost 90% of this work was produced between 1959 and
6 Mi Guevara. Suplemento Especial. Revista Cuba Intemacional, La Habana: Prensa Latina, 1997,17.
7 Carlos Jesus Delgado Diaz, Diccionario Tematico: Ernesto Che Guevara, La Habana: Ciencias 
Sociales, 2000, 349.
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1967 and there is an equal balance between Guevara’s written and oral product. This 
is exceptional, stated Delgado: ‘Considering the social conditions of the historical 
moment and the importance and presence of oratory in the political discourse of the 
Cuban Revolution. His preoccupation for recourse to the printed word to express his 
revolutionary political thought, whether that was theoretical articles or journalism, is 
notable.’8
Delgado’s survey includes material that was not published for public circulation, for 
example the transcripts of the Ministry of Industries (MININD) internal bimonthly 
meetings, which this thesis draws on extensively, but which have not formed part of 
the mainstream appreciation of Guevara’s works. Apart from the original print, few 
of the documents listed have been incorporated in collected works. In the 1970s two 
compilations were published in Havana; half the documents were speeches and 
articles on socialist construction and the rest of revolutionary war and 
internationalism.9 These did not include material by Guevara kept in archives.
The largest compilation of Guevara’s work published in English was edited by John
Gerassi in 1968, before the selected works had been published in Cuba.10 This
included several articles and speeches about socialist transition and the work of
MININD. In 1971, Bertram Silverman published five theoretical articles, already in
Gerassi’s book, which Guevara contributed to the Great Debate 1963-5.11 In 1987
Pathfinder published Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution}2 Of 27 articles, just
two relate to socialist theory or industry. A decade later, Ocean Press produced a Che
1 ^Guevara Reader, which was basically a reprint of the Pathfinder book. Pathfinder
8 Delgado, Diccionario, 352.
9Ernesto Che Guevara: Obras Escogidas 1956-67, tomos 1 & 2, La Habana: Casa del las Americas, 
1970 & Ernesto Che Guevara: Escritos y  Discursos, tomos 1-9, La Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 1977 
Orlando Borrego’s compilation is not included here as only 200 copies were printed and distributed 
selectively.
10 stJohn Gerassi (ed), Venceremos! The Writings and speeches o f Che Guevara, 1 ed. London: 
Weidenfield & Nicolas Limited, 1968.
11 Bertram Silverman (ed), Man and socialism in Cuba: The Great Debate, New York: Antheneum, 
1971.
12 David Deutschmann (ed), Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution: -writings and speeches o f 
Ernesto Che Guevara, Melbourne: Pathfinder/Pacific and Asia, 1987.
13 David Deutschmann (ed) Che Guevara Reader: Writings and Speeches on Guerrilla Strategy, 
Politics and Revolution, Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1997.
48
Chapter 3: Ernesto ‘Che' Guevara: the existing literature
and Ocean Press have a common history and editor and between them have 
published more English-language material from Cuba -  about and by leading 
revolutionaries -  than anyone else. Ocean Press’s catalogue includes Guevara’s 
writings on Latin America, his Diaries from the Congo guerrilla campaign, which 
did not appear in the 1970s Havana compilations mentioned, a book about the FBI’s 
files on Guevara, and a memoir about him by Fidel Castro.14 However, these works 
have not entered the academic mainstream.
In 2002 Ocean Press launched a project in collaboration with the Che Guevara Study 
Centre in Havana, directed by Guevara’s widow Aleida March, to ‘prepare Che’s 
complete writings for publication in a large number of thematic and other 
collections.’15 Most of the titles are reissues of material previously published. 
However, most significant for this thesis, the project includes 1) critical notes on 
political economy: Apuntes Criticos de la Economia Politico, and 2) philosophical 
notes, both based on archive material. A Cuban/Ocean Press edition of the former 
was published in early 2006.16 The latter is not due until 2007.
The Apuntes includes the lull text of Guevara’s critique of the Soviet Manual o f  
Political Economy, which Orlando Borrego, his closest collaborator in Cuba 1959-
171965, had already summarised in his book El Camino del Fuego in 2001. In 
addition, it includes extracts from the transcripts of the bi-monthly meetings of 
MININD, the full text of which are in volume six of Borrego’s limited edition of 
Guevara’s work compiled in 1967 and five theoretical articles he contributed to the 
Great Debate on socialist transition previously published in Cuba in the 1970s 
Havana compilations and in English by Gerassi and Silverman. These articles have 
been republished by Ocean Press and Ciencias Sociales collaboratively in 2003.18 
The Apuntes also contains: a biographical article by Guevara on Marx and Lenin; a
14 http://www.oceanbooks.com.au
15 A New Publishing Project o f the Works o f Che Guevara, press release, 8 October 2002, Ocean 
Press. The release date was timed to coincide with the 35 anniversary of Guevara’s death.
16 Ernesto Che Guevara, Apuntes Criticos a la Economia Politico, La Habana: Ciencias Sociales,
2006.
17 Orlando Borrego, El Camino del Fuego, La Habana: Imagen Contempor&nea, 2001.
18 Deutschmann (ed), Ernesto Che Guevara: El Gran Debate: Sobre la Economia Politico.
Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2003.
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fragment of a letter written to Fidel Castro in April 1965; notes on the economic 
philosophy of Marxism; five unpublished letters and part of an interview given in 
Cairo.
The material in Apuntes is presented in an edited form, without commentary or 
analysis by the editors apart from an introductory note. The stated aim of the Che 
Guevara Study Centre is that: ‘this series -  by presenting Che in his own words -  
will contribute to a better understanding of Che’s thoughts, allowing the reader to 
delve into his cultural depth, his incisiveness, his irony, his passion and his astute 
observations -  that is to say, the living Che.’19 However, a lot of historical 
background and, theoretical knowledge is assumed of readers in order to appreciate 
Guevara’s contribution to socialist political economy. Furthermore, an essential 
aspect of Guevara’s methodology is lost: the test of theory in practice and experience 
as the basis for theoretical development.
In 2000, the Diccionario Tematico Ernesto Che Guevara 20 provided an historical 
context to Guevara’s important speeches, with summaries and some direct quotes. It 
includes descriptions of key personalities and their relationship to Guevara. This is a 
useful resource providing vital historical contextualisation to other inedited material 
available, for example, the material in Ernesto Che Guevara: Ciencia, Tecnologia y  
Sociedad 1959-1965, published subsequently in 2003, which thematically and 
chronologically organises extracts from Guevara’s writings and speeches 21 The 476 
extracts were derived from 110 bibliographic sources, so most sources were used 
several times with different extracts under various thematic headings. The themes 
exclude Guevara’s views on guerrilla warfare and international anti-imperialism, 
concentrating on his economic ideas, explaining policy formulations, discussions 
about industrial organisation, technology, education and development. The thematic 
schema is imposed on the ideas by the editors. Relying on extracted quotes limits the 
sources utility because the way an argument is developed and linked to other themes
19 Ocean Press, Statement.
20 Delgado, Diccionario.
21 Ernesto Che Guevara: Ciencia, Tecnologia y  Sociedad 1959-1965, La Habana: Editorial Academia, 
2003.
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is vitally revealing. Extracts preclude this type of analysis. Nonetheless this 
publication is an important contribution to the critical re-examination of Guevara. It 
has been used as a reference in the thesis research, indicating the sources in which 
Guevara dealt with different themes. The original material could then be sought and 
examined.
BIOGRAPHIES OF GUEVARA
According to the Diccionario between 1967 and 1995 eight significant 
bibliographical studies of Guevara were published.22 However, the list excludes 
several significant texts which presented an overview of all, or aspects of Guevara’s 
life and work. Among them was Andrew Sinclair’s contribution, written as part of 
the Modem Masters series, to summarise Guevara’s political and economic 
philosophies and emphasise his influence in the Cuban Revolution. While there is 
no ‘official’ Cuban biography of Guevara as such, there have been bibliographical 
compilations 24 There are more Cubans works related to specific periods of his life, 
particularly military campaigns. Outside of Cuba, in 1995 alone another six 
biographies were published or being prepared for publication.25 This reflected a rush 
to publish by the 30th anniversary of Guevara’s death in 1997 and exploit renewed 
public interest. Three mainstream biographies entered the international English 
market in 1997.26 Whilst detailing Guevara’s upbringing and youth, these 
biographies barely touch on his contribution to the socialist political economy 
debates or industrial organisation and economic management in Cuba. The
22 Daniel James, Iosiv Grigulevitch, Enrique Salgado, Horacio Daniel Rodriguez, Ricardo Rojo, 
Ernesto Guevara Lynch, Hildea Gadea, Alberto Granado - half of these were testimonies by Guevara’s 
family and friends.
23 Andrew Sinclair, Guevara, London: Fontana, 1970. Other significant bibliographical studies from 
this period include I Lavretsky’s, Ernesto Che Guevara, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976 & Hugo 
Gambini’s El Che Guevara, Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1968.
24 Jesus Soto Acosta (ed): Che: Una Viday Un Ejemplo, La Habana: Comision de Estudios Histdricos 
de la UJC, 1968 & Luis Agtiero (et al), Che Comandante: Biografia de Ernesto Che Guevara,
Mdxico: Didgenes, 1969.
25 Jean Lok Cormier, Pierre Kalfon, Henry Ryan, John Lee Anderson, Jorge G Castafieda and Paco 
Ignacio Taibo II. See Delgado, Diccionario, 348-9.
2 Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life, London: Bantram Press, 1997, Jorge 
Castafieda, Companero: The Life and Death o f Che Guevara, London: Bloomsbury, 1997 & Paco 
Ignacio Taibo II, Guevara: Also known as Che, New York: St Martin’s Griffin, 1997.
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mainstream audience, therefore, generally remains ignorant about Guevara’s 
involvement in these areas.
Living to tell: biographies of Guevara’s colleagues
After Guevara’s execution in 1967, several of his companeros and family wrote 
about their relations and experiences with him. None of these early accounts included 
his work in the Cuban government so they are of limited value to this thesis. 
Provided an audience by the reflected glory of their association with Guevara, these 
authors tended to assert that he was exceptional at a young age and emphasise their 
own influence on his formation, or his on theirs.
More recently, there has been a trickle of memoirs and personal accounts produced 
by Guevara’s colleagues. Most are limited to the revolutionary struggle leading up to 
the Revolution in 1959, or the guerrilla campaign in Bolivia 1966-7, printed in 
limited runs -  as few as 500 copies -  in Cuba only. There is a conscious push to 
record individual accounts as a contribution to collective history, a process being 
promoted by the Martlana history groups run by the Asociacion de Combatientes; 
survivors from 1950s revolutionary war.27 Director of the national Marti programme, 
which organises these groups is Armando Hart, a founding member of the 26 July 
Movement (M26J) in 1953, the Revolution’s first Minister of Education and then 
Minister of Culture. His autobiographical based account Aldabonazo, published in 
1997, does not extend into the post-1959 period.28 Head of the group in Havana, 
Enrique Oltuski, another leading member of the M26J’s urban wing, published Gente
rjQ
de Llano in 2000. Although this mentions his interaction with Guevara, the action 
takes place before 1959. Oltuski’s Pescando Recuerdos, published 2004, includes 
anecdotes about Guevara post-1959, but has little factual information and therefore is
27 Named in honour of national hero Josd Marti who died fighting for independence from Spain in 
1898.1 attended three historical seminars between 2005 and 2006.
28 Published in English in 2004 as Aldbonazo: Inside the Cuban Revolutionary Underground 1952-58, 
a participants account, London: Pathfinder, 2004.
29 Enrique Oltuski, Gente del Llano, La Habana: Imagen Contempordnea, 2000. Published in English 
as Vida Clandestina, New York: Jossey-Bass, 2002.
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of limited historical use for this thesis.30 Other companeros of Guevara have 
produced memoirs in the last few years which either reviewed the war against Batista 
(Enrique Acevado and Amol Rodriguez Camps), other military missions (Jorge 
Risquet), or recorded the first years of the Revolution without focusing on Guevara’s 
contribution in the economic sphere (Antonio Nunez Jimenez and Luis M Buch
o  i
Rodriguez).
In 2001, Orlando Borrego published El Camino del Fuego, an account of his work as 
Guevara’s deputy in the Department of Industrialisation and in MININD. Borrego’s 
account has been the most useful bibliographic work for this thesis. It combines 
information about Guevara’s daily responsibilities and working relationships, 
insights into the evolution of his ideas on socialist construction and some outline of 
policies or projects put in place. Borrego also published a second book of 
anecdotes.33 Tirso Saenz, MININD’s Vice Minister of Technical Development 
published an account which focuses on his own integration in the Revolution and 
details the work of the research and development institutes Guevara set up.34 
However, it does not directly contribute to understanding Guevara’s theoretical 
analysis or political positions. In 2005, Omar Fernandez Cafiizares wrote about his 
three-month ‘good will mission’ to the non-aligned countries with Guevara in 
1959. Another member of the MININD’s Management Council, Angel Arcos 
Bergnes, has a book due for publication in early 2007. In summary, this biographical 
material provides useful descriptive detail and rich human content to research into 
MININD and developments Cuba at large. More will no doubt follow, most 
circulated in limited Spanish editions within Cuba. It is clear that protagonists are
30 Enrique Oltuski, Pescando Recuerdos, La Habana: Editora Abril, 2004.
31 Antonio Nuftez Jimenez Enrique, En Marcha con Fidel 1960, La Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 1998; 
Enrique Acevado, Descamisado, La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2000; Amol Rodriguez 
Camps, Operacion Fangio, La Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 2005; Jorge Risquet Valdes, El Segundo 
Frente del Che en el Congo, La Habana: Editora Abril, 2000; Luis M Buch Rodriguez & Reinaldo 
Suarez Su&rez Otros Pasos del Gobierno Revolucionario Cubano, La Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 
2002.
32 Borrego, Camino.
33 Borrego, Che: Recuerdos en Rafaga, La Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 2004.
34 Tirso W S&enz, Che Ministro: Testimonio de un Colaborador, La Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 2005.
35 Omar Femdndez Cafiizares, Un Viaje Historico con el Che, La Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 2005.
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racing to record their personal accounts of historical events, encouraged by their 
peers and pressured by a sense of their own mortality.
Guevara’s contribution to socialist political economy and economic 
management in Cuba
The collapse of Soviet bloc was anticipated and measures taken from 1986 to pull 
away from the floundering Soviet model were institutionalised as a campaign of 
rectification, which involved a fresh evaluation and dissemination of Guevara’s 
theories of socialist transition and his economic management system. It was a re­
examination endorsed by the Cuban government which vindicated the change of 
direction. Two compilations of essays and conference presentations were produced 
on these topics.36 However, these lack details about policy formulations and 
structures created by Guevara in MININD, nor is there an exploration of the dynamic 
between the practical policies and the deepening of theoretical concepts which this 
thesis offers. Most of the contributors in the compilations had probably not had 
access to the archive material from MININD or Guevara’s critique of the Soviet 
Manual o f Political Economy, sent by Guevara to Borrego from Prague, as Borrego 
claimed that he had not granted access to the document to researchers from inside or 
outside Cuba. The renaissance of Guevara the minister and critic of the Soviet bloc 
served a political function and the presentations should be expected to reflect this 
motivation. These books are out of print in Cuba and were neither translated nor 
published abroad.
Two studies of Guevara’s ideas won awards in the annual Casa de Las Americas 
competition during the Rectification period: El Pensamiento Economico de Ernesto 
Che Guevara by Cuban economist Carlos Perez Tablada, and Che, el Socialismo y  
Comunismo by Cuban philosopher Fernando Martinez Heredia. Both books
36 Pensar al Che, Los Retos de la Transicion Socialista, Tomos I & II, La Habana: Editorial Josd 
Marti, 1989 & Conferencia Teorica sobre el Pensamiento Economico del Comandante Ernesto Che 
Guevara, memorias, La Habana: Editora Politica, 1990.
37 Carlos P6rez Tablada, El Pensamiento Economico de Ernesto Che Guevara, La Habana: Casa de las 
Americas, 1987 & Che Guevara: Economics and Politics in the Transition to Socialism, London:
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succinctly summarise Guevara’s theoretical conceptions but hardly consider the 
policy formulations within MININD which stemmed from them. They lack an 
examination of how practical experience reflected back on Guevara’s further 
theoretical developments.
In addition to the articles published as part of the Great Debate, several works deal 
with separate aspects of Guevara’s theoretical ideas, most of them concerned with 
the argument about incentives. In the literature review of her doctoral thesis on the 
Great Debate, Sally Gainsbury stated that: ‘analyses of the Debate have 
predominantly fallen into two categories: those who have viewed the Debate as one 
between committed ideologists on the one side and pragmatic economists on the 
other; and those who viewed it as an intellectual mask for political rivalries’. She 
concluded that both interpretations are inadequate. However, neither Gainsbury nor 
any of the literature she cites systematically examines the practical policies adopted 
in an attempt to concretise the theoretical ideas expressed by either side during the 
Debate. In his review of The Theory o f Moral Incentives in Cuba, Robert Bernardo 
does give useful detail about wage and incentives structures to which Guevara 
contributed. However, the study does not explain how Guevara’s ideas on incentives 
were related to his integral analysis of socialist political economy or how they were 
linked to his ideas about, for example, administrative controls, as this thesis does.39 
Bernardo’s methodology, using a capitalist paradigm concerned with ‘market 
allocations’, creates an awkward juxtaposition between his analysis and the 
Revolution’s own approach to consciousness and incentives which is based on 
different precepts.
Pathfinder, 1989 & Martinez Heredia, Che, el Socialismoy Comunismo, La Habana: Casa de Las 
Americas, 1989.
38 Sally Gainsbury, The ‘Great Debate ’ as the Fulcrum o f Competing Narratives o f the Cuban 
Revolution, PhD thesis, Wolverhampton University, 2005.
39 Robert M Bernardo, The Theory o f Moral Incentives in Cuba, Alabama: University of Alabama 
Press, 1971.
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CONCLUSION
A summary of the existing literature on Guevara demonstrates that over the last 40 
years most material produced about him has perpetuated the mainstream image of 
him as a romantic revolutionary, internationalist and guerrilla fighter. Existing 
biographies have scant material on Guevara’s work in the Cuban government or the 
theoretical debates in which he engaged. Most memoirs have focussed on other 
aspects of his life, the most relevant texts having been published since the 
commencement of this thesis. This has had practical consequences. Without 
knowledge of Guevara’s contribution to socialist political economy and economic 
management the concrete lessons that can be drawn from his work have been lost. 
The work focussing on Guevara’s theory has failed to link it to the Budgetary 
Finance System and his practical experiences in Cuban institutions. This thesis 
proposes to do just that.
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Prologue
'The Budgetary Finance System was Che’s great thesis; an economic 
expression that tested his ideas about linking consciousness and 
production. Che discovered the Budgetary Finance System in the large 
imperialist consortia that were directed by a budget managed from the 
United States. Che posed the need to study how imperialism -  capitalism 
-  operated, in order to reorganise these efforts to use them for his own 
benefit.’*
The Budgetary Finance System (BFS) emerged as a practical solution to the concrete 
problems thrown up by the nationalisations of industry during the radicalisation and 
consolidation of the Revolution. This structure was given a theoretical base as 
Guevara immersed himself in a study of Marxism and socialist political economy. 
The apparatus developed out of the necessity to control the economy was 
complemented by theoretical conceptions about socialist transition. Edison 
Velazquez, a founding member of the Department of Industrialisation said: ‘Very 
early on Che had a vision about how to lead industry with a budget; the budgetary 
system. He started from the Marxist conception that the only way to control the 
economy is via planning and making a budget.’2 The BFS combined budgetary 
control within an ideological paradigm. In order to understand the policies 
formulated by Guevara in the Ministry of Industries (MININD), examined in Part 
Three of the thesis, it is first necessary to understand the historical conditions in 
which the BFS emerged, and the theoretical analysis of socialist political economy 
which underpinned it.
Part Two of the thesis serves this function of detailing how Guevara’s BFS was 
adopted and exploring the practical experiences and theoretical conceptions which
1 Armando Hart Davalos, interview, 14 March 2006.
2 Edison Veldzquez, 21 January 2006.
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contributed to its formulation. This acts as a bridge to the substantive Part on the 
economic history of MININD. Chapter 4 summarises Guevara’s contributions to the 
military and political consolidation of the Revolution, as a precondition to Cuba’s 
economic transformation. It discusses the impact of Guevara’s experiences on both 
his theory and practice, outlining his responsibilities with the Revolution from 
1 January 1959 until the foundation of the MININD in February 1961: the agrarian 
reform law, the overseas trade missions, the nationalisations, his work as President of 
the National Bank and as head of the Department of Industrialisation. Chapter 5 
examines Guevara’s written contribution to the Great Debate on socialist transition 
which took place in Cuba 1963-1965. The analysis of his critical theory establishes 
the paradigm within which the practical policies in MININD are consequently 
assessed.
59
Chapter 4: Revolutionary consolidation and the emergence o f the Budgetary Finance System
CHAPTER 4
Revolutionary consolidation and the emergence 
of the Budgetary Finance System
'If the armed struggle in the mountains and the cities against the tyranny 
had been exhausting, the first year o f liberation represented a battle 
without respite to reorganise the country, apply revolutionary justice and 
respond to the beginnings of enemy aggression.
This chapter presents a thematic examination of Guevara’s responsibilities in Cuba 
between January 1959 and the foundation of the Ministry of Industries (MININD) in 
February 1961, demonstrating his centrality in driving the structural changes which 
transformed Cuba. It explores how his military, political and economic experiences 
contributed to organisational and theoretical ideas integral to his comprehensive 
economic management system; the Budgetary Finance System (BFS).
In February 1961, the establishment of new institutions was announced: MININD, 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Internal Trade. These were 
necessary to administer nationalised industries and introduce a planned economy. 
Other existing institutions were transformed: the Treasury Ministry, National Bank, 
the Bank for Foreign Trade, and the Central Planning Board (JUCEPLAN). Edward 
Boorstein, a US economist working as an advisor to Cuban planning bodies wrote 
that: ‘The official announcement that the Revolution was socialist did not come until 
mid-April, at the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion. But already in February laws for a 
socialist reorganization of the government were coming out in the Gaceta Oficial 
[Official Gazette]. These laws were not drafted the night before their promulgation.’ 
Boorstein’s first hand account in The Economic Transformation o f Cuba gives a
1 Orlando Borrego, El Camino del Fuego, La Habana: Imagen Contemporanea, 2001, 11.
2 Boorstein, The Economic Transformation o f Cuba, London: Modem Reader Paperback, 1969,151.
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fascinating insight into the problems encountered by the revolutionary government, 
how and why socialist planning was adopted and the many mistakes and 
achievements which accompanied this process.
The intention here is not to narrate this history, or analyse the succession of new 
laws, resolutions and decrees issued by the revolutionary government: 693 of them in 
1959 (almost two a day), 229 in 1960 and 93 in 1961.3 Rather it is to stress how 
developments within Cuba, in international relations and in the challenges which 
Guevara faced compelled him to develop an approach to socialist transition which 
was distinct and alternative to that in the existing socialist countries.
In January 1959, Guevara was among the most influential individuals in Cuba. By 
the end of the year he was president of the National Bank of Cuba (NBC) and head 
of the Department of Industrialisation. However he held other responsibilities in his 
period about which little is known and less written. These are summarised below 
under three categories: military, political and economic. The research has largely 
relied on accounts of Guevara’s colleagues, because although there is an abundance 
of historical literature on this tumultuous period of Cuban history, and even general 
biographical details about Guevara’s life, there is scant material documenting or 
analysing work in the economic sphere. In contrast to his work with MININD there 
are no internal meeting transcripts, management council reports or manuals for this 
period. The principal sources of information are interviews, speeches, articles, 
memoirs, and Cuban media from the period.4
A summary of the economic situation in January 1959 demonstrates the problems 
which confronted the new government as Batista’s regime collapsed. Interpretations 
of the socio-economic and political situation in Cuba constitute an area of 
controversy in the historiography. Much analysis is based on two sources published 
in the US: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
Report o f the Mission to Cuba, July 1951 and the US Department of Commerce’s
3 Orlando Valdes, Historia de la Reforma Agraria en Cuba, La Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 2003, 2.
4 There is a great deal of collaboration and no significant discrepancies within the interview material.
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Investment in Cuba: Basic Information for United States Businessmen, July 1956.5 In 
general terms, the situation in the 1950s can be summarised thus: structural 
imbalances, underdevelopment with pockets of technologically advanced foreign 
owned industries, endemic under-employment, severe rural poverty and a lack of 
domestic capital and investment; dependent economy, heavily reliant on imports and 
exports, especially sugar-related, domination of trade by the US and most important 
and complex industries technologically dependent on the US. Boorstein argued that 
US imperialism had locked Cuba into a structure of underdeveloped, mono-crop 
dependency:
‘The central fact about the Cuban economy before the Revolution was 
neither its one crop concentration on sugar, nor the monopoly of most of 
. the agricultural land by huge latifundia [plantations], nor the weakness of 
national industry, nor any other such specific characteristic. Until the 
Revolution, the central fact about the Cuban economy was its domination 
by American monopolies -  by American imperialism. It was from 
imperialist domination that the specific characteristics flowed. Unless 
that it recognized, the Cuban revolution cannot be understood.’6
The collapse of Batista’s regime posed the question of what, if  anything, the 
Revolution would do to tackle these economic and structural problems. Different 
forces and sectors within Cuba, not least within the new leadership and power 
structure, had different answers. The conflicts and contradictions which emerged in 
responding to this challenge in the years 1959 to 1961 propelled the consolidation of 
the Revolution and the emergence of the BFS. The first government formed by the 
Revolution was made up of moderate or liberal bourgeois elements of the opposition 
to Batista. This pacified and confused US officials, foreign investors and domestic 
capitalists. However military and popular power lay with the Rebel Army and other 
organisations which had participated in the revolutionary struggle. This created an
5 IBRD. Report o f the Mission to Cuba, July 1951. Washington DC: Office of the President, 1951 & 
US Department of Commerce. Investment in Cuba: Basic Information for United States Businessmen, 
Washington DC: GPO, 1956.
6 Boorstein, Transformation, 1.
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initial awkward co-existence between ‘business as usual’ capitalism and the 
radicalisation of the Revolution. Ultimately it was unsustainable.
In May 1959 the Agrarian Reform Law and other radical legislation made the US 
government and capitalist interests abroad uncomfortable, including those who had 
allied with Castro and the Moncada Programme which had advocated such reforms. 
Capitalists froze investments and ran down inventories, either in ‘wait and see’ 
uncertainty, or to consciously create economic and political difficulties to undermine 
the new regime, which responded with nationalisations to prevent economic 
sabotage. Society polarised, many liberal representatives of the government 
disowned it, some joining force with growing US-based opposition. Meanwhile the 
Revolution consolidated to the left, passing ever more radical legislation.
When advisors to the new government and planning agencies from the United 
Nations Economic Commission of Latin America (ECLA) were withdrawn from 
Cuba under US pressure, they were replaced with advisors and technicians from the 
socialist countries.7 The nationalisations brought most production in Cuba under state 
control and ECLA advisors, mostly advocates of the Import Substitution 
Industrialisation model, had reached the limits of their knowledge which was 
reformist capitalist. They had no experience of socialist planning. Cuba became 
integrated into the socialist countries’ economies and, more gradually, the socialist 
political bloc. The US imposed a trade blockade, leading to severe shortages in Cuba, 
and pressured its western allies to follow suit and refuse financial credits while Latin 
American countries began to break off diplomatic relations.8 Rationing was 
introduced in March 1961. In April, Cuban emigres trained and financed by US 
authorities invaded the island at the Bay of Pigs, being defeated and captured within 
days. It was the third and most substantial invasion of Cuba’s coast by exiles.
7 Juan Noyola, head of the ECLA mission, ignored the order to withdraw and remained in Cuba with 
some ECLA colleagues.
8 See Jane Priestland (researcher), British Archives on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962. London: 
Archival Publications International, 2001.
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As a result of developments in this period, within two years Cuba was transformed 
from a ‘free enterprise’ economy dominated by US investment and trade to a country 
in which around 84% of Cuban industry had been placed under state control and 
trade had almost entirely shifted to the socialist countries. Guevara was instrumental 
to the policies, projects and reactions which propelled this transformation.
MILITARY CONSOLIDATION
Following his bitter experience in Guatemala, where democratically elected president 
Jacob Arbenz was overthrown by a CIA-sponsored military coup, Guevara was 
committed to purging the existing army in the formation of a new regime. From 
January 1959 at La Cabana fortress he presided over the trials and executions of 
members of Batista’s army and police proven complicit in brutal repression. 
Supported by most Cubans and applauded in Bohemia magazine, the events created 
uproar outside Cuba and gave Guevara a reputation for ‘red terror’.9 According to 
biographer Jon Lee Anderson, Guevara was simultaneously involved in setting up 
the new state security apparatus and the Liberation Department in the Intelligence 
Section to assist overseas guerrilla movements.10 The ascendancy of the Rebel Army 
as the armed body of the state and the formation of an intelligence service to keep the 
leadership informed about machinations against the Revolution meant that the 
deliberations of the official government in Havana took the form of ‘sound and fury’ 
as real power and popular support lay with the left wing of the revolutionary 
movement.
By early 1960, operative defence teams were formed in preparation for US or 
mercenary attacks. Guevara was responsible for Pinar del Rio province in the west of
9 Miguel Angel Duque de Estrada Ramos, the lawyer who presided over the Commission for Purges, 
showed me the list of names, charges, verdicts and sentences of the trials between January and June 
1959: 560 military trials with 54 individuals sentenced to death. On 9 June 1959, military tribunals 
were transferred to civilian courts. In October 1959 a new crime was introduced for ‘counter­
revolutionary acts’ including sabotage and terrorism. Interview, 23 February 2005. Indicative of the 
prevailing dramatisation of the purge, Jon Lee Anderson cites 550 executions (not trials) in La Cabafla 
from January-April 1959. Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life, New York: Grove Press, 1997,419.
10 Anderson, Che, 385 & 395.
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the island.11 Cuba entered a state of national defence mobilisation, with civilians 
organised into militias throughout the island. Guevara promoted arming civilians and 
participated in a campaign to provide political education to accompany that military 
training. He was also responsible for institutionalising strict discipline. As head of 
Department of Training of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) from late January 
1959, Guevara was involved with Cayo Lago, a hard labour camp for Rebel Army 
soldiers guilty of indiscipline or petty crimes.12 This discipline was part of Guevara’s 
insistence on the role of the guerrilla fighter as social reformer and, more generally, 
his concepts about social responsibility and work as a social duty under socialism.
POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION
Guevara was determined to provide basic literacy, political and cultural education to 
the troops in La Cabana before they returned to their towns and villages. He urged 
them to contribute to the consolidation of the new regime. In La Cabana he 
inaugurated the Military-Cultural Academy, which gave classes in civics, history, 
geography, economics, Latin American states and current affairs. He gave political 
orientation classes to his own officers, including a basic history of socialism. In late 
January 1959, Guevara became head of the Department of Training of FAR. He 
founded a newspaper called La Cabana Libre and contributed to Verde Olivo of the 
FAR. In his work on the Cuban Rebel Army, Fred Judson said: ‘On the theoretical 
and polemical plan, Verde Olivo relied mostly on Guevara and Castro to explain 
imperialism and Cuban economic dependence. Guevara’s articles, especially, were 
explanations of imperialism from a Leninist perspective.’13 His articles recording 
episodes of the war were published as Reminiscences o f a Revolutionary War. The 
following year he published Guerrilla Warfare, a guidebook to the foco theory. In 
1959 he set up Prensa Latina, a regional press agency to rival US corporate media
11 Omar Fem&ndez Cafiizares, interview, 2 March 2006. Fernandez was in the team which Guevara 
oversaw.
12 Details in Chapter 10.
13 C Fred Judson, Cuba and the Revolutionary Myth: The Political Education o f the Cuban Rebel 
Army, 1953-1963, Colorado: Westview, 1984, 249.
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domination, with Argentinian Ricardo Masetti and Uruguayan Carlos Maria 
Gutierrez, commissioning journalists from around the world.14
In the first days of January 1959 Guevara organised meetings of all the student and 
youth groups involved in the struggle against Batista: the Socialist Youth (youth 
wing of the Popular Socialist Party, or PSP); the Revolutionary Directorate (DR); the 
University Students Federation (FEU); and his own 26 July Movement (M26J). On 
28 January 1959 they became the Association of Rebel Youth, setting up municipal, 
provincial and national committees in all workplaces. In 1962 this became the Union 
of Young Communists, with the daily newspaper Juventud Rebelde. Guevara also 
contributed to the process of university reform.15
In talks with the PSP and DR about power sharing, Guevara was among those who 
lay the groundwork for the Integration of Revolutionary Organisations (ORI). These 
talks were secret because of the prevailing anti-communism, the increasing 
incorporation of PSP members in the new structures of government providing the 
pretext for liberal members of the M26J to split with the revolutionary process. The 
name ORI began as a descriptive reference, but became an institution by July 1961.16 
A national directorate was announced in March 1962 with 25 members from across 
the three groups, including Guevara. He was instrumental in tightening relations with 
the communists, and through them with the Soviet Union. His deputy Orlando 
Borrego said: ‘Che had total confidence in the members of the PSP. He had a 
Marxist formation and he considered the members of the PSP to be most trustworthy. 
When it was necessary to name an administrator of a nationalised factory, he would 
try to find one from among the militants of the Communist Party, because he 
believed they were more reliable.’17 Guevara’s attitude changed following the 
sectarian machinations of PSP leading member Anibal Escalante, ORI’s secretary,
1 fiand as his critique of the Soviet bloc developed.
14 Anderson, Che, 385 & 408.
15 Luis Gdlvez, interview, 9 February 2006.
16Hugh Thomas, Cuba: Or the Pursuit o f Freedom, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1971,1372 & K 
S Karol, Guerrillas in Power, trans. Arnold Pomerans. London: Jonathon Cape, 1971,234.
17 Borrego, interview, 24 January 2005.
18 Guevara’s response to the problems of sectarianism is not detailed in this thesis.
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ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION
Guevara’s concern for production began in the Sierra Maestra where he set up artisan 
workshops and other projects to sustain the Rebel Army: a bakery, a cobblers, farms, 
a newspaper, radio station and ‘home made’ bomb factories. Self-sufficiency meant 
it was unnecessary to take from the locals, and land reform carried out in Rebel 
Army controlled ‘free territory’ gave the rural poor land.19 In October 1958 on 
arrival with his troops in the mountains in central Cuba, Guevara asked the PSP to 
send him books about the Cuban economy, arguably demonstrating that he was 
concerned with economic transformation even before the collapse of Batista’s
0C\regime. In La Cabana, Guevara again set up small scale and artisan industry to 
employ troops. From 5 of January 1959, Guevara began collaborating with Alfredo 
Menendez, Juan Borroto, Omelio Sanchez and Francisco Yero, clandestine members 
of the M26J who worked in the Cuban Sugar Institute (ICA), representing 
landowners and the big sugar owners.21 Borroto recalled: ‘We explained to Che 
about the sugar industry and the sugar diferencial, which was a conquest won by 
Jesus Menendez [militant leader of the sugar workers] to ensure that the sugar 
workers would share in the sugar profits. Che was particularly interested by this.’22 
Menendez said: ‘Che said very early on that we had to create jobs because the 
Revolution could not stay in power for long without resolving the problem of 
unemployment in Cuba.’ By summer 1959, almost two years before Castro’s 
declaration of socialism, Guevara told the ICA group that the Revolution was 
constructing socialism in Cuba 24
Land reform was central to the revolutionaries’ conceptions about political and 
economic independence, and social justice and it was considered a precondition for 
industrialisation. Throughout March and April 1959, Guevara was involved in secret 
talks with the PSP and DR to prepare the Agrarian Reform Law which was
19 For details see Valdes, Reforma.
20 PSP member Alfredo Menendez sent his own books for Guevara. Interview, 11 February 2005.
21 Juan Borroto, interview, 26 January 2006. This work was secret and they continued in the ICA.
22 Borroto, interview.
23 Men&idez, interview, 17 February 2005.
24 Borroto, interview & Men&idez, interview, 11 February.
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promulgated on 17 May and enacted on 8 June. The law was moderate, confiscating 
unproductive plantations of over 1,000 acres, affecting just 12,500 properties, or 10% 
of Cuban farms that size.25 It echoed article one of the 1940 Constitution. Right wing 
newspaper Diario de la Marina applauded it as a very ‘responsible’ agrarian reform. 
Guevara referred to ‘our first timid law, which did not dare take on so basic a task as 
suppressing the plantation owners’.26 Nonetheless, as Antoni Kapcia explained: ‘The 
law’s radicalism lay in the fact of state intervention and the steady shift towards
cooperativization and then collectivisation, all directly affecting American-owned
00property’. The ‘timid law’ confirmed progress towards the revolutionary laws 
originally outlined in Castro’s Moncada Programme of 1953. Boorstein wrote: ‘Cuba 
needed land reform. But a true land reform is not a technical measure that can be 
accomplished to the satisfaction of everybody...A true land reform hurts; it changes 
the balance of political power; it begins a process of broader change. A true land 
reform is not a reform’, it is a revolutionary measure.’28 Menendez worked with 
Castro on a commission set up to negotiate with domestic land owners and sugar 
industrialists. ‘Fidel told me not to fight with them until next year because first we 
will take the land from the Americans’ he said, affirming that ‘Fidel knew that the 
North American imperialism will react immediately after the Law.’29
Nationalised land was to be distributed among landless rural workers or turned into 
cooperative farms to be administered by a new organisation, the National Institute of 
Agrarian Reform (INRA). With Castro as President, and the Revolution rooted in 
rural support, INRA became the key institution driving the radicalisation of the 
regime and the principle power-base for left-wing leaders. Boorstein wrote:
‘You could see and feel in the halls and offices of the INRA headquarters
in Havana that it was a revolutionary organization. Here were not the
25 Thomas, Cuba & Valdes, Reforma.
26 Both cited by Paco Ignacio Taibo II, Guevara: also known as Che, trans. Martin Roberts. New 
York: St Martin’s Griffin, 1997,277.
27 Antoni Kapcia, Island o f Dreams. Oxford: Berg, 2000,114.
Boorstein, Transformation, 15. Author’s emphasis.
29 Menendez, interview, 17 February. In August 1963, the second Agrarian Reform Law was much 
further reaching.
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prim, old-line functionaries of the National Bank or Treasury, but 
bearded rebels in uniform, carrying arms. The working hours were not 
the 9-5 of the ordinary government worker. They were the irregular hours 
-  the nocturnal hours -  of the guerrilla fighter. Meetings could start at 
midnight and last till daybreak. INRA was characterised by suspicion of 
and contempt for bureaucracy and paperwork.’
The group from ICA, Menendez, Sanchez, Idearte and Borroto, worked on the 
structure of this huge institution and later they were incorporated into the Department 
of Industrialisation, going on to lead key areas of work in MININD from February 
1961. After producing a report on the feasibility of selling sugar to countries outside 
the west and socialist bloc, Menendez accompanied Guevara on the new 
government’s first overseas trip, ‘a goodwill mission’ to 11 countries: Egypt, Syria, 
India, Burma, Japan, Indonesia, Ceylon, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Sudan and Morocco. 
The mission, to be headed by Guevara, was announced by Castro in April 1959, just 
hours after inaugurating an exhibition of Cuban products organised by Omar 
Fernandez Canizares. Fernandez fell off his chair with surprise as he found out from
i
the televised announcement that he was to be Che’s deputy on the trip. The 
objective was to initiate and extend commercial and political relations and request 
support for the Revolution: an early measure to decrease Cuba’s trade dependency on 
the US in anticipation of future confrontation. The mission was pivotal for Guevara. 
Between 12 June and 6 September, the delegation observed numerous industries 
which Guevara later attempted to foster under MININD: iron and steel, ship­
building, textiles, hydroelectrics, generators, turbines, machinery construction, paper 
mills and so on. Fernandez recalled:
‘During the trip, Che focussed on the factories, no matter how small they 
were. In India we saw a motor factory and he said: “There are 
components from other countries, but we could make these motors in 
Cuba.” In Egypt we saw the development of the iron and steel industry.
30 Boorstein, Transformation, 48.
31 Fem&ndez Un Viaje Historico con el Che, La Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 2005 & interview.
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. He said it meant that they would be self-sufficient in metals: “We could 
develop the iron and steel industry in Cuba in eight or ten years.” He 
considered everything we saw, like the enterprise for machine 
construction. From the beginning of MININD he tried to develop an 
industry of machine construction.’
Guevara was also interested in agrarian reform laws in Egypt, Yugoslavia, Japan and 
the United Arab Republic and expressed a desire to copy the research and science 
institutes of some countries, particularly the physics, medical, chemical and 
agricultural institutes in Egypt and India, and the statistics institute in the latter.33
Arguably the most significant visit was to Yugoslavia; a socialist country which had 
split with the Soviet bloc and was involved in the foundation of the Non-Aligned 
Movement. This was Guevara’s first experience of a country using the Soviet-style 
economic management system known as economic calculus or auto-financing system 
(AFS). The Cuban mission witnessed workers’ management of factories and 
voluntary labour, as well as advances in industrialisation. Fernandez recalled that the 
Yugoslavs:
‘... explained government policy to us, how they directed the economy, 
the workers’ earnings, how they helped the administrators, their social 
programmes, their ideas and the type of socialism which they were trying 
to construct. The Yugoslavs said that their social problems were identical 
to those in the USSR but that their socialism was different from that of 
the Russians.’34
Arguably, observing a ‘socialist’ country which had broken away from Soviet 
orthodoxy and enjoyed significant industrial development contributed towards 
Guevara’s confidence in critically analysing the Soviet economic management
32 Fem&ndez, interview.
33 Guevara, ‘Conferencia de prensa al regreso del viaje’ & ‘Comparencia en el programa 
“Comentarios Economicos’” , in Fem&ndez, Viaje, 167-184 & 185-193.
34 Fem&ndez, interview.
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system and resisting blanket copying for Cuba. However he never regarded 
Yugoslavia as an alternative model for Cuba.
Indeed, Guevara’s opinion of Yugoslavia appears contradictory. This reflects both 
the tension between public voice and private views, before the Revolution was 
declared to be socialist, and the immaturity of his ideas on socialist political 
economy. Fernandez said Guevara: ‘drew our attention to the fact that Yugoslavia, a 
socialist country, had acquired great development... but he did not speak about Cuba 
being socialist.’35 Back in Cuba Guevara applauded the level of development, the 
freedom of discussion in Yugoslavia, and said: ‘we had many discussions there about 
diverse problems, about the organisation of work in Yugoslavia, based on what they 
call ‘self-financing’, a system in which they give the workers a great responsibility in 
all factories...The system is a little complicated and difficult to understand, but very 
interesting.’ A week later he said Yugoslavia had a ‘Marxist economy’ and had 
advanced without help from the Soviet bloc. However, in a third report, Guevara 
described Yugoslavia as ‘managerial capitalism with a socialist distribution of the 
profits’ and pointed to the potential for competition among enterprises to distort the 
socialist spirit. Cuban economist Carlos Tablada pointed out that: ‘in his first 
contact with an economy governed by the so-called self-management system, 
without direct knowledge of the other socialist countries or of specialised economic 
literature, and without yet having a post in government that compelled him to look 
into these questions -  Che was already concerned about the self-management
'IQ
system’. This process of analysis of political economy was the first step towards his 
later contributions to the Great Debate 1963-5 and his critique of the Soviet Manual 
of Political Economy.
35 Femdndez, interview.
36 Guevara, Conferencia, 171-2.
37 Guevara, Comparencia, 185.
38 Guevara, ‘Yugoslavia, en pueblo que lucha por sus ideas’, Verde Olivo, 26 November 1959. 
http://cheguevara.cubasi.cu
39 Carlos Tablada Che Guevara: Economics and Politics in the Transition to Socialism, New York: 
Pathfinder, 1990, 112.
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Cuba established full diplomatic relations in every country visited and various 
preliminary trade agreements were made. In Egypt they began secret negotiations 
with Soviet representatives. Menendez revealed: ‘I returned from the trip to see Fidel 
to receive more instructions and tell him about the conversations with the USSR.’40 
Three weeks after the mission returned, on 7 October Guevara was named as head of 
the Department of Industrialisation within INRA. Fernandez was not surprised: 
‘After the trip, Che had become a true industrialist, a defender of industry and Fidel 
rewarded him. He spoke a lot about what the country could produce on the base of 
industry.’41 In August 1960 Guevara opposed recommendations by the French 
agronomist Rene Dumont who urged the Cuban government to adopt market- 
orientated measures based on material incentives, the restoration of profit and a 
market pricing system as the main regulators of production and consumer goods 
allocation: another example of his deepening opposition to ‘market socialism’ and 
this still six months before the socialist character of the Revolution was declared in 
April 1961 42 Guevara was also on the Economic Commission of the National 
Directorate of ORI, the highest level organisation determining the Revolution’s 
development strategy, and the Commission’s representative on the Central Planning 
Board (JUCEPLAN) which concretised and institutionalised that strategy and the 
transition to a planned economy. In addition, he also became president of the 
National Bank.
40 Men&idez, interview, 11 February. The need for secrecy reflected Cold War tensions, more than the 
significance of trade negotiations. Even under Batista’s regime, Cuba had sold sugar annually to the 
USSR.
41 Femdndez, interview.
42 Robert M Bernardo, The Theory o f Moral Incentives, University of Alabama Press, 1971,16. 
Bernardo recorded that Dumont was invited to Cuba by Fidel Castro to discuss his reports critical of 
the Revolution’s achievements. Despite criticising the new ‘peoples’ farms’ Dumont was invited to 
Cuba in 1963 by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, INRA President, to carry out further investigations. In 
1964, he published Cuba, Socialisme et D&veloppement, with further criticisms and was invited again 
by Castro in summer 1969. Despite Castro and Rodriguez’s engagement in Dumont’s critical analysis 
of Cuban agricultural organisation, Borrego, said that: ‘although Che did not leave anything written 
referring to Dumont, I can assure you that he regarded him as an enemy.’ (Email correspondence 6 
July 2007.)
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THE NATIONAL BANK OF CUBA
Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos’ joke about how Guevara volunteered to preside 
over the National Bank of Cuba (NBC) is better known than any details of his work 
in that position. The story goes that in a frantic late-night meeting of the Council of 
Ministers in the midst of the tit-for-tat retaliations between Cuba and the United 
States and the defection of the bourgeois liberals from Cuba, Castro asked for ‘a 
good economist’ to take over presidency of the NBC. Half asleep, Guevara raised his 
hand, Castro replied with surprise: ‘Che, I didn’t know you were a good economist’, 
to which Guevara exclaimed: ‘Oh, I thought you asked for a good communist!’ The 
story has become part of the legend of the man and the Revolution and indicates that, 
early on, Guevara was perceived as a revolutionary communist who would take on 
any task he was assigned too. Indeed, Guevara was wide awake to the fact that 
changing property relations and the break with the US government demanded 
profound adjustments in the role and character of financial institutions, particular as 
Cuba was preparing to implement socialist planning. The NBC was integral to 
problems of industrialisation, trade, and the sugar industry. Therefore, given his 
contribution to the agrarian reform law and having been placed at the head of 
industrialisation, it is not so surprising that Guevara presided over a revolutionary 
adjustment in the role of the banking system in Cuba.
Guevara began as President of the NBC on 26 November 1959, seven weeks after 
becoming head of the Department of Industrialisation in INRA. Prior to this, 
Guevara had not even been in the Council of Ministers and his rapid ascendancy to 
two first level roles in government reflected the radicalisation of the Revolution.43 
He was active as President for just 11 months, before leaving on a trade mission to 
the socialist countries in October 1960. Surrounding himself with professionals, 
Guevara introduced import-export licences, withdrew the country’s gold supplies 
from the US, withdrew Cuba from international financial institutions dominated by 
the US, oversaw the establishment of a planning institution to direct trade with the
43 Luis M Buch Rodriguez and Reinaldo Su&rez Suarez. Otros Pasos del Gobierno Revolucionario 
Cubano. La Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 2002, 147.
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Soviet bloc and the nationalisation of the banking system in Cuba, the first step to 
creating a state monopoly bank. In addition, one of his most important projects, the 
change of banknotes, took place in August 1961, almost a year after he left the bank, 
and it was another three years before he wrote a theoretical article about the role of 
the bank under socialism. The following section may take the form of narrative, but 
it should be remembered that a major contribution of this thesis has been in locating 
and recording details about this previously overlooked aspect of Guevara’s work in 
Cuba.
The financial-banking situation at the start of 1959
The NBC had been set up in December 1948. It was relatively impotent in 
influencing the behaviour of private banks and investors in Cuba. The US 
government’s Investment in Cuba report of July 1956 revealed that Cuban capital 
was averse to domestic investments, reluctant to buy Cuban government peso 
securities and invest in the stocks of domestic agricultural and industrial enterprises. 
The Cuban bourgeoisie’s preference for liquidity: ‘has been nurtured by the very 
nature of the Cuban economy, which places a high premium on the maintenance of 
liquid resources to meet the sudden and drastic swings inherent in a one-crop [sugar] 
economy’ the report noted. Meanwhile: ‘Cuban long-term investments in the United 
States amounted to at least $150 million at the end of 1955.’44 This made capital 
flight from Cuba easy and inevitable following the Revolution.
Before Batista’s coup on 10 March 1952, Cuba’s net or free monetary reserves were 
around $534 million. Batista’s regime reduced this by $424 million, 79.4% to less 
than $111 million. 70% of gross reserves were tied up in loan guarantees.45 In sum, 
the Bank’s net reserves did not reach the legally required minimum of 25% of its 
international liabilities in cash, gold or dollars; nor did they cover 75% of the gross 
gold or dollar reserves. Additionally, as Batista and his associates fled Cuba, they 
stole millions from the NBC and Treasury. Guevara’s colleague, student leader Jorge
44 US Department of Commerce, Investment, 14-15.
45 Information mainly from Julio Cdsar Mascar6s, His tor ia de la banca en Cuba: 1492-2000, La 
Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 2004,109-121. One peso was officially equal to one dollar.
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Ruiz Ferrer, explained: ‘When we took power, Batista had taken everything, all the 
money; the country’s reserves. We didn’t have capital, it was a country de­
capitalised; the national funds had been stolen!’46 The new government had only 
national savings and tax revenue to draw on for investments, severely limiting public 
expenditure and private investment.
Public debt was a massive 1.24 billion peso on 31 December 1958: 788 million held 
directly by the state and 450 million in issues by public institutions guaranteed by the 
state, although largely for private investment. Most of this debt was accumulated 
during Batista’s reign, up from 177 million peso in 1952, demonstrating the level of 
credit expansion in this period. Partly this reflects the corruption of dictatorship, 
which channelled state funds to private institutions set up by its collaborators. 
Foreign control of industry and commerce and the stagnation of the sugar sector 
meant that public office became the means to accumulation and social mobility by 
Cubans. ‘Control of the state bureaucracy provided access to resources inaccessible 
elsewhere.’47 Cuba's economic domination by foreign capital created a political
A O
infrastructure in which corruption and graft were structurally inherent.
Jimenez Velo joined the NBC in 1953 as the head of Inspection. Early in January 
1959, he was sent to maintain control at the Bank of Economic and Social 
Development (BANDES). Set up in 1955, with the state as sole share holder, 
Jimenez claimed that: ‘the main objective of the Bank, and this was its 
“development” part, was to favour the members of the dictatorship; they made 
themselves rich. Public credit was used to finance anonymous enterprises.’49 
Consequently a flurry of public works took place during the 1950s, and were 
inherited by the Revolution: the square and statue of Jose Marti (turned into 
Revolution Square); Havana Town Hall (now the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Cuba) the National Bank (now the Ameijeiras Mejeida
46 Jorge Ruiz Ferrer, interview, 5 April 2006.
47 Marifeli Perez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course and Legacy, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999,38.
48 US investment controlled 90% of telephone and electric services, 50% of public railways and 40% 
of Cuban sugar production.
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hospital), among others: ‘The Department of Work Concessions financed 
investments in infrastructure that generated incomes for the initial payment and 
interest on the bonds which were issued as a means of obtaining resources, for 
example toll roads, maritime terminals and other of a similar character’, explained 
Jimenez.50
January 1959
Immediately after the Revolution, Felipe Perez Pazos was named as President of the 
NBC; a politician and economist, he signed the Manifesto to the Cuban People with 
Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestra in July 1957. He immediately took measures to 
stop the withdrawal of funds by ex-functionaries and collaborators of the Batista 
regime and to prevent that money returning to Cuba to cause inflation, or fund 
counter-revolutionaries.51 To avoid devaluation of the peso, a system of control of 
international charges and payments was adopted, restricting the sale of hard currency 
for leisure trips, for remittances and the transfer of capital abroad.
In April 1959, 1,000 and 500 peso banknotes were withdrawn from circulation. In 
September 1959, another law criminalised currency speculation. This stopped 
Batistiano officials extracting money from the country. However, despite these 
controls, which aimed to avoid capital flight: ‘the directors of the National Bank did 
not apply them with the necessary severity in the first months of 1959’ according to
49 Juan Raimundo Jimenez Velo, interview, 6 February 2006. Jimenez gave me details of BANDES 
projects to demonstrate this point.
0 Jimenez, written submission, February 2006.
51 Commercial banks were ordered to stop payments of cheques when the amount suggested unusual 
movement of the account and access to vaults and security boxes was prohibited until new instructions 
were received. On the 28 January 1959, the Monetary Stabilisation Fund placed a 50 peso cash limit 
for all visitors, Cuban or foreign, entering the country.
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Raul Cepero Bonillo, the Revolution’s first Minister of Trade.52 As a consequence 
on 26 November 1959, Guevara was named as President.
Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara as President of the National Bank
‘ Who are those that were worried when we designated Che as President 
o f the National Bank? Surely it was not the guajiros (country folk), the 
sugar workers, nor the poor. Who was worried, who launched a little 
campaign against Che, who slandered Che, who distorted Che’s ideas 
and turned Che into a phantom... and when we designated Che they had a 
big fright, those who were shocked by the phantom they had created... 
Che is not there to carry out any barbarity. Che is there the same as 
when we sent him to Las Villas [central Cuba] to stop the enemy troops 
passing towards Oriente [eastern Cuba], he is in the National Bank to 
stop hard currency leaving, and ensure the store o f hard currency that 
we have is invested correctly. ’
Guevara’s principal qualification was commitment to national independence, and to 
the increasingly socialist character of the revolutionary process; the rest was a case of 
learning on the job. His nomination reveals the severity of the crisis, and the speed of 
transition, where the impulse to radicalise the regime outstripped its technical 
capacity to facilitate that transformation. He was no more an economist then he had 
been a soldier or industrialist, although shortly after taking the job he wrote to his 
parents, perhaps ironically, of his ‘apparently God-given gift for finance.’54 This task
52 Raul Cepero Bonilla, ‘El Canje de Billetes: un Glope a la Contrarrevolucidn’ in Cuba Socialista, 
Afio 1, No. 2, Octubre 1961, La Habana, 43. Bonillo, who replaced Guevara as NBC president in 
February 1961, died in an airplane accident returning from a United Nations conference in Brazil in 
1962. Meanwhile, Pazos left Cuba along with Justo Carrillo, Vice President of NBC and director of 
the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank (BANFAI). In October 1960 Guevara revealed 
that: ‘Felipe Pazos is in Puerto Rico occupying around fourth or fifth place in the leadership of the 
counter-revolution. Of course, the doctor Carrillo is also there and also has a place in the same 
“rating”.’ ‘Intervencidn en el Ciclo de Conferencias del Banco Nacional’, 20 October 1960, in 
Escritos y  Discursos. Tomo 4, La Habana: Editorial de Ciencia Sociales, 1977,215.
53 Fidel Castro Ruz, at the sugar workers’ plenary, December 1959, responding to uproar in the 
conservative press about Guevara’s appointment as President of the NBC. Cited by Borrego, Camino, 
14 to 15.
54 Cited by Anderson, Che, 447.
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and his leadership of industry provided experience of financial administration, later 
institutionalised in the BFS. Borrego, who was left in charge of the Department of 
Industrialisation, said that Guevara effectively continued to direct the work there as 
they met every night to discuss it.55 In addition, he studied maths with Salvador 
Vileseca, the economist who accompanied him on the ‘goodwill’ mission. Learning 
maths and economics ‘on the job’ no doubt contributed to his ambitious projects 
around using applied mathematics for economic analysis and control.
Vilaseca, who had been active against the dictator Machado in the 1920s, recalled 
that Che asked him to work as Bank administrator: ‘The administrator was the 
second in the Bank and I was scared... I had never been in a bank and I didn’t 
possess an account. I said: “I don’t know anything about banks.” He replied “Me 
neither and I am the President, but when the Revolution assigns you to a post the 
only thing to do is to accept, get studying and work to perform as you should.’”56 
Apart from Vileseca, the only other companero Guevara took to the bank was Jose 
Manressa, a former desk sergeant under Batista in La Cabana who he had adopted as 
his own secretary. Guevara worked with the remaining NBC staff, those who hadn’t 
joined the exodus of managers and professionals overseas. The banking trade union 
had been among the most radical in the struggle against Batista, but it represented the 
clerks and administrators, not economists and directors. It was different at the 
management level, as Jimenez testified: ‘There was an enormous emigration. I had 
colleagues that invited me to go to Venezuela where I would be paid double. Most of 
the management personnel left. In Bank Inspections, for example, of 40 people 4 or 5 
remained.’57
Dr Oscar Fernandez Mel, who lived with Guevara in this period, said that Guevara 
was surrounded with experts learning from them and supervising, outlining the 
objectives and drawing his own conclusions: ‘In practice he became an economist in
c o
the bank.’ Ruiz said the bank functionaries accepted Guevara’s presidency, because
55 Borrego, interview, 15 March 2006.
56 Salvador Vilaseca, unpublished interview with Tatiana Martinez Hemdndez, 1994 Havana. Vileseca 
died in 1996.
57 Jimdnez, interview.
58 Oscar Femdndez Mel, interview, 10 January 2006.
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despite being capitalist bureaucrats, they appreciated that Guevara was methodical 
and organised: ‘They were content with Che in that sense.’59 Vilaseca recalled after 
calling the bank staff together to explain the concepts behind voluntary labour, the 
activity was kept up every Sunday: ‘One of Che’s characteristics which I discovered 
in the National Bank was that he knew how to form cadre. The staff had good 
technical formation but they were not really revolutionaries and he gave them that 
formation’ said Vileseca.60 Two months into his presidency, Guevara apologised, 
perhaps tongue-in-cheek, to his audience at the NBC: ‘because my talk has been 
much more fiery than that which the post I occupy would make you suppose; I ask 
once more for forgiveness, but I am still much more of a guerrilla than President of 
the National Bank.’61 As if to prove it, he signed banknotes with his Cuban nom de 
guerre; Che.
According to John Gerassi:
‘The first question he asked of his subordinates when he took over the 
bank was “Where has Cuba deposited its gold reserves and dollars?”
When he was told, “In Fort Knox,” he immediately decided to sell, 
converting the gold reserves into currencies which were exported to 
Canadian or Swiss banks. Thanks to his foresightedness, Cuba was not 
caught in a bind -  indeed, it would have gone bankrupt -  when the 
United States seized all Cuba’s assets in the United States.’63
One day after Guevara’s designation a new resolution established a system of import 
licences and stopped the importation of many luxury goods. An International 
Department was made responsible for granting compulsory licences to import or 
export.
59 Ruiz, interview.
60 Vilaseca, interview.
61 Guevara, ‘Discurso en el Banco Nacional’ 29 January 1960, in Guevara: Escritos, Vol. 4, 67.
62 Buch, Pasos, 149.
63 John Gerassi, (ed) ‘Introduction’ in Venceremos! The speeches and writings o f Che Guevara, 
London: Panther, 1969,41.
79
Chapter 4: Revolutionary consolidation and the emergence o f the Budgetary Finance System
Guevara took decisive political measures to cut financial links with the US and 
international capitalist institutions, announcing Cuba’s withdrawal from the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank. He ended a contract signed by Pazos for a US firm to report on BANDES’ 
potential. Jimenez said: ‘he did not consider it reliable to base any development 
policies on the criteria which came from them, more so when there were 
revolutionary Cuban professionals who are capable of carrying out these kind of 
tasks.’64 BANDES was abolished in February 1960.
To counter the effects of economic warfare anticipated from the US, in April 1960 
the Bank of Foreign Commerce (BANCEC) was set up, with Guevara as chair of the 
commission which oversaw it. Boorstein, who was advising BANCEC, explained 
that the predominant function of the bank was as a government foreign-trade agency:
‘...in July (1960) BANCEC was instructed to import large quantities of 
goods as rapidly as possible, so as to reduce the impact of the embargo 
which the United States was expected to place on exports to Cuba.... The 
successful takeover and operation of the Cuban economy depended 
greatly on how well its foreign trade was managed under the rapidly 
changing conditions produced by the elimination of the US sugar quota, 
nationalization, the American embargo, and the need to reorient about 80 
percent of Cuba’s trade to the socialist countries... Quickly a 
rudimentary organisation was set up -  Import and Export Divisions and a 
Financial Division to prepare the information required by the National 
Bank.’65
The US blockade was indeed enforced from October 1960. Cuba’s need for a state 
monopoly of trade was part of the broader structural changes underway, which 
inevitably involved the nationalisation of the bank. Bank historian Julio Cesar 
Mascaros wrote that: ‘Of all the tasks the BNC had faced since its foundation none
64 Jimenez, written submission. Jimenez adds that Guevara ensured that the US firm were duly paid 
according to the contract.
65 Boorstein, Transformation, 31 and 64-5.
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had such political connotations, or was as complicated and far-reaching as the 
nationalization of the bank.’66 This was a direct response to the US government’s 
cutting of Cuba’s sugar quota.
On 3 July the US Congress authorised President Eisenhower to reduce Cuba’s sugar 
quota. Three days later, the Revolution’s Council of Ministers approved the forcible 
expropriation by the Cuban government of US industrial, banking and commercial 
operations. The law compensated expropriated owners with long-term government 
bonds in peso.67 14 hours later the US cut Cuba’s sugar quota by 700,000 tons. On 20 
July the Soviet Union said it would buy the sugar dropped by the US. On 21 and 22 
July, the Cuban government seized the three largest US sugar-mills. In the next two 
months tensions increased with retaliatory acts between the US and Cuba. On 17 
September Cuba nationalised three US banks and their branches and dependencies in 
Cuba -  The First National City Bank of New York, the First National Bank of 
Boston and the Chase Manhattan Bank -  with total assets of 249 million peso, 149 
million in loans, 207 million in deposits and capital or reserves of 12.5 million. The 
nationalisation resolution stated: ‘It is not possible that a considerable part of the 
National Bank should remain in the hands of imperialist interests that have led to the 
reduction of our sugar quota in a cowardly act and criminal economic 
aggression...’68 Thus articulating the link between the role of the bank, the sugar 
industry and the struggle for national independence.69
On 13 October 1960 all private banks in Cuba were nationalised with a resolution 
stating that the creation of money and the assigning of credit should belong 
exclusively to the state according to the requirements of economic planning and 
should not be entrusted to private enterprises that functioned under the profit
66 Julio Cesar Mascaros, Historia de la banca en Cuba (1492-2000), Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, La 
Habana, 2004,113.
67 The lack of financial reserves made cash compensation impossible. In addition, the government 
may have believed the bonds were an incentive to expropriated owners to urge the US government not 
to cut the sugar quota, which would inevitably annul the possibility of compensation.
68 Cited by Mascaros, Banca, 114-5.
69 Guillermo Jimenez Las Empresas de Cuba 1958, La Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 573-4 & 595-6, 
details these links, for example, between the Bank of Boston and the United Fruit Company, which 
owned two of the largest sugar mills in Cuba.
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HC\incentive, prioritising the interests of the individual, over the collective. Three more 
foreign banks were nationalised, five public credit institutions and 44 domestic 
commercial banks.71 Just six out of the 55 (1.5%) of the banks in Cuba had been 
foreign, but they had held 32% of capital and reserves and 32.5% of cash, had 35% 
of total client deposits, 38% of loans and investments, 41% of bank loans and 31% of 
investments in state bonds and other public and private values, demonstrating the 
disproportionate domination by foreign banks of Cuban financial institutions.72 Six 
months prior to the declaration of socialism, the bank nationalisations turned the 
NBC into the sole bank in Cuba. Less than two years after the Revolution, Cuba had 
one state monopoly bank, which brought it institutionally closer to the Lenin’s model 
of the socialist state bank than even the Soviet Union which still had several banks. 
Guevara asserted that nationalisation: ‘effectively guarantees that the Agrarian 
Reform and the great aspirations to industrialise the country won’t suffer from any 
sabotage or obstacles within the country.’73 The NBC, he said, would be restructured 
along three lines: agricultural credit, industrial or commercial credit and a monopoly 
on imports and foreign trade.
The nationalisations of September and October 1960 transferred to the state 83.6% of 
industry, all sugar mills, 42.5% of land, most trade, the banks and the 
communications networks. On 23 February, at the same time that Guevara was 
named Minister of Industries, state control of all credits and finances was decreed. 
The NBC concentrated the functions of a central bank, investment bank, international 
operations bank and people’s saving bank, increasing its capital to 100 million peso. 
Banking offices were built throughout the country to give the population access and 
encourage savings. Boorstein wrote that: ‘The new organic law provided, not for the 
immediate, but for the “gradual and progressive introduction of the principles of 
planning credit and monetary circulations”...The new National Bank with its 
centralisation of monetary resources, its power of direct decision over credit, and its
70 Mascaros, Banca, 115.
71 Foreign banks were: Royal Bank of Canada, The Bank of Nova Scotia and the Bank of China. 
Credit institutions were: BANFAI, National Finance Bank of Cuba, Cuban Bank of Foreign Trade 
(BANCEX), BANDES and the Assured Mortgages Fund.
72 Cited by Mascaros, Banca, 116-7.
73 Guevara, Intervencion, 216.
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integration into a broader planning mechanism would give Cuba a powerful 
instrument of monetary planning and control.’74 Later, during the Great Debate, 
Guevara challenged the concept of a socialist bank asserting financial control over 
production. This reflected both his experience of implementing administrative 
control in MININD, and the deepening of Marxist analysis from the study of Capital.
Changing the bank notes
‘Less than one year after the nationalization o f the bank, the NBC faced 
an operation o f such magnitude and importance in the economic- 
financial sphere it could be compared with the political-military defeat 
inflicted on the counter-revolution and imperialism at the Bay o f Pigs. ’
The change of banknotes was necessary to regain control of the money supply, stop 
capital flight and remove funding sources for the counter-revolution. Between 
December 1958 and August 1961, Cuba’s money supply had tripled according to 
NBC issues. However, prices rose only 6%, because up to 40% of the notes were 
being hoarded. In December 1958, monetary circulation was 451.2 million peso. 
More than that sum, 462.1 million, was not presented for exchange in August 1961, 
although officially money circulation should have been $1,187 million. According to 
BNC’s then President, Cepero Bonilla, the order to print the new banknotes was 
given in August 1960, under Guevara’s presidency. Jimenez said that only Guevara, 
Castro, Dorticds and Vilaseca knew about the change; and that Cepero Bonilla was 
only informed when the project was ready.76 Vilaseca said that Guevara ordered the 
printing of the banknotes while he was in Czechoslovakia. ‘This was a secret here for 
many years.’77 Jimenez confirmed that: ‘Che ordered Vilaseca to make the money
74 Boorstein, Transformation, 144-5.
75 Mascaros, Banca, 119. In fact, during the Bay of Pigs invasion, the government took measures to 
combat US plans to create inflationary pressures. Thousands of Cuban workers in the US Naval Base 
in Guantanamo who were paid in dollars were suddenly permitted to exchange the dollars for five 
peso banknotes hoarded in US banks. 350,000 peso a month entered Cuban territory via these means 
alone until frontier controls were set up. From Cepero Bonilla, Canje, 46.
76 Jim6nez, interview.
77 Vilaseca, interview.
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7JIand guard it in military zones. The people thought it was armaments.’ Jimenez also 
pointed out that all socialist countries had changed their bank notes and it was a 
process which was necessarily carried out in secret. It is possible to speculate that 
Guevara was advised to undertake this action whilst visiting the socialist countries. It 
was clearly vital to remove the money which the counter-revolution was using.
Cubans had the weekend of 4 to 8 August 1961 to exchange their cash for new 
banknotes. 3,500 exchange centres were set up, with ten operatives in each, having 
been given instructions just hours before the change began. Another 10,000 bank 
workers dealt with the technical aspects of the change and thousands of militia and 
FAR soldiers guarded the exchange centres, the banks and the trucks: ‘We calculate 
conservatively that more than 60,000 people were mobilized’ recorded Cepero
* •' 7Q _ _ .
Bonilla. This operation was organised: ‘with perfect discretion and efficiency, so 
our enemies, from the sophisticated CIA to the last gusano (counter-revolutionary 
worm) would find out about the change through the press, and would not be able to 
take protective measures’ according to Mascaros.80
Rosario Cueto, Borrego’s personal assistant in the Department of Industrialisation, 
was also summoned to join the operation: ‘We did not leave there for 72 hours’ she 
said, explaining how preparations were kept secret: ‘For example, Che got Herman 
Lopez to do the drawings for the banknotes, but he didn’t know what they were for.’ 
These drawings still adorn Cuban peso notes today:
‘We worked on the withdrawal and organisation of the money. I had a 
list of people to call and things to guard. You did not know what they 
were, but you had to do it. Everything was very confidential, very 
compartmentalised. It gave us a level of discretion that was incredible 
considering how young we were. There are things which I still haven’t
78 Velo, interview.
79 Cepero Bonilla, Canje, 44.
80 Mascaros, Banca, 119-120.
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old my family. I said I didn’t want anyone to tell me anything which I
O f
didn’t need to know.’
The decree was overt in its aim to: ‘end the insecurity and risks which result from the 
fact that the banknotes currently in circulation are printed by foreign enterprises 
outside the effective control of the revolutionary government...[and] to prevent 
national monetary resources in the possession of the external counterrevolution from 
being used to conspire against the revolutionary government and the people of 
Cuba’82 Up to 200 peso for each nuclear family was changed immediately, while 
sums surplus to that were deposited in a special account, to be changed and 
withdrawn afterwards. Special Accounts were set up for institutions, enterprises, 
trade unions, political and social organisations and legal personnel, and there were 
special facilities for diplomats, tourists and foreign non-residents. No one could 
arrive or leave the island during the weekend, to prevent hoarders returning from 
abroad to change their banknotes. On the Monday, a new law limited private bank 
deposits. Up to 1,000 peso in deposit would be changed immediately; more than that 
was placed in Special Accounts receiving 3% interests. Up to 10,000 peso could be 
withdrawn in 100 peso monthly instalments. Sums in excess of 10,000 peso 
remained without changeable value. In other words this wealth was expropriated. 
This accumulated: ‘enough to amortise the long term debt of the National Bank, that 
has decreased by 497 million peso’, declared NBC’s President Cepero Bonilla.83 
Changing the banknotes prevented capital flight, demonetised the counter­
revolution’s stolen funds and paid off the Bank’s debt.
The bank and Guevara’s Budgetary Finance System (BFS)
Aleida March, participant in the revolutionary struggle and Guevara’s widow, said 
that Castro sent Guevara to the bank to prevent the exit of hard currency and to 
define the role of the bank. However, she emphasised two distinct periods in relation 
to Guevara and the bank: ‘the first, when he was placed in the bank, without knowing
81 Rosario Cueto, interview in Havana, 20 March 2006.
82 Law 963,4 August 1961, cited by Mascaros, Banca, 120.
83 Cepero Bonilla, Canje, 52.
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clearly what its role was in socialism; the second, when he had developed the lines of 
the Budgetary Finance System and analysed how the bank should function within 
this system. These are different stages.’84 In contrast Jimenez claimed that: ‘Che used 
the bank to consolidate, in an operative form, the Budgetary Finance System that was 
based on the budgeting of expenditures and incomes... Che was developing his 
system consciously through the bank; the bank had to establish it.’85 The truth is no 
doubt somewhere between these two interpretations, because the organisational 
structure of the BFS was established by Guevara in the Department of Industrialisa­
tion as a organisational apparatus to cope with concrete problems created by the 
nationalisation of industry, contemporaneously to his work as President of the NBC. 
However, this preliminary structure was gradually transformed into a unified system 
as Guevara deepened his theoretical conceptions about the transition to socialism. 
These are detailed in the following chapter.
Department of Industrialisation
‘ With the exception o f a few food products, lumber and textile industries,
Cuba continues to be a producer o f raw materials. Sugar is exported to 
import sweets, hides are exported to import shoes, iron is exported to 
import ploughs... Everyone agrees that the need to industrialise the 
country is urgent, that there is a lack o f metallurgy industries; paper 
industries; chemical industries; that there is a need for breeding, crop 
cultivation, technological improvement and processing o f our food  
industries so that they can resist the ruinous competition from European 
industries o f cheese products, condensed milk, liquors and oils, and the 
north American canned goods; that we need merchant ships; that tourism 
could be an enormous source o f revenue, but the owners o f capital
84 Aleida March, interview in Havana, 20 January 2005.
85 Jimenez, interview.
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I demand that the workers remain under the Claudian yoke; the state
86folds its arms and industrialisation can wait for the Greek calendar.’
Castro’s exposition on the state of domestic industry was hardly more radical than 
that reached by the IBRD which concluded there was a need:
‘1. To make Cuba less dependent on sugar by promoting additional 
activities...; 2. To expand existing -  and to create new -  industries 
producing sugar by-products and using sugar as a raw material...; 3. 
Vigorously promote non-sugar exports... the promotion of mineral 
exports and of the export of a variety of crude and processed foodstuffs;
4. To make further progress in producing in Cuba, for domestic 
consumption, a wide range of foodstuffs, raw materials and consumer 
goods now imported.’87
On 7 October Guevara was announced as the head of a new institution to foster 
industrial development, one of a number of departments created within INRA. 
Orlando Borrego recounted that: ‘Che invited me to work with him. Che was to be 
the director and I was to be the vice-director. We had no idea of what needed to be 
done; we just knew we had to develop industry.’88 Guevara’s secretary Manressa also 
joined him while Aleida March was his personal assistant. Guevara is reported to 
have said to Borrego: ‘Well, the first thing we have to do is finish the construction...
A Q
Then I want you to take over the administration of the Department.’ Gradually 
other trusted revolutionaries were added to the Department staff: Francisco ‘Pancho’ 
Garcia Vais, a PSP official; Calixto Morales from the Rebel Army; Ruiz and the
86 Fidel Castro Ruz, La Historia Me Absolverd, Pedro Alvarez Tablo y Guillermo Alonso Fiel (ed), La 
Habana: Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado, 2005,47. ‘Under the Claudian yoke’ refers 
to the city of Claudius where in 32 BC the Samenite general Pontius Herennio made the defeated 
Roman army file past him bent double in humiliation.
87 IBRD Report, 13.
88 Borrego, Speech, International Youth Seminar, 23 November 2002. See also Borrego, Camino, 19.
89 Cited by Anderson, Che, 438.
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team from ICA who had worked on the Agrarian Reform law; Alfredo Menendez, 
Juan Borroto, Omelio Sanchez and Juan Idearte.90
Borrego recorded a peculiar situation because: ‘the Department of Industrialisation 
had no industry under its management.’91 Its first acquisition was a small plastics 
factory with a mechanics workshop owned by Segismundo Pons, a tram driver and 
mechanic who had financed the PSP before the Revolution. Pons’ factory was in 
financial difficulty in 1959 and he made contact with Guevara offering to sell it to 
the Department. A mixed private-state enterprise was agreed. Pons’ head of sales, 
Mario Zorrilla, a PSP member, was invited by Borrego to manage the chemical 
industry enterprise there, which he did from March 1960. This mixed venture 
model was rejected shortly afterwards as events determined the type of ownership. 
The new industries passing into the Department’s jurisdiction fell into three 
categories. Firstly, recovered industries, belonging to members of Batista’s regime, 
those who left the country or had property confiscated by the courts for involvement 
in the dictatorship and passed to the Department by the Ministry of Embezzled
Q'XGoods. Secondly, intervened industries, factories or workshops where labour 
disputes had arisen because the owners had not paid salaries or production was 
interrupted for supply problems or lack of finances and which were passed to 
Industrialisation by the Ministry of Labour. Thirdly, nationalised industries, 
determined by the nationalisations laws, including those previously recovered or 
intervened.94
The Department’s second acquisition was a small tile factory employing 20 workers. 
The owner, a member of Batista’s regime had fled to the US without paying 
the workers. The third factory was the old American Steel, which had been closed for
90 Menendez became the Director of the Consolidated Enterprise of Sugar in MININD, Borroto 
became the Director of Supervision, S&nchez was the Director of the Consolidated Enterprise of 
Minerals & the Institute of Cuban Mineral Resources.
91 Borrego, Camino, 15
92 Mario Zorrilla, interview, 27 March 2006.
93 Ministerio de Bienes Malversados, translated by Thomas, Cuba, as Ministry of Stolen Property and 
by Anderson Che, as Recovery of Illegally Acquired Property, set up in January 1959 and headed by 
Faustino P6rez, a leader of urban M26J, in accordance with point five of the Moncada Programme, for 
property to be confiscated from ministers and politicians involved with Batista.
4 Borrego, Camino, 15-16.
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several years, laying off hundreds of employees. With just three factories, Borrego 
admitted: ‘we already considered our organisation to be something important from 
the “productive” point of view.’95 However the Department had no funds. A national 
campaign was underway to raise funds for INRA because the Treasury had been 
depleted. Ruiz had the idea of selling revolutionary Christmas cards to raise money: 
‘Che loved the idea; he got the best Cuban artists to design them for free and we 
printed and sold millions.’96 Throughout Cuba people donated money or jewellery to 
build up the country’s gold reserves. Borrego, Ruiz and other revolutionaries without 
dependants donated 50% of their salaries to INRA’s funds. Individual contributions 
were institutionalised when western European banks, under pressure from the US, 
refused to grant credit to Cuba in March 1960. On 18 March, a new law put 4% of 
workers’ salaries towards a fund for industrialisation. A week later another law took
0710% from government ministers and the President to fund industrialisation. 
Nationalisations and the search for new administrators
In March 1959, the new government ‘intervened’ in the US-owned Cuban branch of 
the International Telephone and Telegraphy company, officially to investigate 
irregularities in its operations. Effectively, it was the first nationalisation. The 
company, and the team of public accountants who carried out the intervention, were 
then incorporated into the Ministry of Embezzled Goods along with all other 
confiscated properties.98 Nationalisations gathered apace. In July 1960 alone, the 
book value of the US industrial enterprises nationalised was $800 million. In October 
1960, there were two major nationalisation laws. On 14 October the Urban Reform 
Law went into effect nationalising all commercially owned real estate and all large 
industrial, commercial and transportation companies, including 20 with US owners. 
Around 200 small US companies remained in private hands. On 24 October, in direct 
response to the imposition of a partial US trade blockade, all remaining US property 
in Cuba was nationalised. The tit-for-tat retaliations between Cuba and the US are
95 Borrego, Camino, 16.
96 Ruiz, interview.
97 Valdes, Reforma, 198.
98 Joaquin Infante Ugarte, interview, 18 January 2005. Infante was a public accountant on the team 
which intervened in the telephone company.
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well documented." However, to capture the excitement, uncertainty and intensity of 
the period, and understand Guevara’s contribution and response to this process, it is 
worth recording the anecdotes of those who lived through the experience at his side. 
Borrego recalled when Law 890 nationalised 200 foreign enterprises, including 80 
sugar mills:
‘Che called me at dawn straight after the law was passed and said we 
need to find 200 managers for those factories by tomorrow. I nearly had a 
heart attack! Where were we going to find them? I only knew about three 
people with any accountancy experience. Half an hour later Che called 
me again and said “Fidel has an idea, a solution.” There was a boarding 
school with 200 youngsters aged between 15 and 20 years old, training to 
be voluntary teachers for the Sierra Maestra. Fidel said “we will make 
them the managers of the factories.” I was shocked! A few minutes later 
Fidel called me and told me to go to the school even though it was the 
middle of the night to wake them. Fidel arrived at 4am. The students 
went mad with joy, throwing their things up to the ceiling. They were 
told they would be managers, they were very happy. I returned to the 
. office to prepare the paper work so they could take an official letter to the 
factories. But we had a practical problem. There were no computers. All I 
had was a list of their names, ages and educational levels. I took a 
typewriter, wrote a template with a gap for the student’s name and the 
factory name. I reproduced it with a stencil, and I had to make 200 copies 
in a couple of hours. The students arrived in the morning. At the same 
time, I was supposed to receive Jean-Paul Sartre and his wife Simone de 
Beauvoir, so I invited them to be witnesses to this process, the French 
philosopher at my side. Sartre's eyes were coming out of his head. I 
asked him what he thought of the process. “You are crazy!” he said 
“They are adolescents!” ,10°
99 For a daily chronology see Jane Franklin Cuba and the United States: A chronological history, 
Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1997.
100 Borrego, speech & Camino, 19.
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Eugenio Basott, an M26J member, pointed out that the million Cubans who left in 
the first years of the Revolution were those who managed the country. It was difficult 
to find substitutes:
‘I took part in the management of 22 sugar mills and ten distilleries I 
didn’t know how to manage anything. When we nationalised the sugar 
industry, you know who we used to manage the sugar mills? Voluntary 
teachers between 15 and 20 years old. But at that moment in the sugar 
industry the working class was very strong and there were many old trade 
union workers so it was very easy for those young workers to manage the 
mills.’101
In other words, this was a feasible solution because the young cadre could count on 
the support of workers and the trade unions who accepted the authority invested in 
Borrego’s stencilled certificates. Many of these youngsters were replaced as 
MININD found appropriate substitutes and returned to their original teaching task. 
However, arguably the experience moulded Guevara’s approach to industrial 
organisation by providing important lessons: that commitment to the ever- 
radicalising Revolution was as important as technical experience in industrial 
leadership; the value of collaboration between the administrator and experienced 
workers; that no measures considered necessary to secure political and economic 
independence should be avoided for functional considerations. Such problems could 
be resolved sobre la marcha [on the move] with educational and political work and 
discipline.
Given Guevara’s commitment to socialism as a system, it can be assumed that he 
aspired to the nationalisation of industry from the outset. However, this assumption 
and hindsight should not de-historicise the dynamism and fluidity of the situation, the 
essentially reactive nature of the nationalisations. For example, Ruiz recalled how he 
inadvertently influenced the nationalisation of the steel industry. As the architect on 
the National Bank building project he was informed that the stock of belaying pins,
101 Eugenio Basott, interview, 9 December 2004.
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vital in construction, would soon run out because the blockade had ended the raw 
material supply from the US. This would be disastrous; the Revolution had embarked 
on ambitious construction projects: homes for peasants and in urban slums, roads in 
rural areas, and recreational facilities for workers and so on.
‘We could see that within 50 or 60 days we would run out of belaying 
pins. I took the information on one page to Che in the National Bank. It 
was evening. Che was hurrying and said “don’t give me bits of paper 
now; I am going to the Council of Ministers”. I said “This is for the 
Council of Ministers” and he replied “Well then do give me bits of 
paper”. It read: “Commandante, here is the number of belaying pins that 
will be produced in Cuba and how many we need to consume. Greetings, 
Jorge.” And below that was a table showing the figures. The next 
morning my secretary threw me the newspaper. The headline said 
“Nationalised -  the Steel and Iron Industry in Cuba!”’102
A cross-class, anti-imperialist nationalist impulse drove the confrontation with 
foreign firms, particularly from the US, pitting wealthier Cubans together with 
workers in the struggle for independence via socialism. For example, Angel Arcos 
Bergnes was an auditor in the US Verientes Sugar Company earning US$1,200 
annually. Arcos worked undercover for the M26J and revealed his affinity with the 
Revolution when the mill was nationalised: ‘It was one of the most powerful, moving 
moments in my life’ he recalled. Shocked to see where his loyalties lay, his bosses 
offered to double to salary if he left Cuba for the US. He refused. ‘That day I 
committed class suicide, I ceased to represent the interests of the petit-bourgeoisie in 
order to continue with the revolutionary process.’
The Department searched frantically for administrators for the hundreds of new state 
owned production units. Ruiz recalled:
102 Ruiz, interview. Ruiz slept in the vault in the National Bank construction works.
103 Angel Arcos Bergnes, interview, 8 December 2004.
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‘Every afternoon Borrego arrived with a list of all the factories and 
enterprises that had been nationalised. He would say “We need a head of 
production relating to metal balls -  call so-and-so. An enterprise that 
produces things to do with optics in Matanzas -  ring thingy, he’s 
designated as director. A sugar mill in such a place -  who here is from 
that province? Send them there!” These were comrades from the Rebel 
Army, or a friend who you knew more or less. Borrego would say “Who 
do you have there, and what are they? An engineer! Send that one! And 
you know them? What kind of person is he? He’s clean, wasn’t with 
Batista?” It was just like that. We didn’t have any more time.’104
Many of the new administrators had low educational levels and were suddenly in 
charge of complex production units, often with hundreds of workers. The ideal was 
to find people with accountancy training or administrative experience, but principally 
they had to be loyal to the Revolution and honest. Public accountancy could be 
studied in night classes before 1959, so there were working class accountants. 
However, basic accountancy was far short of the kind of managerial and technical 
experience necessary to run some of the technologically sophisticated modem 
industries in Cuba, particularly the subsidiaries of US firms. Cuba was assisted early 
on by advisors and technicians from Latin America, including ECLA, and from 
regional communist and other left-wing parties and, later, from the socialist bloc 
countries.
Grouping industries and centralising finances
The production units that came under the Department’s jurisdiction ranged from 
modem technology plants to artisan workshops. Financially, they ranged from 
profitable to bankrupt. Guevara devised two structures to deal with this problem, 
both of which proved to be elemental in the development of the BFS over the 
following years. Firstly, diverse production units were organised for administrative 
purposes into groups or sectors. In the Department these groupings were labelled
104 • •Ruiz, interview.
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Cohsolidados (Consolidates), but later in MININD they were Empresas 
Consolidadas (Consolidated Enterprises). Secondly, the finances of each unit were 
centralised, so all revenues were paid into a bank account from which each entity 
was allocated a budget.
For administrative purposes, it was decided that the state’s new means of production 
should be grouped according to industrial sector, rather than territorially. Enrique 
Oltuski, a leading member of the urban M26J and the new government’s first 
Minister of Communications, worked with Guevara on this organisational structure. 
He aimed to solve the problem of a lack of technicians by centralising the 
administration of industries to allow more efficient allocation of scarce specialists.105 
Ruiz recalled the process of discussion among the Department’s founding members 
to work out details, such as the appropriate title for these groupings:
‘We were discussing it with Borrego. Che wanted “trustifica”, like the 
English word “trust”. I said “we are consolidating.” Che said “that’s the 
word: Consolidadol” We united groups of industries. We didn’t know 
anything about economics. We would spend the day studying when we 
had a big debate of this type. We had to go to the library or we sent for 
books and we spent an entire night arguing. It was very amusing; there 
would be one person here, two over there, everyone reading, and soon 
someone would exclaim “oh it’s here, I’ve got it!” And another would 
reply “no, look what I’ve got here!” We would have a tremendous 
discussion all night. We didn’t sleep but we carried on work during the 
day. When we had a problem we grappled with it until we knew how to 
resolve it. We found a solution and afterwards we continued reading and 
we went on improving. We weren’t theoreticians. There were some 
theoreticians but there weren’t many.’106
This expresses the dialectical process behind the consolidation of the Revolution;
105 Enrique Oltuski Osaka, 40 Aniversario de Industrias. La Habana: Editora Politica. 2001. 14.
106 Ruiz, interview.
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sobre la marcha, learning by doing, the dynamic between theory and practice, cause 
and effect, conflict and resolution. Guevara underwent this process with his Cuban 
colleagues and it fed into the formation of the BFS.
More serious was the problem of financing production and preventing production 
stoppages where factories did not have funds to pay salaries, acquire raw materials 
and so on. A single bank account was created for the Department in which all 
the factories would deposit their incomes, from the highly profitable enterprises: 
cigarettes, beer, soft drinks, petrol refineries, cosmetics and cleaning materials, to the 
hundreds of tiny workshops and small factories which were breaking even or 
bankrupt. This way the surpluses of the profitable enterprises could be allocated to 
broke ones, to ensure production continued so that the product was still available and 
unemployment avoided. Each enterprise prepared a budget, adding up its payroll and 
main expenditures for the year. This was the first step to the budgetary system of 
management; it was a concrete measure to ensure production continued throughout 
the industrial sector. The ideological aspect was gradually added as control was 
established and Guevara’s theoretical understanding developed.107
As President of the NBC, Guevara created the central fund, which was held in 
BANFAI until the bank nationalisations. Borroto was among those who visited the 
Department’s new factories in the provinces to make a budget: ‘My responsibility 
was the south coast of Santiago de Cuba.’108 Budgets were duly estimated and 
allocated to the new production units and it was the administrators’ responsibility to 
ensure the budget was applied as planned. Administrators could not receive credit 
from the bank, other enterprises, or from the Department itself. This financial 
discipline was a sharp learning curve for the young administrators. Harry Villegas, a 
squad leader in Guevara’s Rebel Army column, and his bodyguard who lived with 
him throughout 1959, recalled his experience as intervening administrator in a mixed 
Cuban-Mexican enterprise called Sanitarios Nacionales, which sold insulators and 
tiles:
107 Oltuski, Aniversario, 13-4.
108 Borroto, interview.
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‘I had read in a student’s thesis about the possibility of making 
homogenous glazed earthenware, so I tried to make it with Coca Cola 
bottles. I invested the whole budget to test the idea. Che told me that if it 
did not work I would have committed a technical misappropriation and 
would receive a strong sanction for deviating from the budget. I spent 
nights watching that little oven rotating full of coca cola bottles to see if 
they would arrive at the temperature necessary to obtain this glassed 
earthenware. Finally, I was saved! I ran to his house and waited for the 
morning to give him the good news.’109
Young guerrilla fighters accustomed to the discipline of military life accepted the 
discipline of administrative responsibility because they understood that the battle to 
secure production and nationalise industry was part of the same revolutionary 
process as the battle against Batista.
Trade mission to the Soviet bloc
On 21 October 1960, Guevara left the island with the first Cuban delegation to the 
socialist countries to combat the effects of the blockade, partially introduced by the 
US government two days previously. The delegation went to the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia, China and East Germany, before Guevara split off to visit North 
Korea and Hector Rodriguez Llompart, then Vice Minister of Foreign Relations, led 
the rest of the delegation to Vietnam. After two months abroad, Guevara returned to 
Cuba leaving Llompart to continue on to Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and 
Albania.110 The list of imports required, exports for offer and expenditure available 
was prepared by BANCEC. Boorstein was involved in the preparations, which took 
two months, with the intention of making trade agreements covering the whole of the 
following year: ‘The data prepared for Major Guevara’s trade mission to the socialist
109 Harry Villegas Tamayo, interview, 22 March 2006.
110 Hector Rodriguez Llompart in Adys Cupull and Friolan Gonzalez (eds.), Entre Nosotros. La 
Habana: Ediciones Abril, 1992, 92.
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countries in November and December of 1960 constituted, however imperfectly, a 
plan.’111
With the hindsight of Guevara’s later criticisms of the Soviet bloc, it would be 
interesting to know his first impressions. Ariet Garcia, scientific coordinator of the 
Che Guevara Study Centre in Havana, said Guevara had a neutral attitude when he
11  *7first went to the socialist countries. ‘He went with respect, not aware of problems.’ 
Aleida March went further: ‘On Che’s first visit to the socialist countries he thought 
they were almost perfect.’113 However, Borrego, who accompanied Guevara, said he 
already understood that there were problems with the political economy of the 
USSR, before travelling there in person. ‘He developed his ideas from reading and 
talking to people. He read about the law of value being at the centre of the capitalist 
mode of production in Marx’s Capital and then read the Soviet manuals talking 
about the use of the law of value. He also disagreed with the law of value operating 
in trade between socialist countries. He developed that idea by the end of 1960, and it 
was fully developed between 1961-2.’114 Capital reading seminars did not begin in 
MININD until September 1961, however Guevara had read a lot of Marxist literature 
before this and international Marxists like Paul Sweezy, Leo Huberman and Paul 
Baran had been in Cuba since 1959 expounding their own critiques of the Soviet 
system.115
Borrego lacked the theoretical base at that time to analyse the Soviet economic 
management system. However, he did observe: ‘backwardness in administrative 
techniques, a low standard of living compared with Cuba’s average, a contradiction 
between the level of development of science and technology in the arena of space, 
military technology and the scarce application of technology to production.’116 In
111 Boorstein, Transformation, 140.
112 Maria del Carmen Ariet Garcia, interview, 20 January 2005.
113 Aleida March, interview, 20 January 2005.
114 Borrego, interview, 16 November.
115 Bernardo states that Guevara’s views on the law of value in socialism were ‘identical’ to Sweezy’s. 
Theory, 8.
116 Borrego, interview, 30November 2005.
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general he found the workers positive and enthusiastic about the system they had, 
hard working and very humble, although he noted a distance between the leadership 
and the rest of the population. The USSR was going through a period of reforms. 
Borrego said that instead of moral incentives, they talked about material incentives, 
profit and other capitalist categories, which Guevara began to criticise for creating a 
hybrid system. His analysis was evolving.
The results of the trip were tangible including four million tons of sugar sold at four 
centavos a pound, substantially higher than the world market price. Cuba received 
millions of peso worth of credit for purchasing capital and consumer goods. The 
Soviets would adapt petrol refineries, aid with prospecting for Cuban oil, help to 
develop the nickel mines and assist electrification of the country. On this return, 
Guevara announced that: ‘More than 100 contracts have been signed to establish 
plants during the five-year period 1961-1965, and an equal number of plants are in 
discussion to be acquired in the course of those five years.’117 The means of 
production purchased from the socialist countries were added to those confiscated, 
recovered and nationalised, in the organisational and financial structure which 
constituted the shell of the BFS, operating in the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Industrialisation.
EMERGENCE OF THE BUDGETARY FINANCE SYSTEM
The BFS emerged as a practical measure to deal with a concrete problem. However, 
what began as a necessity was institutionalised and given the theoretical base to 
transform it into a comprehensive economic management system. Guevara, and those 
involved with his work in industries, claimed that the BFS was derived from the US 
monopolies. This does not mean it was identical to the monopoly system, but that it 
took key managerial precepts and adapted them to a planned economy in the process
117 Guevara, ‘Informe de un Viaje a los Pafses Socialistas’, in Ernesto Che Guevara: Obras 1957- 
1967, Tomo II, La Habana: Casa de Las Americas, 1970,102.
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of constructing socialism.118 It could appear contradictory, to base a management 
system for the socialist transition on capitalist structures; however, as Guevara 
himself deepened his Marxist analysis he realised the logic of this position. Marx had 
argued that communism would develop out of the fully developed capitalist mode of 
production. He also showed how the tendency to the concentration of capital, that is, 
to monopoly, was inherent in the system. Therefore, the monopoly form of 
capitalism is more developed than a ‘perfect competition’ or ‘free market’ stage of 
development. The Soviet system derived from early and underdeveloped capitalism, 
whereas the US and other foreign monopolies in Cuba, or their Cuban subsidiaries, 
were more technologically and administratively advanced, efficient and productive. 
A socialist economic management system which emerged out of monopoly 
capitalism would also be more advanced, efficient and productive.
It is not clear that this was Guevara’s perception as early as 1959-1960. However, it 
was during this period that he began investigating the technological and 
administrative structures of the monopolies, noting their efficiency. Juan Valdes 
Gravalosa, a lawyer who joined the Department in October 1959 as a legal adviser 
and secretary of the Management Council, recalled Guevara analysing the accounting 
systems of the US companies as they fell into state hands with the nationalisations:
‘I remember in the first days of the Department of Industrialisation one 
of the US enterprises nationalised was the Electric Company. The 
enterprises documents came to the Department. Che examined them 
himself and he noted that when there was a problem such as costs had 
gone up or productivity had gone down, immediately an accountant came 
from the US to analyse and take measures before returning to the US.
This stirred his curiosity to understand how the economy of the 
monopolies functioned.’119
118 Details in chapter 7.
119 Valdes Gravalosa, interview.
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Alfredo Menendez’s experience in the Cuban sugar industry, dominated by US 
monopolies meant he understood the BFS:
41 had applied the BFS in the sugar industry and with the banks under 
capitalism, so I explained it to Che. No bank lent money to any mill that 
was not part of its budget. Che asked himself how it was possible to 
manage sugar mills in Cuba from New York. Che began penetrating this 
system more and more. He said that the system was more advanced than 
that applied in the USSR, which was created in 1927 with elements of 
automation. He said that although the integrated budgetary system of 
accounts belonged to the multinationals, it could still be used. All the US 
. subsidiaries that functioned in Cuba, the electrical industry, sugar, 
petroleum, used the budgetary system.’120
In the 1950s, Oltuski had studied architecture in the US and specialised in the 
Organisation of Work Management with the intention of founding a construction 
company on return to Cuba. He also influenced the formation of Guevara’s BFS:
‘Organisationally, there is a lot of similarity in the management 
organisation in any system. There are activities which are common to all 
of them. You have to have a Department that controls personnel, an 
economist that controls the economic aspect of the enterprise; you have a 
technician, an administrator. I had mastered all of these things in my 
studies in the United States and I applied them in the structure of the 
enterprises we were creating... All of this was part of my technical 
formation. We discussed it, Che and me. We spoke about the common 
structures of both systems.’121
Unlike Oltuski and Menendez, who worked with or studied capitalist enterprises, 
Guevara had no experience of management. In the process of creating this new
120 Men&idez, interview, 17 February.
121 Oltuski, interview, 15 February 2006.
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institution Guevara and his team had to study the present laws of the country and
formulate new laws; formulate the enterprises’ plan of production; decide how to
subordinate the factories to the enterprise and determine relations between the
enterprises and ministry, the ministry and the central government. Oltuski was
involved in these processes: ‘This work took us months. The ideas were taken to the
Management Council for debate and approved or adjusted. Che generated many
100ideas, taking decisions as he went along.’
These testimonies demonstrate the dynamic and participatory process of formulating 
the new apparatus for the organisation of industry. The impact and influence of 
individual collaborators who worked with Guevara stand out, not just in relation to 
structures, but also in relation to management styles and methods of stimulating and 
engaging other workers and directors. Mario Zorrilla said that while Oltuski worked 
on the theory, he was contributing the practice through the daily experience of 
organisation.123 As head of the Chemical Consolidado, Zorrilla established a 
procedure for reports to be written by all section heads under his jurisdiction.
‘I asked the heads of production of each group of factories to submit a 
monthly report. In the beginning they were four or five people but I 
ended up with 11 heads of production as well as legal, economic and 
purchases departments. The first reports were six or seven typed pages, 
but they grew. I analysed them in a meeting in two parts: first with the 
heads of general departments, personnel, legal etc, and after with the 
heads of the factories... In this meeting everyone gave their opinion and 
handed in their reports. Then I met with all the heads and gave them a 
ranking: first, second, and so on. I sent all the reports to Borrego and 
Francisco Vais in the Department. This procedure was designed before 
the Ministry was created in February 1961. Che analysed it, spoke to my 
people and then he named me Vice Minister of the Economy when
122 Oltuski, interview.
123 Zorrilla, interview.
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MININD began. I went to see him and I complained that I was not an 
accountant or an economist. He said he knew even less!’124
This procedure of all administrators and managers submitting regular written reports 
on the production units under their jurisdiction became integral to the BFS, part of 
the apparatus which promoted administrative control of production as an alternative 
to the economic control pursued in the Soviet management system, which relied on 
material incentives and other capitalist mechanisms to motivate directors and 
workers.125
Zorrilla’s Chemical Consolidado which began with three factories in January 1960 
mushroomed to 97 factories by the end of the year; the result of interventions, 
recuperations and nationalisations. The growth of the Department’s apparatus was 
repeated in all other sectors of industry, before adding the new means of production 
purchased from the socialist countries in late 1960. Within two years around 84% of 
Cuban industry had been placed under state control and the Department’s property 
included 161 sugar mills, three oil refineries, electric power and telephone plants, 
tobacco, metallurgical, textile, pharmaceutical, chemical and food factories.126 This 
was a country which, unlike much of Latin America, had not previously had 
nationalised industries. It became clear that the Department’s possessions had 
outgrown it and a separate ministry was needed to drive the state’s industrialisation 
programme. The Department had begun with 14 Consolidados, by the time it was 
converted into the MININD in February 1961, there were eight branches of 
production and 40 Consolidated Enterprises. Several additional entities previously in 
INRA passed over the new MININD; the Petroleum Industry, the Cuban Mining 
Institute and the Department of General Sugar Centrals. Zorrilla’s chemical 
consolidado became 12 separate consolidated enterprises within MININD.
124 Zorrilla, interview.
125 Detailed in chapter 7.
126 Boorstein, Transformation, 147.
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From the Department of Industrialisation to the Ministry 
of Industries 127
INRA Department of 14W Industrialisation W Consolidados
Turns into
Ministry of
—
5 vice
— ^ 8 branches — ^ 40 Consolidated
Industries ministries Enterprises
MININD’s five vice ministers were in charge of: Basic Industry, Light Industry, 
Industrial Construction, Technical Development and the Economy. Later four branch 
heads were added to each of the first two vice ministries. Below these were the 
Consolidated Enterprises (ECs), which grouped production units of the relevant 
sector. The head of the EC was called a ‘director’ -  the head a production unit was 
called an ‘administrator’. The number of entities under each EC depended largely on 
the technological level of that sector. For example the EC of Petroleum controlled 
just three refineries while the EC of Flour grouped hundreds of small bakeries. By far 
the largest EC was Sugar, which accounted for 200,000 workers. This was under the 
vice minister of Basic Industry, before splitting off to form an independent ministry 
headed by Borrego in 1964. Throughout Guevara’s period as minister, 1961-1965, 
MININD’s structure continued to expand and transform, with increasing complexity 
and as decisions were made about the organisational structure, such as the level of 
decentralisation of various function. The official organisational structure appears as 
an appendix. By 1967 MININD had split into five separate ministries; Sugar, 
Foodstuffs, Light Industry, Electrics and Basic Industry.
127 A detailed chronograma (organisational structure) of MININD appears as appendix one.
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CONCLUSION
This overview of the first two years of the Revolution demonstrates Guevara’s 
centrality in driving the structural changes which transformed Cuba from its 
underdeveloped semi-colonial status to political and economic independence and 
integration into the socialist bloc. By the end of this period, the revolutionary 
struggle against Batista had embarked on a socialist path. While Guevara did not take 
a prominent position in the first government, he was engaged in the formulation of 
vital policies which created the precondition for the radicalisation and consolidation 
of the Revolution. In the military sphere, and influenced by the experience of 
Guatemala, he led the purge of the ousted dictatorship, transforming the Rebel Army 
into the official armed body in defence of the new state. This meant that despite the 
pomp and ceremony of the new liberal government and the machinations of 
Washington, real power lay with the left wing of the revolutionary movement. He 
was also involved in the creation of an intelligence service which proved vital in 
protecting the lives of the radical leadership and keeping the state informed about 
machinations against the Revolution. This secret apparatus included support for 
overseas insurrections, which in the end, were Guevara’s incentive for returning to 
South America.
Meanwhile, Guevara was also centrally involved the formulation of the Agrarian 
Reform Law, whose radicalism lay not in its redistributional implications, but rather 
in its violation of the principle of private ownership and in its direct attack on US 
landowning interests in Cuba. Unlike in Guatemala, however, this land reform was 
backed up the military force of the new regime. The Reform Law created INRA 
which, headed by Fidel Castro and other leaders of the M26J and PSP, served as the 
principal vehicle for the radicalisation of the Revolution. Guevara himself was 
prominent in INRA as head of the Department of Industrialisation. He also led the 
first overseas mission for the new state, to broaden Cuba’s economic and political 
ties in anticipation of the break with the US. The trip influenced his emphasis on 
international cooperation between underdeveloped countries, particularly as a 
counter to imperialist penetration as well as providing him with insights to various
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industrialisation and economic development strategies. His second trip to the 
socialist bloc heightened his awareness of contradictions within existing socialism, 
both internally and with the capitalist world in relation to the backwardness of 
productive forces and administrative techniques.
In late 1959, Guevara joined the government Council of Ministers, reflecting the 
radicalisation of the new state as liberal bourgeois forces left the Revolution to align 
with US imperialism. His nomination as President of the NBC signalled the 
destruction of pre-1959 institutional structures, which were to be reorganised to fit 
the political paradigm of socialist revolution. Guevara oversaw the nationalisation of 
the banks as President of the NBC, and the nationalisations of industry as head of the 
Department of Industrialisation. These measures created the institutional opening for 
Guevara to experiment in formulating his own structural solution to the challenges 
created by economic transformation; thus the shell of the BFS emerged. As his 
Marxist analysis deepened, along with the experience of management, the BFS 
gained more complex organisational and theoretical structures. Meanwhile, INRA 
and the Ministry of Foreign Trade adopted the auto-financing system (AFS) of 
management used in the Soviet bloc, signalling contradictions within the new and 
radicalised state. Commentator Bertram Silverman observed that: ‘In 1963, when the 
argument reached the light of day, there existed in Cuba two systems of economic 
organization and ideology: one regulating agriculture and foreign trade, the other, 
industry. A confrontation was inevitable.’128 This conflict is examined the next 
chapter of the thesis.
Throughout this period fundamental characteristics became ingrained in Guevara’s 
modus operandi ; learning by doing, working with experts regardless of their ideo­
logical affiliations, adopting the most advanced techniques regardless of their 
origins, permanent education and training, self-criticism and debate. These 
characteristics appear as recurring themes in Part 3 on Guevara’s solution.
128Bertram Silverman, Man and Socialism in Cuba: The Debate. New York: Atheneum, 1971, 11.
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CHAPTER 5
The Great Debate 1963-65
‘Che was a man of profound thought and Che had an exceptional 
opportunity during the first years o f the Revolution to go deeply into 
important aspects o f socialist construction...he confronted the task of 
applying the principles o f Marxism-Leninism to the organisation of 
production, as he understood them, as he saw them. He worked at this for 
years, he spoke a lot, he wrote a lot about all those themes and really he 
developed a theory that was pretty elaborate and very profound about the 
way in which, in his view, socialism should be constructed to progress 
towards the communist society. ’1
INTRODUCTION
In January 1962 Guevara told colleagues in the Ministry of Industries (MININD): ‘In 
no way am I saying that financial autonomy of the enterprise with moral incentives, 
in the way it is established in the socialist countries, is going to be a formula which 
impedes progress to socialism’.2 Less than three years later, in December 1964 he 
described a new management system being experimented with in the USSR as 
capitalist: ‘The only problem is when it is transferred from one factory to the whole 
of society, it will create anarchy of production, a crisis will come, and then socialism 
will have to return.’ There was not yet capitalism in the USSR, he added, but ‘the
1 Fidel Castro, ‘Discurso Pronunciado por Fidel Castro el 8 de Octobre de 1987’ in David 
Deutschmann and Javier Salado (eds) Gran Debate: Sobre la economia en Cuba 1963-1964. La 
Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 2003,402-3.
2 Guevara, ‘Reunion Bimestrales’ 20 January 1962. El Che en la Revolucidn Cubana: Ministerio de 
Industrias, tomo VI. La Habana: Ministerio de Azucar, 1966, 147.
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theory is failing, because they have forgotten that Marx existed.’3 In the period 
between these two statements, Guevara was involved in a debate on the political 
economy of the transition to socialism. He immersed himself in a study of Marx’s 
Capital, other classic Marxist texts and modem literature, from east and west, both in 
favour of ‘market socialism’ and against Soviet use of capitalist mechanisms. This 
theoretical inquiry took place contemporaneously with the formulation of his 
alternative economic management system; the Budgetary Finance System (BFS).
The previous chapter outlined his formative experiences, including his engagement 
with the problems of economic transformation, during the first two years of the 
Revolution. This section is concerned with theory, not practice from 1962 to 1965; it 
focuses on Guevara’s analysis, not the implementation of the BFS, which is detailed 
in the next part of the thesis. These two elements -  the BFS and the interpretation of 
Marxism -  are integrally linked. Theoretical opponents should be understood as 
defending different institutional systems. For clarity, the main differences in the 
proposals of the two systems are examined in Table 1 (overleaf).
The BFS was Guevara’s project, developed within MININD, initially as a practical 
solution to concrete problems. In early 1962, MININD’s Vice Minister of Light 
Industries, Omar Fernandez Canizares, left to become the new Minister of Transport. 
He claimed to have instituted the BFS at the Ministry of Transport (MINTRANS), 
organising the country’s means of transport into consolidated enterprises.4 However, 
when Fernandez left MININD the stage of development of the BFS was basic, so the 
system adapted from MININD was the shell of the comprehensive system 
operational by 1964. In June 1964, MININD’s First Vice Minister Orlando Borrego 
left to set up a new Ministry of Sugar (MINAZ), also implementing the BFS. In 
MINAZ the BFS was applied with the benefit of the experience in MININD.5
3 Guevara, Bimestrales, 5 December 1964, 569.
4 Omar Femdndez Castifiares, interview, 2 March 2006.
5 This thesis does not examine the BFS in MINAZ.
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Table 1: Main differences in the organisational and theoretical structures of the 
Budgetary Finance System and the Auto-Financing System in Cuba
Budgetary Finance System
Enterprise: Factories and other 
production units grouped into 
consolidated enterprises according to 
industrial sector. Finances and 
administration centrally controlled.
Money. Functions as unit of account, as 
reflection in prices of an enterprise’s 
performance, to be analysed by central 
bodies. Enterprise does not have own 
funds, cannot loan or give credit.
Banks. Hold separate account for 
withdrawals and for deposits of 
enterprises in accordance with the 
national production plan.
Auto-Financing System
(also known as Economic Calculus)
Enterprise: Each production unit has its 
own juridical identity. Responsible for 
its own finances.
Money. Functions as means of payment 
as well as unit of account. An indirect 
instrument of control, since funds permit 
the production unit to operate.
Enterprise has own funds in bank and 
can get credit.
Banks. Relationship to enterprise 
similar to those of private producer and 
capitalist bank. Enterprises must explain 
plans and prove solvency, can take 
loans. Decisions are subject to national 
plan.
Incentives. Individual and collective 
material incentives are necessary 
concession, but limited by method of 
wage and bonus payment, not main 
lever to production. Compulsory 
professional training is precondition for
Incentives. Material self-interest is the 
main lever for increasing productivity, 
both collectively and individually 
developing the productive forces as a 
precondition for socialism and socialist 
consciousness. Material incentives
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promotion to higher wage categories. 
Moral incentives play progressively 
more important role and are incentive to 
developing socialist consciousness, via 
mechanisms like voluntary labour.
Law of value. Partially operative 
because remnants of commodity society 
still exist, but undermined by the plan 
(its antithesis) and new social relations. 
No commodity category in exchange 
between state enterprises. Cost cutting, 
not profit is key to evaluating 
enterprises.
Prices. All imported raw materials have 
fixed, stable price based on international 
market price. Cuban enterprise product 
prices made on basis of costs and not 
profit and must compare to international 
prices reflecting world productivity. 
Commodity prices set in relation to 
demand and supply and adjusted for 
basic needs.
applied through payment of bonuses for 
production over the norm and as reward 
to exceptional workers.
Law of value. Underdevelopment 
explains existence and utility of law of 
value in transition to socialism, to be 
considered in the plan. Commodity 
relations remain in exchange between 
enterprises. Profitability is the key to 
evaluating and stimulating production.
Prices. Claimed to be determined in 
relation to the law of value. Price to 
consumer is raised to level off supply of 
goods with effective demand.
National output and worker productivity declined in 1962/3 as the growth effect of 
the redistributional stage gave way to the shocks of profound structural change: new 
institutions, new social-relations of production, new trade relations, the exodus of 
professionals and the imposition of the US blockade. Inevitably Cuban economists 
and planners began contemplating which economic management system was 
appropriate for Cuba. This juncture coincided with increasing integration into the
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socialist bloc via trade and human exchange; Cuban students went to Eastern Europe 
on scholarships while the bloc sent technicians and economists to Cuba. They 
advocated the Soviet economic management system, known in Cuba as the Auto- 
Financing System (AFS), or the Economic Calculus.6 Within Cuba, a challenge 
emerged to the BFS model of centralised administrative control and financing, 
arguing for it to be replaced by the AFS. Among the challengers were those 
committed to the Soviet road to socialism as members of the Popular Socialist Party 
(PSP). However, this was not a division along party lines.7 While Guevara’s most 
prominent opponent was Carlos Rafael Rodriguez who was in the PSP leadership 
and President of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA), other opponents 
were members of the 26 July Movement (M26J); for example, Alberto Mora, 
Minister for Foreign Trade (MINCEX) and Marcelo Fernandez Font, President of the 
National Bank.
The AFS was adopted in INRA and MINCEX. It meant financial decentralisation for 
enterprises which functioned as independent accounting units responsible for their 
own profits and losses and, in the case of INRA, was similar to the khozraschet 
model of cooperative farms in the USSR.8 On 23 August 1963, both the BFS and the 
AFS were institutionalised in law, although they had been in operation long before 
that. There were now competing economic management systems, operating under 
one central planning body (JUCEPLAN), one central bank and one treasury. This 
created the institutional conditions for what became known retrospectively as the 
Great Debate. All ministries received a budget allocated by JUCEPLAN, but the 
system implemented had practical implications concerning structures, policies, 
financial relations between state institutions, relations between producers and
6 The title of the system became a subject for dispute. This thesis uses the terms Auto-Financing 
System (AFS). In some quotes it is referred to as Economic Calculus, but it should be understood as 
the same thing.
7 As claimed by Cubanologists. See Carmelo Mesa-Lago, ‘Ideological, Political and Economic 
Factors in the Cuban Controversy on Material Versus Moral Incentives’. Journal o f Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs, Vol 14: 1 (1972), 49-111.
8 Robert Bernardo identifies two separate groups among those rejecting Guevara’s BFS: ‘those who 
would expand the concept of khozraschet to include Libermanist methods of decentralizing the 
administrative system and those who would expand, to include market socialism. The latter often 
disguised their market orientation, but both camps were united in their relative lack of concern for 
ensuring the primacy of moral incentives.’ The Theory o f Moral Incentives in Cuba. Alabama: 
University of Alabama Press, 1971, 19.
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consumers, and so on.9 However, because the proponents of the different systems 
sought vindication in Marxist literature, the discussion assumed the character of a 
theoretical, rather than a practical debate. It is important to appreciate that there was 
a discrepancy between theoretical conceptions about how the BFS and AFS should 
function, and the reality of their implementation. The theory was the conceptual 
paradigm which guided the practical policies, but the daily experience also fed back 
into the theoretical constructs.
The Great Debate occurred simultaneously with a broader debate within the socialist 
bloc as part of a rightward push to ‘liberalise’ the planned economy, introducing 
what was called market socialism. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland led this 
reformist drive in the 1950s and early 1960s. In 1962 Yevsei G Liberman, from the 
Institute of Industrial Economics in Kharkov, published an article in Pravda 
recommending that profitability become the determinant of production efficiency, 
pursued via material incentives. Lieberman’s proposals, like those of many others, 
were a response to the problems of economic stagnation, low productivity and 
efficiency, particularly in comparison with the economic growth in the developed 
capitalist world. The protagonists in Cuba were well-informed about the broader 
debate on incentives and financial autonomy. In July 1964 Guevara told colleagues 
that he had been reading analyses from the socialist camp, including the resolutions 
of the 14th Congress of the Polish Communist Party: ‘The solution that they are 
proposing for these problems in Poland is the complete freedom of the law of value; 
that is to say, a return to capitalism.’10 Historically, however, at that point it was not 
so evident that ‘market socialism’ was a step towards the restoration of the capitalist 
mode of production. In fact at the core of the debate was the shared objective of 
constructing socialist society in transition to communism.11
9 JUCEPLAN plans were formulated according to the national development strategy which was 
formulated by the Economic Commission of government, constituted by Guevara (MININD), 
Rodriguez (INRA) and Osvaldo Dorticos (President of Cuba).
10 Guevara, Bimestrales, 11 July 1964, 505.
11 Michael Buroway adapts Lakatos’s model of a scientific research programme with a core theory 
that scientists protect against refutation by constructing auxiliary hypotheses to the study of the 
development of Marxism as a science. Applying this approach we can say that the participants in the 
Great Debate defend the core; the commitment to construct socialist society. Their dispute concerns 
the auxiliary hypothesis; that is, the means adopted to get there. ‘Marxism as Science: Historical 
Challenges and Theoretical Growth’, American Sociological Review, Vol 55: 6 (1990), 775-793.
I l l
Chapter 5: The Great Debate 1963-65
Several participants in the Great Debate were in the Council of Ministers and had
therefore studied Capital together with the Spanish-Russian political economy
12professor Anastasio Mansilla who was sent by the Soviets for this purpose. At
Guevara’s invitation, in September 1961, Mansilla began Capital seminars in
1MININD for Guevara, his vice ministers, advisors and invited guests. The weekly 
Thursday seminars began at 9pm, often lasting until 5 or 6am. Every week Mansilla 
chose who would present the material, without prior warning. Participant Francisco 
Buron Sena admitted that: ‘I attended because the analysis of Che confronting 
Mansilla was very illuminating, profound and educational.’14 Angel Arcos Bergnes 
claimed that: ‘Professor Mansilla was shocked by some of the criticisms from Che.’15 
Borrego recalled an all night argument about the average rate of profit and the role of 
the law of value in socialism when at 4am, unable to win the argument, Mansilla 
threw up his hands in defeat and exclaimed that Guevara was right.16
This chapter does not present an exhaustive account of the Great Debate, but 
summarises Guevara’s analysis which developed as a critique of other participants. It 
focuses on published articles, not speeches, meeting transcripts or other documents. 
The Debate has been variously interpreted as: an argument about the operation of the
17 1ftlaw of value under socialism; a disagreement about the use of moral incentives; a 
dispute over the level of financial (de)centralisation of enterprises;19 a conflict 
between the notion of Cubanidad and the New Man in a vision of utopia;20 and a 
power struggle within the Cuban leadership. Furthermore, what actually constitutes
12 Orlando Borrego Dfaz, Che, Recuerdos en Rafaga. La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales,
2004,138.
13 The following information is from interviews with participants in the Capital reading seminar: 
Orlando Borrego, 16 November 2004 and 24 January 2005, Angel Arcos Bergnes, 8 December 2004, 
Tirso Saenz, 7 January 2005, Enrique Oltuski, 12 January 2005, and Francisco Buron Sena, 22 
February 2005.
14 Buron, interview. In March 1962 Buron left MININD where he had been Head of the Auditing 
Department to be Vice Minister of Domestic Trade. However, he was invited to continue participating 
in the Capital group.
15 Arcos, interview, 2004.
16 Borrego, Recuerdos, 138-40.
17 Bertram Silverman, Man and Socialism in Cuba: The Debate. New York: Atheneum, 1971.
18 Bernardo, Incentives.
19 Joaquin Infante Uguarte and other participants in the Debate.
20 Sally Gainsbury, PhD thesis. Cubanidad is the collective sense of national identity as Cubans, 
irrespective of racial, class or religious backgrounds.
21 Mesa-Lago, Ideological.
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the Great Debate has not been definitively defined. Belgian Marxist, Ernest Mandel,
one of the foreign contributors and first to label it ‘Great Debate’, said that it
00consisted of around 20 published articles, half of them by Guevara. The articles
0!\appeared in Nuestra Industria Economica, Cuba Socialista and Comercio Exterior. 
However, within Cuba it is recognised that Guevara’s main opponent was INRA 
president Rodriguez who did not publish on political economy in this period. 
Guevara and Rodriguez battled it out fraternally as companeros on the government’s 
Economic Commission and in the Council of Ministers.24
The fact that Guevara’s main opponent did not publish an article illustrates that the 
Debate penetrated Cuban administrative structures far more deeply than the handful 
of articles suggest. Few Cubans had the theoretical background to contribute to the 
Debate. For example, despite applying the BFS in MINTRANS, Fernandez admitted: 
‘I can’t say in that moment that I understood the fundamental differences. I knew that 
there was a Great Debate because of the discussions which took place in the Council 
of Ministers and it was explained that there were two lines.’25 There were no manuals 
written about the BFS, and no seminars, lectures or training courses organised. 
Guevara spoke a lot about his system in the bimonthly meetings of MININD but for 
those outside that management circle, his articles were the principal means to learn 
about his alternative approach to socialist construction. People read the articles and 
discussed them at their own work places. According to Alfredo Gonzalez Gutierrez, 
who was in JUCEPLAN, most people in administrative positions followed the Great 
Debate passionately although they were not necessarily able to understand all its 
implications: ‘Anyone who was directly involved in planning tried to understand this 
discussion. Planning was new and everyone was trying to understand it better. For 
people like me, Che was a huge lesson. He was so theoretically and culturally
22 Ernest Mandel, ‘El Debate econdmico en Cuba durante el periodo 1963-1964’ in Deutschmann (ed) 
Debate, 347-357.
23 Journals of MININD, the government council and MINCEX respectively.
24 Interviews with Armando Hart, 14 March 2006; Fem&ndez; and Alfredo Mendndez, 11 February 
2005.
25 Femdndez, interview.
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advanced.’26 Juan Borroto, Director of Supervision in MININD, said Guevara 
criticised the Soviets severely, but not publicly: ‘It wasn’t easy to understand what 
was happening. The Soviets were giving us everything and Che was criticising 
them.’27 Jorge Ruiz said that in the bimonthly meetings when Guevara criticised 
Soviet political economy: ‘we stayed quiet. We didn’t give our own critiques because 
we didn’t have the necessary education.’28 This is evident from the meeting 
transcripts.
The exception, however, was in December 1964, when Guevara was challenged in 
the bimonthly meeting by Alberto Mora who, having been replaced at MINCEX, was 
invited by Guevara to join MININD as an advisor. Mora said he did not believe that 
the use of indirect methods, that is, capitalist mechanisms, to direct the economy 
necessarily diverted society from socialist construction. Guevara disagreed with 
Mora, explaining that for him the law of value was equivalent to capitalism, and 
concluded that one of them would be proved wrong but that the discussion would 
contribute to enrich and deepen an important polemic. ‘Alberto has a commitment to 
work on a project that needs development and let’s see where we arrive at’, he 
concluded. Juan Valdes Gravalosa, secretary of the management board, was m 
charge of this project; a manuscript defining the model socialist enterprise. He said: 
‘I asked Che, “if Alberto Mora has a controversy with you and defends the other 
system, how’s it possible for him to work with you?” He said that Alberto just has a 
different opinion, but this could help him test if  he was right or not.’ This is 
evidence that the debate: ‘proceeded in an atmosphere of dignity and mutual 
respect.’31 The following summary of Guevara’s position in the Great Debate is 
divided into three themes: the law of value; money, finance and banking; and 
consciousness and incentives. This thesis argues, in line with Silverman, that the 
dispute about the operation of the law of value in transition to socialism was at that
26 Alfredo Gonz&lez Gutierrez, interview, 27 December 2004. Today Gonzalez is advisor to the 
Minister of the Economy and Planning.
27 Juan Borroto, interview, 26 January 2006.
28 Jorge Ruiz Ferrer, interview, 5 April 2006.
29 Guevara, Bimestrales, 5 December 1964, 577.
30 Juan Vald6s Gravalosa, interview, 22 February 2006.
31 Michael Lowy. The Marxism o f Che Guevara: Philosophy, Economics and Revolutionary Warfare, 
trans. Brian Pearce, London: Monthly Review Press, 1973,35.
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heart of the Great Debate. The contribution of this chapter is in the selection, 
interpretation and thematic presentation of Guevara’s analysis to highlight his main 
positions and how they differed from the other protagonists.
THE LAW OF VALUE
‘All the participants supported the proposition that economic institutions 
and economic goals must conform to the necessities o f objective 
economic forces... But the protagonists disagreed about the nature o f the 
economic laws that regulated Cuban socialist development. Thus, the 
Great Debate began with a controversy over whether the law o f value 
operated in the Cuban economy. ’
The law of value is crucial to understanding Marx’s critique of political economy. It 
has a peculiar and paradoxical function as an economic law, in that it predates and 
outlives capitalism; its operation is obscured under capitalism, yet it is at the heart of 
the law of motion of capitalism and finds its strongest expression under the capitalist 
mode of production. The first condition for the emergence of the law of value is that 
human society has progressed from subsistence to petty commodity production. 
Historically, this implies the social division of labour and production for exchange. 
Society needs a method by which to distribute the social product. All commodities 
are a product of human labour, in an abstract sense. The quantity of abstract human 
labour embodied within them is the basis for their exchange. The two provisos are 
that the commodity is desired in exchange; it has a use value, and that the labour time 
it embodies is socially necessary; that is, consistent with the average level of 
productivity.33
32 Silverman, Socialism, 11.
33 Guevara argued that in a globalised world, particularly in a small country dependent on foreign 
trade, the concept of average productivity must be considered from an international perspective.
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Marx began Capital by stating that the wealth of societies in which the capitalist 
mode of production prevails presents itself as an immense accumulation of 
commodities. He stated that because the commodity form is most developed under 
capitalism its analysis is only possible under that mode of production. However, 
under capitalism, commodities are not exchanged directly in relation to the labour 
time embodied in them -  that is, in relation to the law of value -  but according to the 
price of production, which gives capitals an average rate of profit. This price of 
production in turn is modified by other factors such as rent, interest, demand and 
supply, and so on, to establish the market price. The result seems to contradict the 
law of value. Marx set himself the task of demonstrating how under capitalism the 
price of production is ultimately determined by the law of value.
The dispute about the law of value in transition economies is at the heart of the 
question about the feasibility of constructing socialism in a country without a fully 
developed capitalist mode of production. It is integral to the problems of 
accumulation, production, distribution and social relations. Communism implies a 
highly productive society in which conditions exist for the distribution of the social 
product based on need; not surplus-generating labour time. All the countries which 
have experimented with socialism, however, have been underdeveloped, lacking the 
productive base for the material abundance implied by communism. The Soviet 
solution was to rely on the operation of the law of value to hasten the development of 
the productive forces which takes place organically under capitalism. Guevara 
argued that the operation of the law of value is not the only lever to develop the 
productive forces and that in fact it undermines the collective consciousness which is 
also a precondition for the construction of communism.
The expression ‘the law of value under socialism’ has been used to denote the 
existence of a) petty commodity production, as in the USSR prior to collectivisation; 
b) a socialist country’s foreign trade, where goods are exchanged as commodities 
proper; and c) the constraints imposed by economic necessity on a socialist country. 
To the extent that commodity production and exchange through a market mechanism 
continued to exist after the Revolution in Cuba, it was clear to all participants in the
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Great Debate that the law of value continued to operate. The social product 
continued to be distributed on the basis of socially necessary labour time. However, 
they disagreed about the conditions explaining the law’s survival, its sphere of 
operation, the extent to which it regulated production, how it related to the ‘plan’ 
and, finally, whether the law of value should be utilised or undermined, and if so, 
how. In Cuba this discussion was linked to practical questions such as how 
enterprises should be organised, how workers should be paid and whether means of 
production should be exchanged as commodities. The Great Debate reveals a lot 
about the conditions and contradictions within the early 1960s Cuban economy. The 
starting point of the discussion, however, was defining the law of value.
Defining the law of value
Guevara stated that ‘value’ is brought about by the relationships of production. It 
exists objectively and is not created by man with a specific purpose.34 He agreed that 
the law of value continues under socialism, but added that ‘the law’s most advanced 
form of operation is through the capitalist market, and that variations introduced into 
the market by socialisation of the means of production and the distribution system 
brought about changes that obstruct immediate clarification of its operation.35
The sphere of operation of the law of value and the survival of mercantile 
categories in the transition period36
Guevara insisted that products transferred between state-owned enterprises do not 
constitute commodities because there is no change in ownership: ‘We deny the
34 Guevara, ‘On the Concept of Value’ in Silverman (ed) Socialism, 232.
35 Guevara, Value, 234.
36 The term ‘mercantile’ is translated from the Spanish ''mercantiV which can also be translated as 
‘commercial’. It is not directly related to the term ‘mercantilist’ which implies something historically 
specific; buying and selling commodities at differential prices to make a profit. In the Great Debate 
mercantil is used to indicate commodity production and commercial relations. This discrepancy does 
make some difference to the sense of the argument. For example, Silverman’s translation of Guevara’s 
article on banking, credit and socialism says that the: ‘bank’s existence is contingent upon mercantile
[mercantil] relationships of production, whatever high form they may assume’, 298. In Carlos 
Tablada’s book the translation reads: ‘the existence of banking is dependent on commodity relations 
of production, however developed they may be.’ Che Guevara: Economics and Politics in the 
Transition to Socialism, 2nd ed, New York: Pathfinder, 1990,138.
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existence of the commodity category in relationships among state enterprises. We 
consider all such establishments to be part of the single large enterprise that is the 
State (although in practice this is not yet the case in our country).’37 ‘In expressing 
our concept of a single enterprise, we based ourselves primarily on Marx's definition 
of commodity: “In order to be a commodity, the product has to pass into the hands of
* lo
a second party, the one who consumes it, by means of an act of exchange.” ’ For 
Guevara commodity-exchange relations between factories threatened transition, via 
‘market socialism’, to capitalism. He stressed central planning and state regulation as 
substitutes to such mechanisms. Cuba, he argued, should be considered as one big 
factory. Since the law of value did not operate in exchange between state production 
units, the workers themselves should decide what socialist, non-value-oriented 
economic policies to pursue in safeguarding society against capitalist restoration and 
achieving economic abundance. Guevara’s speeches to workers are replete with 
appeals for the masses to step up to this challenge.
Ernest Mandel agreed with Guevara, pointing out that if  the means of production in 
Cuba were priced in relation to their inherent values during the initial phase of 
industrialisation they would cost more than their foreign equivalents because of 
Cuba’s low productivity. Arguing against the AFS, Mandel stated that the logic of 
giving ‘freedom’ to enterprises to maximise profits would lead them to purchase 
means of production from overseas suppliers. But the state monopoly on trade 
prohibited this; further evidence that the law o f value’s sphere of operation was 
restricted.39
‘It is universally accepted that under the dictatorship of the proletariat individualized 
production necessarily implies the maintenance of the “commodity” and “money” 
categories’, stated French Marxist Charles Bettelheim, complaining that the Cubans 
did not understand that the existence of such categories also requires the existence of 
a market and some freedom of exchange.40 Bettelheim argued that economic
37 Guevara, ‘On the Budgetary Finance System’ (BFS,) in Silverman (ed) Socialism, 143.
38 Guevara, Value, 237.
39 Mandel, ‘Mercantile Categories in the Period of Transition’ in Silverman (ed) Socialism, 82.
40 Charles Bettelheim, ‘On Socialist Planning and the Level of Development of the Productive Forces’ 
in Silverman (ed) Socialism, 45.
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organisation could never be more developed, or higher, than the forces of production. 
The low technological level of production in Cuba explained the continued existence 
of the law of value and mercantile categories and attempts to legislate against this, or 
to change the relationships of production in advance of the productive forces, would 
be detrimental.
Guevara responded that:
‘Bettelheim commits two grave errors in analytical method: (a) He 
mechanically translates the concept of necessary correspondence between 
relationships of production and development of the productive forces, 
which is of universal validity, into the “microcosm” of the relationships 
of production in concrete aspects of a specific country during the period 
of transition; and thus draws apologetic conclusions tinged with 
pragmatism, about so-called economic calculus, (b) He makes the same 
mechanical analysis of the concept of property.’41
For Guevara, Bettelheim’s deterministic formula was dangerously close to 
‘orthodox’ Marxists’ view that communism will evolve organically out of fully 
developed capitalism. The orthodoxy ignores Marx and Engels’ observations about 
how British imperialism underdeveloped Ireland and India, together with Lenin’s 
view that imperialism blocks development in the colonies. Revolutionary socialism, 
Guevara’s tradition, takes up Lenin’s analysis to argue that defeating imperialism is a 
precondition for economic development and the transition to socialism 42 Hence therei
may be no such mechanical correlation between productive forces and relations of 
production in the transition period.
41 Guevara, ‘The Meaning of Socialist Planning’ in Silverman (ed) Socialism, 109.
42 Guevara, Planning, 101.
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Using the law of value in the transition to socialism
In 1952, Stalin affirmed that the law of value operated in the Soviet economy and 
stated the presence of objective economic laws under socialism; ‘the laws of 
economic development, as in the case of natural science, are objective laws, 
reflecting processes of economic development which take place independently of the 
will of man.’43 These statements were used by Cuban supporters of the AFS to 
validate the utilisation of mercantile categories in their economic management 
system.
Guevara used quotations from Lenin about the New Economic Policy introduced in 
the USSR in 1921 and from the Soviet Manual of Political Economy to counter this 
position and oppose the utilisation of mercantile categories in the construction of 
socialism:
‘...the Manual states: “Mercantile [commodity] production, the law of 
value, and money will disappear only when the highest state of 
communism is achieved. But in order to bring about conditions 
favourable to the disappearance of mercantile production and circulation, 
it is necessary to develop and use the law of value as well as monetary 
and mercantile relationships while the communist society is being built.”
Why develop? We understand that the capitalist categories are retained 
for a time and that the length of this period cannot be predetermined, but 
the characteristics of the period of transition are those of a society that is 
throwing off its old bonds in order to move quickly into the new stage.
The tendency should be, in our opinion, to eliminate as fast as possible 
the old categories, including the market, money, and, therefore, material 
interest -  or, better, to eliminate the conditions for their existence.’44
43 Joseph V Stalin, Economic Problems o f Socialism in the USSR. Peking: Foreign Languages Press. 
1972. 3-4.
44 Guevara, BFS, 42. Guevara’s italics.
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Guevara believed that a socialist country’s task was not to use nor even hold the law 
of value in check, but to define very precisely the law’s sphere of operation and then 
make inroads into those spheres to undermine it; to work towards its abolition, not 
limitation.
Reflecting on the Great Debate over two decades later, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez 
claimed that Guevara: ‘said that the law of value cannot govern economic activity 
[under socialism], that socialism had created the conditions for us to manipulate the 
law of value, to use it for the benefit of socialism.’45 The statement was disingenuous 
because although Guevara initially believed it was possible to use the law of value 
under socialism, his analysis deepened to reject this view. In June 1963 Guevara 
questioned: ‘How can one consciously use the law of value to achieve a balance in 
the market on the one hand and a faithful reflection of real value on the other? This is 
one of the most serious problems the socialist economy faces.’46 In October 1963, in 
response to Mora’s claim that: ‘under socialism, the law of value operates through 
the plan’,47 Guevara responded: ‘We are not so sure about this...the law.of value will 
be reflected less and less in the plan.’48 In February 1964, in his first overview of the 
BFS, Guevara concluded: ‘We deny the possibility of consciously using the law of 
value, basing our argument on the absence of a free market that automatically 
expresses the contradiction between producers and consumers... The law of value 
and planning are two terms linked by a contradiction and its resolution. We can 
therefore state that centralized planning is characteristic of the socialist society, its 
definition.’49 In June 1964 he conceded only: ‘the possibility of using elements of 
this law for comparative purposes (cost, “profit” expressed in monetary terms)’.50 
Guevara complained that the defenders of the AFS never explained how the law of 
value is supposed to be utilised through the plan.
45 Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, ‘Sobre la Contribucidn del Che al Desarrollo de la Economla Cubana’ in 
Debate, 365.
46 Guevara, ‘On Production Costs and the Budgetary System’, Socialism, 114.
47 Alberto Mora, ‘On the Operation of the Law of Value in the Cuban Economy’, Socialism, 228.
48 Guevara, Value, 235-6.
49 Guevara, BFS, 143.
50 Guevara, Planning, 109.
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MONEY, FINANCE AND BANKING
'The difference between the proposals o f Che and those who defended 
Carlos [President o f INRA] were in finances, financial mechanisms, 
indirect or direct. The direct ones are credit, taxes and prices... The 
Auto-Financing System was linked to bank credit. I f there was no bank 
credit it wouldn’t work... The central difference is whether there is 
financial centralisation or decentralisation.’ 51
Money as means of account
Following the nationalisations Guevara observed from the accounts of US 
corporations that they did not send bills and issue payments to their own subsidiaries. 
They developed techniques of accounting, administration and analysis that relegated 
money to the role of simply recording the value of what had been produced: ‘money 
of account’. Guevara adopted this approach in the BFS:
‘Under our system, [money] functions only as a means of measurement, 
as a price reflection of enterprise performance that is analyzed by central 
administration bodies so as to be able to control such performance. Under 
economic calculus [AFS], money serves not only this purpose but 
also acts as a means of payment, an indirect instrument of control, 
because without funds the production unit could not operate. Under 
suchcircumstances, the production unit’s relations with the bank are 
similar to those of a private producer in the capitalist system who must 
exhaustively explain plans and prove solvency to his bank... 
Consequently, because of the way in which money is used, our [BFS] 
enterprises have no funds of their own. There are separate bank accounts 
for withdrawal and deposits. The enterprise may withdraw funds in 
accordance with the plan from the general expense account and the
51 Infante, interview, 18 January 2005.
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special wages account. But all deposits come automatically under State 
. control.’52
Money of account was necessary to ensure the plan functioned as the determinant of 
production and investment. It strengthened the apparatus of administrative control, 
which stressed accounting, supervision and inventory control.
Role of bank in socialism
President of the NBC from 1962, Marcelo Fernandez Font was an advocate of the 
AFS. He envisaged the bank as key regulator of all economic activity, arguing that 
the bank should pursue ‘control by the pesos’ of enterprises. He quoted Lenin: 
‘ Without big banks socialism would be impossible... A single State Bank, the biggest 
of the big, will constitute as much as nine-tenths of the socialist apparatus.’54 In 
response Guevara stated that money reflects the relations of production and cannot 
exist without a society based on commodity production: ‘We may also say that a 
bank cannot exist without money and, therefore, that bank’s existence is contingent 
upon mercantile relationships of production, whatever high form they may assume’. 
Such relations of production would gradually disappear as the development of the 
productive forces and socialist consciousness created the conditions to undermine the 
law of value. This did not detract from Lenin’s formulation about the socialist 
apparatus, however, according to Guevara: ‘The centralization that Marcelo seeks 
can be obtained by making the Treasury Ministry the supreme “accounting and 
control” apparatus of the entire State.’55
As Treasury Minister, Luis Alvarez Rom, was an ally of Guevara who defended the 
BFS. The argument about the role of these two financial institutions therefore 
became a partisan debate about the opposing economic management systems. 
Nonetheless, Guevara’s point is entirely consistent with his theoretical schema.
52 Guevara, BFS, 132.
53 Detailed in chapter 7 of this thesis.
54 Cited by Marcelo Fernandez Font, ‘Development and Operation of Socialist Banking in Cuba’, 
Silverman (ed), Socialism, 280.
55 Guevara, ‘Banking, Credit, and Socialism’ in Silverman (ed), Socialism, 298.
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Credit
BFS enterprises did not control their own finances. They could not get bank credit. 
Investment plans were submitted to MININD’s Vice Ministry of the Economy for 
analysis and issued from the ministry’s budget account. AFS enterprises, on the other 
hand, could obtain bank credit, although they were prohibited from providing credit 
to each other. Font argued that: ‘credit is a typical banking function that does not 
disappear during the building of socialism. Rather it serves as a flexible means for 
helping to assure the proportional and harmonious development of the economy, the 
fulfilment of the plans.’56 Guevara opposed this argument with an extensive 
quotation from Marx that:
‘It should always be borne in mind that, in the first place, money -  in the 
form of precious metal -  remains the foundation from which the credit 
system, by its very nature, can never detach itself. Secondly, that the 
credit system presupposes the monopoly of social means of production 
by private persons (in the form of capital and landed property), that it is 
itself, on the one hand, an immanent form of the capitalist mode o f  
production, and on the other, a driving force in its development to its 
. highest and ultimate form... Finally, there is no doubt that the credit 
system will serve as a powerful lever during the transition from the 
capitalist mode of production to the mode of production of associates 
oflabour... [however] As soon as the means o f production cease being 
transferred into capital (which also includes the abolition o f private 
property in land), credit as such no longer has any meaning. ’
Font disputed the claim by proponents of the BFS that bank credit is not used in the 
system. From 1961 to 1963, he stated, the MININD enterprises failed to reach their 
planned net income and therefore did not substantially contribute to the state budget 
which was in deficit as a result. According to Font, this was equivalent to the bank
56 Fem&ndez Font, Operation, 283-4.
57 Marx, Capital, vol 3, cited by Guevara, Banking, 302-3. Guevara’s italics.
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automatically granting credits equal to the deficits. Any time that the bank provides 
funds that have not yet been received it is an indirect credit, claimed Font: ‘In 
summary, bank credit, as an economic category within the State sector of the 
economy, does not disappear. It has only been disguised. But in the process it has 
lost its relationship to production and circulation, and its possibilities for economic
c o
control have diminished in promise.’ Guevara dismissed this claim:
‘This extends fiction beyond the usual limits. To compare bank credit 
with the public treasury reveals a mentality that almost confirms Marx’s 
words: “It was not enough that the bank gave with one hand and took 
back more with the other; it remained, even while receiving, the eternal 
creditor of the nation down to the last shilling advanced.” This is not to 
mention that the bank, as separate from the State, possesses nothing, 
despite the fictitious patrimony granted it by law.’59
This reflects Guevara’s vision of Cuba as one big factory.
Interest
Guevara quotes Marx to attack the NBC for charging interest to state enterprises for 
bank credit: ‘The relations of capital assume their most externalized and most fetish­
like form in interest-bearing capital.’60 In response to Font’s argument that: ‘Bank 
credit...always earns an interest, which is the bank’s principal source of revenue.’61 
Guevara replies:
‘If this situation is currently valid -  and since interest is not technically 
an enterprise cost factor but a deduction of the workers’ surplus labor for 
the society that should constitute a national budget receipt -  is not
58 Font, Operation, 293.
59 Guevara, Banking, 312. Source for Marx not given.
60 Marx, Capital Vol 2, cited by Guevara, Banking, 303.
61 Font, Operation, 278.
125
Chapter 5: The Great Debate 1963-65
interest in fact used to finance the operating expenses of the banking 
apparatus?’62
Under socialism, this deduction should be considered as a cost of banking operations, 
not a private accumulation as in capitalism.
Investment
Font revealed that the bank intended: ‘to decentralise investment control by taking it 
to the agency level...we will be able to sway investment towards building the 
foundations for large-scale agricultural production and socialist industrialization.’63 
Guevara responded by accusing Font of becoming:
‘... involved in the formal and fictitious aspects of the matter, or what is 
the same thing, in the fetishism that conceals the true relations of 
production. This function would only exist if  the bank financed 
investment using its own resources, which, of course, would be absurd in 
a socialist economy. What the bank does is to allocate the resources of 
the national budget in the amounts established by the investment plan.’64
Under the BFS, said Guevara there is no reason for the bank to become involved in 
investment decisions, which are political and economic issues for JUCEPLAN. The 
Treasury Ministry can exercise financial control, as it is responsible for the state 
budget: ‘This is the only place where surplus product ought to accrue if it is to be 
effectively employed.’65 By ‘effectively employed’ Guevara means in relation to the 
national development strategy.
62 Guevara, Banking, 304.
63 Font, Operation, 285-6.
64 Guevara, Bankings 304.
65 Guevara, Banking, 305.
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Financial relations between enterprises
Under the BFS there was no financial relationship between production units or 
consolidated enterprises. Produce passed on from one to another was categorised as 
‘delivery of products’ not as commodity sales or purchases. Consistent with Marx’s 
analysis that commodities change ownership, Guevara stated that in exchange 
between state-owned production units there was no transference of ownership. The 
‘delivery of products’ was accorded a ‘price’ for accounting purposes only and 
relevant adjustments were made in enterprise accounts held in the central bank. 
Rather than being subject to market forces, control was maintained through 
production contracts, regulating quality as well as quantity and punctuality. Failures 
carried administrative rather than financial sanctions. Surplus means of production 
could not be sold to other enterprises, but were transferred according to arrangements 
made by the Committees for Local Industry and approved by Consolidated 
Enterprise management if they were permanent. Inventories were updated to reflect 
these transfers.
In the AFS on the other hand, the transference of goods between enterprises was 
accompanied by financial payments. Surplus means of production could be sold to 
other enterprises which was a means of accumulating funds to meet financial plans, 
pay back loans, fund ‘decentralised’ investments not in the national plan, or finance 
material incentive schemes for workers.
Production costs
Proponents of both of the BFS and the AFS agreed that lowering production costs 
was a key to increasing labour productivity. However, under the AFS, this was 
attained via the profit motive. Under the BFS the focus was on technological and 
organisational innovations, moral incentives and raising skills levels.
Guevara insisted that production costs be the principal performance indicator. With 
the BFS, he aimed:
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‘to develop an entire system of cost accounting that would systematically 
reward and punish success and failure in efforts to lower costs... 
However analyzed, everything is reduced to a common denominator: 
increasing labor productivity. This is essential for building both 
socialism and communism.’66
Administration should be simplified to concentrate on planning and technological 
development; so cost control would be converted into a mechanical operation, 
facilitating mathematical analysis to regulate the economy and achieve the best 
allocation of resources between consumption and capital accumulation, as well as
fnamong the various branches of production.
Guevara argued that while general defects in planning, the result of organisational 
problems and lack of experience and dependency on unstable foreign markets, 
obstructed cost control: ‘this should not worry us so much as our inability to 
understand such a phenomenon as soon as it arises.’68 He believed the ability to 
monitor the cost of production in real time would give enterprise directors more 
control. Incentives should be utilised to encourage the work collective to lower costs. 
‘We have several pilot factories in operation in which we are studying systems of 
collective social incentives that would permit the lowering of costs’69 he revealed.
Font subjugates cost control to financial incentives in his defence of the AFS. He 
argued t^hat while cost control was useful, it was an a posteriori control which could 
not substitute for the enterprise’s self-control ‘by the peso’ in the AFS: ‘premised on 
the enterprise’s obligation to cover costs with receipts and on making use of the 
material interest of the enterprise’s workers as a group.’ This was backed up by the 
consumer and the bank’s financial control via the peso -  a model which reflected 
the market competition of capitalism.
66 Guevara, Production, 118-9. Guevara’s italics.
67 Guevara, Production, 120.
68 Guevara, Production, 119.
69 Guevara, Production, 120.
70 Font, Operation, 292.
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Price setting
'‘Che arrived at a contradiction. How do you create price when there is 
no market?... Che realised how complex this theme was and he did not 
want to make conclusive formulations. He made suggestions, but they
71were not conclusive points.’
If the operation of the law of value had been undermined, as Guevara claimed: ‘How
77can prices be made to coincide with value?’ The revolutionary government had 
frozen prices, introduced rationing, benefited from export sales to the Soviet bloc 
above world market prices and prioritised social justice goals, all of which 
undermined the market mechanism through which price is determined under 
capitalism. But Guevara warned against the dangers of a closed economy pricing 
structure and, especially because of the relative importance of foreign trade to Cuba, 
insisted that: ‘the domestic price structure must remain tied to the price structure of
7*3
the foreign market.’
Guevara made pricing structure suggestions first in June 1963 and again in February 
1964.74 In response to the claim that under the AFS prices were formed in relation to 
the law of value, he asked: ‘which meaning of the law?’ His point was that socially 
necessary labour time is an historical and global construct: ‘Continued technological 
progress, a result of competition in the capitalist world, reduces necessary labor 
expenditure and thereby lowers product value. A closed society can ignore such 
changes for a time, but it must always return to these international relationships in 
order to compare product values.’ Prices could be internally determined, but it 
could not be claimed that they reflected the operation of the law of value unless 
international production standards were applied.
Guevara proposed setting up price indices on the basis of following principles:
71 Gonzdlez, interview, February 2006.
72 Guevara, Production, 114.
73 Guevara, Production, 116.
74 Guevara, Production, 116-7 & BFS, 144.
75 Guevara, BFS, 144.
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1. Raw material imports with fixed and stable prices based on average international 
market price (plus a few points to cover the cost of transportation and the 
facilities of the Foreign Trade Ministry).
2. Cuban raw materials priced on the basis of real production costs in terms of 
money (add planned labour costs plus depreciation costs). This would be the 
price of products supplied by one domestic enterprise to another, or to the 
Ministry of Internal Commerce.
These prices would be constantly adjusted by indices reflecting commodity prices on 
the world market. BFS enterprises would operate on the basis of planned costs and 
make no profit of their own. All profits would go to the Ministry of Domestic Trade. 
The indices would show how effective Cuban production is: ‘The people would not 
suffer at all as a result of all these changes, since the prices of the commodities they 
buy are independently established with an eye to demand and need for each 
product.’ Decisions on pricing and trade could diverge from the mathematical 
optimum for political or strategic reasons:
‘...but we would always have a mirror before us by which to compare 
our work with what is actually happening in the rest of the world. Prices 
will always be viewed with an eye to world-market levels. These will 
. fluctuate in some years in response to technological advances and will 
change as the socialist market and the international division of labour 
gain pre-eminence, once a world socialist price system more logical than 
the one now used is achieved.’
Guevara argued that the conditions of monopoly capitalism from which Cuban 
socialism was emerging were technically and administratively more advanced than 
those in Russia in the 1920s. The challenge was to utilise these corporate efficiencies 
whilst removing the blind motive of profit, the operation of the law of value,
76 Guevara, BFS, 145.
77 Guevara, BFS, 146.
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and placing them within a different framework -  socialism. The debate about the role 
of money, finance and banking was at the heart of determining how to confront this 
challenge. Differences with the NBC were not overcome during Guevara’s time as a 
government minister. However, some of his ideas were implemented within 
MININD: money as account and the abolition of commercial relations between 
enterprises and other capitalist levers.
CONCIOUSNESS AND INCENTIVES
‘7 am not interested in dry economic socialism. We are fighting against 
misery, but we are also fighting against alienation. One o f the 
fundamental objectives o f Marxism is to remove interest, the factor o f  
individual interest, and gain from men’s psychological motivations. Marx 
was preoccupied both with economic factors and with their repercussions 
on the spirit. If communism isn’t interested in this, too, it may be a 
method o f distributing goods, but it will never be a revolutionary way of  
life:n
The debate about the use of incentives to increase efficiency and productivity and 
develop a socialist consciousness was integrally linked to the discussion about the 
law of value and capitalist categories in the transition to socialism and communism. 
Guevara’s emphasis on moral incentives and collective consciousness has been
«7Q
caricatured as idealist by those who fail to understand this link. To move away 
from capitalist laws of motion, socialist society has to distribute the social product in 
a way which does not equate labour time with value. The absence of the law of value 
in many areas of economic life presents the challenges of how to equate individual 
labour time and socially necessary labour time; how to increase productivity; how to 
overcome the dichotomy between mental and physical labour; and how to reach a 
healthy balance between investment in the means of production and in the means of
78 Guevara, interview with Jean Daniels 1964. Cited by Tablada, Transition, 77.
79 For example, Mike Gonz&lez, Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution, London: Bookmarks, 2004.
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consumption. For Guevara these questions had to be resolved by the conscious action 
of the workers, whose objective was to construct socialist society. Moral incentives 
were a tool to create this consciousness and a new concept of work as a social duty. 
Cuban sociologist Fernando Hernandez Heredia explains that: ‘conciencia is the 
fundamental way in which the interrelation of humans and the environment is 
expressed: conscious action, consciousness of the ends and domination of the 
organised subjective factor.’80 For Guevara, he explained, consciousness was the 
means to counter the worst aspects of capitalism inherited by socialism. It was a real 
and growing force which reproduced itself with efficient revolutionary work: ‘Che 
insisted on the need and the urgency of finding and applying the power of 
consciousness, via which means a development in the productive forces was 
assured.’81
The experience of mass mobilisation during the revolutionary struggle and popular 
participation in the first years of the Revolution influenced Guevara’s view of the 
dialectic relationship between objective and subjective conditions driving 
Revolution, social transformation and economic progress.82 Guevara believed that 
the conscious mobilisation of the masses could become an objective factor, even in 
the economic sphere. During the Bay of Pigs invasion by US-trained exiles in April 
1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, overtime, voluntary labour, 
innovations, production and productivity increased, while bureaucracy and 
absenteeism decreased. This was despite many workers being mobilised for military 
defence. Guevara observed that: ‘in moments of extreme danger it is easy to activate 
moral incentives: To maintain their effectiveness, it is necessary to develop a 
consciousness in which values acquire new categories.’
Guevara’s ideas were based on Marx’s analysis of the impact of the mode of 
production on human consciousness and social-relations. Marx described the
80 Fernando Martinez Heredia, Che, el Socialismoy el Communismo. La Habana: Casa de Las 
Americas, 1989, 69.
81 Martinez Heredia, Che, 72.
82 See Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare, London: Pelican Books, 1970.
83 Guevara, ‘Man and Socialism in Cuba’ in Silverman (ed) Socialism, 343. The mechanisms devised 
to raise consciousness and commitment to production are examined in the next part of the thesis.
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sociological or psychological manifestation of the capitalist mode of production as 
‘alienation and antagonism’. Communism proposes the opposite -  man as a fully 
developed social and collective being. Guevara quoted Marx ‘the philosopher’ who 
stressed the problems of man’s liberation as a social being:
‘Communism as the positive transcendence of private property as human 
self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human 
essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of 
man to himself as a social (i.e. human) being -  a return accomplished 
consciously and embracing the entire wealth of previous development.
This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and 
as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine 
resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and 
man -  the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, 
between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and 
necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the 
riddle of history solved, and it is conscious that it is the solution”.’84
For Guevara the obstacle to ‘fully developed humanism’ under communism was 
precisely the commodification of labour under the capitalist mode of production; a 
function of the law of value. During the socialist transition to communism, therefore, 
social relations must change, labour must cease to be a commodity and man must 
develop a social or collective attitude towards the production process:
‘In order for it to develop in culture, work must acquire a new condition; 
man as a commodity ceases to exist, and a system is established that 
grants a quota for the fulfilment of social duty... We are doing 
everything possible to give work this new category of social duty and to 
join it to the development of technology, on the one hand, which will 
provide the conditions for greater freedom, and to voluntary work on the 
other, based on the Marxist concept that man truly achieves his full
84 Marx ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, cited by Guevara, BFS, 123-4.
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human condition when he produces without being compelled by the 
physical necessity of selling himself as a commodity.’
Guevara believed that the use of capitalist mechanisms in the production process in 
socialist Cuba risked reproducing capitalist social relations and a capitalist 
consciousness, despite state planning and state ownership of the means of 
production:
‘Pursuing the chimera of achieving socialism with the aid of the blunted 
weapons left to us by capitalism (the commodity as the economic cell, 
profitability, and individual material interest as levers, etc.) it is possible 
to come to a blind alley...Meanwhile, the adapted economic base has 
. undermined the development of consciousness.’86
Proponents of the AFS believed that economic rationality would automatically lead 
to social rationality. Guevara disagreed and argued that socialism must develop an 
economic management system which found a harmony between the two goals; 
production and consciousness must be built in parallel: ‘To build communism, a new 
man must be created simultaneously with the material base.’87
Given the link between the law of value, labour productivity and incentives to 
production, it is no surprise that opponents in the debate on the use of mercantile 
categories also disagreed about incentives. The question of whether the law of value, 
which predates capitalism, necessary leads to the development of capitalist social 
relations is vital. Against the view of Stalin and the pro-Soviets in Cuba, Guevara 
believed that potentially it does. Thus, undermining the law of value is essential to 
resolving the conflict between man and nature which Marx wrote about. Rather than 
believing that the law of value and the way people are conditioned to its functioning 
could only be undermined with an abundance of material wealth as some proponents
85 Guevara, Socialism, 346.
86 Guevara, Socialism, 342.
87 Guevara, Socialism, 343.
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of the AFS claimed, Guevara believed that moral incentives should be developed to 
undermine the law of value during the process of development.
With 20 years’ hindsight, Guevara’s chief opponent, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez said 
that:
‘...in the conception of incentives I had very few differences with Che, I 
insist, very little differences. Our permanent debate, above all, was a 
debate about proportions, how much to give moral incentives, how much 
. material incentives; the role of education in this. There, in the rhythm of 
acceleration, is where our differences were.’88
Both sides of the Great Debate agree that moral incentives reflect and produce 
socialist consciousness, and material incentives are necessary in conditions of 
scarcity and underdevelopment. For example, Joaquin Infante Ugarte, a proponent of  
the AFS and Director of Prices and Finances in INRA, stated:
‘...the enterprise must employ moral and material incentives in 
appropriate proportions according to the inherent value of the incentive at 
each point on the road to communism. As we move toward communism, 
moral incentives should increase at the expense of material incentives.
But the latter do not completely disappear during the building of 
socialism and communism and, properly used, are an inducement to 
improve quality, increase productivity, and expand output.’89
However, Infante concluded his article with a quote from Khrushchev: ‘We must 
proceed down the path of material incentives with energy and boldness, starting with 
quality and quantity of production.’90 In theory, all the protagonists in the Great 
Debate agreed with the need to gradually replace material with moral incentives. The 
difference was the pace of this development.
88 Rodriguez, Contribution, 379.
89 Infante, ‘On the Operation of the Auto-Financed Enterprise’ in Silverman (ed) Socialism, 168.
90 Nikita S Khrushchev, cited by Infante, Auto-Financed, 183.
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Guevara recognised that the underdevelopment of the productive forces and the fact 
that the Cuban consciousness had been conditioned by capitalism meant that there 
was an objective need for the application of material incentives. But he insisted that 
they should not be used as the primary instrument of motivation, because they would 
become an economic category in their own right and impose on the social relations 
of production. Direct material incentives and consciousness are contradictory terms, 
he asserted, concluding with his most succinct exposition on the theme:91
‘If material incentives are in contradiction to the development of 
consciousness, but on the other hand, are a great force for obtaining 
production gains, should it be understood that preferential attention to the 
development of consciousness retards production? In comparative terms, 
it is possible within a given period, although no one has made the 
relevant calculations. We maintain that the development of consciousness 
does more for the development of production in a relatively short time 
than material incentives do. We take this stance because our society’s 
development is generally projected to lead to communism. This 
J presupposes that work will cease to be a painful necessity and become an 
agreeable imperative. Such a statement is loaded with subjectivism and 
requires sanction in the experience we are gaining. If in the course of 
experience it proves to seriously block the development of the productive 
forces, then the decision must be made to act quickly in order to get back 
. on familiar paths.’
The familiar path was the AFS with its use of mercantile categories. The italicised 
sentence is vital, it expressly states the objective, and defines the paradigm within 
which Guevara’s conceptions of consciousness and incentives should be discussed.93
91 Guevara, BFS, 134.
92 Guevara, BFS, 135. My italics.
93 Mesa-Lago quotes this paragraph from Guevara, but omits this key sentence. Ideological, 62.
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CONCLUSION
Aside from the foreign participants, the protagonists of the Great Debate were 
involved in a daily search for administrative and technological mechanisms to 
organise and stimulate the Cuban economy and maintain the enthusiasm and support 
of the masses. Arguably the challenge of undermining the law of value is the 
essential one for Guevara. The law, subtle yet domineering, had repercussions which 
were economic and psychological, manifested in man’s perception of his role in 
society. Guevara’s insistence on the importance of undermining the law 
demonstrated his understanding of just how profound and traumatic was the rupture 
involved in transition from capitalism to communism. The policies formulated within 
MININD as part of the BFS were consistent with this understanding of the role of the 
law of value.
In April 1965, the month when Guevara left Cuba to fight a guerrilla war in the 
Congo, Fidel Castro said:
‘...beware of those Marxist-Leninists who are only and exclusively 
worried about philosophical questions, for socialism has many practical 
and serious problems to solve. And it is the duty of Marxist-Leninists to 
solve them, a duty which becomes more essential when we realise that it 
is precisely revolutionary power that offers the greatest possibilities of 
solving them.’94
Indeed, Guevara had enjoyed a rare opportunity to deepen his theoretical analysis 
with the experience of applying his ideas in revolutionary Cuba. It was an exciting 
and dynamic process, examined in detail in Part Three of the thesis. The important 
contribution of the following Part Three is twofold. It provides the first systematic 
record of Guevara’s work as Minister of Industries, detailing the practical policies 
and structures developed to concretise his theory and the problems which he aimed to
94 Fidel Castro from El Mundo, Havana, 20th April 1965, cited by John D. Martz, ‘Doctrine and 
Dilemmas of the Latin American “New Left’” in World Politics, Vol 22: 2 (Jan, 1970), 195.
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solve. Additionally, it illustrates how these formulations were directly linked to his 
theoretical conceptions; how those policies and structures aimed to undermine the 
operation of the law of value in Cuba’s transition to socialism.
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PART THREE 
Guevara’s solutions
Prologue
'So you would like us to turn Cuba into a sort o f seminar for 
intellectuals, a Parisian cafe where people can sit down and rave about 
the latest literary hits. But what kind o f country do you think ours really 
is? Cuba is in the midst o f a revolution, besieged by US Marines; she 
. must see to her defenses and build her future. It is not for fun that we 
have decided to rush our children from secondary schools to high 
schools and from high schools to universities. It is because we have to 
act quickly and because we have no choice in the matter... In very quick 
succession, we have been taught the meaning o f economic blockade, 
subversion, sabotage, and psychological warfare...’ 1
The theoretical debates about socialist construction that have taken place in the 
socialist countries since the 1920s have had direct and serious consequences on the 
development strategies and policy formulations in those countries. However, 
Guevara’s contribution was qualitatively different because it bridged two 
oppositional schools of Marxism. On one side were Soviet theorists, or what Ernst 
Nolte called ‘state’ Marxists: Tacking critical distance toward their own state and 
government’; on the other hand their critics, western or ‘free’ Marxists, who enjoyed 
‘the most radical and total form of critical distance.’2 Guevara’s conflict with the 
Soviet system seemingly placed him in the theoretical camp of the western critics. 
But his approach had no such critical distance because, unlike the ‘free’ Marxists, 
Guevara’s analysis had serious practical consequences and was part of the Cuban 
state’s commitment to building socialism.
1 Guevara cited by K S Karol, Guerrillas in Power, trans. Arnold Pomerans. London: Jonathan Cape, 
1971,46-8. Guevara was responding to Karol’s criticism of the use of Socialist Bloc manuals on 9 
May 1961.
2 Nolte concluded that during the Cold War: ‘free Marxism fought in the front lines for the Western 
cause.’ Ernst Nolte, ‘The Relationship between “Bourgeois” and “Marxist” Historiography’, History 
and Theory. Vol 14: 1 (Feb 1975), 68-70.
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As.Marx’s dictum goes: men make history, but not in conditions of their own 
choosing.3 Guevara rejected the idea of theory being formulated in a vacuum. This 
explains the apparent contradiction of Guevara both criticising the Soviet bloc and 
responding angrily to K S Karol’s complaint about the Cubans using Soviet manuals. 
‘Have you got any others you can recommend?’ Guevara demanded, according to 
Karol, and: ‘spoke scathingly of “liberals” who wanted the Revolution to remain 
ideologically neutral, and to give everyone perfect freedom to choose between a host 
of social philosophies and doctrines.’4 Unlike ‘free’ Marxists, whose criticism of 
Soviet socialism took the form of an intellectual exercise, Guevara was in a position 
to concretise his analysis by creating an alternative economic management system 
which attempted to undermine the law of value and place man at the centre of 
development. It is one thing to criticise the lack of ‘humanity’ in existing socialism, 
but another to formulate a policy which actually develops socialist consciousness. 
Guevara complained that instead of devising policies consistent with Marx’s 
analysis, Soviet theorists had adapted theory to accommodate empirical reality.5 His 
challenge was to demonstrate that such compromising pragmatism was not 
necessary; that it was possible to construct a socialist system which could develop 
the productive forces and create socialist consciousness simultaneously, thus 
preparing society for a transition to communism. Guevara’s vision of socialism was 
additionally influenced by the traditions of Latin American struggles for national 
liberation with social and economic justice. As Ken Cole stated: ‘we find in Che 
Guevara an unequalled integration of Marti’s insights and Marx’s theory, into a 
revolutionary practice by which people might liberate themselves by becoming 
aware of their social potentials.’6
Part Three, the core of the thesis, details the institutional mechanisms and policies 
that Guevara developed to achieve this within the Ministry of Industries, 1961-5, and 
demonstrates how they link to his Marxist formation. Despite the importance of 
Guevara’s contribution to both the theory of socialist transition and to the Cuban
3 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire o f Louis Bonaparte. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977, 10.
4 Karol, Guerrillas, 46.
5 Details in chapter 11.
6 Ken Cole, ‘The Cuban Revolution: Marti’s insight, Marx’s theory and Guevara’s practice; lessons 
for socialist development in the 21st century’, paper, January 2004, 28.
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economy, this history remains largely unknown. The Budgetary Finance System 
(BFS) was Guevara’s solution to the challenge of socialist transition in conditions of 
underdevelopment without relying on capitalist mechanisms. The policies under 
examination were developed concurrently, however, the thesis structure has imposed 
a thematic division in order to focus the investigation and organise the narrative. Part 
Three is divided into five chapters: education, training and salaries; administrative 
control, supervision and investment; collectivising production and workers’ 
participation; science and technology; and consciousness and psychology. Each 
chapter explains the practical problems which those specific policies were designed 
to overcome, the obstacles encountered in their application and demonstrates how 
they link to Guevara’s theoretical conceptions about socialist transition.
The chapters illustrate the dichotomy between Guevara’s theoretical ideals, his 
paradigm for socialist transition, and the historical reality, which served as a major 
obstacle: underdevelopment of manufacturing, metallurgy, mechanics, electronics 
and chemical industries; the blockade, lack of spare parts and the low productivity 
and efficiency of means of production bought from the socialist countries; the low 
levels of education, accountancy knowledge and technical training of the general 
population; and the chaos incurred by the sudden nationalisation of industry, the 
exodus of management professionals and the technical inadequacy of their 
substitutes. In the search for solutions to both the theoretical problems of socialist 
transition and the concrete problems of Cuba’s economic development, key 
characteristics stand out: the concept of Cuba as one big factory; learning by doing, 
the process of trial and error and making improvements sobre la marcha [on the 
move]; criticism and open debate, including self-criticism, getting to the root of a 
problem in order to resolve it; not allowing the US blockade to be an excuse for 
production problems; working with experts regardless of their ideological 
affiliations, dependence on key personnel with huge responsibilities and Guevara’s 
tendency to demand most from his closest collaborators; adopting the most advanced 
technology available, whether it be management techniques or means of production, 
laying the groundwork for technological advances even while struggling to overcome 
backwardness; and a flexible approach to the questions of control, decentralising to
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encourage initiative and centralising to ensure control. In detailing this rich and 
complex history this thesis illustrates Guevara’s most important contribution to 
economic history and the history of economic thought.
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CHAPTER 6
Guevara’s solutions: education, training 
and salaries
iThe training o f active workers begins in the workplace at the most basic 
educational level: the elimination o f any remaining illiteracy in the most 
remote areas; continuing education courses and, later, workers ’ 
improvement courses for those who have reached third grade; courses in 
basic technical skills for the better educated workers; extension courses 
to turn skilled workers into assistant engineers; university courses for all 
types o f professionals and also for administrators. The revolutionary 
government intends to turn our country into a big school where study and 
success in one’s studies become a basic factor for bettering the 
individual, both economically and in his moral standing in society, to the 
extent o f his abilities f
Jose Marti’s words ‘to be educated is to be free’ were echoed as a key battle cry in 
the revolutionary struggle against Batista in 1950s Cuba. In November 1956 the 26 
July Movement (M26J) drafted its educational policy to be launched simultaneously 
with the guerrilla campaign of the Rebel Army.2 The self-taught Ernesto ‘Che’ 
Guevara shared the view that education was part of the armoury of revolution and 
that educating the poor was a precondition for winning the struggle against 
imperialist domination, preparing them to seize power themselves. For Guevara 
education was synonymous with culture: the appreciation and assimilation of 
knowledge from science to art. Culture was part of what distinguished the ‘new man’ 
of socialism/communism from the proletariat under capitalism who, in Marx’s
1 Emesto Guevara, ‘Against Bureaucratism’, in David Deutschmann (ed) Che Guevara Reader, 
Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1997, 161.
2 ‘Revolutionary Proclamation of Santiago de Cuba and the Sierra Maestra’, drafted by the 26 
Movement July (M26J) in November 1956 for release following the landing in Cuba of the Granma 
boat from Mexico. Cited by Armando Hart, Aldabonazo: inside the Cuban revolutionary 
underground, 1952-1958, London: Pathfinder, 2004, 277-282.
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words: ‘live only so long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their 
labour increases capital.’3 Education was a constant and dynamic process in which 
the revolutionary had to engage daily as a means of self-improvement and, through 
that, social development.
Antoni Kapcia noted that: ‘any analysis of education in Cuba since 1959 has to 
recognise that education is politics, that politics means revolution and that revolution 
has been largely a search for a new national identity.’4 For Guevara that new identity 
was Cuba Socialista, for which education acquires three key functions in economic 
development and transition to socialism: first, education as culture, in the form of 
basic literacy classes for the Rebel Army during the war and in La Cabana; second, 
political education, teaching Cubans about imperialism, class struggle, the 
revolutionary process, socialist construction and forging the commitment to work as 
a social duty; and third, education for production, learning accountancy, 
specialisation, technical training, developing the capacity for abstract thought to 
assist in the management of complex industries. These aims were concretised as part 
of Guevara’s solutions within the Budgetary Finance System (BFS) and are detailed 
below.
Guevara himself had always had an insatiable appetite for knowledge and a proactive 
approach to learning. During his childhood and youth, bouts of asthma confined him 
to bed where he read widely and prolifically. At 17 years of age, Guevara developed 
a routine of listing and commenting on his reading material in notebooks. He then 
added indexes: a methodological approach to knowledge which demonstrates 
scientific rigour.5 The indexes illustrate the breadth of Guevara’s cultural interests; 
more so given that this reading was additional to his school and university education. 
After January 1959, Guevara’s reading became more focussed and even broader. He
3 Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels, Manifesto o f the Communist Party. Moscow : Progress Publishers, 
1975,51.
4 Antoni Kapcia, Education, Culture and Identity in Cuba: appraising the role o f education in shaping 
and defining society paper presented at the Institute for the Study of the Americas, University of 
London, 29 October 2004.
5 All but one of these notebooks is held in the archive at the Che Guevara Study Centre in Havana.
The content is discussed in chapter 10.
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embarked on a serious study of Marxist classics and socialist political economy, but 
also studied management theory from the corporate capitalist world. He learnt Cuban 
history and devoured the works of Cubans, including Jose Marti and Nicolas Guillen, 
and political and military history from around the world. He studied maths from 
1959 and, when his teacher Salvador Villesca declared there was nothing more he 
could teach Guevara, he began a course of advanced maths set theory, with Dr Hugo 
Perez Rojas.6 He studied accountancy with Harold Anders, and became the teacher in 
the management council’s study circle for linear programming, a mathematical 
technique that can used to predict optimal conditions for production. The Vice 
Minister of Technical Development, Tirso Saenz, recalled that Guevara told the 
Management Council: ‘you are dealing with so many problems that you are not 
thinking in the future, you are not even thinking in the present. Computing is a reality 
in the world and you have to start learning about it.’7 He handed out a book on linear 
programming to study for the following week. Council secretary Juan Valdes 
Gravalosa said: ‘That next Monday, we were waiting for a teacher and Che was at 
the drawing board; it was Che who gave us classes’. All of this was in addition to 
managing the largest ministry in Cuba and to his numerous political and military 
responsibilities of state. A look at Guevara’s Monday schedule from this time 
demonstrates what this meant in practical terms: 7am, teaching linear programming; 
8am, MININD management council meeting; 2pm, annual reports for each 
Consolidated Enterprise (EC) discussed; 9pm, higher maths.
Guevara had lessons from specialist accountant Harold Anderson. In 1964 he began a 
course in probability and theories of information which was understood by only two 
or three people in Cuba at that time. Miguel Figueras, director of the Perspective 
Plan in MININD, participated in this course which was taught by a professor Martiz 
from the Faculty of Physics at Havana University.9 Guevara studied Swahili in the 
Congo and Quechua in Bolivia. He also made them compulsory for the Cuban troops
6 Jimenez Velo, interview, 6 February 2006 & Tirso Sdenz, interview, 2 February 2006. Rojas is today 
at the Institute de Cibemdtica, Matemdtica y Computacidn.
7 Sdenz, interview, 7 January 2005.
8 Juan Valdds Gravalosa, interview, 22 February 2006.
9 Miguel Figueras, interview, 27 January 2006. See Chapter 9 for details of the Perspective Plan.
146
Chapter 6: Guevara’s solutions: education, training and salaries
under his command; and he taught them French and maths as optional extras.10 
According to Harry Antonio Villegas Tamayo, one of just two Cuban soldiers in 
Bolivia to survive and escape when Guevara himself was killed, Guevara had written 
a list of 300 books which they were instructed to buy in Argentina and Brazil on their 
way to Bolivia. ‘This is because he wanted to write about philosophy’ whilst in the 
mountains, affirmed Villegas.’11 Guevara had already written an economic critique 
of the Soviet Manual for Political Economy, whilst in Prague after the failed military 
campaign in the Congo.
To appreciate both the necessity for the educational drive and its achievements it is 
essential to understand the crisis which resulted from the exodus of professionals and 
the lack of revolutionary substitutes. This will be followed by an examination of how 
Guevara’s concept of permanent improvement was institutionalised within MININD. 
Next there will be a discussion of the policies developed to foster the concept of 
work as a social duty: breaking the link between work and remuneration, and 
educating the unemployed. Integral to this are salaries, inflation and the role of the 
trade unions, which since the 1940s had been preoccupied with defence of their 
member’s pay and conditions and imbued with ‘economistic’ tendencies, thus 
negating class struggle and the struggle for socialism. The new salary scale attempted 
to reconcile these factors and is illustrated in the final section.
EXODUS OF PROFESSIONALS
According to the 1953 census 31% of Cubans over six years old had no schooling; 
another 29.4% had three years’ schooling or less. Effectively, 60% of the population 
lacked education. 3.5% had received high-school education and just over 1% had 
university education. The illiteracy rate of the rural population over ten years old was
10 Harry Villegas Tamayo, interview, 22 March 2006.
11 Guevara was captured by the army in Bolivia with books by Lenin, Trotsky, Pablo Neruda and 
Nicolds Guillen’s poetry and a biography of Karl Marx. The other Cuban survivor was Leonardo 
Tamayo.
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41.7% 12 Cuba had a small urban professional elite. Most industry was owned by 
foreign companies, predominantly from the US, which tended to staff their facilities 
with their own nationals; enterprises in Cuba were operated by US managers and 
technicians. Many of the Cubans in managerial positions had been trained in the US 
and used their connections to resettle there shortly after the Revolution. Of the 2,000 
engineers in Cuba 1958, only 700 remained after the nationalisations of 1961. In the 
petroleum industry 75% of engineers and almost all the managers left within one 
year of nationalisation. Fidel Castro described the early days: ‘when there was 
nothing, no experience, no cadre, no engineers, no economists, no technicians hardly; 
when we were left with almost no doctors, because 3,000 of them left out of the 
6,000 there were in the country.’13
The professionals left because they recognised that as the Revolution radicalised it 
was not favouring their interests, as individuals or as a class. However, Guevara 
worked to encourage technicians and managers to stay, confident that the experience 
of integration into the revolutionary process would help them to reconcile their 
individual interests with those of society. Guevara talked openly in Leninist terms 
about the historical position of technicians and engineers as privileged workers, the 
labour aristocracy, and acknowledged their general detachment from the ideological 
sweep of the Revolution. However, he believed that as long as they were not 
organising as a class against the Revolution, their incorporation into production was 
essential and beneficial for socialist society. Even without developing ideological 
commitment, they could transfer technical skills to a new generation of revolutionary 
cadre.14 Miguel Figueras gave examples of experts who stayed to work with the 
Revolution: ‘they were brilliant people and Che used their help and maintained 
their much higher historic salaries. I believe this was a very smart policy of Che not
12 Leo Huberman and Paul M Sweezy, Cuba Anatomy o f a Revolution, New York: Monthly Review, 
1960, 95.
13 Fidel Castro, ‘Discurso pronunciado por Fidel Castro el 8 de octubre de 1987 en el acto central por 
el vigdsimo aniversario de la muerte de Ernesto Che Guevara, in Ernesto Che Guevara: El Gran 
Debate sobre la economla en Cuba, Melbourne: Ocean Press, 392. The Cuban film Memories o f 
Underdevelopment, directed by Tom&s Gutierrez Alea, 1966, examines the decision by the Cuban elite 
to leave or stay in Cuba.
14 Case studies of Guevara giving personal attention to specific technicians whose knowledge was 
essential in key areas of production are cited throughout the thesis.
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to push them aside, but to engage these very intelligent people. Many of these people 
had families that had left or they wanted to leave and Che worked with them to bring 
them close to the Revolution.’15
Guevara conceded that technicians should be better paid than lesser skilled workers 
during socialist transition, while remuneration remained tied to labour, but they 
would not receive political or social privileges over other workers. He said: ‘They 
will be better paid because the law of demand and supply still functions, to a certain 
degree; and it is necessary to have technicians, to pay them better; so they carry out 
their tasks better.’16 On the other hand, he also believed that technicians responded to 
moral incentives sometimes better than the average workers, because they enjoyed 
recognition for their achievements and expertise.17 Guevara lamented that technical 
expertise and revolutionary commitment were rarely combined but he still aspired to 
have an engineer in every enterprise. This would be achieved with:
. ‘... old technicians beginning to incorporate themselves into the
Revolution, called by the sense of justice that everyone has inside, they
will start to understand socialism; and new technicians who are bom with
a different consciousness, who will incorporate themselves into our
enterprises. It would be ideal if in the Mineral enterprise there was an
engineer of the mines with 20 years experience, not this comrade
1 &Herbella who was a travelling salesman of I don’t know what.’
Tirso Saenz’s story indicates, firstly, that the exodus of technicians was not 
necessarily an expression of political antagonism to the Revolution, but motivated by 
individual self-interest, and, secondly, that non-political professionals did become 
ideologically committed to the socialist revolution. Having trained in the US as a 
chemical engineer, Saenz worked in Cuba for Proctor & Gamble, who, following
15 Figueras, interview.
16 Guevara, cited by Orlando Borrego, El Camino del Fuego. La Habana: Imagen Contempor&nea, 
2001,172.
17 Guevara, ‘Reuniones Bimestrales’, 20 January 1962, in El Che en la Revolucion Cubana: 
Ministerio de Industrias, Tomo VI, La Habana, Ministerio de Azucar [MINAZ], 1966,266.
18 Guevara, Bimestrales, 14 July 1962, 266.
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nationalisation of the company, offered him a new job in Cincinnati. The prospects 
were good so, although he had nothing against the Revolution or Castro, in October 
1960 he went to the US embassy with a letter from P&G Vice President Fritz Garber 
stating that he had employment in Cincinnati and requesting a visa. But the embassy 
staff spoke to Saenz in what he considered a demeaning tone, demanding proof of his 
university degree:
‘I said to “go to hell!” and I left. My wife was waiting at home: “What 
happened?” she said. “We are going to stay and see what happens”, I told 
her. The next day I had responsibility for five or six different posts, 
because other people had left. The blockade was already in place. There 
were no raw materials, nothing. I was trying to be an alchemist, 
producing soaps, detergents, toothpaste and shampoo out of nothing.’19
In February 1961, the Ministry of Industries interviewed Saenz in search of a 
‘revolutionary engineer’ to be vice director of the petroleum industry. ‘Four months 
after I was in the US embassy I was considered a revolutionary engineer, because I 
was doing a good job, not just talking. And this was a revolutionary act. I was not 
working for myself and P&G anymore; I was working for the Cuban people. That 
gave my work a new dimension.’ Saenz got the job, which involved mediating 
between the technicians and the government to maintain production and prevent 
sabotage: a kind of political commissar. Nervous of his own record, however, he 
requested a meeting with Guevara.
‘I told Che the story and then he asked me “Do you want to leave the 
country?” I said “No!” “Do you want to work with us?” I said “Yes I 
do.” He said “Ok, I think you are an honest man so let’s work. Go and
work.” And he never raised the issue again, he never referred to me as
0(\the one who wanted to leave the country.’
19 Sdenz, interview, 2005.
20 S&enz, interview, 2005. Sdenz became Vice Minister of Technical Development in MININD 1963.
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Every institution in Cuba, MININD included, was full of under-qualified 
revolutionaries ‘learning by doing’. Most importantly, they were loyal to the 
Revolution; their educational level and lack of experience could be resolved on the 
job. Guevara said the challenge was to: ‘fill the vacancies left by the traitors and to 
meet our need for a skilled work force resulting from the rapid rate of our 
development. That is why training is the top priority of all the revolutionary 
government’s plans.’21 Education and training were integrally linked to production 
and the needs of industrialisation. This linked individual improvement with 
economic development and the progress of the Revolution.
EDUCATIONAL DRIVE
Guevara’s commitment to constant learning and his vision of the revolutionary as 
social vanguard combined in his pedagogical approach to those around him. Harry 
Villegas joined Guevara’s column in the Sierra Maestra aged 17 and became his 
body guard, leaving Cuba to fight with him in the Congo and Bolivia. He said:
‘His book Guerrilla Warfare begins by stating that guerrillas are social 
reformers, so Che said they should have the cultural level to be able to 
reform. He believed that regardless of the educational level we already 
had we had to prepare ourselves to play a role in constructing the new 
society. Every time there was an opening during the struggle he looked 
for the possibility of creating a school.’22
Building schools and studying helped keep the troops occupied between combat and 
meals, both of which were infrequent. Guevara gave literacy classes and general 
education to his troops and local people in periods of non-combat: maths, Cuban 
history, war strategy, and the Mambisi resistance to Spanish colonists. They would 
read in groups and discuss the material. Guevara even read the poetry of Pablo
21 Guevara, Bureaucratismo, 161.
22 Villegas, interview.
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Neruda to the young soldiers.23 The troop education was formalised in the first days 
of January 1959 when La Cabana fortress in Havana was turned into Ciudad 
Libertad (Freedom City). He invited teachers and other university graduates, 
members and supporters of the M26J and PSP to provide literacy and political 
education for his troops. Maria Teresa Sanchez was among them. She said:
‘He emphasised the importance of the soldiers’ understanding why we 
wanted to educate them, why we wanted to prepare them; that they were 
the ones who were going to complete the future tasks. Che knew that 
many of them would return to their homes, but at least they would return 
literate... We gave classes in the morning: reading, writing, mathematics.
A group of us gave them political indoctrination and history. I talked to 
them about Cuban struggles, the situation of workers, their leaders and 
the sugar cane. We introduced them to Marxism and discussed how the 
workers lived. We worked on the level they were at because we didn’t 
want to alarm them. They were very conscious of the role they would 
play in the future. Those who weren’t interested left the army.’24
Once the soldiers had basic literacy, they went on to other education, training and 
military schools. Fred Judson detailed the political education of the Rebel Army, 
from 1953 to 1963. In the post-1959 period of institutionalisation, he stressed the 
importance of educational material published for the military apparatus, purged of 
Batista loyalists and reorganised as the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), in 
raising the political level and commitment to the radicalisation of the Revolution:
‘ [It] was not aimed exclusively at creating anti-imperialist convictions. It 
was also aimed at constructing an army with a social conscience; an army
23 Neruda recalled meeting Guevara: ‘I was flattered by what he told me about my book Canto 
General. He would read it to his guerrillas at night, in the Sierra Maestra. Now, years later, I shudder 
when I think that my poems accompanied him to his death... I keep seeing in Che Guevara that 
pensive man who in his heroic battles always had a place, next to his weapons, for poetry.’ Pablo 
Neruda, Memoirs, London: Souvenir Press, 2004, 323.
24 Maria Teresa Sanchez, interview, 8 March 2006. Camilo Cienfuegos did the same with his Rebel 
Army column in the Columbia barracks.
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prepared to carry out land reform and innumerable construction projects; 
an army prepared to be involved in production; an army prepared to root 
out corruption; an army prepared to administer a whole series of 
reforms... Such political education was not exclusive to the Rebel Army.
The revolutionary leadership intended to educate a whole people, both to 
prepare it for coming struggles and, as a matter of principle, to equip the 
people with the skills necessary to build the society of the revolutionary 
vision.’25
A number of publications were produced to assist in literacy training and political 
education and for general reading. The vocabulary and content varied according to 
the degree of literacy of their readership. But all materials emphasised the continuity 
of struggle: both from the wars for independence to the Revolution of 1959 and from 
the war against Batista to the struggle to consolidate the new state. The attainment of 
literacy was portrayed as a blow against the old regime where ignorance served the 
dictatorship: ‘To read and write is a new weapon and you should care for it as you 
care for your rifle.’ Publications included: Arma Nueva, Alfabeticemos Veneeremos 
and the weekly magazine Verde Olivo whose readership in the army and militias was 
in the hundreds of thousands and which was also available to non-military readers. 
As director of education and director of the orientation courses for the FAR from 
March 1959, Guevara regularly contributed to these publications. He wrote the 
introduction to the Manual of Civic Training, training booklet published in January 
1960 for educating soldiers, stating that it served all Cubans, not just the army 27 
According to Judson, the content of the Manual was already anti-imperialist and 
influenced by Marxist concepts a year before the declaration of socialism.28
25 C Fred Judson, Cuba and the Revolutionary Myth: The Political Education o f the Cuban Rebel 
Army, 1953-1963, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984,237.
26 Verde Olivo, 27 March 1960, cited by Judson, Myth, 265.
27 Fernando Hemdndez Heredia, Seminar, pensamiento militares de Ernesto Che Guevara, 
Diplomado: Pensamiento Latinoamericano, Che Guevara. Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias 
Sociales (FLACSO), University of Havana. 19 January 2006.
28 Judson, Myth, 237.
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In January 1959 the new government established a Ministry of Education. Within 16 
months it had increased expenditure on education by 10%; school capacity increased 
by 25% and teaching staff by 30%. In the previous 57 years since the establishment 
of the Republic, just one new school had been built in Havana. The new government 
build 37 new schools in Havana alone.29 This expanded state education provision 
was free, or workers were paid to study, thus removing all barriers to entry presented 
by the thriving industry of private education, in which around 90,000 Cubans were 
enrolled by 1949.30 Armando Hart, a leading member of the M26J urban wing and 
Minister of Education from January 1959, explained that:
‘Five thousand classrooms for nine thousand unemployed teachers could 
be created just with the financial resources available in the long list of 
“botellas” [absentee teachers] paid by the Ministry of Education of the 
old regime. When I told Fidel I was going to devote myself to creating 
five thousand classrooms, he pointed out that we should talk to the 
teachers and ask them to cut their salaries in half and thus create twice as 
many classrooms -  ten thousand -  with agreement that their salaries 
would be raised gradually in a short number of years. That’s what was 
done.’31
In 1960 the literacy campaign was launched and achieved its goal of eradicating 
basic illiteracy within one year. Over 300,000 Cubans, including 100,000 students, 
many in their early teens, travelled across Cuba teaching more than 700,000 people 
to read and write, simultaneously experiencing how the country’s poorest lived, 
reinforcing the sense of Cubanidad and an understanding of the profound social 
change ushered in by the Revolution. Armando Hart said: ‘Youth who were too 
young to participate in the struggle against the tyranny were given a no-less 
important task at the triumph of the Revolution: that of defending the country and the 
revolutionary program, one of whose points was the elimination of illiteracy.’ In
29 Huberman, Anatomy, 97.
30 Laurie Johnson, ‘Cuban Nationalism and Responses to Private Education in Cuba, 1902-1958’, in 
Will Fowler (ed), Ideologues and Ideologies in Latin America, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997,39.
31 Hart, Aldabonazo, 304.
32 Hart, Aldabonazo, 305.
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December 1960 the establishment of Schools of Revolutionary Instruction was 
announced to overcome the lack of professionals versed in Marxism-Leninism and to 
counter the tendency to action devoid of analysis.
‘ILLUSTRIOUS ILLITERATES’ AND SUPERACION
MININD was set up in February 1961 with four vice ministers: Orlando Borrego, 
Omar Fernandez, Mario Zorrilla and Gustavo Machln. Like Guevara, Fernandez had 
a medical degree, but none of the others had a university qualification. Femdndez left 
to be Minister of Transport and was replaced by Jose Manuel Castifieiras, who also 
lacked a university degree.34 The MININD management council were affectionate 
known as the ‘illustrious illiterates’. Likewise, of the nearly 40 Consolidated 
Enterprise (EC) directors, only three were university graduates. Few of the factory 
administrators even had middle-school qualifications, with the exception of a handful 
of complex plants, such as petroleum refineries.
In this context, the educational drive was institutionalised into the MININD 
apparatus, to engage everyone in constant superacion, self-improvement, from those 
who had just learned to write their own names to the specialist advisors whom 
Guevara urged to study new degrees and specialisations. Classrooms were created in 
every production unit. Saenz explained how this was possible given the exodus of 
professionals:
‘Every worker, every engineer, every man with a slightly higher level 
than the rest, was able to teach. Really! You had a course for 
everything.Everybody was studying. Workers, older people were 
contracted as teachers. When did this take place? Some were practical 
classes, for example minimum technique, which was studied during the
33 Lionel Soto, ‘Las Escuelas de Instruccidn Revolucionaria y la Formacidn de Cuadros’, in Cuba 
Socialista, Aflo 1: 3, (November 1961), 30.
34 Tirso W Sdenz, El Che Ministro: Testimonio de un Colaborador. La Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 
2005, 52-54.
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working day. Most classes were outside the working day. How often?
Every course had its own structure and organisation. Were the classes 
obligatory? No, but everybody went, because it was important. You see 
the importance of ideological work, people felt that they needed to 
improve their qualifications; they even felt pride in studying.’
Jose Luis Punales was one of those who transformed immediately from pupil to 
teacher. In 1961 he studied in the school for Political Commissars. Having 
previously studied in the School of Commerce, once he graduated he was asked to 
stay on and teach. The course included political economy, history and Marxist
'J iT
philosophy.
Guevara had a reputation for being most demanding of his closest colleagues and 
collaborators. Juan Alberto Castallenos Yillamar was one of his four bodyguards:
‘One day he said to us: “Well lads, you know that you are companeros 
with sufficient merits for us to give you any task, but, if you don’t study, 
in ten years you may have more merits but we will have to replace you 
with those who have knowledge. You will have to retire with a little 
salary.” He gave us a teacher.’37
On return from his trip to the leading non-aligned countries, Guevara checked the 
class register and seeing that Villegas and Castanellos had skipped classes he 
punished them with one month’s labour on a farm outside Havana. Guevara forced 
them to accept the discipline of superacion, as they had the discipline of the guerrilla 
struggle.
The policies formulated to institutionalise superacion in MININD are examined 
below. EC directors were given exams at the start of the bimonthly meetings, testing 
their statistical and accounting knowledge of the production units under their
35 Sdenz, interview, 2005.
36 Jose Luis Puflales, interview, 21 January 2005.
37 Juan Alberto Castellaflos Yillamar, interview, 1 March 2006.
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jurisdiction.38 They were threatened with replacement if  they failed to get 60% on 
three occasions. Guevara criticised members of the Management Council of 
MININD for not participating in study circles, arguing that constant study was 
essential to prevent the creation of bureaucracy: ‘There are several people who have 
a circle of political economy...others content themselves with the professional 
experience that they have and others simple with daily work... this will produce a 
coarsening of people; bureaucratisation and standardisation, that will lead to work of 
bad quality and a decline, in the long term, in the effectiveness of the comrades.’ 
Pufiales said: ‘With Che you had to study continuously. Almost all of us had a 
commitment to get into university. That was something that he struggled hard for.’40
Edison Velazquez was named director of the EC of Nickel. Just 20 days after 
arriving at the huge and complex Nicaro nickel mining plant in eastern Cuba, 
Guevara visited him there to assess how he was getting on. Velazquez recalled: ‘Che 
asked me how much a ton of nickel was, and I didn’t know. He shouted at me saying: 
“You are an irresponsible person; you are in charge of the most important industry in 
the country!” He was furious. So I studied with the technicians about the factory 
processes, accounting and costs in the different areas. Che obliged you to study. He 
gave you exams.’41 In the bimonthly meeting of February 1964 Guevara referred to 
this case, stating that the director relied entirely on the advice of technicians because 
he lacked knowledge of the industry: ‘Well then there is an obligation to study 
systematically all of the problems of nickel, in order to learn.’42 He suggested the EC 
of Electricity organise a study course for other directors.
For Guevara, it was vital to study the theory in the process of daily practice; the 
balance was essential: ‘Now to invent theory totally on the basis of action is 
foolish... This is not to say that we have to become philosophers, nor become great 
economists, but we have to have basic knowledge.’43 Intellectual work was vital for
38 Detailed in chapter 7.
39 Guevara, Bimestrales, 9 March 1963, 340.
40 Pufiales, interview.
41 Edison Vel&zquez, interview, 21 January 2006.
42 Guevara, Bimestrales, 22 February 1964, 461.
43 Guevara, Bimestrales, 22 February 1964,462.
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developing the capacity of abstract thought necessary to administer a complex 
factory or direct an EC. In July 1962, he said that administrators who are exemplary 
in workshops often fail when faced with complex management operations because 
they lack this intellectual training:
‘...when that good worker arrives at a bigger factory, he starts to have 
problems, because there he has to confront problems of organisation; he 
cannot move this big factory with his personal example, he does not have 
time, it is not possible, there is not the direct contact... a low scholarly 
level weakens the director’s ability to work with a little abstraction. He 
cannot appreciate the problems that exist and this ends in catastrophe.’44
Administrators and directors were expected to encourage the mass of workers to sign 
up to training courses and Guevara complained when this task was not taken 
seriously: ‘There are places where training has been taken up with enthusiasm and 
has advanced more than in other places; that is to say, it makes a difference over 
night, but it has not been used enough. We have to give a lot of emphasis to the 
existing courses, those that are being developed, and to the planning of new 
courses.’45 Workers were informed about education and training courses in Nuestra 
Industrial one of three MININD journals.46 As Vice Minister of Technical 
Development, Tirso Saenz’s responsibilities included overseeing the training 
apparatus of MININD. He claimed that he failed in prioritising this task because he 
prioritised the development of MININD’s research institutes and machinery 
construction, also under his jurisdiction. ‘The training task was not fulfilled properly. 
That is one of my self-criticisms.’47 MININD’s Annual Report for 1964 stated that
44 Guevara, Bimestrales, 14 July 1962, 342.
45 Guevara, Bimestrales, 9 March 1963, 340.
46 For example, the January 1963 issue advertised courses at the School of Automation designed ‘to 
create technicians in automation, industrial instrumentation and mechanical instrumentation’. There 
were courses at different levels: specialists in automation (28 to 30 months); technicians in 
instrumentation and electronics (24 months); industrial instrumentation; and mechanical 
instrumentation. Nuestra Industria, Revista de Ministerio de Industrias, Afio 3: 1 (Enero 1963), 51-2. 
Policies to introduce automation to Cuban industry are detailed in chapter 10.
47 S&enz, interview, 2006.
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the training had met with difficulties, originating at the national level. In 1964, 
41,628 workers were involved in courses for ‘technical minimum’ and superacion of 
workers at different skills levels. More workers were incorporated onto these courses 
than planned although the graduation rate fell short of the plan, 49-80% down for the 
superacion courses (13,281 graduates), 38% for ‘technical minimum’ (6,385 
graduates) and 64% for special courses (3,099 graduates).48 Low completion rates for 
graduations was explained, among other things, by the need to design different 
programmes for distinct specialities, the absence of specialised workers and 
technicians to act as instructors, the historical salaries of some workers, untouched 
by the new salary scale, which undermined the incentive to training.49
As well as the work-study courses, seven schools were set up within MININD: for 
administrators (of production units), directors (of ECs), automation, mechanical 
drawings; metrology, administrative personnel, and for super-gifted young workers 
to be fast-tracked to university. 52 Peoples’ Schools provided basic education and 
training for surplus workers, particularly in artisan industries. In addition when a new 
plant was being built the workers were trained to operate it by Soviets or whoever 
had. sold Cuba the industry. The Cubans were also sent abroad to train in the new 
technology. Saenz recorded that in 1963-4, around 16,000 workers graduated in 
training courses throughout the country, and around 2,000 on courses for plants 
under construction between 1964 and 1965.50 In addition to technical skills, many 
courses covered political economy and philosophy. Borrego, First Vice Minister of 
MININD, claimed that by 1963 there was a basic Marxist understanding within 
MININD:
‘We began Marxism courses in the ministry and at enterprise and factory 
levels. These were obligatory for the leaders, because political economy 
and Marxist philosophy were included in the administrators’ courses,
48 Memoria Anual 1964, Ministerio de Industrias, Republica de Cuba, 77.
49 Details on salary scale below.
50 Sdenz, Ministro, 205-6.
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along with maths, chemistry, Spanish, and so on. Marxism was not 
obligatory for other courses -  it depended on what was studied.’51
Despite the reliance on Soviet manuals for these studies, Guevara constantly fought 
against the dogmatic approach to Marxism or critical theory that was prevalent in the 
Soviet bloc. Two anecdotes illustrate the point. When Borrego was being assessed 
for membership of the Integrated Revolutionary Organisations (ORI) in a meeting in 
1962, it was announced that he was a suitable candidate except for committing the 
indiscipline of reading a Chinese bulletin which members of the old PSP wanted to 
ban as Cuba was dragged into the Sino-Soviet split. Borrego said: ‘Suddenly, Che 
entered the meeting and asked how everything was. He was told that they were 
discussing my militancy and the issue of the Chinese bulletin. Che said he hoped 
they were congratulating me for reading it, as it was the militant’s duty to stay 
informed by reading everything.’52 In another incident, members of the Union of 
Young Communists in MININD complained to Guevara about an ongoing argument 
with some colleagues who were Trotskyists. Guevara advised them read Trotsky for 
themselves before continuing the polemic. Whilst encouraging theoretical debate, 
the main concern, however, was to raise the general educational level of 
administrators to sixth grade: the equivalent of eleven-year-olds in British schools.
SIXTH GRADE EXAMS .
‘When we initiated this process, in the middle of rapid nationalisation of 
all the means of production, we could not be selective; but that time has 
passed and we have seen that one cannot have less than sixth grade [to 
administrator a production unit]. We still have administrators -  some
51 Borrego, interview, 23 November 2004.
52 Borrego Diaz, Orlando. Seminar. Los pensamientos internationalistas de Ernesto Che Guevara, 
Diplomado: Pensamiento Latinoamericano, Che Guevara. Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias 
Sociales (FLACSO), University of Havana, 18 January 2006.
53 Borrego, Camino, 249.
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of them very good -  who have, sometimes, only second grade and it is 
incredible how, as soon as they know how to read, write, and do simple 
maths, they can manage factories. But in the coming year we will be 
demanding another test from these comrades who demonstrate their 
capacity for management. Next year, all the administrators of industries 
should take the exam to accredit them with sixth grade at least. Those 
comrades who don’t have education must return to school to achieve 
• sixth grade. In this way, we will go on demanding more every time.’54
Little more than one year after the nationalisations and the frantic search for 
administrators, MININD was in a position to stipulate that all administrators should 
pass sixth grade exams. Even university graduates were expected to retake the sixth 
grade exams. One MININD director, Oscar Bergnes, did not think it was necessary 
for him to take the exam. Guevara pointed out that he had sat the exam and instructed 
Bergnes to do so. The pass mark was 70 points; Bergnes got 72 -  only just passing.55 
Despite progress Guevara continued to complain about the low educational level of 
administrators. In March 1963 he reported that the Ministry of Education had 
supposedly selected the best graduates with sixth grade from study centres to 
participate in a special course. In the final exam half of them did not achieve sixth 
grade: ‘The level of sixth grade of our graduates is really at fourth grade’, he 
complained. ‘There are people who have a sixth grade certificate but they have lost 
the knowledge in the course of life; they took the exam 20 years ago.’56 Several 
months later 986 administrators sat an exam at the end of a course organised by the 
Committees for Local Industry (CILOs); 132 administrators failed and were 
suspended. Guevara lamented that: ‘after all the insistence on reaching sixth grade 
and the warnings that they would be replaced, despite all this, there were still 132 
incapable of passing an exam that is barely sixth grade.’57 The pass mark was 60%. 
Those with less than 50% could not be administrators. Those with 50-60% were sent
54 Guevara, ‘Discurso en el XI Congreso Nacional Obrero, 20 November 1961, in Ernesto Che 
Guevara: Ciencia, Tecnologlay Sociedad 1959-1965, La Habana: Editorial Academia, 2003, 229- 
230.
55 Angel Arcos Bergnes, interview, 8 December 2004.
56 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1962, 341.
57 Guevara, Bimestrales, August 1963, 363.
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to the School of Administrators. If they did not improve they could not be 
administrators. Guevara announced that 260 administrators had not turned up for the 
exam. He suggested they stop receiving their salaries until they sit the exam in ten
• < o
days time, unless they could prove a legitimate excuse for their absence. In October 
1963, Guevara complained that directors were sending weak administrators, who 
have already been rejected by the School of Administrator, back there. ‘We can’t be 
recycling, putting them in the School and taking them out, putting them in and taking 
them out, playing a stupid little game. Where are the new people?’59 Frustrated, 
Guevara insisted that there are workers, especially youngsters, who have the 
minimum school qualifications for the role of administrator.60
THE SCHOOL FOR ADMINISTRATORS
The school was set up in 1960 under the Department of Industrialisation, transferred 
to MININD and then opened up to workers from other ministries. Later those 
ministries organised their own schools. Given the intensity of the School, three years 
of normal study in one year, candidates had to first pass entrance exams and 
psychometric tests to prove they could cope.61 Requirement for enrolment in the 
School for Administrators was that students had passed sixth grade and were 
between the ages of 20 and 45 years old. Speaking to the first graduates in December 
1961, Guevara said:
‘You were enrolled in this School when we realised that the working 
class, with the education that it had, was going to restrict the 
development of the productive process if we did not quickly give the 
directors technical training... you are the first result of this attempt to 
create technicians.’62
58 Guevara, Bimestrales, August 1963, 363-4.
59 Guevara, Bimestrales, 12 October 1963,406.
60 Guevara, Bimestrales, October 1963,407.
61 Details about the application of psychometric tests in chapter 10.
62 Guevara, ‘Discurso en la graduation de administradores del MININD’, 21 December 1961, in 
Tecnologia, 229.
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Castellanos was among the emergency administrators allocated to head the newly 
nationalised industries and later attended the School for Administrators. He recalled: 
‘We began with numbers and we ended with algebra. In political economy we 
studied the USSR Manual of Political Economy; we had six months of philosophy, 
capitalist and socialist accounting, statistics, mathematics, Spanish, physics, 
chemistry, work organisation and normalisation, and a little history.’63 The students 
lived at the school and received a monthly salary of 200 pesos of which 25% was 
held back until they passed. Some of the students had previously earned up to 1,000 
pesos; some as little as 80 pesos. Villegas also attended: ‘To graduate you had to 
present a thesis about a factory; describe all aspects from human relations to flows of 
production, costs, and perspectives plans. I did my thesis about beer production.’64 In 
addition to the curriculum, Villegas recalled that they participated in theatre groups 
and had to do domestic work.
Of the first 400 students -  100 came from the Ministries of Transport and Domestic 
Trade and 300 from MININD -  327 graduated. Guevara was disappointed: ‘300 
individuals from a mass of workers that have passed sixth grade and have the 
necessary conditions to be an administrator: that is not a fabulous sum.’65 There were 
over 1,000 production units in MININD; so the amount of administrators clearly fell 
short of MININD’s needs. Guevara blamed directors for selecting students who 
lacked the educational level to pass the course: ‘I say to you gentleman’ he said with 
the tone of irony he used to castigate his colleagues, ‘one cannot study at the School 
of Administrators with second grade... Sending a man with second grade there will 
destroy him... we cannot use people in this inhumane way.’66 Guevara admitted 
having sent unqualified youngsters to the school: ‘and, after receiving a deficient 
grade those lads are in tears, and they have come to see me in desperation.’67 He 
believed there were qualified workers who had not been selected for the School, but 
he warned EC directors not to use the School as a means of getting rid of inadequate 
administrators: ‘The School is not brilliant at all; there are dozens of organisational
63 Castellaflos, interview.
64 Villegas, interview.
65 Guevara, Bimestrales, 10 March 1962, 183.
66 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1962,184.
67 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1962, 185.
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defects. But it is very easy for us to resolve these problems if you send the best 
people and don’t resolve your own problems by sending people to the School of 
Administrators.’68 Graduates were supposed to return to the workplaces from which 
they had enrolled.69
A new intensive school was set up, for people described by MININD’s psychology 
director Dr Graciela del Cueto as ‘super-gifted’. They did not have sixth grade but 
demonstrated a high intellectual ability. The aim was to educate them up to 
university level in three years.70 Guevara highlighted the directors’ responsibility to 
select candidates for this school: ‘you all know which are the intelligent youngsters 
in the factory; truly interested, awake to everything... go pulling out these people 
and give them a painstaking education; prepare them as cadre.’71 By February 1964, 
the EC of Electrics required sixth grade certificates from all its workers.72 The 
workers’ general educational standards were rising, but Guevara’s expectations rose 
with them. He aspired to create study circles specific to every branch of industry.73
WORK AS A SOCIAL DUTY
The previous chapter on the Great Debate detailed Guevara’s view about the need to 
decommodify labour in order to undermine the operation of the law of value in the 
construction of socialism and transition to communism. This section examines how a 
new concept of social work, breaking the link between work and remuneration, was 
institutionalised into the MININD apparatus. This was done through negating 
traditional preoccupations with salary rates, limiting payment over the norm, paying 
the unemployed to be educated and creating a salary scale which linked 
qualifications to pay rates and promotions. These measures promoted the notions of a 
social wage and work as a social duty.
68 Guevara, Bimestrales, 28 September 1962, 315.
69 Guevara, Bimestrales, February 1964,460.
70 This was called the Lenin school, but was not the same as today’s Lenin school in Havana.
71 Guevara, Bimestrales, October 1963,408.
72 Guevara, Bimestrales, February 1964,461.
73 Guevara, Bimestrales, February 1964,463
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Guevara rejected his ministerial salary claiming only the 190-peso monthly wage 
paid to members of Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR). MININD cadre followed 
suit. In 1961, Pufiales became administrators of La Modelo brewery, taken from the 
Bacardi Corporation during the nationalisations. Brewery workers were privileged 
members of the working class.
‘The first name that appeared on the payroll was mine, followed by the 
Master Brewer. My salary was 190 pesos, like all the officers of the 
army, and my subordinate’s 1,000 pesos. The other workers earned 700- 
900 pesos. For my generation money was not the most important thing.
This showed how the workers’ mentality transformed with their 
incorporation into voluntary labour.’74
Guevara defined the work ‘norm’ as: ‘the average amount of labour that creates a 
product in a certain time, given average skill and under the specific conditions of 
equipment utilization. It is the contribution of a set amount of labour to society by 
one of its members. It is the fulfilment of social duty.’75 In ministries operating under 
the Auto-Financing System (AFS) a worker exceeding the norm by 50% would 
receive a 50% increase in remuneration. Under MININD regulations workers 
received some additional payment for production over the norm, as material 
incentives were considered to be a ‘necessary evil’, but not in direct proportion to the 
amount surpassed. Citing Marx’s Critique o f the Gotha Programme, Guevara argued 
that part of the surplus produced by the worker goes to cover investment in social 
production -  new capital goods, expanding production and towards insurance 
reserves -  while another part goes on social consumption; administrative costs, social 
welfare provision, and provision for those unable to work. Society provided the 
workers’ education so the worker should contribute back to the society. Workers’ 
bonus payment could not exceed the basic rate of the next level up on the salary 
scale. To reach this level workers had to improve their skills and qualifications: ‘Our 
system of norms has the merit of establishing compulsory professional training as a
74 Pufiales, interview.
75 Guevara, ‘On the budgetary finance system (BFS)’, in Reader, 180.
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condition for promotion to higher job categories.’76 In place of receiving a bonus in 
proportion to output over the norm, workers were rewarded by their capacity to 
achieve more capacity. Guevara explained:
‘For example, going to a school where one’s salary is paid and where one 
comes out with a new qualification. On returning to the factory this new 
qualification is automatically converted into an increase in salary. That 
means that it is a material incentive; the only thing is that the material 
incentive is not derived directly from the relationship between the work
77and what is received for the work.’
Along with the attempt to break the link between work and wages there was a more 
general attempt to break the link between production and commercialisation; for 
example, by changing the title of the ‘Commercial Department’ into ‘Exchange 
Department’ or ‘Delivery Department’. Guevara intended: ‘to separate the 
production, which is one thing, and the commercialisation which is another.’78 
Production was to be understood as meeting social need, not motived by the profit 
motive as under capitalism.
EDUCATING THE UNEMPLOYED
'A careful analysis o f the 1953 census showed that on an annual basis 
only about 75 percent o f the Cuban labour force was employed.,. For 
Cuba, in respect to unemployment, every year was like the worst year of 
[the US’s] worst depression. And there was no system o f unemployment
70. insurance or unemployment relief ’
76 Guevara, BFS, 182. See also Augusto Martinez Sanchez ‘La implementaci6n del nuevo sistema 
salarial en las industrias de Cuba’ in Socialista, Aflo 3: 26 (Octubre 1963), 19.
77 Guevara, Bimestrales, 20 January 1962, 147.
78 Guevara, Bimestrales, January 1962, 149.
79 Huberman Anatomy 6-7. Authors’ emphasis.
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Before 1959 Cuba suffered from endemic unemployment and underemployment. 
Guevara conceded that tackling unemployment took political priority over raising 
productivity and efficiency. In late 1960 he called unemployment a cancer of the 
economy which had to be destroyed and announced that despite the importance of 
heavy industry in industrialisation, the policy of the Department of Industrialisation 
had been to develop small manufacturing industries which were more labour 
intensive, facilitating the employment of more workers.80 By the end of 1961 
unemployment had been eliminated as a major socio-economic issue. Guevara 
announced:
‘the revolutionary government has freed itself from one of the great 
invisible burdens that has weighed it down, to protect industrial 
development in specific areas where it had to put factories to eliminate 
major unemployment, excessive in some zones, and specific factories of 
low productivity that employ a great deal of labour power, precisely in
o i
order to employ the greatest number of companeros.’
Guevara turned to the question of productivity, which he argued must be 
accompanied by a drive to raise the technical level of the population. He repeatedly 
insisted that the mechanisation and automation of the Cuban economy should not be 
resisted because of the fear of unemployment.82 Guevara argued that superfluous 
workers represented social unemployment of resources and argued for them to be 
removed from the workforce and given a salary to acquire technical knowledge. 
Meanwhile there would be an immediate rise in productivity per worker in the 
original workplace. This was considered to be an economical solution to the problem 
of underemployment. In March 1962 Guevara revealed that Soviet advisers had 
recommended closing the small bakeries in Cuba, replacing them with six big 
factories, and sending the surplus workers to study, thus freeing them from the 
inhumane conditions of their work. This would cost almost nothing, he said, other
80 Guevara, ‘Comparencia televisada en el programa Ante la Prensa’, 20 October 1960, Tecnologia, 
61-2.
81 Guevara, ‘discurso en el XI Congreso Nacional Obrero, 20 November 1961, Tecnologia, 58-59.
82 Mechanisation, automation and productivity are discussed in chapter 9.
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than the investment into the new factories, as the surplus workers were already being 
paid a salary. Illustrating the point, he argued that when three people are working on 
a job which one can do, the surplus workers are effectively unemployed, just like a 
bureaucrat in a surplus post:
‘But if those two workers are removed and given a salary they can live 
on, given technical training, and the other man works for the three of 
them, produces for the three, creates a surplus for the three, is not that the 
same? What more do we have to spend on? The cost of those two 
comrades studying. Maybe if we lower the salary a little, rationalise the 
studies, it will work out the same. That means that we have the 
possibility of training fifty or sixty thousand surplus workers, for no extra
O')
cost; for the cost of reorganising work. This is the main proposal.’
In 1962, thousands of workers were removed from their posts with the rationalisation 
of small artisan industries which were grouped into large production centres with 
improved technology. People’s Schools were created for these workers, who 
received a salary to study. In January 1963, Borrego attended the graduation of 5,050 
workers from the People’s Schools, with Guevara. The workers had qualified in 
technical courses in various factories in MININD: ‘They learned to make parts and 
equipment for use in the new industries.’84 Guevara announced that the future 
generation of technicians would study in the technological institutes and schools 
which the Revolution was creating. In total 52 People’s Schools were set up by 
MININD.85
In May 1964 Guevara proposed that workers in factories who had temporarily 
stopped work because of a lack of raw materials should continue to receive 100% of 
their salaries with the obligation to study, thus maintaining them and raising skills 
levels. The possibility of dividing the year between six months of production and
83 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1962,228-10.
84 Borrego, Camino, 312-3.
85 S&enz, interview, 2006.
86 Guevara, Bimestrales, 9 May 1964,481-2.
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six months of training was suggested for the EC of Soaps and Perfumes and the EC 
of Pharmaceuticals and several others. This solution, Guevara said, needed to be 
studied further, but it was better than reducing workers’ salaries. The production 
stoppages were the result of raw material shortages following the imposition of the 
US blockade and the shift in trade.
Guevara’s policy of training the unemployed attempted to reconcile two seemingly 
contradictory objectives; eliminating unemployment and raising productivity. As has 
been demonstrated, for Guevara education and training were not just personal 
choices motivated by individual material incentives, but rather social choices, 
motivated by indirect material incentives, for the benefit of society. For Guevara, 
surplus workers were unproductive for society, while students had the potential to 
improve the efficiency of the productive forces.
SALARIES
The problem of salaries was a concern for the entire revolutionary government. 
There are complex links between salaries, trade unions, workers’ incentives, 
absenteeism, unemployment, the need for skilled workers, economic development 
policy and inflation. The discussion about salaries took place in the context of 
growing social welfare provision, expanding free education and healthcare, massive 
reduction of rent and utility bills, universal rations of basic foodstuffs, and mixed 
ownership of the means of production. Government measures to freeze the prices of 
basic commodities and salaries in state-owned enterprises were undermined by the 
action of the private enterprise which remained in Cuba, which could pay workers 
more or sell produce for less than the state. Given all these contradictory forces, the 
process of devising a new salary scale was a major challenge in which Guevara was 
involved for years in cooperation with the Ministry of Labour. According to Borrego, 
who assisted Guevara to formulate the new salary scale: ‘Che was very agitated by 
the delay in producing the new salary scale. It was very difficult. We needed to
87 Guevara, Bimestrales, May 1964,482.
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discuss with the trade union leaders to convince them about the scale.’88 Guevara felt 
that the BFS was incomplete as an economic management system until the salary 
scale was introduced in 1964. The salary scale was a vital component of Guevara’s 
solution to the decommodification of labour which was pivotal to the BFS. It is 
detailed below, following a discussion of the background to its formulation.
CONTROLLING DEMAND; CONTROLLING INFLATION
As president of the National Bank, it is not surprising that as early as 1960 Guevara 
expressed concern about inflation and its effect on national development strategy:
‘We have to struggle hard against a rise in salaries, because a rise in 
salaries means one man less can be employed. The capital of a country is 
one whole, and we cannot create it with a little machine, this is false. The
O Q
more money we create, the less value this money has.’
The bimonthly meeting of March 1962 was dominated by the issue of salaries: 
apprentices who were awaiting salary rises; pay variations between factories 
involved in similar production; salaries changing or staying the same when workers 
were transferred. When Guevara asked the directors if  the workers would accept a 
new pay scale, EC director Miguel Dominguez, replied: ‘they are waiting for it like 
crazy.’90 Another director, Manuel Malmierca, insisted that ‘the most serious 
problem that we have today is the salary; this is undeniable’. He recommended this 
be prioritised.91 Guevara responded to this challenge by explaining that increasing 
money supply leads to inflation, unless there is an increase in production:
‘What is money if not a commodity that serves to acquire other 
commodities?... What does it matter if a man earns $1,000 monthly if he
88 Borrego, interview, 23 November 2004.
89 Guevara, ‘Discurso a la clase obrera’, 14 June 1960, Tecnologia, 58.
90 Miguel Dominguez, Bimestrales, March 1962, 195.
91 Manuel Malmierca, Bimestrales, March 1962, 197.
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cannot spend it?... We cannot inject a mass of money into circulation if 
we do not have the products on which to spend the money; this is 
elemental. We are working towards raising the salaries. Well, we can 
raise them, as high as you want... I have seen it in Bolivia, where you 
have to pull out $140 to pay for a coffee, magnificent! You go to the 
bank and withdraw a bag of ten or a hundred thousand pesos to buy four 
things. That means the amount of money that you earn does not mean 
anything, the question is the amount of products that the money can 
buy.’92
Guevara urged directors to get to the root of the issue in discussions with the workers 
themselves. He pointed out that many problems had been created through mistakes 
made by the revolutionary government: employing people who produced nothing; 
creating a formidable bureaucracy; badly conceived investments; sumptuous 
expenditures. Consequently, the population had eaten all the food produced in Cuba, 
from cows to malanga.93 The solution was not just to level salaries. The problem had 
to be confronted through discussion; with the trade unions, in the workers’ 
assemblies: ‘We are to blame and that must be said honestly. What will happen? The 
working class wants to condemn us for this? Man, let them condemn us, let them 
change us; let them shoot us, do whatever. But the problem is still here.’94 
Nonetheless, Guevara concluded optimistically that through discussion, coordination 
and a little patience a solution will be found within two months.95 Real salaries were 
falling because private businesses were raising prices and the wage increases won by 
trade unions or offered by private employees were creating inflation. Cuban 
economist Carlos Tablada explained that: ‘the bourgeoisie followed a policy of 
increasing wages, either out of fear of conflicts that might result in intervention by 
the revolutionary government or to destabilize the economy through inflation.’96
92 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1962,202.
93 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1962,203.
94 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1962,203.
95 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1962,221.
96 Carlos Tablada, Che Guevara: Economics and Politics in the Transition to Socialism, New York: 
Pathfinder, 1990, 179.
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EC Director, Pedro Pastor, said workers had demonstrated that they were prepared to 
make sacrifices, but that they did not understand the salary variations between 
workplaces and between ministries. Holiday pay, for example, was paid in some 
enterprises, not others. Director of the EC of Cement, Ramirez pointed out a 
discrepancy between his enterprise’s policy on sick pay and the revolutionary 
government’s new law: ‘we are paying people in full, but the law, which is
Q7retroactive from the 15 February, says that we should pay them half.’ Guevara 
instructed him to follow the law. A third EC director pointed out that workers who 
suffer work accidents are paid half, while those off sick are paid in full, including 
absentees who are not really unwell. Before the Revolution many workers paid 2% 
of their salaries to a private insurance company that no longer operated in Cuba. 
Ramirez called for the abolition of the 2% deduction, as the EC was in no position to 
offer a payout which would now be additional to state provision.98 Pastor complained 
that the factory nuclei, the groups of workers elected as a vanguard in each 
production unit, were failing to comply with the ministry regulations on salaries: 
‘There are cases that the factory nucleus themselves are asking for a salary increase, 
people who are supposed to struggle against this are creating the problems. This is 
happening because even the nucleuses are not clear.’99
Inflation was around 6%, but Guevara understood that this meant a wage freeze was 
unsustainable without political consequences and that minimum salaries would have 
to be reconsidered.
‘...we cannot have an anti-worker policy, when there is still a middle 
class, a petit-bourgeoisie. It is the land-owning bourgeoisie in reality that 
is gaining; and a class of intermediaries that is winning fabulous 
dividends, in the buying and selling of commodities. And we are going to 
say “no, comrades, here the salaries are frozen, everything is frozen”.
The people will say: “frozen?” “Everything frozen, when shoes cost 
double, when clothes cost double, when there is no malanga and when
97 Ramirez, Bimestrales, March 1962,247.
98 Ramirez, Bimestrales, March 1962,248.
99 Pastor, Bimestrales, March 1962, 231.
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there is some it costs so much?”... [The salary freeze] brings conflict 
with certain sectors of the working class, but it is a measure taken to 
defend the working class; because the inflationary process, comrades, is 
the most tragic process that a country can experience, from the point of 
view of development and of social harmony. The Argentinians know this 
well; as do the Chileans, I don’t know if there are any here, they know 
this better; the Uruguayans also know this; and it is a thing of complete 
disruption and a terrible mess.’100
Inflation, the result of goods scarcities, the fall in production and productivity and the 
manipulation of prices by private enterprises, demonstrates how the mixed economy, 
with minimum private ownership, was an obstacle to socialist construction. This 
contradiction was largely overcome with the Revolutionary Offensive of 1968 which 
nationalised the remaining businesses in Cuba. In 1962, however, the challenge was 
for the revolutionary government, Guevara asserted, was to maintain the salary 
freeze whilst the payroll was restructured and applied. This meant constant 
interaction with the trade unions and workers’ assemblies.
In 1963 salaries and training were two of the four issues prioritised for the year in 
MININD.101 That year, Angel Arcos Bergnes, MININD’s director of personnel and a 
member of management council, criticised the de facto salary policy because 
workers could pass up to higher scale just on the decision of the director. Outlining 
the need for some objective method to assess workers’ qualification for promotion, 
Arcos pointed out that he had received only six negative reports from a workforce of 
1,000, which did not realistically reflect the quality of the workers. Guevara agreed 
on the grounds that he would never write anything bad about his personal secretary,
i cnJose Manressa. The new payroll scale did use independent criteria for promotion 
decisions; a skills upgrade was the precondition for a rise in salary.
100 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1962,277.
101 After July 1962 the question of salaries and inflation were raised much less in the bimonthly 
meetings, suggesting that the urgency of the issue had abated as ECs established the norms and pay 
scales.
102 Arcos, interview, 2004.
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In October 1963, an article by Labour Minister, Augusto Martinez Sanchez detailed 
the new salary scale and the results of a pilot survey in which the new system had 
been applied in 247 work centres under different ministries, including the most 
economically significant in the country, effecting 40,000 employees. The pilot plan 
had resulted in an increase in production of 9.2% and in productivity of 17.4%. The 
most significant improvements were in the Ministry of Construction which saw a 
39.2% increase in production and a 56.2% increase in productivity. The National 
Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) improved 19% in both categories and MININD 
5.2% in production and 14.3% in productivity.103 The salary scale is detailed below. 
Sanchez concluded that it was indispensable to apply the salary scale in all work 
centres. Still by February 1964 the salary scale had still not been implemented. 
Guevara warned that this would create more problems and said that the work norms 
had to be applied and the salaries categorised in every workplace within one month:
‘...otherwise we are going to have another year of tricking the workers, 
of asking for more time, of tense Assemblies because the people feel 
deceived by our continuous offers. The plan was that from the 31 
December they were going to have many of the enterprises operating 
with norms and now the majority will have norms by the 31 March. The 
' plan is very behind.’104
Finally the salary scale was implemented throughout the economy and in May 1964 
the Council of Ministers proposed that workers not active on production receive 50% 
of their salary.105 These achievements signalled moves to universalise work norms 
and pay, consistent with the concept of work as a social duty under socialism. 
Sanchez had complained about weak trade unions which had not assisted in the 
ideological work necessary with the mass of workers in order to introduce the salary 
scale with their support. Trade unions had not understood the revolutionary character
103 Martinez, Implementacion, 19.
104 Guevara, Bimestrales, February 1964, 346.
105 Guevara, Bimestrales, 9 May 1964, 483-4.
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of that plan, he complained.106 They were stuck in old economist patterns of 
behaviour.
TRADE UNIONS AND ‘ECONOMISM’
‘There was a negative tendency in trade unions led by old union leaders 
who, at the triumph of the Revolution, used the fact that this was a 
Revolution of the workers to obtain in a disorganised and, it could even 
be said, ruthless way, big salaries that did not correspond with the 
economy of the country. These economistic tendencies infiltrated the 
workers’ ranks so the Revolution was seen only in terms of how much 
they earn and how much more they want to earn, without analysing how 
the Revolution should be made and how much it costs; ruining 
consciousness by taking a syndicalist position as if the state were just a 
foolish big boss from whom they had to get the most out that they 
could.’107
Faure Chomon Mediavilla became leader of the Revolutionary Directorate in the 
struggle against Batista, the group’s leader Josd Antonio Echevarria was killed in 
1957. In 1963 he was given the task of debating these issues with the trade union 
movement. In reality, Faure’s task meant reorganising the union leadership, pushing 
for the election of new cadre. He said these measures: ‘defeated the [economistic] 
line which affected productivity, encouraged indiscipline and crude customs in the 
workers’ relationships’, insisting that: ‘The Revolution never imposed a change that 
was not discussed in the Production Assemblies by the workers.’108
This thesis cannot detail the history of the Cuban trade union movement, except 
to assert that the militancy of organised labour, under the influence of anarchists and
106 Martinez, Implementacion, 21-2.
107 Faure Chom<5n Mediaville, interview, 16 February 2005.
108 Chom6n, interview.
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communists from the early 19th century had abated into economism and co-option by 
the mid-1940s under the Autentico government. This was largely achieved by the 
targeted repression and murder of radical trade union leaders. However, as a result of 
authoritarian cooperativism, some sections of workers were granted significant 
improvements in salaries and conditions which entrenched economistic tendencies 
within the trade union apparatus. Eusebio Mujal, head of the Cuban Workers 
Confederation (CTC), responded to Batista’s coup in March 1952 with cooperation 
and complicity. There were notable exceptions -  transport workers, bank clerks, port 
workers and sugar cane workers -  who organised strikes in the 1950s without official 
CTC support. During the 1950s the revolutionary organisations built up alternative 
labour organisations culminating in the launch of the National Workers 
Confederation in late 1958. The shell of a class conscious, revolutionary trade union 
apparatus had been set up. However, old trade union leaders still had to be won over 
to the role assigned them by the new regime; working within the paradigm of the 
Revolution in the interests of the whole working class, not promoting sectoral 
interests from the margins.109 Fidel Castro told the trade unions that they should not 
be struggling for crumbs, but to take power.110
Guevara recognised the need to honour existing salaries, which often reflected trade 
union victories after years of struggle to defend their workers. Trade unions held on 
to outstanding agreements and insisted that they be honoured by the Revolution. In 
the MININD meeting of March 1962, Malmierca complained to Guevara that:
‘The trade union has fought with us every time there’s been a problem in 
the factory... Problems have been resolved by talking of the “country or 
death”, of Fidel, of Che and of every one else... This is because the trade 
unions have wage rates; they have wage agreements and they demand 
they are met. We say we are going to meet the agreements: then “No we 
won’t complete the agreements”.’111
109 Helen Yaffe, From Student Protest to Revolution: The movement against Batista, 1950s Cuba. 
MSc dissertation. London School of Economics, 2002.
110 Cited by Borrego Camino, 191.
111 Malmierca, Bimestrales, March 1962, 197-8.
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Clearly some administrators did not refuse the economistic demands of trade unions.
In July 1962, Guevara complained that production units were raising salaries despite
the order to freeze them until the new salary scale was devised. This was a ‘suicidal’
mistake. At the same time, he said, they could not reduce salaries: ‘the masses have
not even remotely reached the level of development that would permit the
abandonment of what they have won over the years what was evidently given to
110them by the bosses, in their old relationships.’
Guevara’s own approach to trade unions in socialist construction was radical and 
dialectic. In July 1961 he outlined two distinct functions for the unions: to promote 
the goals of the government with the workers and to defend the specific and 
immediate interests of the working class at the production level. These were not 
contradictions, but complementary, he asserted, giving the example of trade unions 
which intervene on the workers’ behalf to demand improvements in the conditions of 
an unhealthy job in response to a government directive to double production:
‘The establishment of the socialist system does not liquidate class 
contradictions but it alters the way of solving them. Now also, there will 
be contradictions and in this the trade unions will play an important role; 
they will establish the points of view of a given sector of workers when 
their necessities are possible to satisfy without damaging the general 
interests of the mass of the working class; the construction of socialism 
and industrialisation of the country in a short period... ’
Although this was not a regulation, Guevara recommended that trade union leaders 
were incorporated into the management councils of production units in MININD. 
Close contact between the administrator and the trade union representative would 
provide a clearer picture of the state of consciousness of the workers, and of the 
economic objectives of the management: ‘The trade unions are intimately linked to a 
rise in productivity and to work discipline, two pillars in the construction of
112 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1962, 267-8.
113 Guevara, ‘Discusidn colectiva; decisidn y responsiblidades unicas’ in Ernesto Che Guevara, Obras 
1957-1967, Tomo 2, La Habana: Casa de Las Americas, 1970, 123-4.
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socialism; and in the education of administrators from among the workers, raising 
their general political and technical level.’114 The administrator and union 
representative should cooperate: the former responsible for administration; the latter 
for the ideological improvement of the masses. Contradictions must be resolved 
through discussion: ‘because the superior weapon of the working class, the strike, is 
precisely the weapon of the violent definition of class contradictions, which cannot 
occur in a society on the path towards socialism.’115 Guevara concluded 
optimistically that this was not a problem and that trade unions were leading and 
directing workers’ participation in voluntary labour. This was certainly the case in 
MININD.116
In July 1962 Guevara urged MININD directors to read Lenin’s The State and 
Revolution which demonstrated that trade unions would be destroyed along with 
class antagonisms as the state withered away. He complained that post-1959 trade 
unions were mechanical and administrative because they were based on the trade 
union model in the USSR. Copying was not Marxist, he stated, claiming 
responsibility for this mistake, along with the Council of Ministers.117 MININD’s 
Manual for Factory Administrators published in June 1964, asserted the workers’ 
rights to trade union representation and the administrator’s responsibility to
1 t o
coordinate with the unions.
In the final bimonthly meeting of MININD, Guevara stated that, contrary to his 
earlier incorrect assertion, the administrator was a political leader, not just a 
bureaucrat. Trade unions, on the other hand, were associations of workers organised 
against the patron; a product of class war. As the means of production went into the 
hands of society the class contradictions disappeared and trade unions had no reason 
to exist. For now, contradictions remained and new means had to be found to resolve 
them. Workers who became administrators did not become enemies of the working 
class, but contradictions remained or else trade unions would have already
114 Guevara, Discusion, 125-26.
115 Guevara, Discusion, 126.
116 Details in chapter 10.
117 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1962,272.
118 Manual for Factory Administrators, MININD, 4, 3 & 5,17,2 & 5,17,4.
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disappeared. He mentioned the new Commissions for Labour Justice as a possible 
first step to resolving those contradictions; where administrators and workers 
coordinated together.119 Created in 1963 by the Ministry of Labour and the CTC to 
tackle the problems associated with salaries, the Commissions were made up from 
workers selected to liaise with administrators. Borrego recalls that Guevara believed 
these were important and effective. He explained their role:
‘These workers attended seminars about labour justice to learn the laws 
and defend the workers. When there was a problem, for example a case 
of indiscipline, those on the Commissions were consulted on the law to 
assess what punishment should be applied. The Commissions received 
legal advice. They aired problems about the norms of work protection, 
for example, and anything else that could arise in a work centre which 
effected production.’120
Guevara said the workers were enthusiastic about selecting their representatives for 
the Commissions which was better than the questionable democracy of trade union 
representation: ‘The Party meets and proposes to the masses that “so-and-so” is the 
only candidate and then they are selected... in reality without a selection process of 
the masses.’ If a real selection process had been involved, the workers would have 
shown their enthusiasm, he claimed. If these Commissions are capable of winning 
the confidence of the people, they would be more suitable than the trade unions in 
representing the interests of administrative workers, in the general problems of the 
entity. This would allow the elimination of the trade unions, in name and in all 
aspects of class antagonisms, and at the same time it would create a necessary 
democratic vehicle for the new institutions being created: ‘In this moment I would 
even say that the trade unions could already stop existing... and transfer their 
functions to the Commission for Labour Justice, which would combine some 
concrete tasks, and whose members would be chosen.’121 Guevara was confident that 
everyone would agree with him, except for the union bureaucracies. He concluded
119 Guevara, Bimestrales, 5 December 1964, 578-9.
120 Borrego, interview, 15 March 2006.
121 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1964, 579.
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that the issue of trade unions had to be discussed and resolved in a proper manner 
without offending the feelings or interests of companeros.122 This discussion 
demonstrates how Guevara’s education in Marxist-Leninist theory impacted upon his 
approach to the institutional apparatus which should be adopted in transition to 
socialism. He understood that moving towards communism meant overcoming class 
antagonism to create a society where production is organised as in one big factory, 
determined by the plan which was made democratically through workers’ discussion.
NEW SALARY SCALE
‘We inherited from capitalism an enormous quantity and variety of 
different wage rates for the same skills. As you know, under capitalism 
wage rates are a product of the sale of labour power and are influenced 
by the class struggle. In addition, as a semi colonial country dominated 
by US imperialism, Cuba was once a field of investment for the US 
manufacturing industry. Wage rates in the US-owned workplaces were 
much higher than previously known in Cuba, despite being much lower 
than what workers in the United States would receive for the same work.
All this made the wage question more complex and increased the number 
of wage differentials. We have calculated there were some 90,000 
different wage rates in Cuba and some 25,000 different job categories 
based on skill levels.’123
Cuban economist Carlos Tablada underlined the complexity of the task undertaken in 
designing a new salary scale: ‘drawing up a list of job descriptions and skill 
requirements for each job; and evaluating, from the standpoint of complexity, more 
than 10,634 occupations, dividing them into 340 categories based on skill level... 
reorganizing thousands of different wage rates into a total of 41 for the entire
122 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1964, 581.
123 Guevara, ‘Participaci6n en programa televisado Acerca de la implantacidn de Normas de Trabajo y 
Escala Salarial en Los Sectores Industrials ’ in Ernesto Che Guevara: Escritos y  Discursos: tomo 7, 
LaHabana: Ciencias Sociales, 1977, 163-164.
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economy.’124 After two years work, with a national salary freeze in place, and with 
the results of a pilot test, the scale was introduced nationally in 1964. Labour 
Minister Sanchez outlined the key points of the new salary scale: current incomes 
would be respected; workers had to improve their qualifications; work norms were 
established in every work centre; workers were paid according to the norm with 
limited bonuses for over-completion and a proportion withheld for under-completion, 
rates were higher for dangerous work. In addition to eliminating the divisive and 
anarchic payroll inherited from the capitalist era, the new scale was necessary 
because: ‘we can’t organise the socialist economy without organising the salaries, in 
accordance with the socialist principles of distribution.’
The salary scale comprised three elements: grouping of wage rates; established tariffs 
for each group; categorisations of every employment into the groups, accompanied 
by the establishment of work norms.126 The salary scale had eight hourly wage rates 
with 15% differential between them, reflecting a rise in complexity, worked out on 
the basis of coefficients of the simplest employment. Those who worked in harmful 
conditions received 20% over the base rate; those in dangerous conditions an extra 
35%. Completing the norm established for each task was the precondition to 
receiving the full salary. Workers could receive a bonus for over completion but this 
could never make their salary greater than the base rate of the next level up; that is 
15%. Of that bonus payment; 50% was paid to the worker, and 50% to the state. To 
avoid reducing any worker’s income in the process of implementing the new scale, 
those who were currently receiving a salary higher than that corresponding to their 
categorisation had their salary split into two parts; basic salary and historical salary 
actually received. For example, if the worker received 8 pesos per day, but the daily 
salary corresponding to their categorisation was 5 pesos, their salary would be 
configured as 5 plus 3; where 5 is the basic wage and 3 the historical wage. 
However, when they passed on to a higher wage rate, or when there was a salary rise, 
their total salary would still only reach 8 pesos, for example, 6 plus 2, until the point
124 Tablada, Transition, 180.
125 Martinez, Implementacion, 9-10.
126 Martinez, Implementacion, 10-11.
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where their basic salary was equal to the historical salary and then they would be 
fully incorporated onto the national scale, without overhanging remnants from the 
previous capitalist system. As old workers retired and a new workforce was 
incorporated on the basic rates, the wage fund would decrease, thus increasing the 
productivity of labour. By not slashing existing salaries the Revolution avoided 
another exodus of skilled workers. Rather than lowering the wages of those in the top 
bracket the idea was to raise the salaries of those in the lowest income brackets to 
decrease inequalities. Castro explained: ‘The Revolution cannot equalize incomes 
overnight. The Revolution's aspiration is to arrive at equal incomes starting from the 
bottom up, not from the top down. It would be incorrect to do it the other way.’127
Salary scale: categories and wage rates:128
Category
I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
0.48 0.56 0.65 0.76 0.89 1.05 1.23 1.49
Hourly wage rate in peso.
The tariff for the first group, 48 centavos was to reflect the first significant 
concentration of workers’ wages. 19.11% of Cuban received 45 to 49 centavos. It 
was consistent with the minimum salary established by the government of 85 pesos 
monthly. To pass up into a higher bracket workers had to gain higher qualifications 
through training. Sanez explained:
‘If you are a mechanic of a certain level, regardless of your industry you 
receive the same salary as your colleagues. If you want a higher salary 
you have to study. If you are a mechanic B, you have to train to be a 
mechanic A to get a pay increase. This idea couldn’t be implemented 
. without ideological support, because to practice Che’s ideas it was
127 Fidel Castro, ‘To create wealth with social conscience', in Silverman, Bertram (ed) Man and 
socialism in Cuba: The Great Debate, New York: Antheneum, 1971, 368.
128 See Martinez Implementacion for details of the wage scale. Tablada, Transition & Roberto 
Bernardo The Theory o f Moral Incentives in Cuba. Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1971, also 
have details about the salary scale.
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necessary to have the ideological support of the working class, of the
19Qmanagers too, the enterprise directors and so on.’
The scale also got rid of piecework, which was considered to be a brake on techno­
logical development, particularly in employment where technical norms could not be 
established. Sanchez explained: ‘Furthermore, piecework in general foments the 
material interest of the worker in the increase of their private yields, independent of 
the results of social production. This supports individuals and separates the workers
i i nfrom the collective interest’. Interestingly, at INRA, where piecework payment 
was most applied, the results of the pilot study in terms of production and 
productivity were by far the best. By the end of 1964 the new payroll, norms and 
salary scale, had been implemented in all 1,753 MININD work centres, affecting all 
110,081 employees. As a result the average salary increased by 5.2% and production 
per worker rose 21.7%, reducing the salary-cost of production by 19 cents per $1. 
71% of MININD’s non-administrative workers (69,613 out of a total workforce of 
98,206) and 61% of administrative workers (7,183 out of 11,875) were placed in the 
lowest three skills brackets, salary groups I to III, which illustrates the low skills 
level of the population as a whole.
In 1965, on return from leading an expedition of soldiers to the French Congo, Jorge 
Risquet replaced Sanchez as Minister of Labour, responsible for implementing the 
salary scale. He recalled:
‘I spent several years applying this scale. It took a lot of work. The scale 
was too narrow; it was difficult to place thousands of trades into only 
eight subdivisions. The workers accepted it fine because if  they earned 
low salaries, their income was raised, and if they earned higher salaries, 
their income maintained. The problem was with the over-completion of 
the norm; 50% went to the worker and 50% went to the state. I remember
129 S&enz, interview, 2005.
130 Martinez Implementacion, 14-15.
183
Chapter 6: Guevara's solutions: education, training and salaries
in one meeting with the Dockers’ Union the workers said to me that they 
felt a lot of respect for Che, but that they did not understand the scale. ’131
According to Risquet, the dock workers objected to handing over half their bonus to 
the state therefore the new scale was never applied to the ports. Guevara argued that 
if everyone went 30% over the norm, the norm itself should be revised. In Risquet’s 
opinion this became a brake on productivity. The salary scale was adjusted in 1976, 
but remained as a general concept until 1989. Given the phenomenal advance in 
education and training in Cuba the main function of the scale, to promote skills
137training and qualifications was no longer a priority:
According to Roberto Bernardo’s study of the theory of incentives in Cuba: ‘The 
Cuban and Chinese view of the debate on incentives is that the test of whether a 
society relies primarily on moral incentives is found in the extent to which it has 
abolished the market wages system — where labor is allocated like any other 
commodity.’133 He concluded that since 1966, both countries had eliminated the 
labour market. Clearly, wages were no longer determined by the law of value 
operating through a market where labour power was sold as any other commodity. It 
was a step towards the decommodification of labour which Guevara pursued. 
Remuneration was still determined on the basis of work done, according to an 
established norm. This was consistent with what Marx, in the Critique o f the Gotha 
Programme described as ‘bourgeois right’, the distribution of the social product 
during transition according to work done; still a long way off from communist 
distribution ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs’. 
However, the narrow pay categories which Risquet complained about began a 
process of converging salaries, equalising the material conditions of Cubans: a 
precondition for harmonising the material and political interests of workers. 
Furthermore, wage differentials did not translate into equivalent consumption 
differentials because of the effect of rationing, social provision and the scarcity of 
consumer goods for sale; all of which acted as a wealth equaliser.
131 Jorge Risquet, interview, 8 February 2005.
132 Alfredo Gonz&lez Gutierrez, interview, 27 December 2004.
133 Bernardo, Incentives, vii.
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CONCLUSION
Forced to confront the scarcity of technical and administrative personnel, Guevara 
developed an apparatus to institutionalise the national educational drive, first within 
the Department of Industrialisation and then in MININD. It served three functions 
simultaneously: education as culture, political education and education for 
production. Classrooms and study circles were established throughout MININD 
production units and by the political organisations within MININD. Skills training 
and. qualifications were promoted via the material incentive of the salary scale, by 
embedding the concept of superacion and with the use of administrative control 
mechanisms: sixth grade exams; the school of administrators; directors’ exams in the 
bimonthly meetings; education for unemployed and underemployed workers. In 
addition, Guevara constantly sought mechanisms to break the link between work and 
remuneration at the heart of the capitalist mode of production and, by undermining 
the operation of the law of value in labour allocation, began a process of 
decommodifying labour. Education and training meant self-improvement which in 
turn meant social development, improving the productivity and efficiency of the 
productive forces necessary for the transition to socialism. Education was political; 
politics was revolution; revolution was Cuba Socialista. These were processes 
underway throughout the island but they were exemplified in MININD. As Maria 
Teresa Sanchez said: ‘If there was a ministry where the people were politicised it 
was MININD.’134 The mechanisms described above became key elements of 
Guevara’s BFS and integral to his conception of socialist transition.
134 Sdnchez, interview.
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CHAPTER 7
Administrative control, supervision and 
investment
. 'Che devoted absolute, total, priority attention to accounting, to 
analyzing expenditures and costs, cent by cent. Che could not conceive o f  
building socialism and running the economy without proper 
organization, efficient control, and strict accounting o f every cent. Che 
could not perceive of development without an increase in labour 
productivity. He even studied mathematics to use mathematical formulas 
for economic checks and to measure the efficiency o f the economy. 
What’s more, Che even dreamed o f computers being used in running the 
economy as a key factor to measure efficiency under socialism. ’*
In Guevara’s analysis: ‘The law of value and planning are two terms linked by a
a
contradiction and its resolution.’ While supporters of the Auto-Financing System 
(AFS) argued that the law of value could be expressed through the plan, Guevara did 
not. Planning was the product of the conscious organisation of the national economy 
in pursuit of political objectives. He perceived the plan as a social contract, a 
democratic product devised through workers’ discussions. However, once the plan 
was agreed, mechanisms had to be in place to ensure its fulfilment. These 
mechanisms constituted administrative control and should include computerised 
accounts procedures to relay information in real time. To prevent planning from 
being undermined by capitalist mechanisms it must be accompanied by an apparatus 
which has moved away from what Guevara called ‘financial compulsion’: the profit 
motive. This chapter examines the policies formulated in the Ministry of Industries
1 Fidel Castro, ‘Speech by Fidel Castro on October 8,1987’ in David Deutschmann (ed) Che: A 
Memoir by Fidel Castro, Australia: Ocean Press, 1994,153.
2 Guevara, ‘On the Budgetary Finance System’ in Bertram Silverman (ed), Man and Socialism in 
Cuba: The Debate. New York: Atheneum, 1971, 143.
3 See chapter 5.
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(MININD): to foster administrative control of industry and to raise the accounting 
and administrative skills levels necessary for this control among the new 
administrators, along with the ministry structures implemented in order to monitor 
their progress and secure resources. It also details Guevara’s insistence that the most 
advanced administrative techniques be adapted from capitalism, without relying on 
financial and material incentives which destroyed a sense of collective ownership 
and responsibility for production.
What stands out is the significant gulf between Guevara’s ambitious ideas for 
attaining administrative control: automated accounts in real time, advanced 
management techniques, total inventory control, comprehensive economic analysis, 
decentralised investments and quality controls; and the disorder which prevailed 
when he took over industrialisation: the absence of basic statistical knowledge and 
manual accounts, financial indiscipline, and a lack of control at all levels. Guevara’s 
approach was to encourage learning by doing, push for analysis and, as part of a 
dynamic search for solutions, work with all available experts, aspiring to the most 
advanced technology and laying the groundwork for future advances even while 
struggling to overcome present backwardness. He had a flexible approach to 
questions of control, decentralising to encourage initiative and centralising to ensure 
control. The examination of the apparatus developed reveals a weakness in the 
ministry in its dependence on Guevara and a few other key individuals, to personally 
highlight and resolve daily problems in administrative control, supervision and 
investments.
LACK OF ACCOUNTANTS AND SUPERVISORS
A huge proportion of accountants joined the exodus of professionals from Cuba in 
the first two years of the Revolution: of 1,200 certified public accountants, 800 
(66%) left the country.4 In addition, professional expertise was concentrated in 
Havana, particularly in the sugar industry, which dominated the Cuban economy.
4 Angel Arcos Bergnes, interview, 30 March 2006.
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The accountancy knowledge in the mainly Cuban and Spanish mills in the east of the 
country was basic, their balance of accounts were organised from Havana, with 
book-keepers in the provinces sending receipts to the capital.5 The modem sugar 
mills in the Oriente province in the east were US properties staffed by US managers, 
accountants and technicians. The rest of the advanced mills were in Camaguey, in 
central-eastern Cuba. On nationalising the sugar industry the decision was taken to 
decentralise accounting control so that workers would know the results of 
production. Before 1959 Angel Arcos Bergnes worked as an auditor with a US 
corporation which owned three sugar mills. He also worked with the 26 July 
Movement (M26J) in support of the Revolution. In 1960 he was named General 
Auditor of the sugar industry in Camaguey, with 24 mills. In 1961, Oriente was 
added to his portfolio with 40 mills and in 1962 La Villas province with 52 mills. In 
late 1962 he was transferred to MININD in Havana as General Auditor of the 161 
mills in Cuba and 50 related units from refineries to distilleries. Following the 
nationalisations, Arcos’ responsibilities were to facilitate this decentralisation of 
accounting procedures, to convert the accounting system used from one appropriate 
to capitalism to one necessary for socialist planning, to ensure uniformity among 
mills, to group them by size and to audit their accounts. He was unable to dedicate 
himself to the task of auditor, he said, given the scale of his other tasks:6
‘In this moment 90% of our work was to normalise the accounting 
system everywhere. The North Americans had very advanced accounting 
but the Cubans and Spanish was very bad. I would go to a mill at 2am 
and call another one to say that I would arrive at 5am. In every one I met 
with all the economic personnel and discussed their doubts about the new 
socialist accounts. I had a group of auditors in every province. Many 
weren’t very revolutionary, but they did the work; others left. One 
auditor in Oriente was formidable, but he left because he didn’t agree 
with communism.’
5 The term ‘sugar mill’ is used here generically to refer to both ingenios (smaller mills) and centrales 
(larger, more industrial mills).
Arcos, interview, 2006.
7 Arcos, interview, 2006.
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The task was further. complicated by the need to travel armed, because bandits 
sometimes shot at him and because of the difficulty in persuading accountants from 
Havana to take up work in the provinces. As the mill professionals left, however, the 
Revolution expropriated their houses and offered them rent free as an incentive to the 
Habaneros to move to the country. Edison Velazquez was the head of the Section of 
Inspection, Investigation and Audits within the Department of Industrialisation. He 
was also involved in searching for the best accountants in Havana for the 
Department’s new acquisitions.8
Chapter 4 has described the frantic search for new administrators for the nationalised 
industries. The absolute priority was to keep production going or the Revolution 
would collapse into chaos. Alexis Codina, studied in the School of Commerce after 
the Revolution and in 1961 became the head of accounts at the large Consolidated 
Enterprise of Flour in MININD. He explained:
‘When the Revolution triumphed it was most important to give food to 
the people. As an accountant I had to argue with people to establish 
controls. For example the flour arrived at the port and they took it out 
urgently, but no-one was concerned about the values, there was no 
economic culture... When you make a plan you start by compiling 
information about what you consumed, how much it cost you, and so on.
In that moment there were no statistics. I visited enterprises where there 
. was no accounting. The statistical base was very important in my work, 
but there was no tradition of registering accounts.’9
The scarcity of revolutionaries with accountancy training impelled the formulation of 
mechanisms to push those in charge of production to study and learn on the job. 
Orlando Borrego, who became First Vice Minister to Guevara, rose to such a 
prominent position because he was a revolutionary combatant with basic 
accountancy training: ‘I had no aspirations to hold any position of this type. I just
8 Edison Veldzquez, interview, 19 January 2006
9 Alexis Codina Jimenez, interview, 27 January 2005.
189
Chapter 7: Administrative control, supervision and investment
knew accounting and Che asked me to help him in the economic aspect first in La
Cabana and after in the Department of Industrialisation.’10 In 1962, Jose Luis
Punales was named as administrator of a brewery which had belonged to the Bacardi
Corporation. Punales said: ‘The previous administrator had been Pepin Bosche, a
famous economist. We are talking about a semi-illiterate replacing an economist.’11
The strategy of prioritising production and placing loyalists to lead industry was
evidently successful. In October 1960, before MININD was set up, Guevara reported
that most of the new state industries had increased production from the period
preceding its transfer to state hands.12 This does not just mean that production had
exceeded 1958 levels, but that the threat of economic paralysis had been overcome.
There had been some disasters, Guevara added, in unprofitable industries which
. workers had taken over in the name of the Revolution. But, he predicted these could
be improved with major organisational changes and technological adjustments. Of
the Department’s 300 factories, only ten were operating at a loss. Three of them were
losing serious quantities of money. These were all factories that had been set up by
1Batista’s Bank of Economic and Social Development (BANDES).
MININD produced a Procedure Manual with guidelines on accountancy and other 
administrative functions for the new administrators. Accountancy relied on statistical 
literacy which administrators who struggled to achieve 6th grade lacked. Guevara 
constantly pushed his directors, and through them, the administrators of production 
units, to dedicate themselves to learn statistical analysis. This was a precondition for 
his vision of administrative control of the economy, the successful implementation of 
planning, free from the anarchy of the capitalist market. With his eye constantly 
focussed on the most advanced administrative and technological techniques to 
provide the shortest route to communist development. Guevara ultimately hoped to 
create structures which facilitated increasing computerisation of accounting and 
control of the plan.
10 Orlando Borrego Dfaz, interview, 24 January 2005.
11 Jose Luis Puflales, interview, 21 January 2005.
12 Orlando Borrego, El Camino del Fuego, La Habana: Imagen Contemporanea, 54-5.
13 BANDES was part of the apparatus set up by Batista to facilitate the pilfering of state revenue. See 
chapter 4.
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ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY
Against the assertion of the proponents of the AFS about the efficiency of applying 
‘control by the peso’ that is, financial compulsion, Guevara argued that it was 
possible to institutionalise an administrative system of checks-and-balances to permit 
analysis of the entire production process. It was not necessary to depend on material 
incentives and other capitalist mechanisms in order to control and expand 
production. In January 1962, Guevara told MININD directors that with good control 
systems, modem accounting equipment, a strong planning apparatus and daily 
inventory controls:
‘we can get round the problem of self-financing and convert financial 
compulsion, on which the AFS is based, into a type of administrative 
compulsion, in such a way that we can monitor the apparatus and have 
centres where the concrete results of the tasks of the factories can be 
overseen, and immediately they will sound the alarm when there is 
incompletion of the plan of any other aspect and the problems can be 
remedied.’14
The preconditions for administrative control were knowledge of statistics and 
accounting methodology and the implementation of structures to monitor the costs of 
production. As long as it was accompanied by quality control reduction of costs 
would be the means by which the productivity and efficiency of industry were raised. 
The Budgetary Finance System (BFS), Guevara said: ‘is fundamentally based on 
cost. This means moderating the economic management of the entity via the cost, 
which is the real index that shows how the enterprise is doing... what interests us is 
the analysis of cost, as it falls, its composition and where action can be taken to 
lower it.’15 Cost analysis was the alternative to financial compulsion which applied 
the profit motive to production and undermined the development of a collective
14 Guevara, ‘Reunion Bimestrales’, January 1962, Ministerio de Azucar, El Che en la Revolucion 
Cubana: Ministerio de Industrias, tomo VI, La Habana, 1966, 150-151.
15 Guevara, Bimestrales, 9 March 1963, 348.
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attitude towards national production: part of Guevara’s notion of Cuba as one big 
factory. Cost analysis would replace the profit motive as a lever to improving both 
labour and capital productivity and efficiency. Borrego pointed out that Guevara 
believed that ‘socialist enterprises must be more efficient that capitalist ones’.16 But 
he believed that only if this efficiency came through administrative control could 
there be a transition from socialism to communism, far removed from the operation 
of the law of value.
Advanced management techniques
Technology has no ideology, argued Guevara. Technology includes administrative 
and managerial techniques. He argued the case in military terminology that would be 
understood by a population emerging out years of dictatorship and insurrection: a 
US-made rifle is a weapon in the service of exploitation in the hands of Batista’s 
troops, but an instrument of liberation in the hands of revolutionaries, although its 
function is to kill in both cases.17 The AFS had emerged out of the level of 
development of capitalism in the 1920s in Russia, using techniques far behind those 
operating in the capitalist corporations of 1958 Cuba on which the BFS was based. In 
MININD’s first bimonthly Guevara told directors that the BFS:
‘.. .is very similar to the accounting system of the [pre-1959] monopolies, 
but no one can deny that the monopolies have a very efficient system of 
control and they take great care of every penny... So it’s not important 
. who invented the system. In short, the accounting system that they apply 
in the Soviet Union was also invented under capitalism.’18
From 1959, Guevara studied bourgeois literature on the science of management, 
searching for the practical influences he could apply in the Department of 
Industrialisation. According to Borrego he studied prolifically, from the classic texts
16 Borrego, interview, 23 November 2004.
17 Arturo Guzman Pascual, ‘La Accidn del Comandante Ernesto Guevara en el Campo Industrial’ in 
Revista Bimestre Cubana. No 8 (1998). La Habana: Sociedad Econdmica Amigos del Pals, 32.
18 Guevara, Bimestrales, 21 December 1963,420.
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to contemporary material. Borrego recalled particularly French industrial engineer 
Henry Fayol, from the classical school of managers, and Lea Iacocca, whose system 
of management training was adopted by the Ford Motor Company in the US.19 In 
addition to understanding the theory, Guevara studied the organisational structures of 
the most productive capitalist enterprises in Cuba, as they were nationalised, to find 
which advanced techniques could be used for the socialist administration. Borrego 
said Guevara believed:
‘.. .that the advances achieved by humanity in the historical process of 
development should be utilised to the maximum, without fear of any kind 
. of ideological contamination. It was precisely the rejection of this reality 
in many socialist countries that had held back their economic and 
technical-scientific development by underestimating the advances 
reached in the most developed capitalist countries, especially in relation 
to management techniques.’20
Having studied the administrative control mechanisms of the US monopolies in 
Cuba, Guevara was struck by the backwardness of Soviet techniques. Borrego, who 
accompanied Guevara on his first mission to the USSR in 1960, recalled their visit to 
an electronics factory with 5,000 workers which used an abacus to do accounts. 
Guevara had been studying the US-owned Cuban Electricity Company, Shell, 
Texaco and others which used the latest IBM accounting machines.21 When the 
apparatus of MININD was under construction, Guevara ignored the advice of Soviets 
who argued against having a Department for Organisation and a Department for 
Investigation. Enrique Oltuski, who was responsible for designing this structure, 
explained:
‘They didn’t feel the need to have a Department of Organisation because 
they had been organised for many years, but we were starting something
19 Borrego, Interview, 16 November 2004. Borrego later published his own study of management 
systems, La Ciencia de Direccion: algunos antecedentes y  enfoques actuates, La Habana: SUPSCER, 
1989.
20 Borrego, Camino, 157-8.
21 Borrego, Camino, 60.
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new, without experience and it was important to create a Department of 
Organisation so that we would fully understand the technical concepts 
behind how to administer an enterprise. The same occurred with the 
Department of Inspection. Che said to us: I believe in man, but control 
him. Che was very strict in this. The Soviets thought their organisation 
was perfect.’22
Miguel Figueras, who became MININD’s director of the Perspective Plan, said that 
Guevara authorised him to subscribe to three US business magazines, including 
Fortune, which serialised My Years With General Motors a book by Alfred P Sloan, 
President of General Motors until 1956. Sloan was accredited with creating a new 
management concept which involved:
‘...the coordination of the enterprise under top management, direction of 
policy through top-level committees and delegation of operating 
responsibility throughout the organization. Within this framework, 
management staffs conduct analysis, advise policy committees and 
coordinate administration. Mr Sloan’s idea was to establish 
“decentralized operations and responsibilities with coordinated control.”
At the individual level, his policy was simple: “Give a man a clear-cut 
job and let him do it.” ’23
Figueras stated that Guevara was impressed with the General Motors’ management 
system, with its single centralised bank account and budget.24 In addition to the 
budgetary structure, other precepts of this management system are evident in the BFS 
structure: for example, the establishment of clear guidelines to determine levels of 
decision-making and responsibility. Guevara refused to make decisions which the 
guidelines stipulated should be made at inferior levels, unless there were valid 
reasons. Guevara has been misinterpreted as an advocate of centralisation per se. In 
fact he understood this as a dialectical, not an absolute, question, which should be
22 Enrique Oltuski, interview, 15 February 2006.
23 http://media.gm-powertrain.at/powertrain-media/background/docs/gm_history.doc.
24 Miguel Figueras, interview, 27 January 2006.
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resolved at each stage according to changing circumstances. His slogan was: 
centralise without obstructing initiative and decentralise without losing control.25 A 
policy of ‘sole responsibility’ was outlined for administrators, which meant that after 
collective consultation with the trade unions and the party in the production units, the 
administrator had the final decision and responsibility for the consequences of the 
measures taken. This organisational mechanism was posed by Guevara as a direct 
alternative to that operating in the USSR:
‘At the beginning in the Soviet Union they made a trilogy, the Holy 
Trinity of the party secretary, the trade union head and the administrator.
This trinity was a total disaster. [MININD] has sole responsibility... We 
have to be clear that it is not the function of the active revolutionary
o r
nucleus to supplant the administrative authority.’
Despite the implied heresy in upholding capitalist techniques over those in the 
Socialist bloc, Guevara went public with his analysis, printing articles on the subject 
in Nuestra Industria. Tirso Saenz, who became MININD’s Vice Minister of 
Technical Development from 1963, had worked for Proctor and Gamble before the 
Revolution. He said: ‘several times Che called me to talk to him about how Proctor 
and Gamble worked. What were the management mechanisms? How did they 
stimulate people?’27 The Consolidated Enterprise of Petrol in MININD was an 
amalgamation of the three refineries in Cuba owned by Esso, Texaco and Shell. 
Borrego claimed that they maintained and perfected the pre-1959 system of control
<%Q
and it was considered to be the administrative model in MININD.
In 1962 Alexander Gerschenkron published his book of essays on Economic 
Backwardness in Historical Perspective arguing for state-led industrialisation to pass
25 Juan Valdes Gravalosa, interview, 22 February 2006.
26 Guevara cited by Borrego, Camino, 278. See also Guevara ‘Discusion colectiva; decisidn y 
responsabilidades unicas’ in Ernesto Che Guevara, Obras 1957-1967, Tomo 2, La Habana: Casa de 
Las Americas, 1970, 119-135.
27 Tirso W S£enz, interview, 7 January 2005.
28 Borrego, Camino, 297.
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rapidly through necessary stages of development.29 According to Borrego, Guevara 
was interested in the fact that bourgeois authors of the period had concluded that the 
state should formulate programmes and plans to foster industrialisation in 
underdeveloped countries.30 If proponents of capitalism could argue for the 
importance of centralised administrative control and directed investment, then their 
role under socialism must be vital.
Guevara insisted that automated control of the economy was achievable. The 
ministry had to focus on cadre development, the creation of a powerful statistical 
base and attention to supervision reports, and to struggle for quality at all levels. He 
told MININD directors:
‘every unit should be perfectly calculated so that mistakes can be 
discovered through the indices and this system can be perfected until it is 
weekly, then daily; so that accurate reports will come to the Ministry and 
they can be tabularised and everything can be detected and the 
enterprises can take measures constantly, in a system that I have seen of 
teletype, or whatever it is, for national information, so production is 
controlled day by day and measures taken, the inventories controlled so 
that they bring to light whenever there is an excessive inventory or a 
defect in any one of the units, or in any of the enterprises... Statistics, the 
correct information at the unit level... you have to organise and create 
the necessary indices so that information flows quickly from the base to 
the central organism.’
Borrego claimed that by 1963 a good level of management had been achieved, but 
that they were still struggling to overcome errors committed in the earlier period: 
lack of an investment plan, failure to prioritise tasks, lack of quality, and failure to
29 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book o f Essays. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962.
30 Borrego, Camino, 101. It is not claimed that Guevara read Gerschenkron, but that he knew the 
arguments posed by this school of development theory.
31 Guevara, Bimestrales, 28 September 1962, 323.
32 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1962, 320-321.
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reduce costs and lack of technicians. In June 1964, the Manual for Factory 
Administrators was published partly to institutionalise methods of supervision and 
control, combining theory and practical instructions for factory administrators. 
Section two outlined the ‘fundamental concepts’. These include ‘analysis of costs’, 
‘economic analysis’, ‘socialist management principles’, ‘financial discipline’ and 
‘productivity’. Section five detailed the costs of production, with instructions for 
carrying out economic analysis of the factory, advice on managing savings, and the 
importance of developing inquisitive analytical skills, cultivating ‘a disciplined non­
conformism’ in approaching problems and encouraging a collective interest from 
workers. Section seven dealt with organisation, effective work methods and 
administrative techniques, summarising different management methods: global, 
detailed, sectoral, generic, and instructive. It concluded that: ‘The obligation of the 
administrator is to point out the goals and to control their completion. The rest of the 
tasks can be decentralised.’34 Discussing the flows of production the Manual stated 
that: ‘The organisation of work represents, at its base, the plan of mutual 
coordination between men and machines.’ The goal was ‘to produce more, of better 
quality, and at lower cost’ Produced nearly five years into Guevara’s experience of 
organising and managing Cuba’s industry, the Manual details many of the 
mechanisms he established to create an effective apparatus for accounting, 
supervision and investment.
The component elements of the BFS apparatus of administrative control are detailed 
below, including an explanation of the obstacles faced in the implementation of each 
aspect: statistics and accounting; inventories; control, supervision and inspections; 
investments; and quality.
33 Ministerio de Industrias. Manual Para Administradores de Fabricas. 2nd ed. La Habana: 1988. 
Reprint of 1964 edition.
34 Manual, seccidn 7, asunto 2, pagina 8.
35 Manual, seccidn 7, asunto 3, pagina 1.
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STATISTICS AND ACCOUNTING
‘Che is considered to be a founder of economic statistics in the 
revolutionary stage. He started to create networks to capture and process 
data and statistics. He introduced the application of computers to 
statistical work, despite the fact that computing was very rudimentary at 
that time. Che worked on the organisation of a regional network, 
attempting to create an apparatus where local enterprises would yield 
accumulated statistics to regional offices, which would then send 
information up to the national level. For technical reasons the 
achievements were limited, but the idea was to create a network to 
capture national statistics. They even tried to apply this in the Ministry of 
Industries.’36
Aside from the absence of computers in Cuba, the key obstacle to Guevara’s vision 
of automated national accounts was the absence of accounting culture among the 
young, largely unskilled administrators, placed at the head of nationalised industries, 
plants and workshops between 1959 and 1961. Once it was clear that a production 
crisis had been averted and the BFS had institutionalised control procedures, the lack 
of statistical collection and accountancy systems became a priority for MININD. In 
the first bimonthly meeting, Guevara said: ‘We have to insist on statistics because we 
are thinking more than anything of the idea of mechanising all accounting, to 
mechanise the processes even at the lowest level possible in order to have the best 
control possible.’37 In March 1962, Guevara complained about the lack of audits and 
said that Vice Minister of Light Industry, Jose Manuel Castineras would study the 
problem of the audits and, if necessary, suspend them or reduce them while a group 
of specialist auditors gave accountancy classes, based on the new Procedure Manual,
-JO
to accountants in production units at a local level. The administrators were to learn
36Fidel Emilio Vasc6s Gonz&lez, interview, 16 February 2006. From 1976 to 1996, Vascos was 
President-Minister of the State Comisidn of Statistics and Director General of the National Office of 
Statistics.
37 Guevara, Bimestrales, January 1962, 153.
38 Guevara, Bimestrales, 10 March 1962,224.
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and apply these new skills but EC directors were responsible for staying informed 
about comparative costs, inventories and production processes:
‘It is not difficult to know. It is nothing more than the product of a 
method, it is a method of work which allows you to have the results of 
the activities of the enterprise, factory by factory and globally, on the 
table every week and to check where it is bad and what you have to 
resolve -  without waiting for the administrator to explain to you so that 
you then explain to the vice minister, who explains to me, and that I 
explain to the government that you lacked raw materials.’39
The directors themselves had to be up to date with the production statistics of the 
entities under their jurisdiction. In the bimonthly meeting of September 1962, 
Guevara tested enterprise directors about their planned contribution to the national 
budget with specific questions about particular factories. The questions demonstrate 
both Guevara’s working knowledge about the 40 Consolidated Enterprises grouping 
around a thousand production units, and the diversity of production under the 
jurisdiction of MININD, from petroleum to wheat: ‘How many hours was Petroleum 
stopped ?... Factory 203-9, why did it stop?... How many thousands of flour sacks 
did La Molina bag from here? How many tons of wheat were milled?’40 Guevara 
announced that in the following bimonthly meeting the directors would face an exam 
to test their knowledge of the indices. The next meeting was in March 1963, after a 
gap of five months, which included the Missile Crisis of October 1962. Enterprise 
directors were put in the front row and given an exam with 15 questions to answer 
from memory.41 This was repeated before every bimonthly meeting. As director of 
the EC of Mining, Edison Velazquez had to sit bimonthly meeting exams. He 
recalled: ‘The tests were checked by a group of people, so for instance, if  I said one 
ton of nickel cost $23,000, they might say, you’re making it up, it costs $25,000. 
They would grade you, you had to get over 60%.,42 Three failures would lead to
39 Guevara, Bimestrales, 14 July 1962, 259-260.
40 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1962, 326.
41 Bimestrales, March 1963, 335-6.
42 Vel&zquez, interview, 21 January 2006. Other interviewees who had been EC directors also told me 
about the exams.
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automatic replacement, although this never actually occurred. EC directors, Guevara 
said, had to lead via numbers, but they also had to visit the units to observe what the 
numbers cannot reveal and to prevent separation from the masses.43 Directors had to 
visit and inspect a factory in the EC every two weeks. Failure to do so led to one 
day’s pay being docked. Juan Borroto, head of the Department of Inspection said that 
at one point many directors were falling behind in this task. The Vice Minister of the 
Economy cantankerously remarked: “let them dock me one month”, which is exactly 
what Guevara ordered when he heard about the comment44 Guevara insisted on 
discipline and was known to make an example of his closest colleagues.
For Guevara the key was not just data collection, but analysing it in order to tackle 
deficiencies and locate bottlenecks in order to improve efficiency and lower costs. In 
August 1963 he cited the example of an administrator of a textile factory who had a 
wall full of daily production graphs. When asked why the chart rose or fell, the 
administrator did not know: ‘We are characterised by the total lack of analysis at all 
levels,’ Guevara complained 45 Even Alfredo Menendez, director of the EC of Sugar, 
he said, did less analysis than he had done as an analyst at the Cuban Sugar Institute, 
which represented the private interests of the sugar industry before the Revolution: 
‘This is a serious contradiction; Sugar is one of the enterprises here that carries out 
analysis and that can present data and use it rationally based on experience’.46 
Guevara pointed out that directors had had nearly four years to learn these skills and 
emphasised why it was so important for production: ‘it is not the same to analyse 
production on day 10 as to analyse it on day 25 when almost another month has 
already passed with setbacks’.47 Awareness of production problems was essential to 
preventing stoppages and bottlenecks, thus improving efficiency.
Once procedures had been established to collect statistical data, Guevara focussed on 
the need for financial discipline: completing reports on time and adequately 
analysed. Economic heads in the ECs had to submit accounts, with the directors’
43 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1963,353.
44 Juan Borroto, interview, 26 January 2006.
45 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1963, 357-8.
46 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1963, 362.
47 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1963, 367.
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approval, to the Vice Minister of the Economy by the fifth day of the month 
following operations. Guevara also analysed the reports and occasionally he called 
directors to discuss the economic and financial state of the enterprise, to render 
accounts and provide information about distinct balances of account. Francisco 
Buron Sefia, a head of audits in MININD, said: ‘It did not mean they had to become 
accounting specialists but they had to dominate the essential aspects important in the 
functioning of management.’48 The lack of automation meant that most of these 
accounts were done manually.
In October 1963 Guevara commented sardonically that the EC of Cigarettes had 
passed into the annals of accounting history as: ‘the first enterprise in the history of 
accounting to submit its financial record, not with a certification that the data is 
exhaustive, but rather a postscript that the data could not be relied on.’ While the 
‘gentlemen’ of the EC of Beer and Malt had honoured the pre-revolutionary tradition 
of hiding profits, they appeared to have adjusted the inventory to the value of four 
million peso, he revealed. All those responsible for financial indiscipline would be 
removed, Guevara warned, even if that meant there were no economic heads left as 
was the case in the earliest stage of the Revolution. What’s more, he said, enterprise 
directors held responsibility and would also face investigation and punishment for 
statistical failures.49 In response to one director’s suggestion of organising a course 
about the BFS, Guevara said: ‘It is useless to hold a seminar about the budgetary 
finance system if the statistical apparatus of the ministry and the financial apparatus 
of the ministry don’t function, because at the base of the BFS is knowledge of data to 
facilitate centralised management’.50 Administrative control, via statistical data and 
basic accountancy, was a building block of his BFS. By 1964 there is no more 
mention of statistics and accounting in the bimonthly meetings, suggesting that the 
serious deficiencies had been largely overcome. Juan Borroto confirmed the problem 
was resolved and that a Department of Statistics was set up in MININD staffed by 
accountants trained under capitalism who applied their expertise to socialist 
planning. Figueras set to work on an input-output matrix with two specialists who
48 Francisco Buron Sefla, Radio Interview (taped), Havana Radio, 2004.
49 Guevara, Bimestrales, 12 October 1963,409.
50 Guevara, Bimestrales, October 1963,411-12.
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had trained at a specific institute in the US, one of them a woman named Zoila 
Gonzalez.51 They collated purchases and sales information from the ECs and made a 
matrix using Cuba’s first computer, which Guevara had imported. This gave them 
an overview of the global balance of the ministry which facilitated improvements in 
efficiency.
INVENTORIES
'The excessive inventory is money dormant, whether it consists of raw 
materials, or the finished product; either o f these is a burden on the 
enterprise. Our enterprises’ funds are contained in such a way that they 
cannot have a huge inventory. ’
Under socialism, argued Guevara, all production units in Cuba should be considered 
elements of one big factory, which was the Cuban nation. The law of value could not 
operate in exchange between state-owned units, because there was no change of 
ownership. Under the BFS, production units were not independent entities and 
therefore did not possess their own resources. Excess resources in one factory should 
not be seen as the individual surplus of that unit, but rather the bad distribution of 
resources within a large and complex system of production. For this reason Guevara 
emphasised the need to control and monitor inventories, the stocks of resources held 
in production units under MININD: raw materials and other inputs, capital goods, 
spare parts and final products. Guevara’s insistence on the importance of inventory 
control was influenced by his appreciation of the efficiency of US corporations. 
According to Edison Velazquez, Guevara was impressed with the US system at 
Nicaro mine where there was a card in each warehouse listing the parts stored in each 
one. This prevented pilfering and allowed control of the inventory by providing a
51 No further information was obtained.
52 Figueras, interview. Details about the use of computers in chapter 9.
53 Guevara, Bimestrales, January 1962,150.
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record of stocks so that replacement orders could be placed in advance, and the 
inventory was neither excessive nor deficient. Velazquez explained:
‘It was important to have a detailed study of the supplies and the 
production cycle; to know if a spare part came to Cuba from England, for 
example, and it took six months to arrive: to know if you need ten spare 
parts a year, to order replacements in advance. However, if  you 
purchased a hundred pieces it would be dead capital, or it could 
deteriorate within five years. Che was very concerned about this and 
impressed with how well organised the capitalists had their warehouse.
. The card would be able to tell you what the parts were and how many we 
consumed a year. It was the best way to maximise the capital without 
wasting any resources.’54
The system of card-controlled inventories was adopted so that: ‘even the toilets had a 
card recording control of inventories and basic means’, according to Yolanda 
Fernandez Hernandez, who worked on investment programming in MININD.55 She 
said that when new investments were planned and plants built they always started 
with the warehouse; then established control of the inventories and capital goods, 
until the factory could begin production: ‘A screw’s gone missing, where is it? You 
have to know what you have to produce with.’56 When industries were nationalised 
their inventories were low, because 95% of capital goods and 100% of spare parts 
came from the US.57 When replacements or maintenance were needed parts were 
ordered by phone to arrive in two days. But as the US imposed the blockade these 
supplies dried up and stopped. The Soviet bloc stepped into the breach but there were 
three significant problems. Firstly, the different technologies; secondly, existing 
storage facilities were inadequate for the huge shipments arriving from the socialist 
countries; thirdly, replacement parts had to be foreseen and included in the plan. 
Extra supplies would have to wait for the following year’s plan. Velazquez said:
54 Velazquez, interview, 21 January 2006.
55 Yolanda Fem&ndez Hem&ndez, 24 March 2006.
56 Fernandez, interview.
57 Arturo Guzm&n Pascual, ‘La Accidn del Comandante Ernesto Guevara en el Campo Industrial’ 
Revista Bimestre Cubana, No 8 (1998), 29
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‘You couldn’t ask for money after drawing up your budget for things which you 
hadn’t foreseen. It was a planned economy, based on inventories. The technician 
should know how long each part of equipment has been used for and know when it is 
coming up for replacement.’58 In March 1963 Guevara announced to directors that 
the task of inventory control had been decentralised from the ministry to the EC 
management level, warning that: ‘it is a huge task that is very difficult.’59
Velazquez said that his EC of Mining achieved inventory control during Guevara’s 
time as minister. A chief of production in every warehouse reported to him monthly 
on the state of inventories. Other specialists analysed how long the inventory would 
last and if one part was being used up too quickly from one warehouse, they would 
investigate the reason. This avoided production shocks and dead capital: ‘Given the 
number of warehouses, if there was dead capital in each it would add up to millions 
of peso worth throughout the country.’60 When inventories had grown the head of 
production in that EC would inform Guevara. He demanded an explanation of the 
cause from the EC director, who had to be well informed about the production 
process. Guevara could assess the situation via an analysis of the costs. Velazquez 
said:
‘The cost is like gossip. He would test us on our basic costs, how much 
on salaries, on coal. So I had to study!... He asked me once “why did 
your inventories go up?” and I told him that I had spent extra money on 
manpower to fix some broken pipes. I had to know that. He knew that as 
well because the inventories were an element of economic analysis and 
he could see where you had spent more money than usual.’61
The important point here is not just-that Guevara believed in the importance of 
inventory control but the level of detail which he personally went to in order to
58 Vel&zquez, 21 January 2006.
59 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1963, 353.
60 Veldzquez, interview, 21 January 2006.
61 Vel&zquez, interview, 21 January 2006.
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perfect the apparatus of economic analysis.62 Rosario Cueto was personal assistant to 
the Vice Minister of Basic Industry, Arturo Guzman Pascual. She kept a card index 
with information about all the inventories of basic means of production for each EC, 
which she said: ‘allowed us to act quickly to avoid a crisis in supplies to industry.’ 
Cueto travelled to Nicaro every month with either Guzman or Guevara to participate 
in their management council meeting. On one occasion, Guevara became furious 
because of accounting adjustments which had been made. She said:
‘I had seen him irritated before, but never like that. He spent an hour 
explaining why adjustments could not be accepted, especially when 
things were missing, and he pointed out the economic implications that 
this could have. It could hide thieving, corruption, indicating people had 
an interest in falsifying information. He said this made it possible to 
conceal crimes... He asked who had authorised the adjustments but the 
person who was responsible wasn’t there, which made him more cross.’64
Francisco Buron Sefia claimed that there was no stealing in MININD both because of 
revolutionary commitment and the implementation of control mechanisms to prevent 
it.65 However, the transcripts of the bimonthly meetings of MININD reveal that 
thieving had occurred. It is also clear that Guevara took a strong line to deter it. 
Mistakes were accepted but not thieving: ‘It is one thing to put your foot in it’ he said 
‘but another to dip your hand in the till.’66
In December 1963, announcing that control of inventories would be one of the main 
ministry tasks for the pending year, he revealed that in the weekly meetings to
62 Chapter 9 details the importance which Guevara gave to the mining sector for Cuban economic 
development.
63 Rosario Cueto Alvarez, interview, 29 March 2006.
64 Cueto in Adys Cupull and Froilan Gonz&lez (eds), Entre Nosotros. La Habana: Ediciones Abril 
1992,116.
65 Buron, interview.
66 Buron, Radio.
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analyse the EC’s annual reports anomalies in inventories were the norm, the result of 
financial indiscipline and thieving:
‘People have been imprisoned in the last two months for dipping their 
hands in the till. The weak point is storage...and spare parts, above all in 
the big enterprises, it is a weak point where the nation’s money goes off 
in private hands... misappropriation of funds caused by the lack of
fncontrol and discipline.’
He repeated the complaint in September 1964 and warned that the ministry would 
take ‘drastic measures’ to combat financial indiscipline, particularly the adjustment 
of inventories. He concluded that: ‘the possibilities for thieving will exist for a long 
time under socialism until there has been a change in people’s mentality.’ In this 
context ideological work was vital so that individuals understood how their interests 
were reconciled with those of society. A thorough investigation would be launched 
into these anomalies, he announced, in which the EC directors would be held 
responsible: ‘I don’t know whether it is due to a complete lack of knowledge of the 
elemental rules of accounting, or if it is with the collusion of directors, but I know 
that it happens and it is serious.’69 Guevara recognised that some directors attempted 
to adjust inventories to avoid violating the regulation on control of inventories, but 
warned them that if they came across anomalies they must inform the ministry, rather 
than hiding them, so that inspectors could be sent immediately to verify the
70problem.
Miguel Dominguez, director of the EC of Soaps and Perfumes, which had the best 
record on inventories, was instructed to set up a team of advisors to assist other 
directors to organise theirs. Santiago Riera, Vice Minister for the Economy, 
announced that MININD’s total inventory was $26 million peso.71 At the end of
67 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1963,419.
68 Guevara, Bimestrales, 12 September 1964, 533.
69 Guevara,Bimestrales, September 1964, 533-4.
70 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1964, 534.
71 Santiago Riera, Bimestrales, September 1964, 538.
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1964, MININD’s inventory was $31,078,400 peso.72 Guevara complained that 
inventories of raw materials had grown significantly and many resources were not 
included in the plan and went to waste.73 On his monthly factory visits, Guevara 
himself would inspect the warehouses. Buron said: ‘there were cases of 
some directors who, perhaps because they had been recently designated, had not 
even visited the warehouses. The fact that Che inspected there was a lesson for them 
of the importance of empirical checks as an instrument of management; that you can­
not just base yourself on reports.’74 This approach to economic analysis 
viastatistical analysis and reports, backed up by on site investigations, was 
exemplified in the apparatus established for supervision and inspection: functions 
which Guevara had prioritised since he first began to lead industry.
SUPERVISION AND INSPECTION
‘ When they created MININD, Borrego explained the organisational 
structure on a board in the ministry. Borrego began to speak about some 
sub-secretariats and Che said to him that the first organ that should be 
under his supervision was the management o f supervision and control.
“This man should be my eyes and ears to allow me to see what I cannot
ne
see and to hear what I  cannot hear
In the Department of Industrialisation, a Section of Inspection, Investigation and 
Audits had been one of the first set up. Velazquez was head: ‘We investigated 
indisciplines and anomalies. We audited the enterprises and important factories. If 
there were problems with the audit or investigation we did a detailed inspection. We
72 Memoria Anual 1964, Ministerio de Industrias, Republica de Cuba, 1965.
73 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1964, 537.
74 Buron, interview.
75 Buron, interview. Vel&zquez, interview, 19 January 2005 & Borroto, interview said the same. The 
sub-secretariats were soon renamed Vice Ministries, an ideological change which reflected 
realignment from US institutional models to Soviet and European ones.
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consulted with the revolutionary organisations and the trade unions about their 
relationship with management.’76
Juan Borroto, who took over from Velazquez, said that by the time the Department 
became MININD in February 1961, there were already 100 people in this Section, 
which became the Department of Supervision within MININD. Guevara was 
personally involved in analysing the results of these investigations, always concerned 
to create mechanisms of guidance and control. Reflecting back he said: ‘it was an 
endless job, exhausting, to read a multitude of inspections and audits that reflected 
the general state of permanent chaos of accounting without there being any 
remedy.’77 Borrego recalled: ‘Usually, Che attended to these despatches in the late 
hours of the night, because of his wish to fully concentrate on this analysis and to 
take pertinent decisions without the urgency of other daily tasks.’ Alexis Codina 
confirmed this from his own experience as head of accounts in a bakery in 1961. He 
was catching up on the accounts at 2am when Guevara appeared and asked to tour 
the factory: ‘He overwhelmed me with questions about the costs and accounting’, 
Codina said. The following year Codina was promoted to head the accounts of the 
EC of Flour. One day his director, Jesus Suarez Gayol, called him at 3 am for a 
meeting with Guevara.79
‘Che was standing up in his office with the top draw of a filing cabinet 
pulled out, leaning on the sharp metal comer, reading a report which he 
had to discuss at 8am. He explained that if he sat on the armchair he 
would fall asleep, which is why he made himself uncomfortable. He had 
the financial records of our enterprise and started asking me questions.
For example, about the sales ledger, registering what clients have ordered 
but not paid for. These were subdivided into state sector, rural sector and 
the private sector. Our accounts sale ledger for the private sector had 
increased. Che asked me who had authorised me to finance the private
76 Veldzquez, interview, 19 January 2006.
77 Guevara, Bimestrales, 11 July 1964,488.
78 Borrego, Camino, 73.
79 ‘Gayol was an extraordinary person, very intelligent. It is he who Che called El Rubio [the blond] in 
his diary and he was the first to fall in the war [in Bolivia].’ Codina, interview.
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sector, as I was giving primary materials to a sector that was not paying 
me for them. I confessed that I had not made that type of analysis.’80
Later, the task of checking inspection reports passed to Orlando Borrego as First 
Vice Minister. Then through 1962-3, the supervisory procedures were decentralised 
to the ECs which all had an Office of Supervision, in addition to five provincial 
offices which reported direct to the ministry. Guevara warned directors against 
taking people or reports on trust. This was a reflection of mental or spiritual laziness, 
he said, or of subjectivity in appreciation, the tendency to see everyone through rose 
colour spectacles without bothering to analyse profoundly their work: ‘You have 
three sets of eyes working to the same ends, four with your own: the eyes of the 
ministry’s supervision, the eyes of the provincial delegations’ supervision and the 
eyes of the supervision in your own enterprise... Weaknesses are discovered through 
supervision.’81 In early 1963 Borroto reported problems with the supervision 
apparatus. In July 1964 Guevara announced that the ministry would recentralise the 
personnel and resources of the management of inspection because enterprise 
directors were failing to implement it. This serves as evidence of Guevara’s 
dialectical approach to the issue of centralisation and decentralisation. When control 
was lost measures were taken to re-establish it. He said: ‘We are at a level of 
development in which we cannot permit a return to the errors that were perfectly 
permissible in 1961 but cannot be permitted now.’82 It became the General Office of 
Supervision, divided into three departments -  inspection, auditing and investigation -  
which responded to EC summonses to carry out these tasks. In addition they carried 
out three-monthly checks of each EC to assess how they were fulfilling the annual 
tasks; four or five work priorities highlighted in MININD’s annual review. 
Nationally, the Office employed 600 workers including office personnel who 
programmed the regular checks.
80 Codina, interview.
81 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1962, 314.
82 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1964,489.
83 Borroto, interview & Guzm&n, Accion, 450.
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Audits dealt with the financial state of the enterprises. Inspection checked functional 
apparatus; equipment maintenance and the work of personnel. Investigation was a 
tool which allowed more profound analysis and which, in Guevara’s view, had a 
political importance. It was responsible for responding to workers’ complaints and 
opinions. Borroto said the investigatory apparatus ensured that management w^re 
conscientious about their own behaviour, knowing that any complaints would be 
thoroughly investigated: ‘Guevara operated with the principle of constant doubt’, he 
said, so everything had to be investigated and verified; ‘he knew he had a team 
which could verify everything.’84 Guevara announced that: ‘the department of 
inspection is going to be made into a powerful department at the ministry level.’ 
Clearly inspection was a vital instrument in the emphasis on administrative control of 
the economy integral to the BFS. In addition to the principle of constant doubt, was 
the rule that supervisors must be outside of administrative functions to ensure 
objectivity and remove all vested interests. Guevara explained: ‘I cannot make an 
inspection of MININD; it’s too difficult, it’s not logical or correct. Because, as 
honest as I might be, I will present mistakes moulded by my own decisions as
o /
correct... I cannot be the one to analyse them.
The administrators’ Manual stipulated that they have daily production reports in their 
hands within the first four hours of the day. The departments, sub-sections or offices 
of quality control, work and salaries, planning, movement of materials and products, 
personnel, heads of production, office of administrators and economic heads, had to 
report any daily deviations from the economic-technical plan. The Manual specified 
which elements each department should concern itself with. This was described as a
systematic type of preventative control.87 It stated: ‘With the intention of overcoming
the deficiencies observed in the inspection reports and to be able to obtain the 
benefits which can come from them, it has been circulated to all directors of the 
branches of production and consolidated enterprise directors that the best use of these 
investigations is through their discussion.’88 Velazquez confirmed that in the huge
84 Borroto, interview.
85 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1964, 536.
86 Guevara, Bimestrales, 22 February 1964, 449-51.
87 Manual, secci6n 4, asunto 7, paginas 1-4.
88 Manual, secci6n 5, asunto 19, pagina 1.
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complex nickel mines of Nicaro and Moa that he directed, this mechanism was in 
place:
‘In Nicaro the production heads bought me a report in the morning and I 
had a board meeting with the 40 engineers to see if there were any 
problems. I might say, for example, right we need two more shifts to 
resolve this because there is an accumulation of production in one point.
You cannot wait to the end. The end is an autopsy, the corpse is dead. 
Prevention means checking during the process, not waiting to discover 
problems at the end of the day. I supervised one administrator at Nicaro 
and another at Moa. I often said to them “give me a production report 
every eight hours or every four”. And I had to inform the ministry of any
Q Q
problems.’
In four tumultuous years significant progress had been made from the chaos of 
retrieving flour at the docks without registering accounts to an obligation to submit 
production reports four hours into the working day. The investigation, auditing and 
inspection apparatus was essential to the BFS’s mechanisms of administrative 
control. Without the financial compulsion of the profit motive inherent in the AFS, 
MININD had to secure a way of ensuring financial discipline and accountability, and 
focus its workers on reducing costs, improving production and efficiency. Guevara 
has been dismissed as idealistic for his vision of revolutionary commitment and 
sacrifice. However, the importance he gave to the functions of supervision 
undermines that characterisation. Man was in the process of transformation along 
with his society and mechanisms were necessary to guide these developments.
COMMISSION OF ARBITRATION
In 1963, the Commission of Arbitration was set up within MININD to deal with 
disputes between internal ministry ECs concerning quality, quantity, price, and
89 Veldzquez, interview, 21 January 2006.
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exchange dates, infractions of legal norms or regulations and incompletion of 
agreements and contracts. Arbitration had legal status, so according to the Manual it 
should be considered as a last resort. Administrators with complaints relating to their 
production units should search for administrative measures to resolve the problems 
before referring to Arbitration. Marta Lugioyo, who had become a judge in 1957 
under Batista whilst a member of the M26J, was one of the legal experts on 
Arbitration: ‘I worked in evaluating industrial conflicts, the problems of quality, 
quantity of production... Arbitration gave legal coherence to the relations between 
enterprises.’90 Arbitration was under the direct control of Guevara, and Lugioyo 
reported to him and Santiago Rieras, Vice Minister of the Economy. Although it was 
set up for internal ministry arbitration it expanded to mediate in relations between 
MININD and other institutions. When the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MINCEX) 
complained about the quality of products coming out of MININD for export, it was 
Arbitration’s task to investigate and resolve the problems. They assisted with the 
issue of salaries and worked closely with the Office of Product Study, concerned 
with product specifications and presentation, and the Office of Quality and Norms, 
which established quality standards. Lugioyo said that because they dealt with legal 
questions, they had to have a comprehensive understanding of the BFS:
‘Some institutions didn’t understand Arbitration; nor that it was 
necessary to fine people for non-completion of contracts. INRA 
[National Institute of Agrarian Reform] and MINCEX defended the auto- 
. financing system, so they couldn’t understand that you would punish 
someone in relation to the delivery of products. There were also 
problems with JUCEPLAN [Central Planning Board]. This was all due to 
the differences in regards to the economic system.’ 91
Under the AFS exchange between enterprises and ministries was resolved by demand 
and supply market mechanisms; Guevara called this ‘financial compulsion’. 
Guevara’s BFS aimed to replace ‘control by the peso’ with administrative
90 Marta Lugioyo, interview, 27 March 2006.
91 Lugioyo, interview.
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compulsion so that exchange was controlled by contractual agreements. The 
Commission of Arbitration was a vital tool in this system; it was the mechanism that 
enforced the primacy of the contract and represented planned management of the 
economy. The fines imposed by Arbitration were monetary in nature, but they were 
imposed after the fact, as punishment for failing to stick to administrative contracts. 
They were not an expression of market forces influencing the character of production 
itself, as proposed by the AFS paradigm. In 1963, 104 proceedings were started by 
Arbitration, most relating to deliveries of raw material supplies, materials or finished 
products. Eleven related to problems of quality and 31 to incompletion of contracts. 
This rose to a total of 237 in 1964; 12 concerned quality and 81 incompletion of 
contracts. Of those totals, arbitration between ECs in MININD increased from 17 to 
82 and on proceedings enacted on behalf of MININD ECs against MINCEX fell 
from 42 to 39 cases, the percentage decreasing from 40% to 16%. This reduction was 
partly due to the lack of contracts and delivery conditions agreed between the 
institutions, rather than a lack of problems. However, in 1964 only 20 claims were 
issued against MININD, but MININD had paid $6,586,400 peso to other institutions
O '}in fines. In 1966 a National Commission of Arbitration was created and Lugioyo 
passed on to that. MININD’s Arbitration, therefore, constituted another institutional 
apparatus created by Guevara which was consequently adopted on a national scale. 
Clearly Arbitration had demonstrated its utility.
ANNUAL REPORTS
When MININD was set up in February 1961, Circular 38 was issued; it contained 
guidelines for the 40 ECs to write annual reports. This was then replaced by an 
improved Circular 43 and finally by the stringent Circular 90. An annual schedule 
was worked out so that reports were received and reviewed weekly in MININD. The 
accounts rendered included not just details relating to the completion of the 
technical-economic and financial plans for the enterprise, but also their social
92 Memoria 1964, MININD, 92-4.
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objectives, state of organisation, structure, personnel roles, and assessment of 
management personnel, training, perspectives and relations with the ministry
93management, trade unions, the party and other organisations of the masses. Once 
complete, 100 copies of the report would be edited and produced by MININD’s own 
EC of Graphic Arts and delivered to MININD Management Council a month before 
it was due for discussion. Guevara would nominate three companeros to carry out an 
in-depth analysis of the balance of the enterprise. They had to visit that EC’s units of 
production, attend management meetings, check its economic, administrative and 
productive procedures, and produce an evaluation. The relevant branch head also 
produced an analysis of the EC. From the Office of Supervision, Juan Borroto would 
send two investigators, two auditors and two inspectors to analyse the ECs, some of 
which, like the EC of Flour, consisted of hundreds of small entities, a selection of 
which they visited. This process could take up to two months. They also did 
evaluations of the management personnel.94 Finally, specialist managers in the 
appropriate area would submit an additional report analysing the enterprise. All these 
reports, plus any contributions by the ministry’s advisors, had to be read before the 
weekly meeting of Circular 90, chaired by Guevara and including all those involved 
in the analysis, plus all other vice ministers and general directors of MININD. In this 
way management personnel would be aware of problems and progress of 
industrialisation as a whole.
Analysis of the EC usually took four hours, but occasionally continued the following 
day if it had not been completed. According to Villegas, Guevara checked that the 
ECs were focussed on improving and expanding production and technology. ‘You 
had to answer a whole set of questions about installed industrial capacity, 
development plans, what raw materials you had, how you would substitute imports, 
how were relations with the trade union.’95 An important aspect of Circular 90 was 
the appraisal of personnel. Arcos said:
93 Arcos, ‘M6todo y estilo de trabajo de Che’, in 40 Aniversario Ministerio de Indnstrias, Editora 
Politica, Habana, 2001,21 & Harry Villegas, interview, 22 March 2006 & Borroto, interview.
94 Borroto, interview.
95 Villegas, interview.
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‘In a personal way, with the spirit of constructive criticism, Che 
discussed the evaluation of each leader, first invariably asking if it had 
been discussed with them and their opinion about it. The enterprise 
reports also had criticisms of MININD (including the minister, his 
. apparatus of management and specialists) and the analysis also 
commented on bad decisions and deficiencies. These were analysed and 
suggestions made for measures to be taken or weaknesses to be 
overcome. And all of this had to be verified by the ministry inspectors.’96
The Circular 90 discussions did not always take place in the ministry. On one 
occasion the whole team went to Nicaro in Oriente for the annual report of the EC of 
Mining. Guevara said the report was ‘brilliant’ except for the lack of a spirit of
07criticism by the director, Edison Velazquez.
After an exhaustive analysis the nominated team reached final conclusions. 
Agreements and announcements were formalised to serve as the basis for a plan of
Q O
action in the following year. Arcos concluded that: ‘Without doubt, this rendition 
of accounts and the meetings of control of production (monthly), were two of the 
most formidable tools that Che counted on to control this GIANT which had to be 
divided afterwards into five ministries.’99 While the thorough task of rendering 
accounts and analysing their work was an annual one for the ECs, for the MININD 
Management Council it was weekly. Circular 90 was a scrupulous tool for 
scrutinising the functioning of MININD production units, as the basis for devising 
strategies for the rationalisation and expansion of production, based on collective 
discussion and analysis. The fact that inspectors, auditors and investigators, as well 
as vice ministers, carried out their evaluations lent the process the dynamic character 
necessary to keep the analysis lively and avoid bureaucracy.
96 Arcos, Metodo, 23.
97 Velazquez, interview, 19 January 2006.
98 Nearly 30 examples of EC assessments appear in El Che, tomo VI, MINAZ, 25-132.
99 Arcos, Metodo, 24. Arcos’s emphasis.
215
Chapter 7: Administrative control, supervision and investment
INVESTMENTS
Velazquez said that Guevara was impressed with the stringent capitalist control and 
management of investments in US subsidiaries in Cuba: ‘Che applied the same 
procedures; no-one could carry out investments without the ministry approval.’100 
Centralised control of investments was facilitated by the BFS structure, where 
production units did not accumulate finances, but withdrew funds for operational 
costs from one bank account and all gains were paid into another which went straight 
to the ministry. Payments for goods exchanged were registered as debits or surpluses 
in the central bank accounts. BFS entities could not accumulate ‘profit’ or get credit 
for decentralised investments. Planning also imposed restraints on investments, as 
projects would have to be included in the annual plan and thoroughly analysed. 
Velazquez said:
‘Your end of year balance included investments, so you had to find out 
from your technicians what was needed, list and justify it. If you needed 
new equipment you would detail how much it cost: materials, labour 
. force and collaterals like soldering. You said in what period you planned 
to recoup that investment. The ministry decided which part of the 
proposal it would approve.’101
The ministry could also decide where investments should be made in order to expand 
production. This was a social investment, for example informing a bakery that a new 
oven would be constructed. The ministry would purchase the oven and give 
directives to the bakery to install it.
An ‘investor’ in MININD was the person nominated to oversee projects, from 
purchase of means of production, to construction, to organisation and inauguration. 
The investor was attached to the production unit, but the Ministry would advise them 
and provide technicians and material. For example, the ministry would provide the
100 Vel&zquez, interview, 21 January 2006.
101 Vel&zquez, interview, 21 January 2006.
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finances to pay for a mason who would work in the production unit under contract. 
This was agreed by the Vice Ministry of the Economy and co-ordinated by the Vice 
Ministry of Industrial Construction, headed by Angel Gomez Trueba. The 
responsibilities of Construction were so extensive that a new building was needed to 
house the apparatus. It was built with the voluntary labour of MININD employees. 
Industrial Construction included project managers, investors and inspectors to carry 
out routine checks on every investment at three month intervals. As head of the 
Office of Supervision, Juan Borroto was given a programme of checks to be carried 
out. Borroto said: ‘I had to inspect the projects with an architectural engineer sent to 
me to help with this task.’102 From 1964, Yolanda Fernandez Hernandez worked 
under Trueba in the team which was programming investments and inspections.103 
Before this apparatus was set up, however, investments in MININD were a problem 
of concern for Guevara. In the bimonthly meeting of March 1962 a director 
complained that urgent investments could not wait for the next year’s plan. In one 
factory a roof was falling down but there had been problems in securing emergency 
investment to rebuild it. Another director complained that after investments were 
approved they were delayed in normal budgetary channels.104 Guevara instructed 
directors to inform him when things got stuck, so that he could get things moving. 
This reflected a structural weakness in the ministry where the minister was so 
personally involved in breaking bottlenecks. Guevara articulated the problem: ‘This 
organism is a process of change, we have terrible bureaucratic obstacles. We give the 
authority to those who should have it; we need to move things on with a lever of 
immediate action that you are not using gentlemen. The truth is that investments 
problems are bad. That investments are stopped is bad.’105 Director of the EC of 
Cement, Ramirez pointed out that when investments in other enterprises were 
withheld, the production of cement was also obstructed, because the lack of storage 
facilities meant that production stopped until the finished product was removed from 
site,106 Guevara reacted with fury:
102 Borroto, interview.
103 Fernandez, interview.
104 Compafieros, Bimestrales, March 1962,235.
105 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1962,236-7.
106 Ramirez, Bimestrales, March 1962, 237.
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‘That the ministry cannot be shaken is outrageous. It is a symbol of the 
bureaucracy, of a lack of sensitivity. Gentleman this cannot be. You have 
to get stuck into consistently. It is everyone’s obligation...you cannot 
leave the nation’s economy in the hands of one man. This cannot be my 
decision; it has to be everyone’s responsibility. I can accept my due, 
twenty times over, for having once forgotten the problem, but this is an 
obligation of the entire ministry. Cement cannot be stopped; one man 
cannot stop an investment... Am I a magician? Are there not 20, 60, 100 
Ches here that have the same concerns every day, that go out, that shout, 
that stamp their feet at all levels...We cannot progress, we cannot drive 
this with energy if we do not take resolute decisions, everyday, if we 
don’t get bitter every time things don’t happen.’107
In summer 1962 Guevara complained that the level of investments in MININD was 
‘scandalously low’ and blamed the ministry, in particular Construction. He also 
blamed JUCEPLAN, and the government, for permitting these errors. ‘So the 
criticism falls on me from all sides: for the government, for JUCEPLAN, for the 
Industrial Construction’, he announced. Part of the problem, admitted Guevara, was 
the result of JUCEPLAN’s overestimation the growth attainable without further 
investment. The initial planned growth rate was 20%, subsequently reduced to 15% 
and then to 9.8% but the real growth rate that year was just 1%. Actually, production 
increased in all the ECs, he said, but the 29% fall in sugar production distorted the 
results, because sugar accounted for a quarter of the ministries’ production.108 
Velazquez said directors did not request funds for investment because they did not 
want to take risks, but this held back economic expansion, impossible without 
investment. He said: ‘It was a lack of vision, but Che was a visionary so he insisted 
on investment. ’109
107 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1962,238.
108 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1962,285. For details about JUCEPLAN’s inflated growth predictions 
see Edward Boorstein, The Economic Transformation o f Cuba: A First Hand Account, New York: 
Modem Reader Paperback, 1968. In 1964, MININD’s growth was planned at 12% and achieved 6%, 
Memoria 1964.
109 Veldzquez, interview, 21 January 2006.
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By September 1962, MININD was meeting production plans, but not growing. 
Guevara declared that investment was the ministry’s greatest failure: ‘Investment 
secures future production: the more or less long term future. Then there is 
maintenance which assures production for tomorrow.... Everywhere we visit we find 
an absolute neglect of investments.’110 In response to these failings, investment 
functions would be centralised so that with correct management decisions would be 
made with objectivity, not decentralised at the unit level where surpluses are 
sometimes used in an irrational way.111
Investment was one of the four key areas for 1963. In March 1963, Guevara warned 
directors to make their investment proposals concrete and realistic. The EC of 
Pharmaceuticals had begun ten investments simultaneously without guarantees, 
endangering the production plans. Projects had to be monitored, Guevara said, 
complaining that: ‘Even today we haven’t found a method of pushing the investor 
who is behind to focus on this task. We have a number of investors who are now 
dedicated to centralised works.’112 The enterprise had to be linked to the investor and 
work together on the project. Guevara admitted that decentralised control of 
investments was preferable, but that centralisation was necessary because of failures 
at lower levels.113 He complained that MININD funds were below what had been 
requested from JUCEPLAN, adding: ‘They spend money in the country on things 
much less important than industries’ and he cited an example of spending $50,000 on 
dancers.114
According to Velazquez, with the centralisation of investment functions in 1963 the 
situation was improved.115 In 1964 MININD’s planned investments totalled 
142,316,000 peso, of which 50% went on equipment, 27% on construction, 13% on 
assembly and 10% on other costs. However, following adjustments, partly made 
because of problems associated with the compatibility of imported resources, by the
110 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1962, 310-12.
111 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1962, 320.
112 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1963, 344.
113 Guevara, Bimestrales, 10 August 1963, 372.
114 Guevara, Bimestrales, August 1963, 377-8.
115 Vel&zquez, interview, 21 January 2006.
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end of the year approved investments had increased by 48,216 peso.116 By 31 
December 1964 there had been a 78% completion of the annual plan of investments, 
including adjustments. A further 136,000 peso was planned for 1965, on 128 
projects. Four new plants would be inaugurated in 1965 and another 18 projects 
would be underway during the year, with a total value of 286,525 peso to be invested 
by 31 December 1965.117
Investments were not mentioned again until the final bimonthly meeting in 
December 1964, when Guevara complained about bad investments in backward 
technology purchased in 1960 which was still not operational. New investments, he 
insisted, must consider world productivity.118 He announced that investment was the 
fundamental task of MININD, but that the apparatus would be changed, completely 
so that the investor would come from the EC which would operate the new plants. 
Furthermore, they would have more responsibility for the actual work, visiting it 
frequently: ‘not this absurd separation there is today between the intellectual who 
puts it together in an air-conditioned office* far removed from the natural problems 
which arise with a project in the countryside, for example.119 New investments 
should not take more than one year to complete. That meant ensuring continuity in 
the work occurring when, for example, a technician changed the specifications. He 
also highlighted the problem of technicians who change their minds during the 
investment process, leading to the need to change plans and projections.120 The 
investors’ task included training personnel to operate new equipment. The 
administrator of the production unit under development had to provide a weekly 
report on every aspect of the project’s progress.121
Guevara battled through the major obstacles -  the lack of financial resources, the 
lack of a medium or long term vision for production plans and the lack of an 
investment culture among those responsible for managing production -  to ensure that
116 Memoria 1964, MININD, 31.
117 Memoria 1964, MININD, 32-40.
118 Guevara, Bimestrales, 5 December 5 1964, 547-8. This is detailed in chapter 9.
119 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1964, 550.
120 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1964, 550 & 556.
121 Manual, seccidn 5, asunto 11, pagina 1.
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an investment apparatus was built into the work of MININD. Investment was the key 
to expansion. The challenge, however, was to create mechanisms to foster an 
investment culture which did not rely on material incentives and other capitalist 
levers.
QUALITY
‘One o f the first steps taken by Che was to contact the best known Cuban 
publicists and designers and ask for their collaboration in organising the 
marketing of the socialist industry in the 1960s. The difference is that the 
. new department set up in the ministry for these ends adopted the name 
Study o f Products. ’122
This Department for Norms, Metrology and Quality Control was to respond to the 
public demand for quality. Given the absence of market forces, controlling quality 
was an extremely important element of the apparatus of administrative control in the 
BFS. MININD adopted the slogan: ‘quality is respect for the people.’123 This was an 
integral part of Guevara’s conception of work as a social duty.
In the first bimonthly meeting, Juan Valdes Gravalosa reported that the quality of 
production in the industries operated by MININD had declined. This had political 
implications, he said, as the population was dissatisfied.124 In September 1962 
Guevara told MININD directors that:
‘Increasing production for the sake of it and throwing quality out the 
window is absurd. If we make two million pairs of shoes and we sell 
them at the same price and in four days the shoes are useless, we have 
gained nothing, because the shoe has to complete a social function and
122 Borrego, Camino, 104. Author’s emphasis.
123 Guevara, Bimestrales, 9 May 1964,470. The slogan was thought up by Castillo, a publicist before 
1958 who worked in quality control in MININD.
124 Vald6s Gravalosa, Bimestrales, January 1962, 161.
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that is our main duty, to produce so that people can dress, they can eat, 
they can live in society.’
Guevara met with the workers from the Office of Measurements and Quality Control 
to discuss production controls and new products being developed. Borrego recalled 
one occasion when the director of the EC of Textiles asked Guevara’s opinion of a 
new print design for women’s clothes. He replied:
‘Do you believe that I should be in charge of deciding how the women of 
this country should dress? I refuse to give my opinion about this design.
It is up to the specialists and designers to decide this issue. The worst 
thing that could happen to the women in Cuba is that a minister decides 
what clothes they should wear. If I say that I like the colour red, does that
10Amean that all the women should go around dressed in red?’
By May 1964, MININD had made substantial progress with basic production. 
Guevara said that directors must focus on quality. On a recent trip to Czechoslovakia, 
he said, he had passed through Switzerland and France:
‘One of the things that most impressed me is the profound revolution in 
the production system, in the concepts of production, and in the 
enormous respect there is for quality in the capitalist countries, which is 
reflected in the market. Czechoslovakia is perhaps one of the countries 
which has the highest quality within the socialist system. Now, the 
difference with Switzerland, for example, is extraordinarily marked. 
Naturally, in Switzerland you immediately see all the blights of 
capitalism, but I am not interested right now in referring to the blights of 
capitalism which we all know; the important thing is the issue of 
quality.’127
125 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1962, 308-9.
126 Borrego, Camino, 311.
127 Guevara, Bimestrales, May 1964,470.
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Guevara said that there were two obstacles to attaining quality in production in Cuba: 
firstly, problems obtaining materials, because of the blockade and other objective 
conditions; and secondly, a lack of discipline, with too much focus on quantity at the 
expense of quality. He reeled off examples of faulty goods: a trouser zipper that does 
not close; a child’s ugly doll; shoes held together with just two nails; bad quality 
shampoo, hair lotion, blusher, sold at a profit. He indicated that a representative from 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade was present, as this was a problem for that institution 
too. Quality norms were being implemented in pilot factories, he said, and warned 
that blaming the low quality of raw materials was not an excuse not to prioritise 
quality control.128
Capitalist competition, stated the Manual, generated the need for constant quality 
control. In Cuba, planning had replaced competition and consumer choice was no 
longer a controlling mechanism. The apparatus of quality control was therefore vital: 
‘Buyers acquire what is sold because they have money and they do not find anything 
better; or worse, they acquire an item which is regular or bad, but for the price of one 
that is good, obliged by the circumstances. This is immoral and cannot be permitted 
in a socialist country.’129 Each production unit had a worker responsible for quality 
control and the Manual instructed administrators to support that work, noting that the 
existing quality control was terrible and had caused economic losses for the nation.130 
Quality standards were part of the economic-technical plan and could not be changed 
by administrators.131
Guevara’s emphasis on quality control was linked to other concepts in BFS: the 
aspiration to use the most advanced technology, the conviction that socialism should 
be a superior mode of production to capitalism, more efficient and productive and 
that man must be at the centre of the socialist system, the purpose of production 
being his spiritual and material satisfaction.
128 Guevara, Bimestrales, May 1964,470-5
129 Manual, secci6n 9, asunto 2, pagina 1.
130 Manual, secci6n 9, asunto 2, pagina 2.
131 Manual, secci6n 4, asunto 7, pagina 3.
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MODEL ENTERPRISE
In September 1964, Guevara announced that the capacity for data analysis in 
MININD had improved to the point where it could be called statistics, but not to the 
point of real economic or technological analysis. He announced projects underway to 
study and improve the MININD apparatus. To assist him he established a small 
Department of Advisors, under the leadership of Valdes Gravalosa, which would 
carry out whatever analysis or other projects were deemed necessary. This included 
weekly tasks set by the Management Council meetings, of which Valdes Gravalosa 
was secretary. The team was also set the task of studying the ‘problems of 
socialism.’132 The group of advisors consisted of Valdes Gravalosa, Alberto Mora 
Morales, Harold H Anders, Carlos Franco Canillas and Evelio Horta. As head of the 
Office of Organisation, accountant Harold Anders would also be studying the 
perfection of methodology and organisation in MININD. Meanwhile specialists in 
industrial engineering, maths, linear programming, operational calculus would help 
to give integral and concrete guidance to the ECs: ‘What’s needed is a stronger 
central apparatus that really can guide and lead the enterprises and the restructuring 
of key levels of the ministry so that internal bottlenecks in information don’t occur 
and decisions aren’t impeded because of failures in the method of 
communication. ’133
A longer term project for the Department of Advisors was to study the optimal 
conditions for an enterprise, its functions, organisation, and administrative principles. 
In April 1965, they completed a manuscript called Report on the Elements Required 
to Create a Model Industrial Enterprise and the Methods o f Work that Should be 
Applied in Distinct Areas o f Activity. Guevara sent Valdes Gravalosa with one of his 
bodyguards to have eight copies printed. The prologue to the book stated:
‘The present work attempts to outline the functions and methods that a
consolidated enterprise should use to reach a grade of efficiency that will
132 Valdes Gravalosa, interview.
133 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1964, 542.
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serve as a model for all. The level of efficiency attainable is, naturally, 
intimately linked to the existing organisational and economic conditions 
in the country.’134
The manuscript divided the work of the EC into four areas: economic, technical- 
productive, administrative and those related to the director. The manuscript was 
terminated just days before Guevara left Cuba for his secret military intervention in 
the Congo. Without his instructions more copies of the book were never printed. 
Therefore it was never applied or introduced as a model. It is not clear what Guevara 
saw as its function, whether it was to serve as an equivalent to the administrators’ 
Manual for the ECs in MININD, but it contains a comparable mix of management 
theory with practical guidelines for overseeing the factories under the EC 
jurisdiction; factory visits, daily reports, coordination in planning, maintenance, 
contracts for product delivery, Arbitration, quality control, storage and inventory 
control, investment, accounts and audits, and so on.
CONCLUSION
‘ When we started the organisation o f the ministry, against all the advice 
we had, against all the guidelines from the socialist countries, we created 
two offices that the advisors contested: the management o f organisation 
and the management o f inspections. These offices were shown to have 
fundamental importance for a period.'1*5
The BFS began as an administrative measure to deal with the situation created by the 
nationalisation of industry. Centralising the funds of all production units and 
controlling them from the ministry according to political-economic objectives was 
the first step towards implementing administrative control of the industry.
134 Ministerio de Industrias, Informe Sobre los Elementos Requeridos Para Crear una Empresa 
Industrial Modeloy de los Mitodos de Trabajo que Deben Aplicarse en los Distintos Frentes de 
Actividades. La Habana, 15 April 1965, Pre&mbulo.
135 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1964,488.
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Meanwhile, Guevara studied the management and accounting operations of the 
highly productive and efficient capitalist corporations. His study of Marx, 
particularly Capital, forged his conviction that it was necessary to undermine the 
operation of the law of value and replace capitalist mechanisms with purely 
administrative ones. Throughout his leadership of MININD, Guevara constantly 
searched for the appropriate levers to implement administrative compulsion. The first 
obstacle, however, was the absence of an economic culture, elementary statistical 
knowledge or even recognition of the importance of data collection at the base level 
of the production units. However, even while Guevara battled for basic numerical 
literacy he was already introducing computer-based input-output matrices and 
experimenting with the possibilities for introducing the automation of national 
income accounting. He imposed this vision on his colleagues, underlining the 
importance for production of economic analysis in real time. Production problems 
must be detected immediately and measures taken to overcome them. For this dual 
agenda, Guevara surrounded himself with experts, determined to harness their 
knowledge regardless of their ideological position. Administrative control ensured 
the primacy of planning, undermining the law of value in the transition to socialism; 
supervision was a tool to monitor and enforce this; investment was a necessary 
precondition to expand production, improve productivity and efficiency. Without this 
apparatus, the BFS would have no meaning.
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CHAPTER 8
Collectivising production and 
workers’ participation
i ...the workers will participate in the management o f the factory through 
trade union action, discussion of the Technical-Economic Plan, 
emulation, the innovators ’ movement, Production Assemblies and in the 
councils established for these ends... The factory belongs to the people, 
the State, that is to say, to the workers; the administrator is nothing more 
than the agent of the State, a servant o f the people... As we approach 
communism the participation o f the workers in, the management o f  
. production will expand, the role o f the collective in finding solutions to 
the most important questions o f work in the plant or in the factory, will 
constantly increase.’1
Under socialism the law of value is to be increasingly substituted by the plan as a 
means for determining production and consumption decisions. In a country in 
transition to socialism, particularly one in conditions of underdevelopment, measures 
have to be implemented to increase productivity and efficiency. Without reliance on 
capitalist levers, particularly individual material incentives, new mechanisms must be 
found to encourage greater worker effort and create incentives to innovations and the 
rationalisation of production. The plan sets worker production ‘norms’, based on 
socially necessary labour time, but workers are urged to surpass these in order to 
increase economic efficiency. The challenge in the period of transition is to 
transform the value added to production by the worker above his own subsistence 
from surplus value into surplus product; from production for exchange, to production 
for use. The value added in production by the worker is not the product of 
exploitation, but a contribution to social production, which is distributed according to
1 Ministerio de Industrias. Manual Para Administradores de Fabricas, 10 June 1964,2nd ed. La 
Habana, 1988. Seccidn 2, asunto 10, pagina 1-3.
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criteria determined by the plan. Under capitalism, workers’ surplus value is the 
product of exploitation, because it does not belong to them. Under socialism, it is a 
contribution to social production; they work for themselves as part of a collective 
society. Workers management means workers’ ownership of the means of 
production. The masses must participate collectively in devising the plan, 
establishing the norms and in daily decisions concerning production and 
consumption. This chapter examines the mechanisms developed by Guevara within 
the Ministry of Industries (MININD) to collectivise production and workers 
participation to give socialism the democratic, participatory character necessary to 
prepare society for a transition to communism. As Guevara said: ‘the government 
and the working class cannot be separated under the dictatorship of the proletariat.’2
The Revolution had major objective conditions to overcome: conditions of 
underdevelopment and dependency, the exodus of managers and technicians who had 
run the economy and the low educational and skill level of the masses. The apparatus 
created in MININD aimed to tap into the creative energy of the working class in 
finding solutions to production problems: rationalising production, lowering costs, 
raising productivity, technological innovations, and generally developing the 
productive forces in Cuba. Obstacles to the integration of workers into management 
post-1959 included the ‘economistic’ tendencies of the organised labour movement -  
years of battling to secure crumbs from the capitalist table had resulted in a loss of 
class consciousness.3 Furthermore, the working masses were so accustomed to 
having the production process imposed upon them that is was difficult to convince 
them that they owned the means of production and could influence technological and 
managerial decisions. This manifested as inertia, a slow acceptance by workers of the 
idea that they had a stake in the progress of development. Orlando Borrego, First 
Vice Minister in MININD said that Guevara complained in Management Council 
meetings about this reticence:
2 Guevara, ‘Reuniones Bimestrales’, 14 July 1962, Ministerio de Aziicar, El Che en la Revolucion 
. Cubana: Ministerio de lndustrias, Tomo VI. La Habana, 1966, 267.
3 See chapter 6.
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‘Che questioned why important tasks that were the direct responsibility 
of the working class always emerged as “bureaucratic” initiatives. He 
pointed to the examples of the technical minimum and worker 
improvement [courses] that were bom as initiatives of the Ministry of 
Industries and not from the workers organisations. Why were the 
initiatives born above taken to the roots where they should have been 
born to be taken to the entire working class?4
Inertia was also the result of hierarchical notions. Workers on the ‘shop floor’ did not 
identify with the need to resolve management problems. Guevara told MININD 
directors that they must constantly approach the masses to discuss and argue 
fraternally with them in order to create a new spirit and understanding:
‘...that the duty of leaders does not exclude the duty of coordinated and 
harmonic work, the working class has to be preparing itself to take up 
management work in the shortest time possible and the more that we can 
decentralise and create work habits independent of any material 
incentive, and independent of any administrative pressure, the quicker we 
will advance.’5
Such patterns of behaviour, nurtured under capitalism, were difficult to break, 
particularly as Guevara argued strongly that new social relations and new ideas could 
not be imposed, but must be encouraged and fostered organically. He said:
‘...you cannot change how people think by decree. People have to 
change their way of thinking by their own conviction and the best way to 
change their way of thinking is to demonstrate the capacity for sacrifice 
of the true revolutionaries, the capacity to help a companero, the capacity 
to do concrete things through the collective and by the individual, that 
shows that members of a revolutionary organisation have not acquired
4 Borrego Diaz, Orlando. El Camino del Fuego. La Habana: Imagen Contempor&nea, 2001,226. 
Emphasis in original. Borrego’s italics.
5 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 62, 306.
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any type of extra rights, what they have acquired are duties that they have 
to complete.’6
Guevara was not insinuating that none of the MININD personnel were working class, 
but rather that the mass of workers were not integrating themselves enough into the 
management apparatus and therefore the process of development was not being 
directed by the working masses. This was in the first years of the formulation of the 
Budgetary Finance System (BFS). As this problem was identified, apparatus to 
promote the collectivisation of production and workers’ participation was integrated 
into the BFS, which viewed all production units in Cuba as part of one big factory. 
The state was owner of the factory, that is, of all the means of production in Cuba, 
and the working masses were responsible for the management of that factory. 
Guevara said:
‘The economy as a whole is considered to be one big enterprise and we 
attempt to establish collaboration between all participants as members of 
a big factory, instead of being wolves among ourselves within the 
construction of socialism.’7
Eight months after MININD was established in February 1961, Guevara gave a 
decisive speech to MININD workers on the issue. Borrego recalled: ‘the Minister 
submitted himself to such extensive self-criticism that we were all surprised.’8 
Guevara began by explaining that he had been assigned the job of Minister because 
of his revolutionary track record. The problem was that he had transferred concepts 
applied to the guerrilla campaign to the ministry: treating people as soldiers, 
commanding strict discipline and a lack of discussion. He had realised this mistake 
when witnessing Fidel Castro’s capacity to establish direct contact with people, to 
discuss with everyone. He admitted: ‘I do not know a single cabaret, nor a cinema, 
nor a beach... practically never have I been in a family house in Havana, I do not
6 Guevara, ‘Charla a los trabajadores del Ministerio de Industrias’, 6 October 1961, in Ernesto Che 
Guevara: Escritos y  Discursos, tomo 5. La Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 1977, 298-9.
7 Guevara, Bimestrales, 21 December 1963,413.
8 Borrego, Camino, 175.
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know how the Cuban people live, only in statistics, numbers or summaries...’ He 
assured the workers that measures would be taken to make MININD more humane, 
‘so that they feel part of a great collective effort that the nation must make and so we 
can be as integrated as possible in making this effort, every one with their own varied 
way of thinking, and with their own varied convictions, but trying to incorporate 
them into work that is alive...’9 The policies cited below, some of them formulated 
before that speech, were measures taken to initiate that dynamic process of 
integration. The apparatus examined was in addition to trade union and other 
organisations of the masses and the peoples’ militias, operational in every MININD 
entity throughout the country, which also served to forge a collective responsibility 
guarding production against sabotage and terrorism. Additionally, two of the most 
important projects for collectivising production and workers’ participation, voluntary 
labour and socialist emulation, are not included in this chapter.10
BIMONTHLY MEETINGS
The first bimonthly meeting took place in January 1962, attended by the 
Management Council and all directors in the central apparatus: directors of the 
Consolidated Enterprises (ECs), their heads of production and economic heads, 
directors from the ministry’s provincial delegations, directors from the science and 
technology research institutes, advisors, and other invited guests: approximately 400 
people. These meetings were a vital tool for ensuring ideological and structural 
cohesion. Each meeting had set themes, which the directors themselves could 
propose. They gave directors the opportunity to raise their own queries, ideas or 
complaints. It is clear from the meeting transcripts that they used this opportunity.
9 Guevara Charla, 293-4.
10 See chapter 10.
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PUBLICATIONS
MININD had three publications; Nuestra Industria [1961], Nuestra Industria 
Tecnologia [1962] and Nuestra Industria Economica [1963]. Juan Valdes Gravalosa, 
was editor of Nuestra Industria and it was his idea to produce the journal in A5 size, 
similar to the US magazine Readers’ Digest. Valdes Gravalosa sent the first draft to 
Guevara to look over before publication. He said: ‘The only time that Guevara’s 
complained about the journal was when his photo appeared in one issue four times. I 
never put in a photo of him again!’11 Produced by a team of seven, 35,000 copies of 
the journal were printed monthly by MININD’s EC of Graphic Arts and with paper 
made from Cuban sugar cane bagazo, and it was sent to every MININD production 
unit in the country.
Examining just one issue of Nuestra Industria from January 1963 demonstrates how 
the magazine was designed to create a sense of the collective among the huge and 
diverse production units in MININD and forge ideological and’structure coherence. 
The following headings serve as examples of the content and tone of the publication: 
‘An award you would not change for anything in the world’ -  for a worker of 20 
years industrial service, nominated by his colleagues, who built a machine to 
manufacture staples en masse; ‘List of the factories that are behind’ -  examples and 
descriptions of the problems and administrative failures discovered; citation from 
Lenin: ‘How to organise emulation’; ‘Combatants of production’ -  six workers 
commended with comments like ‘watching out for the security of his industry’ and 
‘designed an apparatus to be adapted to the landings’; ‘The most outstanding 
workers’ -  82 workers who contributed to an increase in production; ‘Most 
outstanding technicians’ -  two named with photos. On the back page was a diagram 
with arrows running between minister, first vice-minister, vice-minister of 
production, director of the branch, director of the EC, to the factory, and a finally a 
man in dungarees, with the words: ‘Your work centre is a solid link in the great chain 
of production of the Ministry of Industries.’12
11 Juan Valdes Gravalosa, interview, 22 February 2006.
12 Nuestra Industria, Revista de Ministerio de Industrias, Aflo 3: No 1 (Enero 1963).
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Vice Minister of Technical Development, Tirso Saenz, was responsible for 
publishing Nuestra Industria Tecnologia, but it was edited by Maria Teresa Sanchez, 
head of the Deparment of Scientific-Technical Information.13 Produced for MININD 
technicians, it was very specialised. For example, the August 1963 edition contains 
an article by a Hungarian engineer Pal Mihalyfi, on the analysis of production, 
including graphs and complex econometric equations. Other articles concern: sugar 
crystallisation; chromatographic analysis of colorants for synthetic fibres; 
‘derivatography’, a modem Hungarian method of thermo analysis; installations of 
capacitators in electric circuits; the increase of production with open-heat furnace by 
means of enrichment of the flame with oxygen, an article translated from the 
magazine Iron and Steel Engineer,; an article about documentation and searching for 
information by Sanchez, and over 20 pages with tables of technical norms.14 Clearly 
this was for a more limited audience than the first ministry magazine. It reflects the 
rising technological level within the ministry, the presence and collaboration of 
technicians from the socialist bloc and the effort to keep abreast of developments in 
the capitalist countries. Guevara was the editor of Nuestra Industria Economica and 
Miguel Figueras, director of the Perspective Plan in MININD, sub-editor. This was 
the vehicle for the theoretical articles which constituted part of the Great Debate.15
The MININD publications served several vital functions: linking education to 
production; forging a collective concern to national production - Cuba as one big 
factory; disseminating information about technological innovations; as a vehicle to 
ensure the ideological and structural cohesion of the BFS throughout the production 
units; and as a means for Guevara to communicate his ideas about socialist transition 
and generally raise the political understanding of workers at all levels. These 
objectives were also encapsulated in the Manual Para Administradores de Fabricas 
(Manual for Factory Administrators) discussed below.
13 MarlaTeresa S&nchez, interview, 8 March 2006.
14 Nuestra Industria Tecnologia, Ministerio de Industrias, Afio 2: No 8 (Agosto 1963). Mihalyfi 
devised a system for organising production to increase productivity by rational utilisation of the 
working day. Plan Mihalyfi was applied in the metallurgy branch and the heavy mechanics branch.
15 Miguel Figueras Alejandro, interview, 27 January 2006. See chapter 5 for citations from articles 
written as part of the Great Debate.
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Manual for Factory Administrators
Published in June 1964, the Manual collated Ministry directives in a manuscript 
which combines theoretical explanations of the importance of collective production 
and workers’ participation with the policy procedures applied to this end. Some 
examples follow. Section five: the technical-economic management: the 
administrator must: ‘be convinced of the incalculable source of inexhaustible ideas, 
inventiveness, practical knowledge, etc that is latent in each one of the factory 
workers and establish a more adequate and effective system to make use of these 
resources.’16 When involving workers in efforts to constantly reduce the costs of 
production: ‘success will mainly depend on the understanding and conviction of all 
the factory’s workers of the need of this attitude and the collective benefits that will 
be derived from it’.17 Section seven: organisation, effective work methods and 
administrative techniques: ‘In all the decisive sectors of production, the Soviets have 
started to work in accordance with the principle known as “CONVENTIONAL 
FORMULA OF 1 + 1”. The objective is the following: “transmit the experience you 
have gained to others immediately.’18 This knowledge sharing is directly linked to an 
increase in productivity. Section eight: training; the importance of respect and 
courtesy between the administrator and their assistant trainee, and from the assistant 
to others in the production unit and outside.19 Section ten: communication; the 
aspirations or criticisms of workers must be considered in all forms of 
communication. This fosters emulation, encourages workers to feel that they are 
participating in management, helps them to accept changes to the past system, avoids 
a lack of knowledge being an excuse for incompletion of tasks, assures uniformity in 
application and allows projections into the future.20
Immediately after the Revolution, stated the Manual, bureaucratic roles were 
designated without analysis. Old structures remained intact along with a certain 
inertia and disdain for the political changes that were a necessary prelude for
16 Manual, secci6n 5, asunto 10, pagina 1.
17 Manual, seccidn 5, asunto 10, pagina 1.
18 Manual, secci6n 7, asunto 9, pagina 1.
19 Manual, secci6n 8, asunto 2, pagina 1-2.
20 Manual, secci6n 10, asunto 1, pagina 1-3.
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transformations of the economic structure. The nationalisations of enterprises and the 
brain drain of specialists, led to a scarcity of administrative and technical personnel 
for management roles: ‘We all filled our roles as well as we could, but not without 
embarrassments and difficulties. Many mistakes were committed by the 
administration of the state apparatus, enormous errors were committed by the new 
administrators of enterprises, who had responsibilities too big in their hands.’21 
Consequently, cadre policy became synonymous with a policy toward the masses: an 
apparatus that would both connect with and educate them. The label ‘cadre’ indicated 
anyone in leadership position, whether that was in production, managerial, technical 
or political. Leadership positions entailed more responsibility and commitment, and 
therefore, greater dedication to the revolutionary project. Cadre were the political 
vanguard. The Manual reproduces Guevara’s September 1962 article Cadre: 
Backbone o f the Revolution to explain his concept:
‘We should state that a cadre is an individual who has achieved sufficient 
political development to be able to interpret the larger directives 
emanating from the central authorities, make them his own, and convey 
them as an orientation to the masses: a person who at the same time also 
perceives the signs manifested by the masses of their own desires and 
their inner-most motivations.’22
In addition, a cadre has to have discipline, practice collective and individual decision 
making and responsibility, be of proven loyalty who will face any debate and give 
his life for the Revolution, exercise creative initiative without conflicting with 
discipline. A cadre is exemplary, but encountered daily among the Cuban people: a 
creator, a leader, a technician with knowledge of Marxist theory and responsibility 
for his actions, a good political level who by reasoning dialectically can advance his 
sector of production, or develop the masses from his position of political leadership. 
Cadre must be selected from among the masses: political cadre, the foundation of 
mass organisations; military cadre, the young combatants who were tested under fire
21 Manual, secci6n 2, asunto 9, pagina 1.
22 Manual, secci6n 2, asunto 9, pagina 1.
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but need theoretical knowledge; and economic cadre, dedicated to the difficult tasks 
of planning and organising the socialist state. They know how to harness the 
knowledge of existing professionals. They should be encouraged to pursue technical 
careers, to give science the energy of ideological enthusiasm that will guarantee 
accelerated development. Cadre must have political clarity, with reasoned, not 
unthinking support for the postulates of the Revolution:
‘It requires great capacity for sacrifice and the capacity for dialectical 
analysis, which will enable them to make continuous contributions on all 
levels to the rich theory and practice of the Revolution. These 
companeros should be selected from the masses solely by application of 
the principle that the best will come to the fore and the best should be 
given the greatest opportunities for development... The cadre... is not 
simply a transmitter of slogans or demands upward or downward, but a 
creator who will aid in the development of the masses and the 
information of the leaders, serving as a point of contact between them... 
there are no better cadre than those chosen by the masses in the 
assemblies that select the exemplary workers.’23
Guevara cites the Revolution’s programmes underway to develop cadre: 
scholarships, workers study programmes, technical development courses, training 
schools, broadening general and university education access. The key institution in 
the formation of cadre, he said, was the Union of Young Communists. The United 
Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS, from 1965 the Cuban Communist Party) 
would start as a small party with enormous influence over the worker, but would 
grow with the advance of socialist consciousness.24 Borrego said the aspiration was 
to change the numerical relationship between the mass and the vanguard so that as 
more individuals reached adequate political and technical levels, the nucleus would 
grow until it incorporated the masses.25 In March 1962 Guevara told MININD 
directors that:
23 Manual, secci6n 2, asunto 9, pagina 2-3.
24 Manual, secci6n 2, asunto 9, paginas 1-3.
25 Borrego, Camino, 182.
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‘The Revolution has to be made at a furious rhythm, those who tire have 
the right to be tired, but they do not have the right to be in the vanguard. 
Therefore we need to go to the factories, we need to converse with 
everyone, investigate the problems there are, promote free, open 
discussions, without any form of coercion.. ,’26
To facilitate this free and open discussion in MININD it was necessary for managers 
and administrators to be in contact with the workers at the site of production. 
Guevara argued that this was essential in order to avoid bureaucracy and to improve 
their knowledge of the functioning and problems in the productive units.
FACTORY VISITS
EC Directors in MININD were expected to visit the enterprises under their 
jurisdiction fortnightly. This involved meeting with the administrator, heads of 
production and economic heads and the representatives of the mass organisations: the 
party, UJC, trade unions, and any other groups in those entities, and talking to 
workers and technicians in the production process, discussing problems and 
initiatives, checking inventories and storage and employee facilities. Vice Ministers 
were also obliged to visit production units fortnightly. Angel Arcos Bergnes said that 
as MININD grew Guevara complained that this task was not being carried out. He 
warned that this would lead to a separation of the management and from the 
grassroots. A Commission was formed to produce a guide for factory visits.27 Under 
the new regulations any member of MININD’s Management Council not carrying 
out fortnightly visits would have three days salary docked with the threat of 
substitution.28 They had to produce a detailed report following each visit which 
included concrete recommendations for improvements. Juan Valdes Gravalosa, 
secretary of the Council was responsible for programming the visits and ensuring the
26 Guevara, Bimestrales, 10 March 1962, 176.
27 Angel Arcos Bergnes, 40 Aniversario Ministerio de Industrias. La Habana: Editora Polftica. 2001, 
30.
28 This never happened because visits were completed.
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vice ministers did not visit the same place twice and that they rotated on visits to the 
provinces. He said: ‘Che read the reports from the factory visits. They had an index, 
a check list. For example, you arrive at the warehouse; you have to check the 
inventory cards.’29 Arcos pointed out that Guevara was exemplary in fulfilling this 
obligation. He recalled: ‘Once during the missile crisis of October 1962, Che had 
been all weekend in Pinar del Rio (western Cuba, where he was Rebel Army 
commander responsible for organising defence of the island), he arrived late to the 
Management Council on Monday morning. It had been said that he would not have 
been able to complete the report from a factory visit, but Che pulled out a report, 
apologising that it was not typed up because the pressure of the situation meant that 
he had no secretary in Pinar del Rio. He had visited the pencil factory at Batabano.’30
The Manual instructed administrators to visit the workshops in their factories or 
production units:
‘If we visit the workshops in a pressured way we will never derive 
benefits from these visits, they should not be done because of the simple 
fact of completing a directive, but with the ends of obtaining from the 
visits new ideas to improve the activities and to listen calmly and with 
interest to the suggestions and criticisms of the workers.’31
The factory visits provided an opportunity for thousands of workers to meet and 
discuss with the administrative and management personnel of MININD, including 
with the Minister. Harry Villegas, Guevara’s military escort, said factory visits and 
conversations with the workers: ‘was a link with the masses which gave him an 
exhaustive command over the reality of the activity in the sphere which he led.’32 
Guevara’s talks in the bimonthly meetings are peppered with references to his 
experiences and encounters during these factory visits.
29 Valdes, interview.
30 Arcos, interview, 8 December 2004. Other Management Council members related this story.
31 Manual, seccidn 7, asunto 2, pagina 10.
32 Harry Villegas Tamayo, interview, 22 March 2006.
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1960 COMMITTEES FOR SPARE PARTS
‘Among Che’s most acknowledged achievements were results in the 
production o f spare parts, an objective which was possible thanks to the 
creation o f the Committees for Spare Parts, which, organised from the 
base up to the ministry and by means o f an enthusiastic emulation, 
resolved the most serious problems that arose, avoiding the paralysis of  
industry. m
As stated in chapter 7, before the Revolution, 95% of capital goods in Cuba came 
from the US and 100% of spare parts.34 In the context of the US blockade and the 
shift of 80% of Cuba’s trade from the US to the Soviet Bloc, the problem of spare 
parts was acute. The island struggled to replace machinery parts worn out in 
production. Before the Revolution, Cuban or foreign managers in Cuba could 
telephone orders to the US for replacement parts or technical assistance which would 
arrive in Havana on a shuttle boat within two days. There was no culture of 
stockpiling for future security, so even before its imposition when the blockade was 
anticipated, managers did not stock up on spare parts. The fact that the Committees 
for Spare Parts were the first workers’ committees established testifies to how 
rapidly spare parts became a central issue for production in Cuba.
The Committees were set up in 1960, however, over the following years Guevara 
continued to complain about problems related to spare parts: factory administrators 
waited until machinery parts were totally worn out before ordering mechanics to 
make them. Production was paralysed during the wait for delivery. Parts were 
ordered separately instead of in bulk which would be cheaper and build reserves.
By August 1961 Guevara said the Committees had given marvellous results, not just
33 Borrego, Camino, 164.
34 Arturo Guzmdn Pascual, ‘La Acci6n del Comandante Ernesto Guevara en la Campo Industrial’ 
Revista Bimestre Cubana, No 8 (1998), 29.
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in solving production problems, but also in constituting the first campaign of 
emulation in production, achieving effective contact with the mass of workers:
‘...with the emulation of everyone and with the effort of all the workers 
in all the factories of the country, they have resolved innumerable 
problems. To such an extent that the Higher Committee of Spare Parts, at 
the ministerial level, has only addressed the problems that could not be 
resolved at various levels... The work is still not organised but it is 
improving all the time, as are our aspirations and it is one of the 
achievements that the Ministry can show with pride, and naturally, it is 
not an achievement of the Ministry, rather it is the achievement of the 
communication with the mass of workers, so that the participation of the 
mass of workers is fundamental for the management of the country.’35
Guevara lamented that the first Cuban trade mission to the Soviet bloc, which he led, 
had not had the foresight to purchase a factory of spare parts.36 Clearly, the 
Committees were vital in bridging that gap to keep production going.
By late 1962 the First National Exhibition of Spare Parts of the EC of Petroleum, 
took place in Havana. Nuestra Industria reported that: ‘The exhibition shows some 
500 parts of diverse types such as: electrodes, axles for pumps, mechanical 
equipment for various uses in the petrol industry, machines...all built in the 
workshops of the refineries “Hermanos Diaz” in Santiago de Cuba and “Nico Lopez” 
in Havana and including a varied collection of components manufactured in different 
terminals of the Republic.’37 The same issue carried photos of ‘Equipment and parts 
built by the workers of the refineries J A Echeverria.’38 The quantity and diversity of 
spare parts manufactured and displayed in just this one issue of Nuestra Industria is 
evidence of the degree of success of the Committees for Spare Parts.
35 Guevara, ‘Discurso de la Primera Reunidn Nacional de Produccidn del MININD’ in Escritos, tomo 
5,218.
36 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1962, 289.
37 Industria, enero 1963, 55.
38 Industria, enero 1963,62-78.
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1961 MOVEMENT OF INVENTORS AND INNOVATORS
When the Department of Industrialisation was set up dozens of inventors and 
innovators arrived at the offices to demonstrate their creations. Orlando Borrego 
recalled that a new section had to be created in the department to deal with the 
quantity of products:
‘They appeared in abundance forming the most diverse range of 
specialities and levels of qualification. Among those there were technical 
engineers of middle level qualification or people of low educational 
levels but with amazing intelligence. The most ingenious ideas 
imaginable had occurred to them. Most of them appeared with prototypes 
or miniature models which awoke a curiosity in children and adults 
alike.’39
The collection served as an improvised exhibition within the department: ranging 
from aeroplanes for the Revolutionary Armed Forces; to cutters, cane retrievers and 
storage centres for the sugar cane harvest; to air-conditioning compressors; and even 
a machine to generate electricity from sea currents. The inventions and innovations 
revealed the limitless imagination of the population, but also the extent that talents 
were wasted for want of technical training. Borrego nostalgically recalled'that: ‘the 
exhibition served as an occasional nocturnal distraction for those of us that worked in 
the Department. Many nights we would meet in front of the exhibition to enjoy those 
miniature apparatus. There was no lack of those who returned to their infancy and 
played on the floor with the small automobiles or the miniature locomotives...’40 
When MININD was set up in February 1961, the Department of Inventions and 
Innovations was part of the Office of Norms and Metrology, under the jurisdiction of 
the Vice Minister for Technical Development.
39 Borrego, Camino, 12.
40 Borrego, Camino, 12.
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The Manual stated that: ‘the work of Inventions and Innovations is of vital 
importance for the technical development of factories, because it constitutes one of 
the bases which should help the Administrator to achieve an increase in the 
production and productivity of the factory.’41 It described the function of the 
Department of Inventions and Innovations as leading and coordinating the 
development of the movement of inventors and innovators and their industrial 
application in coordination with the ECs and the trade union organisations.’42 The 
Manual said these objectives would be further embedded in the production units with 
the establishment of a new policy to create teams of ‘factory cadre’, one member of 
which would be responsible for inventions and innovations: ‘registering all the 
inventions achieved by the workers, in order to revise and determine which could 
have general industrial application. Afterwards, they will systemise the inclusion of 
the corresponding inventions in the economic plans of industrial development.’43 
Inventions were to serve important industrial functions.
Guevara gave special attention to the movement of inventors and innovators, 
interviewing the designers of the most promising projects presented. Borrego said:
‘No-one could have imagined back then that as the years went by this 
movement would become an organised force that would allow us to solve 
innumerable technical problems that we faced in the country’s industry 
after nationalisation. From the evaluation of those projects, some that 
appeared to be mere dreams, would emerge very quickly great 
technological solutions for the development of agriculture and industry in 
Cuba... The movement of inventors and innovators included the whole 
country and its enduring push has lasted till today on a par with the 
growth of the development of science and technology attained in the 
years of the Revolution, representing millions saved by the most diverse 
machinery, equipment, spare parts and other products for specific sectors
41 Manual, secci6n 9, asunto 3, pagina 3.
42 Manual, secci6n 9, asunto 3, pagina 3.
43 Manual, secci6n 9, asunto 3, pagina 3.
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of the economy, including the scientific sector and the public health 
sector of the country.’44
Guevara, however, had always been convinced that the product of workers’ 
experimentation, a reflection of their commitment to production, could be applied to 
improve production techniques. In October 1963 Guevara told MININD directors 
that: ‘technicians naturally have to work in the area of research, and from this task of 
research will arise, perhaps, new things which will have to be respected, that are 
going to totally change economic concepts.’45 The social utility of individuals’ 
inventions was significantly enhanced by the absence of market mechanisms, such as 
copyrights and intellectual property rights, which would have added to the social 
costs of such developments. Individuals were motivated by moral incentives, 
vanguard status and social applause in the realisation and application of their 
inventions and innovations.
Cubans have acquired an international reputation for their resourcefulness and their 
ability to commit human and material resources in order to find solutions to the most 
acute problems of the moment. The movement of inventors and innovators has 
evolved into the National Association of Innovations and Rationalisers today in 
Cuba. Beyond this institutional form, the daily inventions that Cubans create to 
overcome shortages and maintain old equipment have become embedded into 
national culture and generically celebrated as ‘inventos'.
1961 ADVISORY TECHNICAL COMMITTEES
‘ ...practically none o f the administrators possessed the necessary 
technical level or experience in production o f the factory they were 
leading. The [Advisory Technical] Committees were supposed to study 
solutions to the serious problems o f spare parts and propose measures in
44 Borrego, Camino, 12-13.
45 Guevara, Bimestrales, 22 February 1964,402.
243
Chapter 8: Collectivising production and workers 'participation
relation to the rationalisation o f the production process and the increase 
in work productivity \ 46
Chapter 4 of this thesis illustrated how, with the nationalisation of industry, Cubans 
were nominated as administrators for their loyalty to the revolutionary process, 
despite their often inadequate skills and experience in management. In this context, 
Guevara searched for institutional forms to engage the mass of workers, those with 
years of experience of the production processes, to assist the administrators in the 
task of rationalising production, reducing costs and improving technology. Advisory 
Technical Committees were set up at all management levels from the factory or 
production unit to the consolidated enterprise. The most outstanding workers were 
selected by the administrator or director to form a Committee to advise them on 
practical measures to improve production. Usually around 10% of the employees 
could be on the Committee. In larger production units they were organised into sub­
committees to focus on specific problems. Borrego explained:
‘Their principal function was to direct the discovery of productive 
reserves to accelerate production, and to advise the administrator or 
director of the enterprise in their technical functions with the same 
objective, to propose ideas in order to improve work conditions and 
safety in factories, to facilitate a closer relationship between the worker 
and the management of production and to generally help resolve the 
complicated problems that occurred as a result of the imperialist 
enclosure and the blockade imposed on the economy of the country.’47
Guevara believed that if the Committees were selected from the most dedicated and 
knowledgeable workers they would both improve the conditions and productivity of 
production process and the integration between the working class and the 
management. Borrego pointed out that the Committees demonstrate that Guevara did 
not distinguish between the technical and revolutionary tasks of the working class.
46 S&enz, Capote and Taupier, Aniversario, 79.
47 Borrego, Camino, 110-111.
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Participants in the Committees were encouraged equally to find important technical 
solutions to production problems, replacing imports and producing much needed 
spare parts, as they were to constitute a revolutionary vanguard, inspiring the mass of 
workers with their engagement in production.48 Guevara himself said: ‘The Advisory 
Technical Committee is, then, a laboratory experiment where the working class 
prepares itself for the great future tasks of the integral management of the country.’49
Saenz affirmed that: ‘They were really useful tools for management’50 and compared 
Guevara’s Committees to the quality committees set in Japanese industry to study 
solutions for production problems. Guevara had visited Japan in 1959 during his 
seminal trade mission as the head of the first Cuban delegation overseas after the 
Revolution, although these Japanese committees are not mentioned in his published 
report on the visit.51 Omar Fernandez, on the other hand, claims that Guevara saw 
similar Committees functioning in Yugoslavia.52 The fact is that new administrators 
had often relied on experienced workers to maintain and improve production from 
the tumultuous days of the nationalisations.53 Guevara’s efforts to exploit the 
knowledge of professionals and technicians, regardless of their ideological 
commitments are evident throughout his work. The Advisory Technical Committees 
engaged technicians, not just solving production problems, but also politically, in the 
conscious effort to bring productivity and efficiency to a planned economy.
48 Borrego, Camino, 213.
49 Guevara, ‘Discusion Colectiva; Decisi6n y Responsabilidad Unica’ in Guevara, Ernesto Che. Obras 
1957-1967, tomo 2, La Habana: Casa de Las Americas, 1970,127.
50 Tirso Sdenz, interview, 7 January 2005.
51 Guevara, ‘Recuperese Japdn de la Tragedia Atdmica’, Verde Olivo, 19 October 1959, from 
http://cheguevara.cubasi.cu.
52 Omar Femdndez Castifiares, interview, 2 March 2006.
53 Chapter 9 has details.
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1961-2 PRODUCTION ASSEMBLIES
‘ ...the Production Assemblies will be part o f  the life o f the factories, 
and will be an armament that the working class have in order to audit 
the work o f their administration for the discussion o f plans, for the 
control o f the plan, for the establishment o f new technical and 
organisational norms o f all types, for every kind o f  collective 
discussion o f the all the nucleus o f the factory, or all the workers o f  
the factory, or all the workers o f a department, according to the 
importance o f each unit ofproduction. ’ 54
According to Borrego, Production Assemblies were a mechanism devised by 
Guevara and the Minister of Labour (MINTRAB), Augusto Martinez Sanchez, as a 
vehicle for communication between the administration and the mass of workers.55 In 
January 1962, MINTRAB’s Resolution 105 made Assemblies compulsory in all 
nationalised or joint-owned production units in the country. However, as with many 
innovative apparatus adopted at a national level, the Assemblies had been functional 
before that in MININD. In July 1961 Guevara had described them as a vital 
expression of the aspirations and opinions of the working class: a kind of legislative 
chamber that analyses its own tasks:
‘This model will allow the exchange of many points of view, sometimes 
oppositional, that will educate the administrators in the school of critical 
analysis of their own tasks before a plenary of the mass of workers for 
the effective control of the task of administration. Criticism and self- 
criticism will be fundamental to daily work, and exemplified in the 
Production Assembly, where all the problems related to industry are
54 Guevara, cited by Borrego, Camino, 196-7.
55 Borrego, Camino, 196.
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aired, and where the work of the administrator will be subject to 
questioning and criticism by the workers that he leads.’56
Political organisations, trade unions, enterprise directors, or factory and workshop 
administrators could call a Production Assemblies at least once every three months 
and if possible once a month. Those organisations were to agree the agenda. The 
Assembly itself would choose someone from among them to chair and a secretary to 
record the acts and certify agreements and resolutions. All workers, employees, 
technicians, engineers and whoever lent services to a unit of production should 
participate in the production assembly.57
The MININD Manual described the Assembly objectives as: motivating the workers 
to participate in the management of production and to contribute to benefiting the 
collective; applying the principle of democratic centralism; facilitating the workers in 
expressing doubts, and ideas, so administrators can discuss these and proffer official 
clarifications; creating a spirit of collective interest in the development of the factory; 
inspiring interest in individual and collective emulation.58 Assemblies had to be well 
organised with advance notice given to workers outlining the agenda, comfortable 
seating and amplification prepared. The guidance went as far as suggesting that 
administrators announce the end time of the meeting, limit the speakers’ 
interventions to ensure there was time to cover the agenda, avoid digressions and 
insist on concrete treatment of the themes, not vague generalities. A minimum of 
70% of the workers must participate or Assemblies had to be cancelled. The trade 
union, party and other mass organisations should help ensure participation and 
minutes should be circulated after the Assembly to keep workers informed and 
encourage further analysis. The administrator was expected to respond to workers’ 
points: ‘and in this way to try to constantly improve any deficiencies of organisation; 
lack of interest, lack of collective participation, etc, in order to obtain the maximum 
benefit that a good assembly should and can yield.’59
56 Guevara, Discusion, 131.
57 Manual, secci6n 2, asunto 4, pagina 1-2.
58 Manual, secci6n 2, asunto 4, pagina 1.
59 Manual, secci6n 2, asunto 4, pagina 2.
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The Assemblies had to achieve a delicate balance between being authentic and gritty, 
tackling deficiencies in production or work conditions without becoming a forum 
which generated antagonism between manual and administrative workers. Guevara 
insisted that they do not become bureaucratic, he challenged MININD directors: 
‘The production assemblies have to be lively. It is your responsibility to make them 
lively.’60 However, Borrego said Guevara warned that they could not become 
agitational meetings. They had to bear in mind the national interests and not be 
distracted by ‘economistic’ demands from workers.61 By February 1964, the 
deficiencies of the early Production Assemblies had become clear. Guevara told 
directors:
‘I remember once we did an assembly of criticism and self-criticism, at 
the end of ’61, and I believe it took a year and a half to compile the 
conclusions of that assembly and they were never analysed. In reality that 
was a bureaucratic failure, fulfilled everywhere, everyone did assemblies 
of criticism and self-criticism. Also there was a lot of venting and insults, 
the result of a lack of consciousness, the product of comrades from the 
mass of workers who did not understand the fundamental problems of 
management. But within all of that there was a set of problems that were 
indicators of the malaise that existed, of the deficiencies, and none of this 
was put to use.’62
Guevara complained that a survey had shown that hardly any of the MININD 
directors analysed the results of the Production Assemblies. He tested them directly:
‘Raise your hand all the enterprise directors who do not analyse the 
opinions of the Production Assemblies in your factories! Seven, no 
more? Now, those that analyse them! There are many. Now... who has
60 Guevara, Bimestrales, 9 March 1963, 351.
61 Borrego, Camino, 187.
62 Guevara, Bimestrales, February 1964,442.
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noted the phenomenon that participation decreases? What enterprise had 
participation greater than 70% in the latest assemblies?’63
On factory visits, Guevara stated, he hears numerous criticisms, some which reveal 
the need to improve the existing apparatus. The Assemblies must be suspended until 
enough workers will attend, he said. To encourage participation, the workers must be 
informed of the results of all their proposals, at which organisational level they were 
dealt with, and which have not yet been resolved, so that ‘the workers start to feel 
they are participating in the administration’.64 Despite Guevara’s frustration with the 
deficiencies of the Assemblies to function as intended, he clearly believed that the 
institutional structure was adequate and appropriate. The deficiencies were due to 
administrators and directors failures to turn the assemblies into dynamic and 
effective forums for workers’ participation in management and production, as 
opposed to merely a talking shop. Production Assemblies remain an integral aspect 
of working life in all sectors in Cuba today.
1962 CONSTRUCT YOUR OWN MACHINE
The campaign to construct your own machine has been immortalised by the Tomas 
Gutierrez Alea’s film Death o f a Bureaucrat in which a vanguard worker who 
invented a machine to mass produce Jose Marti busts is buried with his worker’s 
card, leading to a nightmarish struggle against bureaucracy to retrieve it for his 
widow’s pension.65 Developing out of the success of the Committees for Spare Parts, 
the campaign took the technical challenge to a higher level, as Saenz said: ‘to 
contribute to breaking, with our own solutions, the imperialist blockade imposed on 
our country.’66 Borrego explained how this was organised:
63 Guevara, Bimestrales, February 1964,442-3.
64 Guevara, Bimestrales, February 1964,444,
65 Alea Gutierrez, Tomds (dir.) La Muerte de Un Burdcrata. La Habana: ICAIC, 1966.
66 S&enz, Aniversario, 78.
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‘The workers and technicians with the most revolutionary drive and 
highest qualifications created multidisciplinary groups to copy the most 
important machines in the country. Later they would try to reproduce 
them on the scale necessary and with the largest possible proportion of 
national resources in order to achieve the independence required in 
certain technologies that traditionally had been totally imported from 
capitalist countries.’67
Guevara told workers in November 1961: ‘a machine is nothing more than a unit of 
parts. We should learn to love it and learn the mechanical sense of this machine...’68 
He told MININD directors to encourage everyone to investigate a one step further, to 
foster restlessness and curiosity: ‘All the workers who make machines, all the 
workers who invent formulas, all the workers who are concerned for the 
rationalisation of work, which is even harder than finding a machine, all these people 
must be given the opportunity to be a director.’69 Again, this demonstrates that 
Guevara did not distinguish between technical and political tasks.
By March 1962 Guevara had already complained that the campaign was ‘another 
demonstration of how things have already taken a bureaucratic form.’70 However, it 
appears that the campaign was revitalised. In 1963 almost every issue of Nuestra 
Industria featured workers with their inventions in a section on the campaign to 
construct your own machine. In a television appearance in February 1964 Guevara 
declared that: ‘The future of industry, and the future of humanity, is not with the 
people who fill in papers, it is with the people that construct machines... It is with the 
people who study the great technological problems, resolve them... discover new 
things and learn to take out new things from nature.’71 It is clear that a significant 
quantity of machines were built and applied in industrial production.72
67 Borrego, El Camino, 164.
68 Guevara, ‘Discurso en el XI Congreso Nacional Obrero’, 20 November 1961 in Ciencia, 212.
69 Guevara, Bimestrales, 20 January 1962, 152.
70 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1962,250.
71 Guevara, ‘Camparecencia televisada en el programa “Informacidn Publica”’ 25 February 1964 in 
Ciencia, 180.
72 Details of machinery development for the sugar harvest in chapter 9.
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1962/3 COMMITTEES FOR LOCAL INDUSTRY
‘Between the socialist enterprises there can be no transfer of  
commodities because there is no change in property: so the use o f those 
utensils or means o f production in other more rational ways by another 
enterprise, without a real transfer o f property, o f legal contract, the 
goods simply go from one place to another... That could be desk, 
machines, a vehicle that is not being used, that everyone is reluctant to 
hand over... we get together, discuss and resolve this. ' 73
The Committees for Local Industry (CILO) were created to forge the unity of 
production and management at the micro level which the BFS institutionalised on a 
national level. Previous chapters have detailed the centralisation of funds and their 
allocation according to political priorities under the BFS and Guevara’s criticisms of 
commodity exchange between enterprises under the Auto-Financing System (AFS). 
The CILOs should be understood as an extension of those ideas.
The CILOs were first operational in 1962. Administrators from each entity within a 
local area would meet fortnightly to discuss their situation in terms of resources, to 
see whether any of them had materials which could be lent to those in need. The 
function of the CILOs expanded to include education and training for administrators. 
Organised at a local level as part of early ministry efforts to decentralise, there were 
some problems, such as CILO policies which clashed with ministry directives.74 In 
July 1962 Guevara said:
‘...the CILOs have an enormous importance as a means for 
decentralising and they are not being understood properly. The CILO is 
an idea for preparing the conditions for...the construction of socialism, 
and from socialism to communism....self-management is a measure to 
prepare the conditions for raising the consciousness, to create the base of
73 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1962, 301.
74 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1962,251.
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communism: work as a social necessity; not work as an obligation, as a 
. precondition for eating... The CILO should be resolving the local 
problems’.75
Guevara emphasised the importance of promoting this level of cooperation. He 
complained that when the administrator of a petrol unit gave two surplus desks to 
another administrator from the shoe enterprise who was writing on his knees, he was 
told off by his own EC for not seeking prior permission. He revealed that some sugar 
mill administrators had not been attending CILOs, but the Ministry’s Provincial 
Delegations should oblige them to attend. He concluded: ‘What is fundamental? That 
the CILO condenses the opinion of every body and that it is understood that it is 
another apparatus at the base of the Ministry.’76
To overcome some of these failures the CILOs management was centralised in 1963. 
However, to avoid the bureaucracy which plagued other initiatives, Guevara 
nominated a single individual responsible for CILOs at the ministry level. That was 
Eugenio Busott, Director of General Services in MININD. Each area covering 15 to 
20 MININD factories was organised with a CILO which met fortnightly. Havana 
alone had 20 CILOs. Each CILO selected a president from among them to represent 
it on the Board of Local Coordination, Execution and Inspection (JUCEI-local) -  a 
nationwide apparatus responsible for rubbish collection and other services. This 
responsibility was rotated to give all the administrators the experience. CILOs 
meetings should not take place where the head of the CILO worked, but in different 
locations so they would become familiar with other work centres. The CILOs 
reported on their meetings and agreements made. They received ministry instructions 
via the Provincial Delegates, except the CILOs in Havana that were directly 
subordinate to Borrego as First Vice Minister. The agreements reached in the CILOs 
could not contradict the directives received from the MININD ECs. The 
administrators’ participation in the CILOs was obligatory as was their fulfilment 
of agreements reached by the CILOs. Busott travelled around visiting CILOs
75 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1962, 300.
76 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1962, 303.
252
Chapter 8: Collectivising production and workers' participation
throughout the country. He recalled the types of obstacles faced:
‘There was an old bakery where the oven was insulated with special 
brick, refractory brick. The oven collapsed and they needed a special 
mason because of the oven’s shape. Nearby was a sugar mill with a 
mason, but the administrator there didn’t want to cooperate. He thought 
he was too powerful to be part of the CILO. Che told him “Ok, from 
tomorrow the workers at the sugar mill will not receive bread from the 
bakery”, to demonstrate how every one was linked. That convinced the 
sugar mill administrator not to think he was self-sufficient... Most 
important about the CILOS was the sense of belonging, that each unit 
was part of that big Cuban factory.’77
Arcos was head of the light mechanics branch. He explained the CILOS potential to 
resolve concrete problems: ‘I had a factory that wasn’t working through lack of 
electricity. There were five electricians who were being paid without working. In 
front there was a hairdresser which five broken hair dryers. The solution was 
obvious, but in this case if didn’t work because the hair dressers belonged to the 
Ministry of Internal Trade. But that is how Che wanted it to work.’78 Arcos explained 
that the goods exchanged between entities did not take the form of a gift. They 
handed over official papers and accounting and inventory adjustments had to be 
made.
In 1964 CILOs’ aims and functions were outlined in the Manual which stated that: 
‘the growing complexity of industrial development, such as the need to use our 
resources more rationally, makes necessary the coordination among territorial bases 
of the industries administered by the Ministry of Industries.’79 The CILOs’ functions 
are: to serve as a vehicle for the mutual lending of technical and material assistance 
between the industries in the same locality or region; to coordinate the activities of 
its participants; to facilitate the exchange of experiences; to coordinate industrial
77 Eugenio Busott, interview, 9 December 2004.
78 Arcos, interview, 30th March 2006.
79 Manual, seccibn 16, asunto 1, pagina 1.
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plans with local interests and through JUCEI local, to suggest new local 
investments.80 CILOs also discussed new laws, directives and norms emerging 
nationally and from MININD.81 Their functions expanded to organise training for 
administrators. In August 1963 Guevara cited that 986 administrators had taken a 
course with CILOs.82 In September 1964 Guevara reaffirmed: ‘The CILOs have been 
an attempt, successful enough we believe, to create the consciousness of one 
factory.’83 Borrego pointed out that:
‘Che ideas about industrial cooperation did not come from intuition; they 
were the result of his studies of the experiences of other countries, 
including capitalist countries such as Japan which had demonstrated the 
utility of intensive cooperation. If such cooperation was effective in the 
functioning of capitalist interests, it would prove much more necessary 
and important to develop this experience in socialist conditions where 
social interests prevailed over any private or enterprise interests.’84
This supports Guevara’s claim that the existence of monopoly capitalism in Cuba 
created conditions more conducive to the transition to socialism, than those 
prevailing in 1920s Soviet Union, out of which the AFS, had emerged. Arcos even 
claims that the CILOs held the genesis of the system of People’s Power institution in 
Cuba today.85
80 Manual, secci6n 16, asunto 1, pagina 1.
81 Arcos, Aniversario, 25.
82 Guevara, Bimestrales, 10 August 1963, 362. See chapter 6.
83 Guevara, Bimestrales, 12 September 1964, 514-5.
84 Borrego, Camino, 287.
85 Arcos, interview, 2004.
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1964 PLAN OF INTEGRATION
‘ For a long time we have proposed the necessity o f  a real integration 
• between productive and intellectual work, something that has been 
realised through voluntary labour o f a productive character, that now 
has been presented in a plan at the national level ’ 86
The Special Plan of Integration was presented to MININD directors in September 
1964 as a set of ideas to deal with weaknesses in the political work of the ministry: 
the tendency to bureaucracy, and the separation between manual and administrative 
work that, Guevara said, were problems that had appeared to be endemic in existing 
socialism. It was a measure: ‘to renovate the attitude of functionaries in the face of 
their work.’87 An outline of the proposals was distributed to directors who were given 
15 days to comment and make amendments. Even the title, Guevara said, could be 
changed. Some measures were voluntary, others obligatory. This was to be piloted 
from 1 November 1964 and applied throughout MININD from 1 January 1965.
The Plan of Demotion was the principal and obligatory measure whereby directors 
had to spend one month a year working in a position that was at least one level, and 
preferably two, subordinate to their own. The plan applied to the minister (Guevara), 
six vice ministers (first vice-minister, basic industry, light industry, economy, 
industrial construction and technical development), 90 branch, office, and institution 
directors. In exceptional cases it could also include administrators or technicians in 
large factories. Within a one month period not more than 25% of a given hierarchy 
could be demoted so, for example, only one vice minister could be demoted at any 
given moment.88 Their own work would be covered by a colleague, while they 
worked alongside their subordinate, creating a system of work substitutes which 
remains in Cuba today.
86 Plan of Integration; read by Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1964, 514.
87 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1964, 514.
88 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1964, 515.
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Other measures of the Plan of Integration were the establishment of specialist work 
brigades formed from outstanding workers to assist throughout the ministry. Arcos 
explained: ‘This plan also included a plan of mutual assistance between offices of 
enterprises or between administrators of factories, a plan of specialised work 
brigades, and a plan of brigades for work methods.’89 This was a case of horizontal 
integration; managers from stronger ECs be that of the director, heads of production 
or economics heads would assist weaker ECs, and administrators would do likewise.
Announcing the formation of the specialist work brigades Guevara said they would 
be organised around eight fundamental tasks of MININD, with workers outstanding 
in these areas. He gave the examples of work security, organisation of transport, 
mechanisation of accounting, and so on. These brigades would be auxiliary for 
ministry personnel of the same specialisation.90 The specialist brigades were to be set 
up by the ECs themselves, which would start by listing a speciality in which they are 
strongest and organise groups around this. The brigades would operate in the 
enterprises weak in that area for a specified period, consolidating their work. 
Workers should be considered for the brigades if they have easily fulfilled the goals 
in their own employment, but participation was voluntary. A special salary system 
would be established, which would be transferred with them as they travelled 
through the provinces visiting MININD entities and teaching others their methods. 
Technical teams for maintenance or electrical engineering were also planned.91 As an 
example, Guevara said the EC of Soaps and Perfumes, directed by Miguel 
Dominguez, would organise a specialist brigade to assist other enterprises with their 
inventories. The aspiration was for specialists in many fields, he said, who would 
give guidance to the weakest enterprises.92 The fact that such specialist brigades were 
being proposed testifies to the success in raising skills levels of MININD workers as 
part of a national educational drive five years after the massive deskilling of the 
Cuban labour force resulting from the exodus of managers and technicians. Guevara 
emphasised the cooperative spirit of these exchanges:
89 Arcos, Aniversario, 28.
90 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1964, 515-6.
91 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1964, 516-8.
92 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1964, 535 & 542. See chapter 7.
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‘The comrades who carry out any of these advisory tasks should not 
present any reports, this is to ensure and conserve the spirit of 
affectionate and disinterested help between people, so that weaknesses 
are analysed only with the objective of improving them and not to serve 
as an antecedent for taking future action, except if they have detected 
. abnormalities that constitute crimes against the Revolution or against the 
State. That is to say that there is no kind of “squealing” lets say, so that 
straight away the weak people are going to think of the companeros as 
hungry lions. It is better if this task is carried out as a completely extra- 
ministerial form of assistance for the purpose of information, except, 
naturally, if there are serious things detected of a non-administrative 
nature.’93
Another voluntary measure of the Plan of Integration was the promotion of managers 
carrying out voluntary labour in factories during vacations. Guevara explained the 
motive: ‘it is essential that directors, administrators and other leaders participate 
directly in manual tasks. However, this will be voluntary and separate from the 
earlier point about obligatory demotion.’94 Juan Borroto, Director of Supervision 
recalled that after spending one week on his honeymoon, he went to work in a glass 
factory for three weeks. ‘I worked on a line where the bottles come out. If you don’t 
catch the bottles they fall on the floor and break. When you leave the factory you 
continue the same movements as in the factory!’95 This was an important lesson for 
Borroto about factory work, which stayed with him for life.
Guevara revealed that not everyone agreed with the Plan, including members of 
government, at which level it had not been approved. This is evidence of the 
institutional independence of MININD, which permitted Guevara to experiment with 
the development and application of the BFS. His approach was to apply new 
measures to test their feasibility, which would give concrete results serving as an 
argument either for or against them. This was the process of learning by doing,
93 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1964, 517.
94 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1964, 515.
95 Juan Borroto, interview, 26 January 2006.
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through which many of the projects developed in MININD were consequently 
adapted in other institutions. In relation to the Plan of Integration he said:
‘To avoid scrapes and susceptibilities, it is preferable to use it, refine it, 
analyse the results and after to demonstrate it as the fruit of a complete 
experience to be considered for use, changed partially or totally, or scrap 
the system. We have a set of ideas; some expressed by comrades here, 
others used totally or partially in other socialist countries that in their 
entirety constitute new experiences in this country. We will give a period 
of 15 days for every director to analyse the scheme of guidelines and 
make the suggestions they consider necessary.’96
A commission should be established, he said, to compile the suggestions and 
opinions of the directors concerning the proposals.
When implemented the Plan of Demotion stipulated that during temporary 
occupation directors should: not search for mistakes, but learn and teach; not change 
work methods, established systems, without profound analysis and collective 
discussion in the factory; assume full responsibility for that role, without leaving 
tasks incomplete; complete all the obligations of the new role without using the 
hierarchy of their real role.97 In addition to strengthening the administrative and 
leadership work of their subordinates, Arcos pointed out that the Plan also meant that 
those demoted could observe whether it was possible to apply the regulations 
directed from superior levels: to experience the social-labour conditions of the 
factory, workers’ refectory and food, sanitary installations, equipment for physical 
protection, and so on; to connect to the mass of workers and understand their 
problems; to learn about the operative and technological problems at the entity and 
the technology of the production process, which would prove useful when they 
returned to their official role. In addition, it served to remind them that their 
management roles were not fixed for life and that directors could return to the
96 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1964, 518.
97 Arcos, Aniversario, 27-8.
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production base.98 Directors who had been in their current position for less than six 
months did not qualify to participate. Guevara stated: ‘The ministry is one 
administrative and technological entity. It is subject to a methodology which is 
distinct when observed from different levels... You can observe where there are 
mistakes of methodology, failings in the methods of work and even personal 
weaknesses also.’99
When Guevara left Cuba for the Congo in April 1965, many of his projects were 
frozen and then abolished in October 1965 by Joel Domenech who took over from 
Guevara’s stand-in Arturo Guzman Pascual. Consequently, the Plan of Integration 
was barely institutionalised within MININD, although some vice ministers and 
directors had taken part. Arcos pointed out certain aspects of the spirit of the Plan 
were generalised throughout Cuban institutions: the paring of workers so that every 
one has an institutional substitute, the emphasis on intellectual and administrative 
workers doing voluntary manual labour, especially students and cadre of political 
organisations.100 The latter policy was already generalised practice since the 
beginning of the Revolution, but Guevara’s Plan of Demotion had aimed to further 
systemise the practice, instead of relying on periodic emulations or national 
mobilisations in periods of crisis.
HYGIENE AND SAFETY
‘We have taken factories of the capitalist system where the most 
important point was to produce... and in Cuba the conditions were very 
. bad, very unhealthy. We have dedicated our efforts to improving life, the 
time that workers spend in the industrial plant. This will be one of our 
main efforts throughout the coming year. ,101
98 Arcos, Aniversario, 27-8.
99 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1964, 519.
100 Arcos, interview, 2004.
101 Guevara, cited by Borrego, Camino, 361.
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For Guevara, human beings were both the means and the ends of socialism and 
communism. Production had to serve humans, not enslave or oppress them. This was 
reflected in the prominence Nuestra Industria gave to issues of hygiene and safety at 
work. Each issue carried a drawing of a chaotic work centre with innumerable 
disasters waiting to happen with the prize of revolutionary books offered for 
the reader who could cite the most errors.102 Guevara even raised the issue with 
directors in the bimonthly meetings. In February 1964 he complained about a lack of 
consideration from some administrators for the welfare and conditions of the 
workers. As an example he recalled his visit to shoe factory during which a worker 
complained about the dust where he worked, saying that he had requested a 
ventilator or to change positions because his asthma was irritated. When Guevara 
communicated the complaint to the administrator saying it was brutal to leave a man 
with asthma working in the dust, the administrator replied that actually the man had 
tuberculosis, not asthma. Guevara was disgusted by the lack of sensitivity.103 On 
visits in the provinces he had been dismayed by the lack of small investments to 
provide the workers with even a sit-down toilet: ‘There is nothing to impede this; on 
the contrary, this is neglect and not knowing how to mobilise the people to resolve 
this type of problem. ’104
In his last bimonthly meeting Guevara reminded directors that man was the great 
protagonist of evolution and warned: ‘we do not just dedicate ourselves to be 
producers, but we must consider the productive substance of work, which is man... 
we must sacrifice what there is to sacrifice to carry out investments that assure 
hygiene and safety at work’.105 He insisted that the two fundamental pillars of the 
BFS were centralised, administrative control and the emphasis on man: ‘the 
individual as the protagonist of the Revolution’.106
The Manual dedicated a section to hygiene and safety at work. It stated:
102 Industria, enero 1963,46.
103 Guevara, Bimestrales, February 1964, 443.
104 Guevara, Bimestrales, February 1964, 445,
105 Guevara, Bimestrales, February 1964, 551.
106 Guevara, Bimestrales, 5 December 1964, 551
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‘The administrators of factories are just not technical leaders of 
productive installations, but first of all they are leaders of collectives of 
workers, for whose health and safety they assume responsibility during 
their stay at the work centre, which in turn contributes to the peace and 
happiness in the workers’ homes, sparing their families from the sorrow 
and worry that work accidents always cause... The most important factor 
of the productive forces is man, who makes the machines, tools, 
equipment and factories... To obtain the results with the maximum 
productivity it is vital that the work conditions and the workers 
. themselves are in the best conditions to produce according to the needs of 
society.’107
On the path to socialist construction, stated the Manual, there will be a rapid 
development of the productive forces. The administrator must oversee an increase in 
production and productivity in line with the needs of the working class. The general 
tasks for Hygiene and Safety were: to protect the worker from the dangers of harmful 
machines, environmental risks and the danger of their own mistakes; to protect 
production, avoiding accidents which paralyse or affect it; to protect the economy 
from unnecessary costs and waste caused by accidents, such as unemployment 
compensation, broken parts, medical costs and reparations.108 The Manual detailed 
the Ministry resolution on medical provision for workers and the coding system for 
products and work areas according to their characteristics, warnings about danger 
levels and the location of safety equipment.109
Regular health and safety inspections were integrated into administrative work: 
‘Inspection is the principal means to discover and improve defective conditions, 
risks, unsafe actions, etc.’110 Each EC had a person responsible for hygiene and safety 
to inspect every work centre. However, each work centre also had a person 
responsible for regular inspections. These inspectors should examine and make
107 Manual, secci6n 18, asunto 1, pagina 1.
108 Manual, jecci6n 18, asunto 1, pagina 1.
109 Manual, secci6n 18, asunto 3, pagina 1.
110 Manual, seccidn 18, asunto 4, pagina 1.
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recommendations on: accident reports; order of operations; maintenance of 
machines, equipment and tools; protection of machines; conditions of floors, stairs 
and passageways; access to all places where personnel go; light, heat and ventilation; 
equipment to protect personnel; conveniences; reparation and conservation of the 
plant; and the possibilities of catastrophe, such as boiler, gas or vapour explosions, 
work in tanks or metal basins, storage of inflammables, and explosives.111 Those 
responsible for inspections must not take a superior attitude and should:
‘...finish the inspection visit with a chat with personnel where they are 
informed of the general conditions in the plant and the collaboration 
necessary to improve them... The person responsible for Hygiene and 
Safety should take advise in everything possible from the workers, 
technicians, department heads, etc. those who through their experience 
can contribute opinions that should analysed, with the aim of making the 
most logical recommendation with the view to reaching a final 
solution.’112
In addition to commenting on problems in hygiene and safety, the inspector should 
suggest concrete solutions and give a determined time period for their completion, 
which would be followed up to ensure that the measures had been taken as agreed. 
Three inspection forms were included in the Manual with details about how to fill 
them in.113 The concern for work conditions; both of the worker and equipment were 
not just conceptually important, but the apparatus was institutionalised in order to 
monitor, assess and improve them.
111 Manual, secci6n 18, asunto 4, pagina 1.
112 Manual, secci6n 18, asunto 4, pagina 3-4.
113 Manual, secci6n 18, asunto 4, pagina 5-12.
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ABSENTEEISM
‘Is it the case, gentlemen, that the working masses in a North American 
factory have affection for the owner? Absolutely no affection, and is 
there political vigilance in watching over production? No there is not, 
because there is a set o f administrative mechanisms that when 
production fails allow administrative measures to be taken which mean 
that a mister workman who is careless earns less, his own person 
receives the measure o f his mistake, in a peaceful way... n14
Essentially capitalism uses the fear of unemployment as an apparatus of social 
control and to induce productivity by competition between labourers. In early 1960s 
Cuban workers who had toiled under capitalism suddenly found they had 
employment guaranteed, albeit in agriculture, free education and numerous training 
courses, health care provision for themselves and their families, a food ration and 
prices frozen. At the same time their consciousness and values had been moulded by 
capitalist social relations. New attitudes and cultures are not created overnight. 
Inevitably, absenteeism was a serious a problem, the epitome of the problem of 
inertia and low productivity. The challenge of reducing absenteeism was confronted 
in every measure, every apparatus which attempted to engage the labour force, which 
aimed to collectivise production and workers participation. However, some directors 
began to formulate specific polices to reduce absenteeism directly.
In October 1961, speaking to all MININD workers, Guevara recounted his recent 
experience of touring the offices in the ministry building:
‘..there were many people missing, its true that the eighth floor is 
planning, and people had to go to specific places, but there were other 
people who listened to the radio, there were others who were chatting and 
what is more when I started to go round one by one, immediately the
114 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1962, 180-181.
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people who had been missing started to return and get on with their work, 
or if not everyone was in a meeting with the comrade Lavame. It seems 
that the comrade Lavame was suffocating with all the employees of that 
floor who he was meeting with, everyone that was missing was said to be 
in that meeting.’115
Despite the national campaigns against absenteeism, complained Guevara, it even 
existed in the ministry building: direct absenteeism, people who just did not turn up 
to work: and indirect absenteeism, arriving late, leaving on time and not completing 
the work properly. Time lost was part of the indirect costs of production, he said, 
adding that it was a significant sum.
In the spirit of self-criticism which characterised that speech, Guevara took the 
blame, as minister, for not having a methodology in place to know the reality. For 
Guevara the question of absenteeism was not just about production costs, it was an 
ethical one as well. Attempting to demonstrate how these apparently individual 
choices and patterns of behaviour affect relations at a much broader level, Guevara 
reminded ministry workers about the sacrifice made by the Chinese people in order 
to show internationalist solidarity with the Cuban Revolution. Despite China’s 
relative backwardness the Chinese people work industriously, donating massively in 
aid and trade to secure the Cuban Revolution. He asserted:
‘We have to complete our share, we do not have the right to listen to the 
radio in work hours, we do not have the right to squander a moment of 
production when there are 650 million people, each one of them who 
gives a bit of their share of fabric, or a grain of their rice, things they 
need to satisfy the main needs in life, they give away so the Cuban 
people have non-essential goods... without rice we could live perfectly 
well and here in Cuba our level of consumption of non-durable goods is
115 Guevara, Charla, 294-5.
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infinitely superior per capita to most socialist countries: in shoes, hides, 
soap.. .automobiles, petrol.’116
In March the director of the EC of Cement, Ramirez, told other directors about two 
non-fmancial approaches developed in his enterprise to tackle absenteeism. Firstly, a 
commission for illness; factory workers selected by the trade union who visited those 
off sick. Presumably, if there was no real ailment, the homebound worker would be 
embarrassed into returning to work. Secondly, the factory bulletin had a section on 
‘absentee of the month’, which provided the personal information on who this was, 
minus the name. Readers were invited to guess the identity of the offender, to be 
revealed in the next month’s bulletin. Ramirez explained that: ‘This provokes 
tremendous discussions about who it will be... we are seeing a real reduction in 
absenteeism in the factory; it has been taken up positively, the workers are no longer 
being absent for the sake of it.’117 Doubtlessly, in the process of these discussions 
workers would openly articulate the problem of absenteeism and evaluate colleagues 
for their attendance, thus raising consciousness of the severity and consequence of 
the problem, as a precondition for tackling it. Absenteeism would decrease as 
workers avoided the shame of being named in the bulletin.
Borrego claimed that in general absenteeism was a phenomenon among the higher 
income level workers, those who had worked within US corporations, which had 
served to divide workers through differential pay awards, reducing the trade union 
movement to a permanent ‘economistic’ struggle for salary increases.118 With salaries 
frozen, these workers had benefited least from the upheavals caused by the 
Revolution. They pursued their individual self-interest, lacking identification with 
the production needs and goals of the Revolution. Success in tackling absenteeism 
depended on an apparatus of administrative compulsion, in addition to general 
success in fostering a collective consciousness towards production. Both direct and 
indirect absenteeism remain serious problems in Cuba, indicating that the puzzle of
116 Guevara, Charla, 297.
117 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1962,249.
118 Borrego, Camino, 169-170. This is validated by several testimonies including that of EC director 
Alberto who affirmed that most problems of discipline came from technical personnel. Bimestrales, 5 
December 1964, 559.
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motivating production without dependence on capitalist levers whilst maintaining 
universal social welfare provision has still not been solved under socialism. Guevara 
and his MININD colleagues had initiated the search for a solution.
PERSONAL RECORDS
From February 1964 a new universal system of workers’ personal records was 
implemented nationwide in Cuba. Records mainly held administrative details, health 
problems, medical certificates and other official notes. However, in May 1964, 
Suarez Gayol, director of the Cuban Institute of Mineral Resources, described how 
his institute were expanding the function of the records to induce commitment to 
production. Positive reports about the workers efforts were added to the record, as 
were reports of any indiscipline, with a copy sent to them also:
‘We have some practical examples of how positive this experience has 
been. We have taken this issue to workers in Production Assemblies. The 
importance of their record and making workers consciousness of the need 
to care for their record, their labour history, will definitely serve them 
and serve the enterprise in deciding on any claims and selections for 
more qualified posts... this has captured the spirit in workers, in caring 
for their personal record, taking care of their labour history in the work 
centre.’119
Guevara solicited the opinion of other directors about the system Gayol had 
proposed. One director compared it to before the Revolution when the capitalist 
owners of US enterprises had threatened the workers with adding things to their 
record. Guevara added caustically: ‘We will have to send people to the United States 
to learn how to treat the workers.’120 Gayol denied his system was comparable to that 
under capitalism. It was not to be imposed as a threat, but discussed with the
119 Suarez Gayol, Bimestrales, 9 May 1964,476.
120 Guevara, Bimestrales, May 1964,477.
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workers, it should be explained that their record was how they would be judged on 
their worth to society. People had shown such concern to for their personal record 
that they had preferred an administrative or economic sanction, even to be sent to 
Guanahacabibes labour camp, rather than have something noted on their personal 
record.121 In addition, Gayol pointed out that when it came to the selection of 
vanguard workers this record would help them judge who fitted the criteria, based on 
written documents not just verbal recommendations. Guevara concluded that no 
administrative decision could be reached on this proposal, because it would 
inevitably be bureaucratic. The decision of whether or not to adopt this line towards 
personal records would be taken collectively with the masses. He urged those 
directors interested in utilising this method to discuss it in their Production 
Assemblies with the mass of workers, and in six months time they could explain the 
workers’ reaction and/or experiences in applying this method.122
In December 1964 Guevara asked directors for their experiences with the personal 
records. Two directors responded. The first had tentatively applied the policy in 
some recent cases of indiscipline, but admitted to failing to apply it in a positive way, 
with commendations about workers performance. The second had met with the EC’s 
administrators and heads of personnel before introducing the personal records for 
technicians and management staff. The director said:
‘We have given this the most emphasis with the technical personnel 
because this is where we have the most problems. It is producing a very 
good effect in that we are improving our work a lot. The technicians 
know that they are evaluated, we discuss with them, and we have applied 
a system in the units of production so every three months they discuss 
their work with us. We also do this with the administrators and in this 
way we are fomenting it among the leadership personnel in order to later 
apply it to other levels. ’123
121 Chapter 10 for details about Guanahacabibes.
122 Guevara, Bimestrales, 19 May 64, 478-9.
123 Alberto, Bimestrales, December 1964, 559-560.
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Other mechanisms were in place to punish ‘indiscipline’ by management personnel 
in MININD, however, the mass of workers were exempt from these policies. The use 
of personal records was an attempt to foster the same accountability among the 
masses. What stands out is the experimental atmosphere within MININD, in 
searching for new apparatus to strengthen the key tenets of the BFS: administrative 
control, consciousness and technological progress.
CONCLUSION
‘...we are attempting to develop to the maximum the consciousness o f  
workers at all levels o f production to think of work as the highest 
expression o f being human, searching for integration in this way in work 
that is freed from the fetters o f the need o f workers to earn their bread... 
so workers at all levels in our Ministry work because it is their social 
duty: 124
The policies detailed above: Factory visits, Committees for Spare Parts, the 
Movement of Inventors and Innovators, Advisory Technical Committees, Production 
Assemblies, the campaign to Construct Your Own Machine, Committees for Local 
Industry, the Plan of Integration, Hygiene and Safety procedures, policies to tackle 
absenteeism and the Personal Records, aimed to integrate workers into the 
management of production, to harness their experience and creativity to resolve 
problems and rationalise production, and to induce them to identify with the means 
of production as their own. For Guevara they were mechanisms to equip the working 
class for increasingly decentralised and direct control over production. This was vital 
for the transition to communism as well as to overcome the practical problems of the 
production process. The policies complemented the educational and technical 
training apparatus and financial and accounting aspects of the BFS serving to 
undermine the operation of the law of value and emphasise the role of consciousness 
and human beings at the centre of production. It meant production would be
124 Memoria Anual 1964, Ministerio de Industrias, Republica de Cuba, 1965, 107.
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determined according to social and political rationale, rather than just the economic 
rationale characteristic of capitalism.
Guevara’s emphasis on integrating workers into the technical and managerial aspects 
of the economy did contribute towards a conceptualisation of how socialist society is 
to be built: promoting the self-management of the Cuban masses. It must be 
recognised, meanwhile, that the persistently punitive US blockade and terrorist 
attacks against Cuba have limited the feasibility of decentralising control to the 
Cuban masses. It has been necessary, therefore, to integrate the mass of workers into 
the central apparatus of government. The decentralisation to which Guevara aspired 
has not yet been achieved.
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CHAPTER 9
Science and technology
‘We cannot follow the development process o f the countries which 
initiated capitalist development, 100 or 150 years ago -  to begin the slow 
process o f developing a very powerful mechanical industry, before 
passing on to other superior forms, metallurgy, now chemicals and 
automation after that. We have to jump stages. And conscious o f our 
backwardness, conscious o f our economic weaknesses and o f our 
technical weaknesses, try always to make use o f the best world 
technology; without fear o f having the best world technology here, and 
as quickly as possible develop technicians capable o f operating these 
plants
Capitalist competition, noted Guevara, drove the application of science and 
technology to industrial development, constantly revolutionising the productive 
forces.2 Modernisation of production was also the key to economic efficiency under 
socialism. Given the level of underdevelopment in pre-1959 Cuba, rationalising 
production, equalising distribution and offering incentives to workers could result in 
an immediate rise in productivity. However, the precondition to sustained economic 
development was scientific research and technological innovations. The. socialist 
government had to find a method for fostering an innovative approach, without 
relying on the law of value, competition and the profit motive. In the search for 
solutions to this challenge Guevara set up apparatus within the Ministry of Industries 
(MININD) to institutionalise the application of science and technology to industrial 
production. This apparatus was integral to his Budgetary Finance System (BFS) and
1 Guevara, ‘Discurso en el acto de inauguracidn de la industria nacional productora de utensilios 
domdsticos INPUD, 24 July 1964, in Ernesto Che Guevara: Ciencia, Tecnologiay Sociedad 1959- 
1965, La Habana: Editorial Academia, 2003, 67-68.
2 See chapter 11 for details.
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the concretisation of his belief that to build socialism it was necessary to develop in 
both consciousness and production.
This chapter begins by exploring Guevara’s development paradigm; industrialisation 
based on endogenous resources. This ambitious development strategy aimed to 
maximise Cuba’s self-sufficiency by using the island’s natural resources to create a 
mechanical and manufacturing base as a preliminary step towards the introduction of 
automation and an advanced chemical industry. This is followed by an examination 
of the obstacles to that strategy: mistakes made during the early adoption of an 
import substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategy; the scarcity of science technicians 
to develop and implement the numerous ideas, which generated a reliance on 
foreigners; the need for a training infrastructure to prepare future specialists; the lack 
of financial and material resources and institutions to foster technological 
innovations; the general deficiency in the development vision of the government and 
production managers; isolation from the advanced capitalist world, imposed by the 
US blockade, which obstructed the flow of information and technology transfers, 
thus undermining Guevara’s insistence on using the most advanced technology; and 
the relative backwardness of Soviet bloc capital goods purchased. This paradoxically 
hindered Cuba’s ability to ‘jump stages’ in development whilst simultaneously 
buffering the Revolution from the threat of collapse because of the US blockade. The 
Soviet support facilitated the establishment of MININD’s research and development 
institutes.
The aims, obstacles and achievements of these institutes are examined below. 
Despite the often insurmountable hurdles, there were tangible results. Many of the 
objectives set out for the research and development institutes in MININD were not 
feasible in the short term. It is not the intention of this thesis to assess the extent to 
which Cuba’s contemporary scientific-technological developments are a direct 
legacy of those institutes. Nonetheless, it is clear that Guevara introduced a 
methodology for applying science and technology to production and an appreciation 
of its pivotal role in economic development which characterises Cuba today.
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PROPOSED LINES OF DEVELOPMENT
Five months after the foundation of the Department of Industrialisation within the 
National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA), Guevara projected future lines of 
development, grounded on the specific conditions of the island and reflecting 
international technological progress. He told Havana University students that:
‘we have initiated a process of development that includes six very 
important and basic branches of production which are: heavy chemicals, 
organic chemicals starting with hydrocarbons from sugar cane, minerals, 
combustibles, metallurgy in general and the iron and steel industry in 
particular and the products derived from our intensive agriculture. But we 
have seen a sad reality that the training given in the universities in the 
country is neither adequate, nor sufficiently orientated, towards the new 
necessities of the Revolution.’3
Two years later he wrote that: iPrima facie, we orientate ourselves towards four lines 
of development: metallurgy, naval construction, electronics and sucroqwmica.u 
Three prerequisites were essential for such developments: the rational exploitation of 
natural resources, creation of a mechanical base and training at all levels.
Regino Boti, a Harvard-educated Cuban economist and co-founder of the UN’s 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), returned to Cuba in January 1959 
to be Minister of the Economy, later renamed the Council for Economic Planning 
(JUCEPLAN), in the Revolution’s first moderate government.5 Soon after, an ECLA 
mission arrived in Cuba. Its economists promoted an import-substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) strategy for economic development, an approach common in
3 Guevara, ‘Discurso en la universidad de La Habana sobre el papel de la universidad en el desarrollo 
econdmico de Cuba’, 2 March 1960, in Ciencia, 187-8.
4 Guevara, ‘Tareas industrials de la Revolucidn’, March 1962, in Ernesto Che Guevara: Escritosy 
Discursos, Tomo 6, La Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 1977, 105. By sucroquimica Guevara was 
referring to chemical derivatives from sugar cane, see Ciencia, 29.
5 While other ministers of that government left the Revolution, Boti remained as part of its leadership 
until his death in 1999.
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Latin America since the late 1940s.6 During Guevara’s trade mission to the socialist 
bloc in October 1960, factories were purchased according to a list of finished 
products needed to replace imports. Within a year and a half it was clear that this 
criterion had been disastrous. Guevara explained the mistake:
‘We lacked due emphasis on the exploitation of our own resources; we 
worked with our vision fixed on substitution of imports of finished 
goods, without seeing clearly that those articles are made with raw 
materials that are necessary to have in order for them to be 
manufactured... We continue to be largely dependent on foreign trade to 
resolve our problems, but the possibilities of being supplied by foreign 
trade are also limited in the industrial plane, because of the enormous 
development of other sectors of the economy and the life of the country 
that demands materials from abroad.’7
Guevara listed factories for brushes, screws, pickaxes and shovels, electric solders, 
barbed wire, among others, which Cuba had purchased because the finished product 
was needed, but which relied on imported materials. This was a costly mistake, the 
US blockade was already cutting off imports from the capitalist world. Pursuing 
rapid industrialisation was idealist and in August 1961 the National Production 
Conference confirmed that the sugar industry would continue its historic role as 
principal export, to secure vital imports, whilst serving as the basis of accumulation 
for longer term investments in industry and social welfare. Guevara’s 
industrialisation strategy was to be based on the manufacture of endogenous natural 
resources, including the industrial application of the sugar cane. Guevara envisaged a 
diversified chain of production with both horizontal and vertical integration. He told 
MININD directors:
‘...to develop textile factories and have to buy the thread is an absurd 
policy. We have to develop cotton together with the textile factory; have
6 Under pressure from the US, the ECLA mission was withdrawn by Raul Prebisch in summer 1960.
7 Guevara, Tareas, 103.
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to develop iron together with the factories that will consume iron... From 
sugar everything should be extracted. [There are] huge possibilities of 
converting sugar, as an article of consumption, into a secondary 
product... Just as lard is a secondary product of pork in the United States, 
we will be able to reach that point with sugar production so that sugar 
will serve as a primary material.’8
Theoretically, the lines of development proposed by Guevara were feasible, in that 
they recognised the natural resources and historical legacy of the Cuban economy. 
Guevara’s logic was thus: Cuba holds rich metal deposits, especially nickel, which 
could form the base for the mechanisation and production, first of much needed spare 
parts and later of capital goods. As an island, hugely reliant on overseas trade for 
survival, developing a merchant fleet would save Cuba millions in hard currency 
paid to others for transporting imports and exports. The precondition for this would 
be the development of the iron and steel industry. Using sugar cane as a primary 
material for manufactured and chemical goods would increase the value added to 
Cuba’s exports based on the historical mono-crop. Furthermore, Guevara argued that 
countries that could master electronics and automation technology would be in the 
vanguard of international development.
To begin to overcome the lack of adequate training and infrastructure for these tasks 
in the existing academic institutions Guevara set up research and development 
institutions within MININD, focussing on sugar cane derivatives, minerals and 
metals, the chemical industry and agricultural bi-products, technological innovations 
and automation to improve productivity. His intention was to establish an 
institutional framework to begin experimentation at both ends of the production 
chain; raw materials and manufacturing simultaneously. Not all these projects were 
feasible in the short term, however, more important than the productive achievements 
was the methodology introduced.
8 Guevara, ‘Reuniones Bimestrales’, 14 July 1962, El Che en la Revolucion Cubana: Ministerio de 
Industrias. Tomo VI. La Habana, Ministerio de Azucar, 1966,286.
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To implement his long term vision, Guevara worked towards strategies that 
transcended the annual plan. An Office of the Perspective Plan was created within 
MININD to prepare a development plan for 1965-1970, projecting statistics forward 
and determining the priority lines of production. A young Cuban economist, Miguel 
Figueras became director of the Perspective Plan from 1963, taking over from Ciro 
Oyarzun, a Chilean communist who went on to become Director of Investments. The 
team consisted of less than 20 experts and administrators. Figueras recalled among 
them Dr Mario Fleitas, an electrical engineer and university professor who had 
trained in England, and another who was a chemical engineer with an economics 
masters from the US; professionals trained in the most advanced capitalist countries. 
They studied industrial development and the role of new technologies. The Cuban 
state had just two computers, one of them being a greyhound betting machine 
imported privately in 1950s and used by Guevara in MININD and the other was an 
Elliot 803 imported from England by the new regime and located in the Cuban 
National Centre for Scientific Research (CENIC), where the Perspective Plan team 
went to formulate their projections.9 They also relied on technical and scientific 
journals passed on to them by technicians or libraries which were subscribed since 
before the Revolution.
They were assisted in this by a small team in the Department of Scientific- 
Technological Information, set up within MININD in 1962, the first of its type to 
exist in Cuba. The Department got hold of all the specialist magazines and scientific 
abstracts they could from anywhere in the world, translated them and conveyed 
information about the latest technologies to specific sectors within the MININD 
apparatus. They were also directed to search for specific information by the ECs or 
research institutes. Maria Teresa Sanchez, the director, explained:
‘People would go to Che with ideas, for example, they could say “I have 
discovered continuous movement” and we had to find out if it existed 
and if it was possible. We used magazines of abstracts for medicine,
9 The multinational corporations in Cuba, including the oil refineries, had IBM punch machines, but 
not computers.
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technology, pharmacology. In the beginning I had to submerge myself in 
the little that existed in Cuba. Later we developed exchanges with friends 
in other countries... We did all this work by hand. We didn’t have a 
computer or an IBM machine.’10
The Department began with four people, but gradually expanded to include an 
archive and departments for photography and translations. Sanchez said: ‘They sent 
me a group of some of the first youngsters to learn languages such as Czech, French 
and English. I don’t remember anyone studying Chinese at that time.’11 The Centre 
assisted the research and development institutes to set up their own information 
centres.
In March 1965, the Plan Perspective team produced a two-volume document. 
Figueras recalled: ‘It was the last night that we spoke when Che revised the final 
version. He said “tomorrow you go with my guards to get it printed in secret; 25 
copies and you give them to me.’” 12 One month later, Guevara left Cuba and 
MININD was gradually split into separate ministries.
Nine research and development centres were set up within three years in MININD:
1961 Commission for Mechanisation of Sugar Industry
1961 Cuban Institute of Mineral Resources
1962 Cuban Institute of Mineral and Metallurgy Research
1962 Office of Automation and Electronics
1963 Cuban Institute for Research into Sugar Cane Derivatives 
1963 Cuban Institute for the Development of the Chemical Industry 
1963 Cuban Institute for Technological Research
1963 Cuban Institute for Machinery Development
10 Maria Teresa Sanchez, interview, 8 March 2006.
11 Maria Teresa Sanchez, interview, 8 March 2006.
12 Miguel Figueras, interview, 27 January 2006. MININD’s Annual Report for 1964, includes a plan 
for industrial development 1966-1970, but stated that in late 1964 work began to project development 
in some manufacturing branches over a 15 year period. It is likely that this was the ‘secret’ project 
which Figueras was leading. MemoriaAnual 1964, Ministerio de Industrias, Republica de Cuba, 70.
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1963 Ciro Redondo
In 1964 research institutes in MININD accounted for 53.2% of the ministry’s total 
costs, at $42,566,100 pesos, reflecting how they were prioritised. Tirso Saenz was 
Vice Minister of Technical Development, responsible for all of this apparatus except 
the Commission, which was created by the Office of Special Issues. He said: ‘Every 
one of these institutes had a reason to be created, some of them directly with the four 
basic lines of development; metallurgy, naval construction, electronics and sugar 
cane derivatives.’13 The institutes were located outside the ministry building but they 
were integrated under the same organisational structure and financed under 
MININD’s BFS, receiving a planned budget for investments and salaries, assuming 
the same principles, but operating with some independence. For the purpose of 
analysis the research apparatus has been divided into three categories: first, those 
concerned with the sugar industry; second, those involving the extraction and 
exploitation of natural resources, minerals, metals and agricultural products, 
excluding sugar; third, naval construction, electronics and automation. Saenz also 
pointed out that: ‘All those institutes were created with important support from the 
socialist countries. That has to be said, because it would be unjust not to recognise 
that. Che was aware of that.’14 The technological characteristics of Soviet bloc trade 
and assistance is briefly examined below.
SOVIET BLOC TRADE AND TECHNICIANS
‘Many factories turned out to be inefficient, because we depended on 
what the Russians and the socialist camp had achieved and they were 
behind. You could say these factories were obsolete. This wasn’t Che’s 
fault. The Yankees wouldn *t sell us factories. Che said “these factories
13 S6enz, interview, Havana, 7 January 2005.
14 S£enz, interview, 2005
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are obsolete, but they are factories ” and we had to make more effort, it 
was more work for the country. ’ 15
Compounding the mistakes associated with the ISI policy was the relative 
backwardness of equipment purchased from the socialist bloc compared to the 
advanced capitalist countries. As the US government pressurised other capitalist 
countries not to trade with Cuba, real politik forced Guevara to accept technology 
which was two decades behind that existing in advanced sectors of Cuban industry in 
1959. The socialist countries also provided credit, advisors, technicians and other 
specialists. In 1962, Guevara announced:
‘The Soviet Union granted us one hundred million pesos for the iron and 
steel industry, some electrical plants, a refinery and for geological 
prospecting of one-fourth of the national territory. Czechoslovakia did 
this for an automobile plant. China granted us 70 million for the 
construction of 24 plants of various types; Romania 15; Bulgaria five; 
Poland 12 and GDR offers ten for 1963. The most important plants 
contracted, in addition to those already cited, are: a shipyard that has 
been made with Polish assistance; a nickel plant, with additional Soviet 
assistance; the textile factories acquired from the Chinese People’s 
Republic, and those of cement.’16
All MININD vice ministers and directors were assisted by socialist bloc specialists 
or Latin American communists trained in the Soviet bloc. Guevara listed the 
assistance of USSR technicians in the Cuban petroleum industry, Czechs who helped 
found Cuba’s Academy of Sciences, Bulgarians and Chinese who assisted in the 
agricultural branch and Koreans who helped in mechanical plants.17 They gave 
training courses on operating the new plants. By end of 1964 there were 640 foreign 
technicians working in MININD, of whom 492 were sent from the socialist bloc and
15 Edison Veldzquez, interview, 21 January 2006.
16 Guevara, Tareas, 100.
17 Guevara, INPUD, 319-320.
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the remaining 148 contracted directly from various places.18 Most of these were 
assisting in training and the research and development institutes examined below. In 
1964-5, around 2,000 Cubans received on site training for plants in construction.19 
Meanwhile, hundreds of Cubans went to study and train in the Soviet bloc. On 31 
December 1964, MININD had 1,271 Cubans training abroad, of whom 858 were 
studying in university, 222 on technician training, and 191 doing workers 
qualifications.20 Guevara recognised the advantage enjoyed by Cuba through this 
socialist bloc assistance, which softened the blow of the blockade and helped to 
secure and consolidate the Revolution:
‘We work in conditions infinitely superior to those of the first socialist 
country. The Soviet Union did this alone; without friends, without credit, 
surrounded by ferocious adversaries, in the middle of an intensifying 
struggle, including within their own territory. We do this in far superior 
conditions that those of the People’s Republic of China, and those of the 
peoples’ republics of Europe, which came out of destructive war and 
without the Soviet Union being able to bring much assistance because it 
was also engaged in a enormous task of reconstruction... and we also do 
it starting from a relatively comfortable situation with the educational, 
technical, cultural and economic level of the masses who are not so 
backward as what confronted other fraternal countries.’21
Guevara did not criticise the Soviets for the relative backwardness of their 
technology per se. Rather, he was critical of the contradiction between the high level 
of research and development applied to military technology and low investment in 
improving civilian production.22 And he objected to the ideological resistance to 
transferring the most advanced technology from the capitalist world. He told 
MININD directors that: ‘the error of not taking the highest technology at a given
18 Memoria Anual, MININD, 78.
19 S&enz, El Che Ministro: Testimonio de un Colaborador. La Habana : Ciencias Sociales, 2005,206.
20 Memoria Anual, MININD, 78.
21 Guevara, Tareas, 118.
22 Orlando Borrego Diaz, interview, 30 November 2005.
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moment has cost a lot for some socialist countries; it has cost them in terms of 
development, and in terms of their competence in the world market.’23
Cybernetics was one example. Invented by Norbert Weiner, a US mathematician 
studying artillery fire during the Second World War, Cybernetics combines aspects 
of physiology and human anatomy to study communication and control, involving 
regulatory feedback in living organisms, machines, organisations and combined 
systems; ‘sociotechnical’ systems such as computer controlled machines, automata 
and robotics. Jorge Ruiz Ferrer a founding member of the Department of 
Industrialisation, shared Guevara’s enthusiasm for cybernetics, and claimed that he 
was one of the few people in Cuba at that time who could discuss this with 
Guevara.24 As early as 1962, Guevara had criticised the Soviet’s rejection of 
cybernetics on ideological grounds:
‘For a long time Cybernetics was considered a reactionary science, or 
pseudo-science. Naturally cybernetics can be given a series of 
reactionary philosophical implications; but that aspect that does not 
interest us... Cybernetics is a branch of science that exists and that 
should be used by man. It has not been developed with sufficient effort.
. However, the north-Americans have worked with this a lot, they have 
worked a great deal at its practical industrial application, to the extent 
that they have many things that are automated.’25
This was part of Guevara’s notion that technology does not have an ideology per se.26 
He said: ‘a tractor has a function: to plough.. .and if we are going to take technology, 
why are we going to take the technology of a socialist tractor in place of a capitalist 
one, if the capitalist one is better?’27 Guevara’s criticisms were aired internally in 
MININD, but he also criticised the revolutionary government’s first purchases from
23 Guevara, Bimestrales, 14 July 1962, 289.
24 Ruiz, interview, 5th April 2006. Ruiz developed cybernetics later as Vice Minister for Minerals, 
Fuel and Metallurgy.
25 Guevara, Bimestrales, 28 September 1962, 318-9.
26 See chapter 8.
27 Guevara, Bimestrales, 21 December 1963,422.
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the Soviet bloc of plants based on already out-dated technology. These mistakes had 
been painful for the country.28 New countries entering socialism, Guevara predicted, 
would adopt the technology and administrative techniques of the capitalist system 
which preceded them.29 The origin of the BFS system lay in the capitalist 
corporations of pre-Revolution Cuba and it was therefore more progressive than the 
Soviet Auto-Financing System (AFS) which was developed from 1920s pre­
monopoly Russian capitalism.
Evidently there was some success in Guevara’s resolution to not repeat those 
mistakes. In summer 1964, inaugurating a factory for domestic utensils, Guevara told 
the workers that some equipment installed in the factory was world leading: ‘And we 
see also that, together with our Czechoslovak comrades, we have not vacillated in 
acquiring some special machinery from other countries, including capitalist ones, 
when it was most useful because that country had developed specialised 
technology.’30
In addition to the relative backwardness of Soviet technologies was the problem of 
technological incompatibility. In 1961, Saenz had been director of the petroleum 
industry. He explained the daily problems resulting in that industry from the 
blockade and the consequent shift in trade relations:
‘Soviet petroleum is different from the Venezuelan oil that we had 
received before. Refineries are designed according to the type of oil they 
are going to process. They were completely different and the Russian 
petroleum had a higher content of salts and sulphur. The corrosion 
problems were terrible. The crude was eating away all the pipes and 
equipment and we had the blockade so we couldn’t get spare parts from 
anywhere.’31
28 Guevara, Bimestrales, 9 March 1963, 344-5. Guevara said new investments must consider world 
productivity, see chapter 7.
9 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1963,421.
30 Guevara, IN PUD, 67-68.
31 S6enz, interview, 2005.
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Ultimately Guevara’s solution was to overcome trade dependency by fostering 
industrialisation based on endogenous resources. The following sections examine the 
aims, problems and achievements of the apparatus set up to initiate this process. 
Guevara did not discuss the research and development centres in the MININD 
bimonthly meetings, therefore the material has been pulled together from annual 
reports, tasks for the pending year, a handful of written accounts and from 
interviews.32 While the following section has less analysis than others in this thesis, 
the important contribution has been to reconstruct a comprehensive record of the 
objectives, obstacles and achievements in this area.
THE SUGAR INDUSTRY
‘ Without sugar, there is no nation’ -  Jose Manuel Casanova, Sugar Mill 
Owner's Association.
‘Because o f sugar, there is no nation’ -Raul Cepero Bonilla, Cuban 
economist.
. ‘ Without workers, there is no sugar'- Lazaro Pena, Cuban Workers 
Confederation.33
Cuban historian Manuel Moreno Fraginals prefaced his seminal work on the Cuban 
sugar industry with the claim that: ‘without an exhaustive study of the sugar 
economy, there is no possibility of interpreting Cuban history.’34 It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to examine this aspect of Cuba’s historical development. 
However, to appreciate the motivation, significance, obstacles and achievements of 
MININD’s attempts to modernise, two characteristics of the Cuban sugar industry 
are summarised. First, the domination of the Cuban economy by the sugar industry:
32 Interviewees explained the lack of discussion about the institutes in the bimonthly meeting by 
stating that the function of those meetings was to focus on theoretical issues and immediate 
production problems, not scientific and technological investigations.
3 All quotes from the 1940s, cited by Marifeli P6rez-Stable, in The Cuban Revolution: Origins, 
Course and Legacy, England: Oxford University Press, 1999, 14 & 36.
34 Manuel Moreno Fraginals, The Sugarmill: The Socioeconomic Complex o f Sugar 1790-1869. 
London: Monthly Review Press, 1976, 9.
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sugar exports, including by-products, accounted for 80% of exports, making Cuba 
the world’s largest exporter of sugar in 1959; sugar companies controlled 70 to 75% 
of arable land in Cuba, half of which they left fallow, they employed 25% of the 
Cuban labour force, but only 25,000 full time with around 500,000 workers hired for 
the labour intensive harvest lasting two to four months, afterwards dismissed for the 
tiempo muerto (dead season). Underemployment was integral to the sugar industry 
and plantation workers constituted a rural proletariat with a history of class­
conscious militancy.35 Second was the domination of the sugar industry by US 
interests. In the 1920s, US-owned sugar mills produced and processed nearly two- 
thirds of the Cuban sugar crop. Following the Great Depression of 1929, domestic 
ownership of the industry increased to 59% by 1955.36 However, 80% of total Cuban 
sugar exports were shipped to the US in exchange for commodity imports which 
dominated Cuba's internal market. The US-imposed sugar quota contributed to the 
stagnation of the industry, as a disincentive to investment. The World Bank warned 
that: ‘Cuba's standard of living...depends mainly on an industry which stopped 
growing many years ago.’37
For Cubans, the sugar industry was associated with slavery, racism, poverty, 
unemployment, underdevelopment and imperialism. Consequently, the first instinct 
of many in the post-1959 regime was to run the industry into the ground, and replace 
it with agricultural diversification, manufacturing and heavy industry.38 However, as 
planning was implemented and control established, the government conceded to a 
development strategy where sugar exports were the mainstay of capital 
accumulation. In 1963, Guevara explained why:
35 The description of plantation workers as ‘rural proletariat’ is disputed by some historians. For 
examples of historians who use this class categorisation see Moreno Fraginals, ‘Plantation Economies 
and Societies in the Spanish Caribbean, 1860-1930’ in L Bethell (ed), Cambridge History o f Latin 
America, vol IV. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, 187, fn 1 & Samuel Farber, The 
Origins o f the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered, North Carolina: North Carolina Press, 2006, 14.
36 US Department of Commerce. Investment in Cuba: Basic Information for United States 
Businessmen. Washington, DC: GPO, 1956, 37.
37 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Report o f the Mission to Cuba, July 1951. 
Washington, DC: Office of the President, 5.
38 Edward Boorstein, Boorstein, Edward. The Economic Transformation o f Cuba: A First Hand 
Account, New York: Modem Reader Paperback, 1968,205.
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‘The entire economic history of Cuba has demonstrated that no other 
agricultural activity would give such returns as those yielded by the 
cultivation of the sugar cane. At the outset of the Revolution many of us 
were not aware of this basic economic fact, because a fetishistic idea 
. connected sugar with our dependence on imperialism and with the misery 
in the rural areas, without analysing the real causes: the relation to the 
unequal balance of trade.’39
With favourable trade deals with the socialist bloc, based on above world prices of 
sugar, the revolutionary government believed it had redressed the unequal balance of 
trade.40 Nonetheless, as long as sugar production remained vital to Cuban economic 
development, Guevara was determined to mechanise its cultivation and develop a 
secondary manufacturing and chemical industry on the back of it.
Incentives to mechanise
'It was a hot day. It was already eleven in the morning and by this time 
everyone was tired, but they had not finished cutting parts o f the 
Canaveral [cane field], which means that the cane can’t be picked up.
Che sat down to rest in the shade. When people saw this they stopped 
working too. I  explained to him why you had to finish the Canaveral. He 
said: “Damn, I  am going to get up and cut cane; but this is slave’s work, 
this has to be mechanised! ”’41
There were three incentives to mechanise the sugar cane harvest. First, the shortage 
of macheteros (cane cutters), following the post-1959 rural-urban migration as the 
real wages rose and employment was created. Voluntary labour was mobilised as a 
short term solution. 200,000 volunteers joined the harvest from 1961. The long term 
solution was mechanisation. Second, to humanise the work, so that in the near future:
39 Guevara, cited by Brian H Pollit, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Cuban Sugar Economy’ Journal o f Latin 
American Studies, Vol 36 (2004), 323, fii 6.
40 The concept of the ‘free’ or world market price of sugar is a misnomer; it applied to only 10-15% of 
internationally traded sugar. Most sugar was produced to quotas and sold for predetermined prices.
41 Alfredo Men&idez, interview, 11 February 2005.
284
Chapter 9: Science and technology
‘those who speak of cutting by hand, loading by hand, would be considered to be 
proposing inhumane, bestial work, something from the past which could not return’, 
said Guevara in 1963.42 Third, to cut the costs of production and raise productivity, 
to: ‘give us the opportunity to compete in the war of prices that the capitalist 
distributors wage against us. Right now, the struggle to lower the costs of production 
of sugar is of primary importance as an industrial task.’43 This would be achieved by 
mechanisation of the harvest and the development of a derivatives industry to 
increase the value added to sugar as a raw material. Both of these projects are 
examined below.
There had been attempts pre-1959 to mechanise the sugar harvest, but these had been 
hindered by resistance from macheteros who relied on this back-breaking work to 
survive. For example, a Soltan cane cutting machine was imported by a large mill in 
Camagiiey, but the workers refused to use it and it was abandoned for years. The 
Francisco Sugar Company had begun to build equipment to export azucar a granel 
(crude sugar transported in bulk).44 One of these was a terminal in the port at 
Matanzas and the other in a warehouse in Camagiiey, but workers opposed their use. 
It was the same with the centro de acopio (to dry-clean sugar cane) under 
construction in Camagiiey. These are examined below.
Paradoxically, the technical characteristics of the harvest meant mechanisation could 
reduce the efficiency and profitability of the industry. This is because the ratio of 
dead weight (soil and straw) to sugar, falls if the cane is hand cut and stripped of 
excess by the machetero in the field before it enters the mill.45 The labour intensive 
work made the industrial processing more efficient. Mechanically cutting the cane, or 
hand-cutting but mechanically retrieving it without manual cleaning, necessitates an 
additional cleaning process off the field, but as cane covered in excess weighs more
42 Guevara, ‘Discurso en la Plenario Nacional Azucarero’, 9 February 1963 in Ciencia, 151.
43 Guevara, Tareas, 108.
44 Special equipment was required to load the ships in Cuba and to unload them in the destination port. 
This technique presented a huge saving on jute sacks made in India in which the sugar was previously 
packaged. Miguel Angel Duque de Estrada Ramos, interview, 23 February 2005 and email 
correspondence, Arcos, 10 December 2006.
45 ‘In die 1960 harvest, 47 millions tons of cane had to be moved in 87 days to produce 5.9 million 
tons of sugar.’ Boorstein, Transformation, 207.
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this adds to transport costs. Furthermore, mechanised cutters damaged the cane so it 
had to be replanted more frequently. These problems could have been overcome pre- 
1959 only with serious investment in research, capital goods and transportation 
infrastructure. That would have raised the costs of production for private capitalists, 
while the plentiful supply of cheap labour kept costs down. Most of the value-added 
to sugar was in refineries and sugar-based .manufacture, largely controlled by US 
interests who lacked incentives to mechanise the harvest.
The minor feats accomplished by Guevara’s mechanisation project were perhaps 
more significant in assuaging resistance to mechanisation, than in productive 
advances. The fact that militant sugar workers dropped their resistance to 
mechanisation demonstrated their confidence that the Revolution would provide 
alternative employment and social welfare. As Miguel Duque Estrada de Ramos, 
who led the mechanisation task force explained: ‘In the epoch of the Revolution, 
these machines did not mean unemployment.’46 Young macheteros moving into 
Havana to study and work would not want to return to manual labour in the 
countryside, they did not oppose mechanisation, and machateros themselves 
contributed to the project to construct cutters, retrievers and cleaners. A task force 
was created to initiate and direct the mechanisation project.
1961 Commission for the Mechanisation of the Sugar Harvest
'Have you seen film footage o f Che cutting cane? That was one o f the 
first prototypes. He was struggling to breathe. So many people were 
sceptical about it that Che wanted to show that it was a possibility and he 
knew that if  he went to cut the cane then the spotlight would be on it. But 
he had to pay a price for that. The dust o f the sugar cane was terrible for 
him. Che was one month, 30 days cutting cane, with a terrible asthma 
attack/ ’ 47
46 , ,Duque, interview.
47 S&enz, interview, 2005.
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The Commission for the Mechanisation of the Sugar Harvest, set up in early 1961, 
was headed by Duque. Guevara told Duque to offer material incentives to 
technicians, engineers and mechanics and sugar workers in the industry to develop 
machinery.48 The first problem was the lack of materials. The blockade was already 
hurting and the mechanics base which was fostered by Guevara around 1963-4 did 
not yet exist. The Commission worked in the workshops of the old mills throughout 
the country. Duque pointed out that: ‘Che knew the task of mechanisation would take 
a long time, but he believed that you had to make a start quickly in order to complete 
it.’49
Despite the obstacles, within one year the Commission had built 500 alzadoras 
(retrievers) for the following harvest. 5,000 were produced in total. The alzadora 
picked up the piles of cut cane to load them onto the mill transportation. Macheteros 
were paid piece-work, and initially they feared that the alzadores would disrupt this 
system, but a solution was reached whereby workers continued to mark their piles, 
honouring the piece-work system.50 Next the Commission moved on to cane cutters 
and despite the blockade, Guevara managed to import a US and an Australian model, 
to examine how they worked, in order to adapt the design to build on top of tractors 
which the Revolution was able to import.51 Duque explained the complications 
involved: ‘Some machines only work on erect cane, others won’t pass over ditches in 
the irrigated lands, and stones can break the blades of the machines. Adapting the 
cutters to Cuban conditions was a long process.’52
However, the Commission had no intention of working towards perfection before 
introducing the cutters. It took nine months to create an enterprise to construct the 
machines, but with the cooperation between the mechanics and around ten engineers 
including Czechs, Hungarians, Argentinians and one Bulgarians, 600 of these simple 
models were built in the first year. The machine had problems, but it was a start and
48 Duque, interview.
49 Duque, interview. See also Borrego, El Camino del Fuego. La Habana: Imagen Contemporanea. 
2001,233-5.
50 Mendndez, interview, 17 February 2005.
51 Borrego, Camino, 235.
52 Duque, interview.
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it was used in the harvest of 1962-1963. Guevara himself pioneered tests on the 
machine, so he was well aware of its deficiencies. He applied socialist emulation to 
the tests, to provoke enthusiasm. Borrego recalled that Guevara challenged him to a 
competition on the first machines: ‘We began a 6am helped by some companeros 
who had worked in the construction of the machines. The task finished at 6pm, with 
just 15 minutes break after the first six hours... when we finished, almost at dusk, 
Che appeared jubilant, and with his short breath [from asthma] he spoke about the 
advantages and disadvantages of the cutter and ending by saying that the battle to 
mechanise cane was being won.’53
Speaking to sugar workers mid-harvest, Guevara said the cutters were in the 
experimental stage and explained initiatives underway to improve them: ‘The cutter, 
as it is today, is cutting cleaner than the average machetero\ he said, urging the 
workers to make constructive criticisms to help improve the machine.54 He described 
his own experience days previously when the machine blades broke, injuring a 
companero: ‘the machine is dangerous’ he warned. His audience applauded when he 
announced that he had cut 45,000 arrobas in one week [495 metric tonnes], to which 
he replied: ‘I don’t tell you for the applause, but rather to put the example here and 
show you my record so that you break it tomorrow: 45,000 arrobas, a new operator, 
without attending a school!’55 Guevara’s commitment to leading by example as a 
management technique; engaging workers via fraternal competition, known as 
socialist emulation, meant he had to engage on a practical level in these daily tasks. 
Guevara’s final record was to cut 22,000 arrobas in one day.56
In 1961, Guevara instructed Alfredo Menendez, director Consolidated Enterprise 
(EC) of Sugar, to locate the Cuban engineer Roger Lopez, who, before the 
nationalisation of the sugar industry, had been designing the equipment to transport 
azucar a granal in Camagiiey. Lopez had already requested to leave Cuba for the 
US, but Menendez asked him to stay long enough to finish the project. He agreed:
53 Borrego, Camino, 236.
54 Guevara, ‘Discurso en la Plenario Nacional Azucarera’, 9 February 1963, in Ciencia, 129.
55 Guevara, cited by Borrego, Camino, 315.
56 Duque interview & see Borrego, Camino, 315.
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‘because he wanted to see his work finished’.57 MININD provided him with a car and 
a revolutionary engineer to shadow him both to learn and ensure he did not carry out 
sabotage. When the work was complete, Guevara facilitated the engineer’s exit to 
join his family by Christmas. Menendez said: ‘the engineer explained that if he had 
been treated in the way Che had treated him since the beginning, he would have 
stayed in Cuba, but that his family was already over there.’58 Guevara said they were 
welcome to return. Just as Guevara believed that technology per se had no ideology, 
he also believed that technical skills could be exploited for the benefit of the 
Revolution regardless of the ideological affiliations of the technicians. As a result the 
azucar a granal equipment was inaugurated in Cuba, which private capitalists had 
been unable to introduce before the Revolution due to workers’ resistance.
There was a similar story in relation to the centro de acopio. As explained, 
mechanising the cutting and retrieving of cane would necessitate a mechanical 
cleaning process before the cane was processed. Duque recalled that before 1959: ‘an 
engineer in Camagiiey had designed a plant to ‘dry clean’ the cane with air to remove 
the earth and straw. Better if the cane was burnt, but it could also be used with green 
cane [unburnt].’59 His design was abandoned after workers opposition pre-1959. A 
Canadian engineer Robert Henderson Kernel, assisted the Mechanisation 
Commission to complete the construction of the centro de acopio. Henderson stayed 
to inaugurate five centros de acopio as well as working on a combine harvester, 
mounted on a bulldozer, which cut a whole furrow of cane in one go. This machine 
was built for a specific type of cane and was never generalised.60 By 2005, Cuba had 
680 cleaning centros de acopio, distributed throughout every sugar production unit in 
the country.61
For Guevara the importance of the Commission was not just measured in concrete 
results, but also the Revolution’s audacity in working towards complex goals. He 
told sugar workers:
57 Menendez, interview, 17 February 2005. Also, email correspondence, Arcos, 14 December 2006.
58 Menendez, interview 11 February 2005.
59 Duque, interview.
60 Diique interview.
61 S&enz, Ministro, 167.
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‘...objectively the cane cutting machines represent a triumph for the 
Revolution, the demonstration of its capacity to focus its forces in order 
to resolve problems, and the prediction that in the next few years we can 
have thousands of cane cutting machines, and what is more, that we will 
go on improving their design year on year to give them better capacity 
and more effectiveness.’62
The mechanisation project continued after Guevara’s departure from Cuba, although 
not more than 1% of the harvest was mechanically cut in 1970.63 However with 
Soviet assistance from the 1970s onwards and increasing use of Cuban components 
in new combines, by 1990 that figure had reached 71%.64 In 2004, Fidel Castro 
announced: ‘today, there is no one left that cuts sugar cane by hand.’65 Guevara’s 
ambitious project was achieved in Cuba’s most important productive sector. In 
addition, the introduction of this machinery to the sugar harvest meant macheteros 
had to develop mechanical skills for the purpose of maintenance, thus upgrading 
their work.
1963 Cuban Institute of Research into Sugar Cane Derivatives (ICIDCA)
‘ ...the day will arrive when the derivatives o f sugar cane have as much 
importance for the national economy as sugar has today.566
Guevara argued for maintaining pre-1959 levels of sugar production whilst 
developing manufacturing and chemical production based on sugar as a raw material, 
creating a vertical integration of primary and secondary sectors of the economy, 
increasing the value of sugar industry exports. To this ends, the Cuban Institute of 
Research into Sugar Cane Derivatives (ICIDCA) was set up and headed by Miguel
62 Guevara, ‘Discurso en la Plenario Nacional Azucarera’, 17 December 1962’ in Ciencia, 127.
63 Pollit, Sugar, 324.
64 Pollit, Sugar, 327.
65 Fidel Castro Ruz, speech on 60th Anniversary of his admission to University of Havana, in the Aula 
Magna of the University of Havana, on 17 November 2005. 
www.ratb.org.uk/html/cspeaks/fidel_l 105.html.
66 Guevara, inscription at the entrance of ICIDCA in Havana.
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Urrutia, a chemical engineer graduated in the US and nephew of the Republic’s first 
president.67
The principal by-product was bagazo, the cane after the juice has been squeezed out. 
It had long been used as fire fuel in the mills. But Guevara argued that it could be 
manufactured to make cardboard and paper, synthetic fibres including rayon, and 
fulfural which has multiple uses in the medical industry, cosmetics and animal feed, 
the syrup from the cane juice could make alcohol, such as rum. If this could be 
achieved, it would create industrial zones around the mills in the countryside, 
bringing employment and development to those areas. MININD’s own publications 
were produced from bagazo. Menendez pointed out the lack of research carried out 
anywhere in the world on sub-products of sugar. The technology required for such a 
comprehensive derivatives industry hardly existed, so it could not be imported. The 
project was largely dependant on the ICIDCA’s ability to develop its own 
technology. Given the lack of scientists and technicians and the absence of a 
mechanical base in Cuba, advances in this field would clearly be made very slowly 
and only with massive investment: ‘The problem was the cost of the technology, 
which would prevent us competing in the market’ explained Menendez.68 As Vice 
Minister for Technical Development, Saenz oversaw the ICIDCA. He said Guevara’s 
vision was not fully appreciated by his colleagues: ‘Che said let’s produce products 
with more value added than sugar, so that sugar is a sub-product and plastics, 
pharmaceutical drugs and so on, are the main products. But I think we missed the 
point at that time, and now it is too late. ’69
A 1964 report, however, demonstrated that the short term expectations on the 
ICIDCA were not so ambitious: ‘the future of the ICIDCA is in the growing 
emphasis on the processes of fermentation that would allow the Institute to have 
advanced technology in this area.’70 The ICIDA had the assistance of East Germany. 
Saenz said one of the important achievements of the institute was in developing
67 Sdenz, Ministro, 168-171.
68 Men&idez, interview, 11 February 11 2005.
69 S&enz, interview, 2005.
70 ‘Informe del Instituto Cubano de Investigaciones de los Derivados de la Cana de Azucar’, in 
MINAZ, Vol, 6. 101
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research centre technology, experimental areas, pilot plants and prototype 
workshops. For example, a pilot plant for extracting dextrane from cane was set up in 
an old US-owned mill. Saenz affirmed that: ‘the advance made in the ICICDA in the 
first years was notable. Che was very satisfied with the results obtained and had a 
high opinion of the work carried out.’71 In June 1964, the EC of Sugar spilt off from 
MININD to become the Ministry of Sugar (MINAZ), headed by Orlando Borrego. 
The ICIDCA passed over to MINAZ’s jurisdiction where it remains today. Luis 
Galvez, a man Guevara once called ‘the administrator of the future’ has been its 
director for 30 years.72
MINERALS, METALS AND AGRICULTURE
The precondition for industrialisation was the development of a mechanical base in 
Cuba and, consistent with Guevara’s vision of development based on endogenous 
resources, this necessitated the expansion of metal extraction facilitates in Cuba, 
which has the world’s second largest known reserves of nickel. The story of the 
Nicaro nickel mine is both an exemplary and exceptional example of the problems 
and achievements of Guevara’s efforts to develop the metallurgy sector of the 
economy. The nickel story illustrates several vital and recurring themes: Guevara’s 
ambitiousness, the technical backwardness of MININD personnel, the need for 
collaboration from industry workers, the dependence on technicians regardless of 
their political affiliations, and the aspiration to apply the best capitalist technology 
and experts.
Before the Revolution there were two nickel mines in Cuba, both in Oriente. Nicaro 
was owned by the US government and Moa was owned by a private US company. 
The metal was sent to the US for processing. Guevara was aware of how the US had 
defended its interests in the sector under Batista’s reign. The US government, he 
revealed, had drafted the $180 million concession for investment to be granted to
71 S&enz, Ministro, 171.
72 Luis Gdlvez, interview, 9 February 2006 & S&enz, Ministro, 55.
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Moa and Nicaro by the pre-1959 Cuban government.73 Nicaro was founded in 
1943 during the Second World War and expanded in 1952 during the Korean War 
for military purposes. It employed 4,000 workers in continuous production and the 
plant had its own electricity supply. A magnesium plant at Nicaro, called Felton, had 
another 400 workers. The plant at Moa was more modem, employing 1,600 workers, 
also in continuous production. Moa was the last plant finished by US interests in 
Cuba. It opened in 1958 and was abandoned in 1959. Restarting production at Moa 
was a major achievement. Meanwhile production was expanded at Nicaro during 
Guevara’s time as minister.
According to the Cubans, the US government assumed that the Revolution would be 
incapable of operating the mine at Nicaro, since the US technicians had left the 
island and the resources vital for production, particularly ammoniac, were imported 
from the US. ‘The technological dependence of the nickel industry on the US was 
total’, stated Borrego.74 Paralysis would have been politically, as well as 
economically disastrous for the revolutionary government, leaving 6,000 workers, 
including skilled workers, out of work. Their families and the towns built up around 
the mines depended on their income. With few engineers and technicians among its 
ranks, the Revolution relied on the support and collaboration of the mine workers 
themselves to re-establish production. One Cuban engineer Demetrio Presilla, played 
an essential role at Nicaro.75 In 1960, Benjino Lorenzo Regueira Ortega became head 
of the Cuban Mineral Institute (ICM), under the National Institute of Agrarian 
Reform (INRA). Although this was not under his jurisdiction, Guevara advised 
Regueira to travel to Oriente to work with Presilla. Regueira had been on the trade 
mission to the socialist countries with Guevara in 1960, following which the USSR 
sent a team of specialists to assist Cuba at Nicaro, motivated by their own interest in 
Cuban nickel exports. Regueira explained that Presilla initially refused to co-operate 
with the Soviets, affected by years of anti-communist propaganda, but finally he
73 Borrego, Camino, 17 & 140-141.
74 Borrego, Camino, 141.
75 According to Benjino Lorenzo Regueira Ortega, Presilla, who was mixed-race with a black wife, 
decided not to go to the US because of racism in that country, interview, 16 January 2006. Presilla’s 
contribution was highlighted by several interviewees.
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agreed to collaborate: ‘not because of me, but because of his respect for Che’, added 
Regueira.76
In January 1961 Guevara spoke to the workers at Nicaro, warning them of impending 
US or emigre invasion, urging them to increase their output in response to the threat, 
promising they would all benefit from the literacy campaign, which in turn would 
improve production. Borrego recalled: ‘He finished by saying that it was much easier 
to die in a trench fighting the enemy than to work with maximum effort for 365 days 
of the year.’77 From February 1961, responsibility for mining was transferred to the 
EC of Mining in MININD. Guevara immediately set up the Cuban Institute of 
Mineral Resources (ICRM) to carry out important research work in cooperation with 
the EC. The nickel story demonstrates how Guevara fostered collaboration between 
the research institutes and the ECs for production. New mines were opened up, with 
co-ordinates provided by the ICRM directed by Jesus Suarez Gayol.78 In addition a 
railroad and other facilities were built to accompany the new mine, with equipment 
bought in the USSR and England.
From 1963, the administrator at Nicaro was Galvez, a young chemical engineering 
student, who had previously turned around the EC of Cement.79 Galvez was sent 
there to deal with problems created by the desertion of key engineers who left for the 
US and because socialist bloc assistance was not very effective. He said: ‘My main 
role was to get a good understanding of that complex technology, to establish good 
relations with the workers and take a lead in the technical side. I had the factory and 
the mine 20 kilometres away. I practically lived in the factory.’80 Workers at these 
mines received special rations and higher salaries, in recognition of the danger and 
intensity of their work -  they sometimes worked consecutive shifts -  and because 
their incomes provided for their families, given the lack of alternative employment in 
the region.
76 Regueira, interview.
77 Borrego, Camino, 140.
78 Veldzquez, interview, 19 January 2006 & Gdlvez, interview. Details below.
79 This was before he became director of ICIDCA as cited above as well as vice minister of MINAZ.
80 G&lvez, interview.
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The ammoniac necessary for extraction of nickel arrived in weekly shipments from 
the USSR, who also provided credit for the Cubans to buy spare parts from the 
west.81 The credit was repaid in nickel. Galvez recalled that Presilla was keen on 
initiating a new process of separating cobalt from nickel, which would increase 
export values as cobalt prices are higher than nickel. The ICRM studied the 
technology for this process. It was this enthusiasm and drive which made Presilla 
stand out. Galvez said: ‘He was passionate about his tasks. He arrived at Nicaro early 
every day to revise the results of the previous day and inform the morning 
Production Council. He went round with a metal helmet. If he arrived at the Council 
and threw the helmet on the table we all know things were bad.’82 Fidel Castro also 
consulted Presilla about possibilities for future production. According to Galvez, 
they knew each other from the revolutionary struggle in Mayari, a town near the 
mine.
The Moa story surpasses that of Nicaro in terms MININD’s achievements. Borrego 
described Guevara’s campaign to restart production at Moa as a chess game. First he 
met with Moa technicians and engineers, most now re-employed in Havana. He 
asked them to volunteer to return to Moa and when those refusing had dwindled to a 
minority, he told them they had no choice, they were instructed to return. Back at 
Moa, with the help of Presilla and the Soviets and frequent visits from Guevara, they 
prepared to commence production. However, Guevara found out about an Indian 
engineer T K Roy, who had worked on the complex plant design. He was contacted 
in the US and agreed to secret arrangements to get him into Cuba where he stayed for 
one week to help rehabilitate production at Moa. Borrego said: ‘this meant the last 
move in the long awaited checkmate that the Cuban Revolution had given the yankee 
government in the technological terrain, showing that in this sphere revolutionary 
daring could be triumphant when you work with intelligence and decision in the face 
of a powerful adversary.’83
81 Gdlvez traveled to England to buy spare parts with credit provided by the USSR. The parts were 
purchased from the US by an export agency run by a couple sympathetic to Cuba who acted as secret 
intermediaries.
82 Gdlvez, interview.
83 Borrego, Camino, 144.
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Galvez said that one of the new mines opened at Sol Libano contained limonitic 
nickel, a metal composed of iron, nickel, cobalt and silica. There was also serpentine. 
Mao had more limonitic nickel than serpentine, and at Nicaro it was the reverse. 
Galvez explained that both Guevara and Castro aspired to progress beyond the 
production of nickel, which is an intermediary product, to produce stainless steels for 
use in the chemical and food industries. This was achieved in the 1980s in Las 
Tunas, but in Guevara’s time the principal achievement was to continue to expand 
the production of nickel and use its export to the socialist countries, mainly the 
USSR, to fund investments. By the late 1990s Cuba was the sixth producer of nickel 
in the world and the fifth biggest producer of cobalt as a nickel by-product. Cuba 
also produced moderate amounts of ammonia, chromite, gypsum, petroleum and 
petroleum products, salt, silica sand and steel and sulphur as a byproduct of 
petroleum, and other construction materials.84 The examination of research and 
development institutes describes the first faltering steps towards these productive 
achievements.
1961 Cuban Institute of Mineral Resources [ICRM]
‘ We must search for our mineral resources... it is a task for everyone. We 
must prepare many geologists or mine engineers, compaheros who 
explore practically every square metre o f the territory to investigate its 
potential... and do the industrial preparation to get at those metals... we 
are thinking o f developing this path a great deal, which is why we have 
created the Cuban Institute o f Mineral Resources, which is part o f the 
Ministry o f Industries.585
The ICRM was the first research institute set up under MININD, despite the fact that 
there were only two geologists in Cuba.86 The institute therefore relied on the support 
of Soviet, Czechoslovakian and Argentinian geologists among others. Its objective 
was to begin investigations to search and prospect minerals throughout the country,
84 Ivette E Torres, http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/1998/9509098.pdf
85 Guevara, Obreros, 276.
86 S&enz, interview, 2005. S&enz, Ministro, has details.
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which often meant opening up paths to remote areas to transport equipment and 
construct temporary housing.
The ICRM was established to replace the Cuban Petroleum Institute created after the 
nationalisation of the petrol industry in 1960, and before significant petroleum 
reserves were located in Cuba. The Argentinian director of the ICP was transferred to 
the ICRM, but he clashed with the Soviet and Czechoslovakian scientists, reflecting 
ideological differences. The annual report on the ICRM reported that these conflicts 
had held back the work, despite the initiatives of a Soviet scientist called Fiodorov.87 
The director was replaced by Suarez Gayol, a captain in Guevara’s Rebel Army 
column, who directed one of the two Cuban geologists to conduct research on the 
mineral and petroleum mines under production, a decision commended by the report. 
It concluded that: ‘we have to give attention to petroleum, because the real 
possibility has emerged of finding it in some zone. We must continue the 
investigations in such a way that we can see if it is possible to reduce imports which 
consume 80 million dollars every year.’88 Guevara instructed ICRM to prioritise the 
search for petroleum and make a geological map of Cuba in 1962: ‘with special 
practical consideration for the economic problems of the country, such as the 
increase of reserves and the prospecting of supplies of those minerals which 
substitute imports and would be a source of hard currency.’89 In 1964, Saenz 
travelled with Suarez Gayol to Cayo Frances to visit a five-metre deep oil well, the 
deepest found at that point. In 1965 the ICRM was instructed to initiate a 
programme, with modem methods and equipment, to search for reserves of nickel, 
copper, chrome and non-metallic metals, as discussed above. With Guevara’s help 
Suarez Gayol organised peoples’ explorations, with the intention of enthusing and 
integrating young Cubans with the search for minerals. In mid-1964, Suarez Gayol 
left to become Vice Minister of Production in the new MINAZ.
87 ‘Informe del Instituto Cubano de Recursos Minerales’, 11 November 1963, MINAZ, 77.
88 Minerales, 80. On 10 April 1967 Suarez Gayol died in Bolivia where he formed part of Guevara’s 
foco group.
89 ‘Tareas Generales para 1963’, 1962, MINAZ, 591.
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In 1964, the book Geology in Cuba was published. Guevara had initiated the project 
to assist in the education and training of new Cuban geologists. He wrote the 
' prologue:
‘...initially the Institute was characterised by the absolute pre-eminence 
of the geology of petroleum... Lately, it has managed to balance that 
with...the direct search for oil or for metal and non-metallic minerals, 
scientific research of a high level or the training of the cadre necessary so 
that the country can find its own feet in this field.’90
Lamenting the lack of Cuban geologists, Guevara recognised the ICRM’s 
dependence on Socialist bloc assistance, but praised: ‘our capacity to learn from our 
contact with the most progressive scientists of the most advanced fraternal countries, 
as much in technology as in organisation.’91 By 1964, 153 foreign specialists worked 
in the ICRM. In 1965, Saenz negotiated 20 million roubles worth of equipment in 
credit from the USSR for drilling oil.92
Juan Valdes Gravalosa, secretary to MININD Management Council said that 
Guevara was convinced that Cuba had oil and he suspected it was in the Gulf of 
Mexico: ‘I asked him if you believe there’s oil in the Gulf, why don’t we go and 
investigate. He told me that we can’t because the technology for this still doesn’t 
exist.’93 In 1965 the ICRM began to create the infrastructure needed to drill for oil. 
By 2003 Cuba was producing four millions tonnes of petrol a year. By 2006, Cuba’s 
state petroleum company was collaborating on a. joint venture with the Chinese 
government’s Sinopec for deep sea drilling to tap into the Gulf reserves, the 
existence of which Guevara had predicted.
90 Guevara, Prologo del libro Geologia de Cuba, MINAZ, 741.
91 Guevara, Geologia, 741.
92 S&enz, Ministro, 157.
93 Juan Valdes Gravalosa, 22 February 2006.
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1962 Cuban Institute of Mineral and Metallurgy Research (ICIMM)
'We have lots o f iron... we have nickel, we have cobalt, we have chrome, 
we have magnesium; there is a set o f minerals that permit us to make 
alloys, to make special metals when we have developed our steel and iron 
industry, and furthermore, we have copper which is also a really 
important metal. That means that we have to develop ourselves a lot, to 
develop with audacity, to go on creating our own technology...here there 
are no metallurgy specialists, but there can and should be, and this 
should be one o f the great lines o f work o f revolutionary industry. ’ 94
Cuba is abundant in lateritas', reddish ground in humid tropical regions, rich in 
minerals, iron, nickel, cobalt and albuminate (an alkali compound of albumin). 
Guevara set up the ICIMM to complement the work of the ICRM. It was dedicated: 
‘to the tasks of developing and applying new technologies’ in the mineral and 
metallurgy branches, focussing on lateritas whilst simultaneously searching for other 
complimentary non-metallic natural resources, such as magnesium and dolomite, and 
increasing the extraction of copper for future utilisation in the electronics industry, 
among others.95 Guevara wanted to increase the exportable base of the country and 
move towards specialisation in the international division of labour of the socialist 
bloc. In addition ICIMM was to develop technology and investments to expand 
Antillana de Acero, the iron and steel plant in Havana, to assist a metals plant in 
Pinar del Rio and to instruct the ministry ECs on the development of the iron and 
steel industry in the west of Cuba.96 The experimentation with lateritas passed from 
the EC of Minerals to the ICIMM, which piloted a rotating oven to produce sponge- 
iron in the institute. Beyond that however, little was achieved, for which Saenz 
largely blamed the managerial deficiencies of the Institute’s director Faustino Prado. 
However, Guevara had offered Prado unconditional assistance in his work, despite 
his lack of ideological affiliation to the Revolution, because of his advanced
94 Guevara, Obreros, 286-7.
95 Tareas 1963, MINAZ, 591.
96 S£enz, Emilio Garcia Capote & G&lvez, ‘El papel del Che en el desarrollo cientifico y tecnoldgico 
de Cuba’, in 40 Aniversario Ministerio de Industrias, La Habana: Editora Politica, 59-60 & S&enz, 
Ministro, 160-161.
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technical level. Finally Prado was transferred to another position but soon left the 
country. Saenz conceded that: ‘independent of the deficiencies of Prado, it was 
impossible to achieve technological results of this magnitude with only two or three 
years of work.’97 Galvez agreed that good results were achieved in separating cobalt 
from nickel in the pilot plants, but that industrial application would have taken 
massive investments, which were not available. The USSR was only interested in 
importing Cuba’s nickel, not in manufacturing cobalt, so they lacked an incentive to 
invest in the technology.98
When Guevara left Cuba, the ICIMM was closed down, its functions returned to the 
pilot plant at Nicaro and the rotating oven transferred for use in a cement factory. 
Today the Centre for Investigations into the Mineral and Metallurgy Industry carries 
out this work in Cuba and once again the development of metallurgy that Guevara 
promoted is receiving investment.
1963 Cuban Institute for Development of Chemical Industry [ICDIQ]
‘The ICDIQ was created to develop the chemical industry...For now this 
institute should just work to create technology and construct factories to 
. match that technology, that is to say, developing the apparatus and teams 
necessary. It has to act as the investor organisation in relation to the new 
plants:  99
The chemical industry was one of the lines of development which Guevara 
recognised as playing an increasingly important role internationally. He therefore set 
up the ICDIQ to address the lack of material and intellectual resources in Cuba to 
foster this sector, based on the islands natural resources, and to collaborate with the 
EC of Pharmaceuticals. As with the ICIDCA, the chemistry institute was given 
resources to build its own prototypes, pilot plants, and technological equipment,
97 S&enz, Ministro, 163.
98 Galvez, interview.
99 Guevara, cited by S&enz, Ministro, 172-3.
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reflecting the vital role which Guevara assigned to this industry.100 The institute was 
instructed: ‘to assure the projection, execution and establishment of chemical plants, 
such as for the extraction of steroids from cane wax, and the consideration of satellite 
plants necessary for the supply of primary materials.’101 In 1964 the ICDIQ was to 
start to develop technology for the extraction of steroids and carotene from the wax 
of cachaza, the outer film of sugar cane.102 By 1964, a new task was added: ‘the 
development of industrial application of antibiotics, not only for human use, but also 
for animals.’103
In January 1964, Guevara reported that the ICDIQ was established to make the most 
out. of the capabilities of its director Alvaro Garcia Pinera, a chemical engineer who 
worked on soaps and perfumes for Colgate-Palmolive pre-1959. Like Prado at the 
ICIMM, Garcia had no ideological affiliation to the Revolution. Saenz complained 
that Garcia was leading the institute badly and had taken Guevara’s endorsement as 
cart blanche to carry out projects which were unrealistic and irresponsible. Saenz 
explained: ‘He dared to do things irrationally and he broke the laws of engineering. 
With a pencil and slide rule he designed an antibiotics plant. That’s crazy!’104 But 
Guevara dismissed S&enz suggesting he was jealous. He was drawn by Garcia’s 
proactive attitude and enthusiasm for an industry which was central to modem 
development but absent in Cuba. In the end Saenz’s assessment was correct and the 
antibiotics plant, which Garcia had adapted from a yeast factory, never produced a 
single antibiotic and retuned to yeast production: ‘The truth is that all the chemical 
plants that Garcia Pinera had announced and included in the ministry plans also 
resulted in failure. The technical approach to the projects was very superficial and 
disorganised.’105
Vice Minister of Industrial Constmction Angel Gomez Trueba, reflected more 
positively on achievements in the chemical industry, although it is not clear if he was
100 Sdenz, Ministro, 172.
101 Tareas 1963, MINAZ, 591.
102 ‘Oientaciones para 1964’, in MINAZ, 612.
103 ‘Tareas fundamental para el Ministro de Industrias para 1965’, MINAZ, 116.
104 Sdenz, interview, 2006.
105 Sdenz, Ministro, 175.
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referring to the heavy and light chemicals branch, which combined 12 ECs, rather 
than the work of the ICDIQ. Both Trueba and Saenz mentioned the construction of a 
fertiliser plant in Matanzas which was brought into production with East German 
assistance. Another fertiliser plant bought from the British firm Simon Carver was a 
disaster, said Saenz, as part of the equipment collapsed after the Cubans had paid for 
it.106
Trueba recalled that plants were installed for the production of calcium carbide and 
he mentioned a contract with the French chemical industry for assistance in the fields 
of fermentation and sodium hydroxide production that was later cancelled. Trueba’s 
conclusion was equally negative: ‘the lack of understanding and internalisation at 
that this time about this sector had an adverse effect on socialist economic 
development.’107 Saenz speculated that even with a better director at the ICDIQ they 
were unlikely to achieve better results. Effectively they were starting from scratch, 
with few scientists, little equipment and scarce capital. Nonetheless a valuable idea 
and a research methodology was established: ‘The idea was excellent, to make an 
institute with what they call a complete cycle of innovation. The institute develops 
products at a scale where it can build pilot plants which if successful are turned into 
production plants.’108 Despite his long term ambitions, Guevara’s initial aim was for 
the ICDIQ to begin to create the base for a future chemical industry. He may have 
been swayed by the unrealistic pronouncements of Garcia, but the methodology of 
constructing laboratories, prototypes and pilot plants remained valid and the 
innovation cycle is applied successfully in Cuba today at the Centre of Genetic 
Engineering and Biotechnology. After Guevara’s departure Garcia was substituted 
and, like Prado, he left the country for the US.
106 Sdenz, interview, 2006.
107 Angel G6mez Trueba, ‘El MININD en la industrializaci6n socialists de Cuba 1960-1965’, 
Aniversario, 43 & 45.
108 Sdenz, interview, 2006.
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1963 Cuban Institute for Technological Research [ICIT]
‘The main task o f the ICIT is in agriculture, which will serve as the base 
for our industrial development and for the maintenance o f botanical 
science... with scientific controls from the planting o f the seed until 
industrial exploitation.'1™
The ICIT was set up to develop technologies based on agricultural produce. A report 
in 1962 stated that the ICIT’s main task was research which would facilitate import 
substitution, especially of goods purchased in dollars.110 The approach was to create 
stronger links between agriculture and industry and to introduce industrial 
management methods to agriculture in a way which Saenz claimed: ‘anticipated the 
idea of the future complex agro-industry.’111 Directed by Miguel Urrutia before he 
left to direct the ICIDCA, the ICIT was situated on a large farm where laboratories, 
pilot plants and workshops were constructed from scratch. The ICIT mainly carried 
out research at Ciro Redondo, the experimental agricultural centre examined below 
and its guideline for 1964 stated that the ICIT must prioritise: ‘the study of the 
application of experimental cultivation being carried out in our experimental unit, 
controlling and improving its internal systems.’112 In September 1964, Saenz’s vice 
ministerial report stated that the ICIT’s principal task was focussing on agriculture as 
a base for industrial development and the maintenance of botanical science.113 He 
concluded that the ICIT had advanced despite its weaknesses and it was instructed to 
coordinate with the EC of Paint and the EC of Mineral Water and Soft Drinks.
1963 Ciro Redondo
‘Che visited the farm “Ciro Redondo” frequently and maintained a 
special communication with the workers and those in charge. There he 
instigated the experiments with the new salary system which was part o f
109 ‘Informe del viceministro para el desarrollo tdcnico’, MINAZ, 143.
110 MININD, ‘Tareas generales del Ministerio de Industrias para 1963’, 1962, MINAZ, Vol 6, 590.
111 S&enz, Ministro, 176.
112 Orientaciones 1964, MINAZ, 611.
113 VM TD Informe, MINAZ, 143.
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his conception o f the budgetary finance system, which focussed on the 
development o f consciousness, the education system and a new mentality 
concerning production as a social duty... he developed a whole set of  
medicinal plants for the production o f medicines, convinced o f the future 
importance o f “green ” medicine. ’ 114
Named after a Rebel Army captain who died fighting in Guevara’s column, Ciro 
Redondo was a farm in Matanzas which MININD took over to develop as an 
experimental agricultural station used by the ICIT. Guevara first gave instructions for 
a farm to be located for MININD to carry out social-productive and botanical 
experimentation in 1961. In January 1962, 165 students from the School of Army 
Improvement were selected and sent to an abandoned farm identified for this 
purpose. Most of the soldiers had been troops in Guevara’s Rebel Army column with 
low educational levels. It was important that the farm be in bad condition so that 
Guevara’s experiment was not interfering with the productive work of the agriculture 
ministry, INRA. The soldiers’ task was to get 200 hectares of the farm producing 
within one year with little mechanical equipment or other means, and study during 
the evenings.115 A mathematical physicist, Dr Raul Arteche Duque, directed the 
school at the farm.
Ramiro Lastre, one of the Rebel Army troops who worked and studied at Ciro 
Redondo, recalled that 23 varieties of medicinal plants were cultivated on the farm, 
some of them foreign species. They were used in experiments: ‘At one stage we had 
Chinese scientists, a doctor of science and three agronomy engineers, who lived on 
the unit with us.’116 There was also collaboration with the Agronomy 
Experimentation Station in Havana Province, run by two renowned Cuban scientists 
Juan Tomas Ruig and Julian Acuna Gale. That Station had been set up back in 1904 
mainly to experiment with different species of sugar cane.
114 Borrego, Camino, 138, also Borrego, interview, 23 November 2004.
115 Sdenz, Ministro, 178.
116 Ramiro Lastre cited by Luis Hernandez Serrano, ‘Un Hacho de Cuaba Multiplicado por Mil’ in 
Juventud Rebelde, 7 October 2004.
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Guevara pushed for international collaboration in agro-industrial production and to 
this ends two missions, headed by Guillermo Cid Rodriguez, a technical advisor at 
the farm, travelled to Brazil to visit experimental centres. The missions established a 
programme for cooperation and brought back samples, but the collaboration was 
frustrated with the military coup in Brazil 1964. Cid’s wife Cora Lazo Jesus, who 
held a doctorate in pharmaceuticals, used plants from the farm in laboratory 
experiments in the Hospital of Oncology in Havana called the Centre for Scientific 
Investigations. According to Juan Valdes Gravalosa, secretary of MININD’s
Management Council, there were around 40 scientists working under Guevara’s 
directives on the top floor of the hospital. Guevara would meet with them to discuss 
ideas and agree which would qualify for investigation; experiments with medicines 
to combat leukaemia, antibiotics and so on. Valdes once went to the Centre to carry 
out his fortnightly ‘factory’ visit, obligatory for all members of MININD’s
Management Council. He recalled: ‘There was an experiment known as ‘31’. I called 
the boss and asked him what it was. The director told me that this involved taking 
post-exhumation earth in which a flower with strong medicinal qualities grows. They 
were secretly going round the cemeteries!’117 There is no independent collaboration
for this claim, but it is clear that the laboratory was involved in diverse and
innovative projects with medicinal and homeopathic potential and that Guevara, who 
had personal experience of medical research in South America in the 1950s, was 
linked to this work.
In addition to the botanical and technical experimentation, Ciro Redondo was used as 
a social experiment for the organisation of work, management techniques, incentives 
structures and salary scales, aspects of the BFS.118 The salary scale implemented at 
the farm applied a system of norms used in the agricultural sector adjusted for 
activity linked to research and development. Exceeding the norm resulted in over 
payment, including payment in kind. However, the bonus went to a collective fund 
distributed to workers according to their different levels of qualifications, of 
completion of the plan of work, attendance, punctuality, quality and yield of the
117 Gravalosa, interview.
118 Information from S&enz, Ministro, 180-181.
305
Chapter 9: Science and technology
harvest. The first type of award distributed from the collective fund was housing, 
built collectively on the farm itself, second was furniture, radios, horses, and so on. 
Those who lacked punctuality could not receive awards. Additionally, the communal 
fund could be used to finance social works, for example, cinemas and kids groups. 
Saenz explained: ‘This form of payment was designed to relate the worker to his 
productivity, to interest him in raising his qualifications and develop his collective 
spirit. In this way, his individual compensation was a measure of his contribution and 
comprehensive personal effort, including in his studies.’119 This salary scale 
experiment was taking place during the project led by the Ministry of Labour, with 
collaboration from Guevara and others, to formulate a new national payroll. The 
experience at Ciro Redondo was clearly significant for what it revealed about how 
incentives could be devised to link training and productivity to a collective attitude to 
work; work as a social duty.120 Minister of Labour, Augusto Martinez Sanchez visited 
Ciro Redondo with Guevara, flying into the airstrip which the workers had built to 
accommodate his frequent visits there. Saenz also accompanied Guevara, touring the 
farm on horse back to observe all the experiments and cultivations and discussing 
these, the administrative systems, and the study circles with the workers. MININD’s 
Director of Psychology, Dr Graciela de Cueto went periodically to the farm to assess 
those with learning difficulties and other problems.121
In 1965 Ciro Redondo was transferred to the National Centre for Scientific Research 
(CENIC). According to Saenz many of the workers there went on to play leading 
roles in the Union of Young Communists and the Cuban Communist Party. Many 
structures experimented with in Ciro Redondo were integrated into Cuban social and 
technological institutions; the salary scale, the system of collective material 
incentives in the form of housing, other durable goods, or social provisions; the 
increasing integration of agriculture and technology, botanical experimentation and 
the use of ‘green’ medicine.
119 S&enz, Ministro, 181.
120 Details in chapter 6.
121 See chapter 10 for details about Guevara’s collaboration with psychologists.
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NAVAL CONSTRUCTION, AUTOMATION AND 
ELECTRONICS
The research and development institutes discussed above relate to two of the four 
lines of development which Guevara proposed in 1962: metallurgy and sugar cane 
derivatives. The remaining sectors were electronics and naval construction. The 
attempt to foster progress in these areas were not institutionalised in research and 
development institutions; but integrated into the ministerial apparatus via an Office 
for Automation and Electronics, under the Vice Ministry of Technical Development 
and a Consolidated Enterprise (EC) for Naval Construction in the metallurgy branch 
of the Vice Ministry of Basic Industry. These areas of work are summarised 
following an examination of the final institute set up to foster machinery 
development within MININD.
1963 Cuban Institute for Machinery Development [ICDM]
‘ The Cuban Institute for Machinery Development will concentrate its action 
in the development of spare parts and agricultural machinery, coordinating 
the latter with INRA [National Agrarian Reform Institute]'122
Guevara lamented that one of the major failures of the early trade deals with the 
Socialist bloc countries had been the failure to purchase a spare parts factory.123 
Committees for Spare Parts had emerged as ad hoc decentralised projects to tackle 
the post-1959 lack of spare parts and prevent production stoppages. In 1961 the 
Movement for Inventors and Innovators was set up and this evolved into the 
Campaign to Construct Your Machine in 1962.124 The ICDM, operating by. 1962 but 
officially inaugurated in 1963 was a further step towards institutionalising and 
systemising domestic solutions to problems of a lack of capital goods and spare 
parts. The Institute had the spare parts plan for the ministry and collaborated with the 
Light Mechanics branch, which had 10 ECs within it. Saenz explained the aims of
122 Orientaciones 1964, MINAZ, 612.
123 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1962,289.
124 See chapter 8.
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the ICDM: ‘They tried to organise the production of spare parts; to generate ideas, to 
train people, with the aim of producing our own spare parts. Cuba didn’t have a 
mechanical industry, only small workshops. They also tried to develop some 
machines. They gave a national impulse to the sugar harvest... This institute was the 
comer stone for future developments.’125 In addition to the production of spare parts, 
the . ICDM was to focus on constructing agricultural machinery for sugar cane and 
kenaf, a plant used to make fibres. Henderson, the engineer who assisted with the 
mechanisation of the sugar industry, was involved in the work of the ICDM, before 
returning to Canada.
The 1964 Annual Report defined the ICDM’s responsibilities as: planning the 
production of spare parts for the ministry, collaborating with the General Office of 
the Plan of Technical Development to study development in the mechanical branch, 
continuing the work initiated on the development of agricultural machines for cane 
and kenaf, and setting up a metallurgy laboratory to tackle problems that arose in that 
branch.126 In 1964 a plant was set up for spare parts manufacture, including 
experimenting in the production of parts for diesel motors. There was a marked 
increase in the production of spare parts, from 4,500 metric tons (4,770 parts) in 
1963, to 5,940 (8,200 parts) in 1964, an increase of 132%, and with a planned 
increase to 9,800 parts in 1965.127 Clearly there was significant progress in the 
principal task of the ICDM. The institute was also accredited with building a 
combine harvester for the sugar cane -  a new prototype tested in the 1965 harvest. 
They had also improved domestic made machinery to cut kenaf and another machine 
for stripping the bark from the plant. While the institutes work was satisfactory, its 
principal weakness was its dependence on foreign technicians.128
125 S&enz, interview, 2006.
126 Memoria 1964, MININD, 116.
127 Memoria 1964, MININD, 81.
128 Memoria 1964, MININD, 82..
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1962 Office of Automation and Electronics
‘ We are entering the era o f automation and electronics; we have to think 
o f electronics as a function of socialism and the transition to 
communism... Electronics has become a fundamental political problem 
of the country.’ 129
According to Trueba: ‘Automation and electronics were a passion for Che as 
minister of industries.’130 Electronics was essential to the development of the 
productive forces and automation was the highest stage of technological 
development. The development of the productive forces under socialism would be 
measured largely by the extent to which the economy had introduced electronics and 
automation to production and administration.131 In 1917 Lenin had argued that 
electricity was a component of socialism, the highest form of social organisation and 
production. Since then electronics and automation had revolutionised production and 
therefore this technology should be integral to socialist construction. Indeed, 
automation itself could accelerate transition to the new society, said Guevara: 
‘automation is precisely the stage that marks the possibility of taking a leap, or we 
can say, arriving at the historical social stage to which we aspire, which is socialism. 
Without automation, that is, without substantially raising productivity, we will take 
much longer to reach that stage.’132
First, however, there was a more basic and immediate need to extend the electricity 
supply throughout the country. This would serve an important political function, 
decreasing socio-economic differences, mainly between urban and rural Cuba 
exacerbated by the inequality of access to electricity, not just in terms of personal 
consumption, but also in determining where new industries could be located to 
provide employment opportunities. Guevara explained:
129 Guevara, Bimestrales, 20 January 1962,149.
130 Trueba, Aniversario, 44.
131 See chapter 7 for projects to introduce the automation of administrative control.
132 Guevara, ‘El papel de los estudiantes de tecnologia y el desarrollo industrial del pais’, 11 May 
1962, Ciencia, 120.
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‘Electricity is one of the services that contributes more than any other 
towards the elimination of those differences, and electrification of the 
countryside is one of the tasks that the agricultural economy of Cuba 
faces in the future...Without electricity it is impossible to locate new 
industrial centres, and often the preferred location, from other 
standpoints, has been jeopardised because electrical provision was 
insufficient for installing factories.’133
Through MININD, energy plants were bought from the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany and France and set up throughout the island. Trueba 
underlined that: ‘The importance that this action had for the economic development 
of the country and for the survival of the Revolution is difficult to overestimate.’134 
However, purchasing the plants from the Soviet bloc incurred enormous additional 
problems, as Saenz explained: ‘the eastern socialist countries worked with 50 hertz, 
and Cuba worked with 60 hertz. They had to adapt the equipment that was sent to us, 
because we couldn’t change the whole electrical system. Those were big problems 
but the biggest problem was the lack of technical people.’135
In 1963 Guevara still referred to the electricification of Cuba as ‘an enormous task’. 
Regions of the island, particularly the countryside, still did not have sufficient 
electricity provision. Many of the factories planned, as part of the overall 
industrialisation strategy, involved huge investments in energy production. For 
example the mechanised cleaning centres for the sugar cane, discussed above.
Electronics and computing
"Che created the first school o f computing and acquired the first 
computers...Che was the pioneer of the introduction o f computing in 
Cuba.'™
133 Guevara, ‘Discurso en el acto de clausura del Forum de la Energia Electrica, 23 November 1963, in 
Escritos, Vol 7, 135.
134 Trueba, Aniversario, 33-4
135 Sdenz, interview, 2005.
136 Oscar Fem&ndez Mel, interview, 10 January 2006.
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Guevara wanted to import computer components and assemble the machines in 
Cuba. This would reduce the cost of the technology transfer and serve to train up 
electrical engineers until they were capable of manufacturing computers 
domestically. To be truly endogenous, the electronics industry would have to develop 
as a corollary of the mechanical industry based on the extraction and exploitation of 
the islands metal reserves. Given the underdevelopment of Cuba’s metallurgy and 
mechanics industries and absence of an electronics industry and the lack of 
computers in Cuba, Guevara’s concept must have appeared as a pipe dream. He 
answered this criticism directly, stating that with investment, planning and training 
there were no barriers to entry in the international electronics field:
‘Everything indicates that this science will constitute some kind of 
measure of development; whoever dominates it will be a vanguard 
country. We are going to make an effort towards this with revolutionary 
audacity and incorporate ourselves into the group of countries that adapt 
themselves quickest to the technological upheavals that are occurring.’137
Guevara did not just articulate this desire but he directed his companeros to prepare 
for these developments. Eugenio Basott, MININD’s Director of General Services, 
recalled that a few days before Guevara left Cuba:
‘I was in the foyer of the Ministry and there was an IBM machine, the 
old type that used cards. Che came by and we started to talk and he said 
to me: “What do you think about making one of these machines?” I said:
“OK comandante we will start working on that.” He was really 
enthusiastic, and I was very enthusiastic. But that never materialised, 
because he left.’138
137 Guevara, Tareas, 108.
138 Eugenio Busott, interview, 9 December 2004.
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It is difficult to speculate the degree of success the project of developing an 
electronics industry would have enjoyed if Guevara had remained in Cuba as 
minister. Given the slow progress in the metallurgy and mechanics industries, it is 
clear that a computing sector based on domestic manufacture was a long way off and 
remains so today. On the other hand, computers are now abundant in Cuba and fully 
integrated into the education system with a computer in every classroom. This will 
facilitate the training of computer engineers. There are also four Cuban computer 
networks with international internet connectivity: CENIAI (Centre for Automated 
Interchange of Sciences), Tinored (in the Youth Club computer centres), CIGBnet 
(Centre of Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology) and InfoMed (National 
System of Health Information of the Ministry of Health). As Guevara intended, 
electronics and computing have been applied to production, and science and 
technology research.
Automation
‘ Today and tomorrow cadres must be prepared so they are ready in the 
future to take up the next great technological task: the automation of an 
ever-increasing part o f total production, the liberation o f man by means 
of the machine. ’139
For Guevara automation facilitated a technologically sophisticated and centralised 
organisation of production, which freed workers from manual labour to concentrate 
on the political priorities of the planned economy. He argued that technological 
advances impose centralisation over the productive forces, citing as an example US 
electrical generators, which generate one million kilowatts each, more power from 
each plant that the installed capacity throughout Cuba, with a handful of operators.140 
This had important political implications for socialism and communism. Guevara 
explained: ‘That means that in the great modem, centralised and. automated 
industries, man’s action should be carried on outside of production. In the future man
139 Guevara, Bimestrales, January 1962, 149.
140 Guevara ‘Discurso en el acto de graduacidn de 296 administradores del MININD’, 21 December 
1962, Ciencia, 91.
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will express his desires through political institutions which will be created, and 
which will determine the types of production which are necessary in the country.’141 
Automation would permit political control over the economy.
The Office of Automation and Electronics was responsible for the School of 
Automation, set up for middle and then higher level technicians to study automated 
control. Saenz described Guevara’s instructions to the Office as: to study, repair and 
maintain all the means of industrial control in the country, to oversee the training of 
technical cadre who would carry out future studies on the automation of the 
industrial sectors, and to study the feasibility of installing an electronic components 
factory. They were also to direct the projects of the EC of Electrical Equipment. In 
1964 and 1965, they had also been asked for a feasibility study of automation in the 
sugar industry, with pneumatic and hydraulic controls.142
Ambitious projects were underway. The Annual Report for 1964 mentioned a project 
related to the automation of the Maritime Terminal of MINAZ in Matanzas, and the 
installation of a system of control of tachos (the centrifuge which separates sugar 
crystals from molasses) and evaporators. The Report concluded negatively that the 
Office suffered from a: ‘lack of definition of objectives, lack of technical cadres and 
internal organisational deficiencies’143 Trueba recalled that: ‘there was the 
negotiation and construction of a plant to assemble televisions in collaboration with 
Poland. It gave few results.’144 Saenz’s listed their tasks in late 1964 as: ‘the 
development of computing starting from a machine and then the entire field of 
automation in the administrative sphere, the components and, with less urgency, a 
plan for the automation of industries’, but concluded that the Office had achieved 
nothing and was incapable of organising the resources it had.’145 The tasks set for 
Office were often changed substantially. It is not clear, however, whether a lack of 
clarity of the institution’s purpose explains this inconsistency, or vice versa. Despite
141 Guevara, Graduacion, 92
142 Tareas 1963, MINAZ, 589-590 & Orientaciones 1963, MINAZ, 610 & S&enz, Ministro, 163-4.
143 Memoria 1964, MININD, 80.
144 Trueba, Aniversario, 44.
145 ‘Informe del viceministerio para del desarrollo t^cnico’, 24 September 1964, MINAZ, 143.
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his ambitious approach to electronics and automation, Guevara warned against 
idealist goals:
. ‘We also have to struggle a little against the idea that automation, that is, 
the era of electronics, is tomorrow, or within our hands. It is an 
aspiration; an aspiration which is a precondition for the development of a 
new society. But for this there has to be preparation.. .and this will not be 
achieved in one day, not even in the course of a plan’.146
A major aspect of that preparation was in training electrical engineers, and 
developing research experience in the field of electronics, cybernetics, 
instrumentation and computing. This was a precondition to create the material base 
for electronics and automation and even the technical capacity to operate imported 
material.147 The School of Automation was, effectively, a theoretical school, lacking 
the technology for the applied aspect. It counted on Czechoslovakian engineers 
among its teachers.148 The specialities it taught were instrumentation and automation. 
In December 1964, 69 worker-students graduated on the instrumentation course of as 
mechanics of measurement and control. A further 39 students were studying 
instrumentation techniques and 28 were students of automation.149 As Saenz pointed 
out, the Office of Electronics and Automation was a further demonstration of how 
Guevara established apparatus to find immediate solutions to concrete problems at 
the same time as laying the groundwork for future studies and work.150 Ultimately, 
however, during Guevara’s time in Cuba the Office had few tangible results.
Naval Construction
'The naval industry offers prospects o f enormous importance to Cuba, 
but it is not just one industrial branch. Rather it is constituted by a 
complex o f manufacturing: metallurgy, motors o f various types, cables,
146 Guevara, Estudiantes, 131-132.
147 Sdenz, Aniversario, 1963-4.
148 Sdenz, interview, 2006.
149 Memoria 1964, MININD, 75.
150 S&enz, Ministro, 164.
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electrical equipment and electronics, carpentry, etcetera. Cuba will need 
to transport more than eight million tonnes [o f sugar] in 1965, when this 
nascent industry begins... we will need at least 80 ships for Cuba alone.
Other important branches could benefit from naval construction such as 
the coastal trade, which is the cheapest form of internal transport, and 
. the construction of a fishingfleet.’151
Guevara was clear about the complexity of naval construction. It served as a kind of 
litmus test of progress in other industries; metallurgy, electronics and mechanics. As 
a trade dependent country, it would save Cuba millions of pesos on transport costs 
every year. The domestic construction of a fishing fleet would facilitate the 
expansion of the fishing industry, providing substitutes for costly food imports, and 
benefit underdeveloped coastal regions. Pre-empting objections to the huge 
investments required, Guevara asserted that: ‘in terms of hard currency, a ship 
recoups a value of 2.5 million pesos in five trips to Europe, with the average value of 
$500,000 per round trip which constitutes a succulent saving for a country such as 
ours, maritime exporter par excellence.’152
Trueba stated that investments in the naval construction industry had begun in the 
1950s, but that after the Revolution: ‘it could not get the internal consensus 
necessary for its development.’153 The Consolidated Enterprise (EC) of Naval 
Construction was set up 1962 in the Metallurgy Branch of the Vice Ministry of Basic 
Industry. The EC achieved little in concrete terms and Guevara assessed its 
management negatively in June 1964.154 That year it was the EC which fell shortest 
from planned production; 61%, a shortfall valued at over 9,000 pesos and accounting 
for 25% of the total shortfall of the Vice Ministry of Basic Industry.155 Although 
Cuba never managed to build major transport ships, there was progress in 
construction of fishing boats from 1962. This included iron and cement boats, and
151 Guevara, Tareas, 106-107.
152 Guevara, Tareas, 106-7.
153 Trueba, Aniversario, 35.
154 Guevara, ‘Informe de la Empresa Consolidada de Construccion Naval’, MINAZ, 109-110. Also 
Gravalosa, interview.
155Memoria 1964, MININD, 8.
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Cubans trained in naval engineering in the Socialist bloc were able to assimilate the 
technology and the management of merchant ships acquired by Cuba over the 
years.156
CONCLUSION
‘ We are inaugurating an epoch in which scientific knowledge is, and will 
increasingly be, the main force that determines our rhythm o f  
development and our capacity to ‘jump stages’ in the construction o f  
socialism."51
Guevara’s promotion of science and technology within MININD was part of his 
theoretical understanding that communism should arise out of the highest stage of 
development of the productive forces. The greater the level of automation and 
centralisation imposed by the production process, the greater the potential for 
conscious and political control of the economy, as market forces are replaced by 
planning in determining production and consumption. More concretely, however, the 
research and development institutes set up in MININD worked towards immediate 
goals: to find substitutes for costly imports; increase the value added to raw material 
exports, particularly sugar and nickel; create a mechanical industry to exploit Cuba’s 
metallurgy reserves, produce spare parts and to create the foundations for the 
production of capital goods. Parallel to these projects, was the need to create a 
training infrastructure, reduce inequality by extending electrical provision and hence 
employment opportunities, mechanise manual labour and improve productivity.
The development strategies pursued by the research and development apparatus set 
up within MININD illustrate Guevara’s insight into important international economic 
and technological developments. At the same time these were based on Cuba’s
156 S&enz, Ciencia, 13.
157 Guevara, ‘Discursco en el acto de graduacidn de 296 administradores del MININD’, 21 December 
1962, in Ciencia, 148.
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concrete conditions; rich mineral and metal deposits; the predominance of the sugar 
industry and agriculture in general; and recent international advances in the chemical 
industry, computing and automation. Domestic naval construction was premised on 
the development of many other industries, but it was motivated by Cuba’s foreign 
trade dependency. Reality imposed many obstacles: a lack of specialists and training 
facilities; deficient financial and material resources for investment; limited vision 
and appreciation of the aims of the institutes in general and within the government; 
isolation from the advanced capitalist world which impeded technology transfers; 
and the relative backwardness of Soviet bloc capital goods. Guevara’s desire to 
catch up with the most advanced world developments appeared idealist against the 
backdrop of underdevelopment and blockade. Reality put up many barriers to entry 
and limited the progress of these institutes and their economic impact. This is 
particularly the case with the development of the chemical industry, sugar cane 
derivatives and naval construction. On the other hand, as the chapter has 
demonstrated, there were tangible results achieved, particularly in metallurgy, 
machine production and the mechanisation of the sugar industry.
Borrego explained that when Guevara left Cuba the research and development 
institutes within MININD suffered neglect as the ministry was split up and much of 
the apparatus which Guevara developed as part of the BFS was removed by the new 
minister Joel Domenech. Borrego said: ‘This lasted about two years. It was a mistake 
on our part, but luckily we realised that quickly and refocused on thenl.’158 Today, 
institutes covering all the functions of those set up by Guevara between 1961 and 
1963 operate in Cuba. Some of them are the same institutes, but with a new title, the 
ICIDCA has remained in MINAZ. It is arguable that, although the achievements in 
productive terms was limited during MININD’s existence, Guevara’s real 
achievement was to introduce a methodology for applying science and technology to 
production, to force that agenda onto the national development strategy and to 
initiate the institutionalisation of the necessary training and research infrastructure.
158 Borrego, interview, 23 November 2005.
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Jorge Ruiz testified to how Guevara’s vision was gradually realised. He had worked 
with Guevara on attempts to apply computer processing to optimise production, 
including through the introduction of the critical path method for managing projects 
with sequential and parallel tasks. When MININD split up, Ruiz became Vice 
Minister of the Ministry of Minerals, Fuel and Metallurgy from where he was able to 
apply these methods, first tentatively investigated in MININD. Ruiz pointed to the 
substantial economic benefits: ‘For example, through my investigation into the 
mining process at Moa we saved millions of dollars with an operational analysis I 
was doing on that old computer...’159 Ruiz was clear that although such results were 
not attained whilst Guevara was minister of industries, they were the direct legacy of 
a methodology which he promoted. Arguably, Guevara’s legacy is witnessed today 
in the substantial advances in Cuba’s biotechnology industry and the ecology sector, 
which have a link, albeit a tenuous one, to his experimentation in the ICIT, Ciro 
Redondo and the chemical institute.
159 Jorge Ruiz Ferrar, interview, 5 April 2006.
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CHAPTER 10
Consciousness and Psychology
A worker goes to see the Secretary of the Party to say that he wants to become 
a militant.
Party secretary: Well, to be a party member you have to be an example at
work. That means that you have to work 12, 18 or 20 hours a 
day.
So many hours a day -  he asks startled 
Yes, and that includes Saturdays and Sundays.
As welll? -  he says even more alarmed.
Yes, and no vacations.
Neither!?
Neither. What’s more you have to be faithful in your married 
life, no going around with women.
Not even one exception?
None. Also, you have to stop having a little drink after work. 
Not even a little drink to celebrate something? -  he asks 
about to go crazy.
No. And most important thing; you have to be prepared to 
give your life for the country.
Now that is no problem.
Really, why not?
Well, after the lousy life I am going to lead...! 1
For Guevara consciousness meant ‘socialist’ or collective awareness, a commitment 
to the social and economic justice aims of the Revolution. The Spanish word 
conciencia is translated into English as both consciousness and conscience. Here the
1 Joke told by Guevara, cited by Tirso W S£enz, El Che Ministro: testimonio de un colaborador, 
Ciencias Sociales, La Habana, 2005, 245-6.
Worker:
Secretary:
Worker:
Secretary:
Worker:
Secretary:
Worker:
Secretary:
Worker:
Secretary:
Worker:
Secretary:
Worker:
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word ‘consciousness’ is used, but it should be understood in the sense of social 
conscience transcending individual interest. For Guevara international solidarity was 
the highest form of consciousness because it was apparently disinterested assistance 
to people on the basis of shared humanity. Psychology was a scientific instrument to 
measure the state of consciousness at the level of the individual and assess how 
changes in society were reflected within the mind and in value systems. The 
relationship between consciousness and production was symbiotic; raising 
consciousness increased workers’ commitment to production and economic 
management, increasing productivity and efficiency, while economic facts and 
relationships of production impact upon consciousness, or the workers psychological 
state. Incentive systems were the key to raising productivity. Guevara insisted on 
changing the names of functions within his economic management system, the 
Budgetary Finance System (BFS). So while the BFS borrowed from US 
corporations, it adopted titles which reflected the conception of socialist Cuba as one 
big factory. Fidel Castro explained that: ‘Che was opposed to using capitalist terms 
when analysing socialism’.2 Guevara’s deputy Orlando Borrego explained: ‘if  you 
change the social system you also have to change the mentality. So “profit” becomes 
“record of results”. The transference of products from one enterprise to another was 
called ‘delivery of products’ rather than commerce or sales, and ‘market research’ 
became the ‘study of products’. This was part of the effort to turn surplus value into 
surplus product. Under socialism, profit belongs to society, products are exchanged 
between enterprises in one big factory and production is determined by social needs, 
not by commercial imperatives.
The first section of this chapter deals with consciousness, starting with an 
examination of the origin of Guevara’s preoccupation with human beings in the 
development process. It then describes the incentive systems adopted, focussing on 
moral incentives and examining the origins, purpose and achievements of both 
socialist emulation and voluntary labour, as the key tenets of incentives policy. Next
2 Fidel Castro, ‘Speech by Fidel Castro on October 8, 1987’ in David Deutschmann (ed) Che: A 
Memoir by Fidel Castro, Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1994, 153.
3 Orlando Borrego Diaz, Seminar. International Youth Seminar: With Che's Ideas, La Habana, 23 
November 2002.
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there is a discussion about the Rehabilitation Centre at Guanahacabibes, a form of 
moral disincentive and of San Miguel de los Banos, a rest and recuperation centre 
which demonstrated the concern for workers’ wellbeing. The second section of the 
chapter examines Guevara’s belief that psychology was a legitimate and useful tool 
under socialism. It illustrates how psychology was applied and the obstacles which 
this apparatus faced, expressed as a general scepticism of its scientific value. The 
policies formulated within MININD, to raise consciousness and apply psychology, 
began in an experimental way as part of a search for solutions to the problems of 
socialist transition. The chapter illustrates how the early tentative policies were 
gradually institutionalised to become vital elements of the BFS.
CONSCIOUSNESS
Guevara’s emphasis on the importance of developing a collective consciousness 
during the process of socialist construction has been attributed to many influences: 
early interest in philosophy, reading Marx’s philosophical works, observations in the 
Soviet Union, the experience of mass participative revolutionary struggle in Cuba, 
Latin American political traditions, the critique of US and westem-European 
Marxists of existing socialism.
Maria del Carman Ariet Garcia, scientific co-ordinator at the Che Guevara Study 
Centre in Havana, claimed that the theme of man’s centrality in social development 
had concerned Guevara since his adolescence. This claim is based on her analysis of 
Guevara’s bibliographical notebooks, kept since the age of 17, in which he listed and 
commented on the books he read. He then indexed these notes. Ariet stated that: ‘the 
index allows, beyond all speculation, a measurement of the breadth of his knowledge 
and the paths down which his intellectual interests took him.’4 Specifically, 
she added, it demonstrated: ‘the importance that he gave to philosophy, as a kind of
4 Maria del Carmen Ariet Garcia, El Pensamiento Politico de Ernesto Che Guevara. Mexico: Ocean 
Press, 2003, 30-1. See also Ariet, Una Aproximacion a la Periodizacion de la Vida y  Obra de Ernesto 
Che. Guevara, Havana: Ocean Press, no date.
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central axis articulated in the later development of his thoughts... This being a stage 
of searching and evolution it is not possible to make absolute statements, but if 
something is valid from a general reading of the notebooks, it is his permanent 
insistence on the theme of man and his place and development in the world and 
society.’5 Ariet claimed that Guevara first embraced Marxism through his interest in 
philosophy.6 According to Borrego, Guevara had read the Argentinian philosopher 
Jose Ingenieros, founder of the Revista de Filosofia in Argentina and: ‘all the 
American philosophers. He read the classical European philosophy, including Kant 
and Hegel.’7 Aged 25 years, Guevara referred to himself as: ‘the eclectic dissector of
o
doctrines and psychoanalyst of dogmas’. The bibliographical index is an early 
indication of a systematic approach to knowledge which characterised Guevara’s 
work in the Cuban government.
According to Borrego, Guevara’s emphasis on consciousness originated from his 
reading of the ‘young Marx’ and observations in the Soviet bloc.9 Marx characterised 
the psychological or philosophical manifestation of capitalist social-relations as 
alienation and antagonism; the result of the commodification of labour power and 
the operation of the law of value. For Guevara, the challenge was to replace the 
individuals’ alienation from the productive process, and the antagonism generated by 
class relations, with integration and solidarity, developing a collective attitude to 
production and the concept of work as a social duty. In the Soviet bloc he observed 
that the operation of the law of value and the neglect of political education were 
obstacles to the transformation of consciousness. Capitalist competition created the 
drive to increase productivity through technological innovations and increasing 
exploitation. Alienation and antagonism increase with productivity. Under socialism, 
the development of the productive forces could be less accelerated. However, 
it should be accompanied by a growth of consciousness. In transition to socialism
5 Ariet, Politico, 36.
6 Ariet, interview, 20 January 2005.
7 Borrego, interview, 30 November 2004. Ingenieros (1877-1925) wrote Principios de Psicologia 
Biologica analysing the development, evolution and social context of mental functions.
8 Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, The Motorcycles Diaries: a journey around South America, Fourth Estate, 
1996,152.
9 Borrego, interview, 24 January 2005.
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market forces are replaced by planning, workers take conscious control of production 
instead of being enslaved by the imperatives of accumulation, thus reversing their 
alienation and antagonism. For Guevara it was vital that efforts to change 
consciousness be incorporated in socialist transition at the earliest stage. Borrego 
explained: ‘The USSR and other socialist countries said that first you had to develop 
the productive forces to reach a determined standard of living, emphasising the 
material aspect, and later you could be concerned with consciousness. Che said 
communism would be reached much quicker by raising consciousness 
simultaneously with the productive forces.’10
Marxists outside the Soviet bloc influenced Guevara’s conception of socialism as a 
function of consciousness.11 Unlike these Marxists, however, Guevara was in the 
position to formulate policies to concretise these ideas. It is far easier to criticise 
existing socialism for underestimating the importance of consciousness and 
education then to actually formulate alternative policies which can be implemented 
and institutionalised. By the time the Ministry of Industries (MININD) was founded 
in February 1961, Guevara had developed his critique of Soviet socialism and was 
already searching for a solution to the problem; what mechanism or policy can be 
formulated to raise the level of consciousness and commitment to socialist 
construction?
For Guevara, the development of consciousness was dialectical; it would increase 
with experience and with material changes in the standard of living and in the 
relations of production. Hence his emphasis on political education and skills training, 
both to accelerate changes in the productive sphere and in the individuals’ capacity to 
understand material changes from a political perspective. July 1962 Guevara 
expressed this dialectical understanding of changing consciousness:
10 Borrego, interview, 24 January 2005.
11 Particularly Paul Sweezy, Leo Huberman and Paul Baran from the US. Guevara told MININD 
directors he planned to circulate an article by Sweezy about how the growing domination of the law of 
value in Yugoslavia signalled its return to capitalism. ‘Reuniones Bimestrales’, 5 December 1964, in 
Ministerio de Azucar. El Che en la Revolucion Cubana: Ministerio de Industrias, tomo VI, La 
Habana: MINAZ, 1966, 568.
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‘Four or five years ago, how many of you said that the Communist Party 
was shameless and that socialism was absurd? Lots of people said this or 
thought it... But when the socialist stage of development arrived, people 
began to change their way of thinking. Are they opportunists? Of course 
not... I came from the bourgeois class, anticommunist and all that and I 
came to understand a set of truths in the process of struggle. People have 
changed, they have a new mentality... this is a dialectical process where
19everything is changing.’
The Revolution, Guevara stated, was in the process of destroying the bourgeois state
apparatus but it was also necessary to destroy the ideas associated with that apparatus
in people’s consciousness: ‘Companeros, I beg you...read [Lenin’s] The State and
Revolution. Go back to the chapters where he talks about the transition of the old
society to the new society and all the remains in this new society that is being 
11constructed.’ This dialectical understanding of the relationship between 
consciousness and material reality explains Guevara’s acceptance of the need to use 
a combination of material and moral incentives, fazing out material incentives until 
they are redundant and can be removed without jeopardising production. The 
theoretical analysis has been explored in chapter 5 on the Great Debate. This chapter 
examines the actual mechanisms built into the BFS to raise consciousness.
INCENTIVE SYSTEMS
Incentives are the key to increase productivity and efficiency in the context of 
underdevelopment and scarcity and in the transition to socialism and communism. 
Guevara believed that it was necessary to use a combination of material and moral 
incentives, giving increasing weight to the latter at every stage until material 
incentives are no longer necessary. The different forms of incentive are summarised 
below:
12 Guevara, Bimestrales, 14 July 1962,268.
13 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1962, 269.
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Material incentives
1. Wage incentives: to improve qualification and skills level.14
2. Individual awards for production over the norm: cash bonus or payment in 
kind. Guevara least approved this form of incentive, which he believed fostered 
individualism, hindering the development of collective consciousness and the 
concept of Cuba as one big factory. Such incentives resorted to the same 
motivating device as capitalism -  personal gain. Individual material incentives
. were largely phased out by the late 1960s.
3. Collective awards for production over the norm: usually payment in kind. 
Collective material incentives did less to encourage individualism, as they 
forged a team spirit and the impulse to work for the common benefit, albeit a 
select group and a material motivation. However, Guevara warned of the 
potential for corruption when work collectives prioritised their own material 
interests over those of society. As example he cited technicians in the Soviet 
Union who battled to lower the plan of production because:
‘.. .this means there is less danger of not completing the plan and it 
is easier to surpass it, which means more awards. So a 
contradiction is being created between the state and'the enterprise 
which is not socialist; a contradiction that commits an outrage 
against the development of consciousness... you see it much more 
in Yugoslavia, but you also see symptoms in the Soviet Union in 
my view. The leader of a Soviet enterprise is a production 
technician and he deceives the central apparatus.’15
4. Material disincentives: Individual’s salaries were deducted due to the failure to 
meet the production norms. Guevara explained: ‘We have given this a slightly
14 See chapter 6.
15 Guevara, Bimestrales, 21 December 1963,425.
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ridiculous name “material disincentive” but it does make sense. It means we 
recognise a material incentive in a negative way.’16 Guevara also applied strict 
disincentives to members of the Management Council as a form of compelling 
discipline. Anyone late for three meetings would be docked three days pay, as 
would anyone failing to carry out obligatory factory visits.
With serious shortages caused by the US trade blockade, productivity decline and the 
budget deficit, the reliance on material incentives required monetary rewards and 
consumer goods that were scarce. As Minister of Labour from 1967, Jorge Risquet 
highlighted the problem: ‘How can Cuba emphasize material incentives at a time of 
serious shortages and economic sacrifices when 90 miles away such goals can be 
more easily fulfilled? We simply would be creating conditions for the mass 
migration of Cubans to the United States.’17 Moral incentives, therefore, had 
economic as well as ideological benefits.
Moral incentives
Moral incentives were institutionalised in MININD through Socialist Emulation and 
Voluntary Labour. Both are examined below. San Miguel de los Banos was a form of 
moral award, a recuperation hotel for worn out workers, while Guanahacabibes, a 
rehabilitation centre, took the form of a moral disincentive. These are also examined 
below.
16 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1963,424.
17 Jorge Risquet, cited by Bertram Silverman, Man and Socialism in Cuba: The Great Debate. New 
York: Atheneum, 1971, 19.
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SOCIALIST EMULATION
Socialist emulation is fraternal competition between workers, either as individuals or 
collectives, in the productive sector. It was the principal method of institutionalising 
moral incentives. Cuban economist Carlos Tablada explained that:
‘In developing a model of economic management, Che viewed socialist 
emulation as a fundamental element in the structure of the entire system.
As against the competition generated by the law of value, Che 
counterposed a fraternal competition based on socialist comradeship that 
favoured emulation. The Cuban Revolution was characterised from the 
outset by broad mass participation... Che worked to establish the same 
approach in the economic sphere, in the process of laying the material
1 ftand technical base for socialism.’
There were several mechanisms to promote participation in emulation. One 
collective moral incentive was what Roberto Bernardo called the ‘play motive’: 
‘Festive-like voluntary work projects in agriculture.’19 Emulation assemblies were 
convened in all the work centres to elect the most productive and dedicated workers 
into the ‘advance guard movement’. Prizes were presented to workers at official and 
public ceremonies for extraordinary effort or productivity. Workers were awarded 
with symbolic flags and plaques at ceremonies which usually took place on historic 
dates commemorating Cuba’s 500-year struggle against colonialism and imperialism. 
Not only did this connect increased productivity with consciousness, it also linked 
the forging of socialist attitudes with national pride. Bernardo observed that: 
‘Competition was to be fraternal marked by no secrecy, a spirit of camaraderie about 
the whole process and willingness to share one’s superior method. Fraternal 
competition takes place among individuals and groups, for example, among brigades,
18 Carlos Tablada, Che Guevara: Economics and Politics in the Transition to Socialism, 2nd ed, New 
York: Pathfinder, 1990,199.
19 Robert M Bernardo, The Theory o f Moral Incentives in Cuba, Alabama: University of Alabama 
Press, 1971, 58.
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sections, factories, regions and the like. In addition there are ad hoc and task-oriented 
emulations...’20
Initially, workers tended to receive hybrid prizes, part material and part moral. 
Material awards sometimes included cash, but mostly goods in kind, such as 
refrigerators, housing, vacations and travel to Eastern Europe. Later, material 
incentives were phased out in favour of moral incentives under socialist emulation. 
According to Bernardo, by late 1965 and early 1966 cash prizes were abolished 21
In 1963 a National Emulation Committee was set up with provincial, regional and 
local emulation commissions presided over by the Ministry of Labour. Every 
Consolidated Enterprise (EC) in MENIND had an emulation office and 
implementation of indices measuring worker performance was monitored by the 
trade unions. For example, 100 points were awarded for completion of the plan, with 
an extra three points for every percent by which it was surpassed and a deduction of 
6 points for every percent by which it was not met22 Committees for the Struggle 
Against Bureaucracy were set up to monitor the administration of socialist 
emulation, setting rules and norms. Cuban economist Carlos Tablada wrote that 
Guevara: ‘was interested not only in the system's concepts and procedures, but also 
in how well they were grasped by the workers.’23 An examination of MININD’s 
bimonthly meeting transcripts confirms this.
Emulation was a national policy before voluntary labour was institutionalised in 
MININD. Already by March 1962 Guevara was complaining that: ‘we have let 
emulation fall by the wayside... Emulation has to be the base that is constantly 
moving the masses and we should have people who are constantly thinking of a way 
to stimulate it.’24 A companero in the meeting complained that the National 
Emulation pamphlet had an extraordinarily complex system of scoring which put off
20 Bernardo, Incentives, 57.
21 For details see Bernardo Incentives.
22 Bernardo Incentives, 60.
23 Tablada, Transition, 199.
24 Guevara, Bimestrales, 10 March 1962,177.
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the workers.25 This pamphlet, Guevara revealed was the result of six months work 
and consultations, so MININD directors should use but adapt it. He cited an 
Argentinian phrase:
“‘Do things badly, but get them done.” Last year we did a very bad 
emulation on sugar, but it was emulation. This year we are waiting; 
commissions of the Central Planning Board [JUCEPLAN], and a 
commission of the CTC [Cuban Workers Confederation], commission of 
the ORI [Integrated Revolutionary Organisations] and quite an 
extraordinary technical super-study, and we continue going round in 
circles. All of this was ready in November, and we have waited three 
months without doing anything.’
Directors should go ahead and get experiences to improve upon next time, Guevara 
said, criticising himself for obeying the authority of JUCEPLAN and accepting their 
bureaucratic proposal. A year later emulation award ceremonies had been taking 
place monthly in MININD and Guevara said the ultimate award would go to the 
worker chosen to sit with Fidel for the May Day celebration27 By July 1964, 
MININD directors were complaining about the quantity of emulation goals set by 
distinct institutions for competition within and between ministries. Manuel Marzoa 
Malvezado, director of the EC of Basic Chemicals added that: ‘all of them have to be 
made real in the factories... for emulation to be alive and understood it should be as 
simple as possible so that the worker can make it their own and it needs to be one 
only and not many which confuse them and don’t allow the worker to analyse 
emulation.’28 Others directors added similar complaints. Guevara insisted that 
achieving extra points or reaching production goals should not be the main aim of 
emulation. The productive side was important, he said, but: ‘the real importance of
25 Companero, Bimestrales, March 1962,234.
26 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1962,234.
27 Guevara, Bimestrales, 9.March 1963, 354. Even proponents of the Auto Financing System of 
economic management, with its emphasis on material incentives acknowledged that ‘workers assign 
great importance’ to public recognition, ‘especially when the award is to join the prime minister, 
comrade Fidel Castro, and other leaders of the revolutionary government on the presidential rostrum 
during parades and mass gatherings.’ Joaquin Infante in Silverman, Socialism, 168.
28 Manuel Marzoa, Bimestrales, 11 July 1964,495-6.
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emulation is educational, because if it doesn’t reach the masses it is for people who 
already have political education, like the directors’. He assured his colleagues that 
through discussion with Minister of Labour, Augusto Martinez Sanchez and with the 
CTC these problems would be resolved so that the masses could understand the 
indices used to measure performance.30
Guevara claimed that people were most inspired to emulation by the example of 
workers like Reinaldo Castro, who became famous through emulation in the sugar 
cane harvest.31 He said: ‘These types of people are, let’s say, the highest expression 
of work and people aspire to be forerunners like Reinaldo Castro and other vanguard 
workers.’32 An entire movement was built around sugar harvest emulations. Jorge 
Risquet, a military commander and member of ORI in Oriente at this time explained:
‘We created the Millionaires Movement in which a machetero had to cut 
a million arrobas, each arroba has 11 kilograms. In the first year we had 
11 brigades with 48 men in each. Organised into brigades, the work 
became collective for the first time... Che asked me to implement this 
new style of organisation in Oriente. There was a little resistance because 
the previous method of individual production had lasted for centuries.
The task of organising with emulation was arduous, but Che praised this 
movement.’33
Calling poor sugar workers millionaires had a psychological impact, elevating the 
importance of productive capacity over financial wealth. Emulation was a means of 
encouraging Cubans to work harder, either in their day job, or voluntary labour
29 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1964,498.
30 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1964,499-500.
31 Bom in Oriente 1941, Reinaldo Castro, became famous in 1962 for cutting 1,000 arrobas a day (11 
metric tonnes) by hand in nationwide emulations. In 1963 he cut 2,308 arrobas in eight hours (leaving 
piles in the field). He recalled that: ‘Che was there. He spent the whole afternoon observing me cut 
cane. He looked at me as if he was calculating, because he already had the combine harvester in his 
mind.’ In 1964 Reinaldo Castro was named National Hero of Work. Reinaldo, who was illiterate 
before the Revolution, graduated with a social science degree in 1977. He joined the Cuban Council of 
State and the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, among other important positions. 
Gabino MangUela Diaz ‘Los Tiempos de Reinaldo’ in Trabajadores, 2 January 2006.
32 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1964,498.
33 Risquet, interview, 8 February 2005.
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agricultural projects. The incentive to compete was moral, with some material 
awards in the first half of the 1960s. As voluntary labour was institutionalised, 
emulation served to consolidate the moral incentive to unpaid work, linking 
consciousness to production through the use of decommodified labour power. This 
was an experimental process, in which Guevara relied on learning by doing and 
maintaining constant vigilance against bureaucratisation.
VOLUNTARY LABOUR
In August 1959 in Yugoslavia, Guevara had seen voluntary labour brigades formed 
of students being paid to build a road. Omar Fernandez Canizares, his deputy on the 
‘good will’ mission recalled: ‘Che said this was impressive, it united them and 
anyone could do it. The problem was that we didn’t have money in the National 
Bank to pay for voluntary labour. He said that if the Cuban youth accepted it without 
payment it would be a triumph.’34 Guevara consulted the Association of Rebel Youth 
-  predecessor of the Union of Young Communists (UJC) -  suggesting that it be 
applied in Cuba, not just for building roads, but also hospitals and neighbourhood 
housing. Consequently, voluntary labour took off in Cuba; first, in construction 
projects, then the agricultural sector and by 1963 in industrial production.
Voluntary labour was decommodified labour, undermining the operation of the law 
of value. Dedicating labour power, without financial compulsion, to different 
economic sectors helped steel the concept of work as a social duty and made workers 
conscious of problems and progress in national production. It broke traditional 
barriers between workers of different sectors and skill levels, particularly between 
manual and administrative work and forged the concept of Cuba as one big factory 
under socialism. It was a mechanism for integrating the mass of workers into the 
revolutionary transformation of social-relations and for broadening the concept of 
vanguard beyond those who had fought to overthrow Batista. The key points for 
understanding the importance which Guevara gave to voluntary labour appear below.
34 Omar Fem&ndez Cafiizares, interview, 2 March 2006.
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Origins and institutionalisation of voluntary labour
Guerrilla warfare by its nature is voluntary and unpaid. But Guevara demanded more 
than just combat from his troops, who built workshops, schools, medical centres and 
farms, thus introducing the concept of work as a social duty. In his examination of 
Rebel Army education 1959-63, Fred Judson said: ‘The experience of Guevara in the 
Sierra Maestra was a precedent’.35 After 1959, Guevara returned to the Sierra 
Maestra with his Rebel Army escorts to help build a school in Caney de la 
Mercedes.36 Other forms of voluntary mass participation were institutionalised 
through the people’s militias set up nationally in 1959, and the literacy campaign of 
1961. Medical graduates dedicated two to three years to work in rural Cuba and 
scholarship students dedicated vacations to agricultural work. Guevara celebrated 
these developments:
‘This is a form of education that improves youth cadre, that prepares 
them for communism: the form of education in which work loses the 
category of obsession that it has in the capitalist world and becomes a 
social duty, carried out with joy, carried out with revolutionary songs, in 
the most fraternal camaraderie, by means of invigorating and uplifting
-3*7
human contact.
By 1961, a significant reallocation of Cuban labour from the countryside to the cities 
had taken place, resulting in an unprecedented shortage of agricultural labour. 
However, the National Production Conference in August 1961 initiated a 
development strategy based on accumulation in the agricultural sector. Bertram 
Silverman explained that: ‘Reversing rural-urban migration through a program of 
resettlement made little sense because economic plans called for a technological
35 Judson adds that in the Second Front controlled by Raul Castro’s guerrilla’s column from March 
1958, ‘social organization and civil administration were expanded much further.’ Fred C Judson,
Cuba and the Revolutionary Myth: The Political Education o f the Cuban Rebel Army, 1953-1963, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, 141.
36 Angel Arcos Bergnes, interview, 30 March 2006.
37 Guevara, ‘Qu6 debe ser un joven comunista’, 20 October 1962, in Guevara, Obras 1957-1967, tomo 
2, La Habana: Casa de Las Americas, 1970, 165.
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revolution in agriculture that would shortly reduce agricultural labor requirements.’ 
The solution lay in voluntary labour, which allowed the reallocation of labour to 
agriculture on a seasonal basis.
In 1960, as head of the Department of Industrialisation and President of the National 
Bank of Cuba, Guevara helped construct a nursery in Las Yaguas, a slum area in 
Havana where members of the Department had carried out the literacy campaign. He 
also cut sugar cane.39 However, the use of voluntary labour in industrial production 
came later with the initiative of Angel Arcos Bergnes, head of the Office of 
Personnel and director of both the light mechanics branch and the textile branch in 
MININD.
Arcos explained that this began in 1963 when the plan for tobacco exports was 
unfulfilled because the factory making cigar boxes was behind. At Arcos’ suggestion 
the factory workers volunteered to add work shifts in the week and work on Sundays 
to catch up with the plan. They were joined by volunteers from throughout the 
branch. On the Sunday Guevara joined in, which further enthused the workers. Given 
the projects success, Arcos decided to implement the practice throughout his 
branches in factories which were not completing their plan of production. Guevara 
was enthusiastic and monitored the movement’s progress.40 Arcos said: ‘Che saw it 
as a sub-system of the BFS because unpaid voluntary labour raises consciousness. 
With time, I also saw that voluntary labour didn’t just influence production, but also 
consciousness.’41
The light mechanics branch began to issue bonds for participation in voluntary 
labour. The bonds served as a receipt, symbolic payment for work carried out for 
society, as evidence of the effort invested, and as an incentive. Bonds became a kind 
of currency. Six blue bonds, issued for four hours labour, could be exchanged for one 
green one, for 24 hours work. The bonds themselves had the profiles and quotes of
38 Silverman, Socialism, 18-19.
39 Juan Valdes Gravalosa, interview, 22 February 2006 and Acros, interview, 2006.
40 Arcos, email correspondence summarising a chapter about voluntary labour from his book pending 
publication in February 2007,21 September 2006.
1 Arcos, interview, 2006.
333
Chapter 10: Consciousness and Psychology
Cuban national heroes: Jose Marti, Antonio Maceo, Jose Antonio Mella, Camilo 
Cienfuegos and Fidel Castro. The latter was quoted: ‘We will have what we are 
capable of producing.’ Finally the bonds were exchanged for ‘Communist 
Certificates.’ At an award ceremony in January 1964, Guevara presented three new 
‘Communist Certificates’ to members of what became known as the Red Batallion. 
Those who had who had completed 80 hours of voluntary labour in the last four 
months of the year were ‘members of the batallion’, those who had done 160 hours 
were ‘distinguished members’, and those with 240 hours were ‘vanguard 
members’.42
Guevara was clearly impressed with the initiative and attributed the campaign’s 
success to Arcos: ‘the companero whose enthusiasm applied to a concrete task has 
resulted in a massive mobilisation in his branch.’43 He revealed that the bonds had 
been vilified by some CTC leaders, and added that the idea of a Communist 
Certificate was absurd:
‘Nonetheless they are an extraordinary success. There are people who in 
four or five months of emulation have won three Certificates; 240 hours 
three times which means 720 hours. In four months there are 960 hours 
in an 8 hour working day and these people have 720 additional hours that 
means that they are working five or six extra hours a day including 
Saturdays and Sundays to win one of these Certificates... that has to 
make us think. This is fantastic.’44
The three most outstanding workers were: a man with 980 hours of voluntary labour, 
additional to his day job, which meant doubling his work day; a worker over 70 years 
old; and a woman with 340 hours, the most accumulated by a woman. Guevara 
announced that in the last four months of 1963, 774,344 hours of voluntary labour 
had been carried out in the vice ministry of light industry, more than half of that in
42 Arcos, email, September 2006.
43 Guevara, ‘En la entrega de certificados de trabajo comunista’, 11 January 1964, in Obras, Vol 2, 
239. See also Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1963,427.
44 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1963,427.
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Arcos’ light mechanics branch. The volunteers were like sportsmen, he said, who 
dedicated themselves to win a race. This was facilitated by the formation of 
voluntary labour brigades set up and competing throughout the ministry in autumn 
1963. First Guevara had challenged Arcos to emulation between the ministry and 
light mechanics branch. The ministry brigades were called the Red Batallion and by 
January 1964 there were 20 brigades with ten workers in each committed to a 
minimum of 80 hours voluntary labour in six month. Guevara was head of the 
Batallion, De La Fe was deputy and Arcos was co-ordinator, responsible for 
organising the work and the transport.45 By July 1964, the Ministry of Sugar 
(MINAZ), just created with Borrego as minister, and the Ministry of Justice also 
adopted the voluntary labour bonds 46
Guevara said that the ministry should aspire for everyone to achieve a certificate of 
240 hours within one year, which meant over 4 hours voluntary labour every 
Sunday 47 ‘We are trying to create “the spirit of October” all year, every month, 
every day, in all the companeros,’ said Guevara, in reference to the rise in production 
and productivity during the Missile Crisis in October 1962, as workers rallied to 
resist imperialist intimidation. The phenomenon was repeated as voluntary labour 
brigades sprung up in October 1963 after Hurricane Flora wreaked havoc on the 
island. The spirit of October was: ‘The spirit of considering the work that one is 
doing at that moment as a fundamental task for the country, whatever it is, however 
humble or simple it is.’48 Even bureaucrats were animated by this spirit, said 
Guevara, as suddenly papers had flown around and problems had been solved49 
Through emulation, voluntary labour became an instrument of institutionalising that 
spirit outside of moments of crisis.
Rosario Cueto Alvarez was Borrego’s secretary and a secretary of ORI in the 
ministry. In one Production Assembly she accepted Guevara’s challenge for a 
brigade to emulate with his team in the sugar cane field:
45 Arcos, interview, 2006.
46 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1964, 508-9.
47 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1963,428.
48 Guevara, Certificados, 242.
49 Guevara, Certificados, 242.
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‘The emulation was pretty equal, and then we discovered that Che was 
sending one of his escorts to spy on us so we started to do the same. The 
competition was so tense that with pain I have to confess that when I was 
informed that Che was having an asthma attack I was pleased because it 
gave us an advantage in the cane cutting. According to the calculations of 
the regulator my brigade won!’50
Guevara was a sore loser, but when the National Institute for Agrarian Reform 
(INRA) challenged MININD to a contest he sent for Rosario to find out how she had 
won. ‘I told him everything; I confessed that when I heard that he had an asthma 
attack I was pleased. He split his sides with laughter when he heard that!’51 Rosario 
pointed out how the emulations spread the practice and enthusiasm for voluntary 
labour. She pointed out that: ‘If I hadn’t emulated with Che, I would never have cut 
cane because I don’t like it. I did it so that he wouldn’t beat me. But a woman who 
cuts 200 or 300 arrobas in one day yields economic results. It was the same in 
industry as in agriculture.’
As participation in voluntary labour accelerated, trade union and ORI representatives 
in MININD complained they should be in charge of organising the movement as 
political leaders, not those in administrative roles like Arcos. On Easter Sunday 
1964, a thousand MININD workers were mobilised and 20 trucks were needed to 
transport them to the countryside. Cueto Alvarez complained that Arcos could not 
organise this alone. She took over with Yolanda Fernandez Hernandez, a trade union 
leader in the ministry. They went to the fields to mark out the furrows to ensure that 
the work was organised. The weekend was a success so Cueto Alvarez insisted that 
the trade unions should be responsible for this mobilisation. Guevara replied: 
‘Rosario, it is true that in the beginning I didn’t have confidence that the trade unions 
could mobilise and organise everything, but today I see that you can. You are right 
and it is true that this is a trade union task.’53 The task passed into the hands of the
50 Rosario Cueto Alvarez, in Adys Cupull & Froilan Gonz£lez (eds), Entre Nosotros, La Habana: 
Ediciones Abril, 1992,118.
51 Cueto Alvarez, Nosotros, 118.
52 Cueto Alvarez, interview, 20 March 2006.
53 Guevara cited by Cueto Alvarez, interview. See Nosotros, 120.
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trade union leaders, including Fernandez who said that Guevara insisted that 
voluntary labour be well organized: ‘If the work is organised when you take workers 
there, after you can talk about how much was done and what they are responsible for. 
This guarantees that the work is awarded later.’54
Maria Teresa Sanchez, another UJC cadre and Director of the Department for 
Technical-Scientific Information, recalled the festive spirit and mischievousness of 
the youth mobilisations, including one incident where they made a dummy the size 
of a man, dressed it up, took it to the roof of the ministry at the end of work hours 
and simulated a fight between two people. When a crowd had gathered they threw 
the dummy down to the ground, causing panic. The dummy had a sign saying; 
‘everyone to voluntary labour!’ Guevara was furious and met them to all to discuss 
it. Fernandez recalled that: ‘this was when Che told us that the youth should be joyful 
but serious.’55
Jose Luis Punales, Director of EC of Beer, said that workers’ incorporation into 
voluntary labour demonstrated how their mentality was transforming. According to 
his testimony, it did serve to turn work into a social duty and a social pleasure:
‘In 1964, our enterprise had one million hours of voluntary labour, only 
the tobacco and flour sectors came close to us. I was a member of the 
Red Batallion commanded by Che; you had to do 240 hours of voluntary 
work every six months, outside your work hours, either holidays or night 
times. This isn’t easy. We practically donated our vacations to this work.
Che usually controlled the last hours of the 240 and said where you 
would do it. He was convinced that voluntary labour had to be hard... For 
us it was practically an award. We were proud of our contribution. When 
we began we were few, but it became normal, all the workers committed 
to voluntary labour. This is what Che called leading by example.’56
54 Cueto Alvarez, interview.
54 Yolanda Fem&idez Hemdndez, interview, 24 March 2006.
55 Fernandez, Nosotros, 112. Also Maria Teresa Sanchez, Interview, 8 March 2006 & Sdnchez, 
Nosotros, 81.
56 Jos6 Luis Puflales, interview, 21 January 2005.
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However, Guevara made several stipulations for carrying out voluntary labour 
correctly. These are examined below.
Verifying claims
Guevara instructed MININD’s inspectors to verify claims about the number of hours 
of labour contributed. Director of Supervision, Juan Borroto, recalled: ‘There was a 
worker with 1,500 hours of voluntary labour in six months. This seemed too much to 
Che and demanded that this was verified, but it was true.’57 In the January 1964 
ceremony, Guevara did not award Certificates to a list of workers whose claims had 
been submitted too late to be verified.58
The economic versus educational function of voluntary labour
Commentators outside Cuba have pointed to the economic rationale behind the 
emphasis on voluntary labour and moral incentives, that of capital accumulation.59 
These attempts to calculate in economic terms the contribution to Cuba’s economic 
development are useful in that they illustrate the scale of mobilisation involved. 
However, they also miss the important point, the educational and ideological 
function of voluntary labour. Recognising that unpaid labour accelerates 
accumulation, Bertram Silverman underscored the political importance of the 
practice, which, he suggested was: ‘a more consistent translation of Marx's idea of 
primitive accumulation when applied to a socialist society than the route used in the 
Soviet Union.’60 This, he concluded, was the fundamental rationale behind the 
voluntary labour movement. It is clear that for Guevara, while voluntary labour had 
to be useful and productive, that was not its principal function. He said: ‘The 
importance of voluntary labour is not reflected in the directly economic aspect that
57 Juan Borroto, interview, 26 February 2006.
58 Guevara, Certificados, 238-9.
59 ‘The wages saved through unpaid labor apparently exceeded $300 million [pesos] in the period 
1962-67... 1.4% of the yearly average of Cuba’s national income during this period.’ Carmelo Mesa- 
Largo, ‘Economic Significance of Unpaid Labor in Socialist Cuba’. Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review. Vol 22: 3 (April 1969), 339-357.
60Silverman, Socialism, 20.
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could be reported to the enterprises or to the state.’61 On the other hand, ‘inventing’ 
chores for voluntary labour was aimless and put people off. He said: ‘the most 
unpleasant sensation that one can have is to waste time. Last Sunday I took part in 
voluntary labour and wasted my time... I was looking at my watch every 15 
minutes... we have to achieve the identification of man with the work, we have to 
organise it.’62 Voluntary labour should be productive and necessary; it therefore 
could not be programmed by bureaucrats but must respond to production needs as 
they arose. Additionally, one worker’s voluntary labour could not be the cause of 
another’s unemployment and so this work had to be practiced outside of normal 
working hours.63 Borrego dismissed the view that voluntary labour is a form of 
exploitation to generate surplus value:
. ‘Voluntary work in socialism is for social and collective benefit. No one 
would do voluntary labour in a private capitalist enterprise. It is a 
conception of production that cannot be compared with capitalism. Here 
the production has a social content. Part of the surplus product goes to 
investment to develop the country and part to social benefit. Che insisted 
that voluntary labour be seen as a social duty from which you obtain 
indirect benefits.’64
This was consistent with Guevara’s notion of undermining the law of value through 
the decommodification of labour. Guevara repeatedly argued that voluntary labour 
had a pedagogical function which could be converted into: ‘a useful instrument to 
accelerate along the path toward communism.’65 Participation in voluntary labour 
reflected a rising consciousness acquired at work, a commitment to the socialist 
transition project, the demonstration of a communist attitude that would carry the 
masses along by its example.66 To forge this communist attitude, labour power had to 
be expended without financial compensation. The incentive was moral, recognition
61 Guevara, Certificados, 240-1.
62 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1964, 508.
63 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1963,431.
64 Borrego, interview, 24 January 2005.
65 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1963,430-1.
66 Guevara, Certificados, 241.
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of an individual’s merit as a worker. A new society could not be built without 
sacrifice. In addition, it was organised as a mechanism for closing the traditional gap 
between manual workers and administrators or intellectuals, combating bureaucratic 
estrangement from production, and heightening class awareness. Guevara told 
MININD directors that: ‘more than 80% of us here come from the petit-bourgeoisie, 
a class with distinct ideological scars which cannot be got rid of just because the 
system changes. It takes constant ideological work to correct this.’67 That ideological 
work was achieved through voluntary labour, particularly manual labour. Miguel 
Duque Estrada de Ramos, Director of MININD’s Office of Special Issues, confirmed 
that: ‘at that moment those of us from the petit-bourgeoisie were a majority and
(\SIvoluntary labour helped us develop a social consciousness.’ Bureaucrats worked as 
equals with factory or agricultural workers and directors got to know their 
subordinates and could experience the problems of production first hand.
To exploit fully the educational and ideological value of voluntary labour, Guevara 
believed workers had to understand the concrete results of their sacrifice. When 
workers assembled on Sunday mornings he would make a speech, introduce 
everyone, thank the employees of the production unit, explain the production process 
and outline the day’s aims. Fernandez pointed out that: ‘if they hadn’t participated in 
voluntary labour, ministry workers would have only known those industries through 
documents.’ This work certainly broadened her own knowledge of the different 
sectors and enhanced her concern for the overall progress of the ministry: ‘Through 
voluntary work I learnt to concern myself with the flow of production in industry, 
with product quality, labour discipline, the organisation and normalisation of work, 
training and daily heroism in industry.’69 In this way, she argued, Guevara was 
successful in linking consciousness with economic production:
‘We spoke with the workers, we toured the factory. Che described the 
new machines that would be purchased and those which were obsolete.
He always made a concrete speech, gave thanks and said what had been
67 Guevara, Bimestrales, 12 September 1964, 521-2.
68 Miguel Angel Duque de Estrada Ramos, interview, 23 February 2005.
69 Fem&ndez, Nosotros, 110.
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produced. He assessed the cracks, the leaks, contacted the directors. It 
was a movement which allowed the workers of MININD to be linked to
7fiproduction.’
This process was most effective when workers could see the concrete results, not just 
read them on paper.
Moral compulsion not obligation
The educational and ideological function of voluntary labour would be undermined if 
workers felt obliged to participate. Guevara said: ‘one of the things that I consider 
fundamental and important is that voluntary labour is not obligatory.’71 On the other 
hand, Guevara advocated moral compulsion, which meant challenging accepted 
behaviour patterns, leading by example and adopting voluntary labour as a 
mechanism to foster progress towards an ideal social paradigm, by lauding desired 
characteristics as exemplary. He concluded: ‘We uphold the system which Fidel has 
baptized “moral compulsion”. This method has given good results up to now, even 
though it has not been carried out in the systematic way required and we have fallen 
into bureaucracy at times.’ There was a fine line between moral compulsion and 
obligation, which the youthful exuberance of trade union cadre in MININD 
threatened to cross. A complaint was once lodged against Femdridez who was 
accused of getting annoyed with a worker who said that he was unavailable for 
voluntary labour. Guevara reprimanded her: ‘Che told me that this wasn’t right; there 
were workers with personal problems who truly could not go... I was young and I 
did not understand that, I just thought that they had a political responsibility that 
couldn’t be missed. I had to overcome this. I spoke to companeros, if they didn’t go
70
one day they went another.’
70 Fernandez, interview.
71 Guevara, Bimestrales, September 1964, 521-2.
72 Memoria Anual 1961-1962, in Ministerio de Azucar. El Che en la Revolucion Cubana: Ministerio 
de Industrias. Tomo VI, La Habana: MINAZ, 1966, 684.
73 Fem&ndez, interview.
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Guevara insisted that the impulse to participate in voluntary labour had to come from 
the workers themselves. This was imperative if work was to become a social 
pleasure. The vanguard could use their personal example as a form of moral 
compulsion, but they could not make participation obligatory. Miguel Figueras, 
Director of the Perspective Plan in MININD admitted that he did not attend 
voluntary work every Sunday. He was young and enjoyed going out on Saturday 
nights. While Guevara criticised him, saying that voluntary labour was educational, 
he never obliged him to attend. However, Figueras was swayed by his example: ‘He 
certainly had the will power to go every Sunday.’74 In March 1965, on submitting the 
Perspective Plan for 1966-1970, Figueras told Guevara: “‘Ok, so that you don’t 
criticise me anymore, on 1 April I am going with all the workers of the Department 
of the Perspective Plan to cut cane for one month.” Che replied that I wasn’t doing 
any more than completing my duty.’ Leading by example was a management 
principle in MININD. Guevara said: ‘The Ministry has always been guided by the 
policy of example, that means that no-one has the right to expect what they don’t do. 
No one has the right to recommend what they don’t feel capable of doing; from 
voluntary labour to daily work, the enterprise directors should lead their
7 A  fcompaneros.’ Cueto Alvarez pointed out that establishing this leadership principle 
in relation to voluntary work resulted in mass mobilisation, beginning with the 1,000
77employees in the ministry it swept up the workers in every production unit.
Numerous anecdotes demonstrate how Guevara’s example made workers feel 
morally compelled to participate, the more so as he persevered through his asthma. 
Risquet concluded that: ‘through his example, Che turned voluntary labour into an 
expression of a healthy man and the will to work for society.’78 Eugenio Busott, a 
member of MININD’s Management Council said: ‘We tried to act like Che, to work 
many hours as well as voluntary work. We started to see our comrades in a more 
humane way. I started to feel a great sense of camaraderie, especially through 
voluntary labour because you give something without personal gain. We participated
74 Miguel Alejandro Figueras, interview, 27 January 2007.
75 Figueras, interview.
76 Memoria 1961-1962, MINAZ, 684.
77 Cueto Alvarez, interview.
78 Risquet, interview.
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willingly, lovingly, and we felt great. No amount of money in the world can buy that 
feeling.’79
In the final bimonthly meeting of MININD, Guevara gave an exposition of the 
importance of voluntary labour as a measure of a new attitude towards work, work as 
a social pleasure:
‘There is a very beautiful phrase from Mao, something like “man as an 
alienated being is a slave of his own production”, a slave to work, 
handing over his work, handing over part of his nature with it and he only 
realises himself as man when he does things that are not necessary to his 
physical being, that means, when they are transformed into an art or, for 
example, when he does voluntary labour or something that yields a little 
for society, something that man hands over. We still have not achieved 
the point when man hands it over; rather we have created an apparatus 
where society sucks up voluntary labour. I don’t know whether you can 
understand this disquisition, but it is very distinct. That man feels the 
necessity to do voluntary labour is an internal thing. The two should be 
united. The environment should help man feel the need to do voluntary 
labour, but if it is only the environment, the moral pressure that obliges 
man to do voluntary labour, then the evil of man’s alienation will 
continue, that is to say, they are not doing something intimate, a new
sothing, done in freedom so they don’t remain a slave to work.’
Voluntary labour was just one aspect of the mechanisms which Guevara created to 
move away from man’s alienation, changing the social-relations of production and 
undermining the law of value at its root. Voluntary labour has become an integral 
part of productive life in Cuba. By 1968, 15-20% of the agricultural labour force 
was estimated to be made up by non-agricultural workers. Silverman said: ‘Such a 
transfer of labour could only make economic sense if  it was based on moral rather
79 Eugenio Busott, interview, 9 December 2004.
80 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1964, 562-3.
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than material incentives. Cuba’s investment into social conscience could be 
tapped.’81
In the 1966 sugar harvest only 1.7% of around 300,000 workers who participated in 
voluntary labour received material rewards so arguably their participation was not 
motivated by material aspirations.82 During the mobilisation as part of the campaign 
for a ten million ton sugar harvest in 1970, Jacqueline Kaye wrote that: ‘The 
Revolution is attempting to rehabilitate the zafra [harvest] as a symbol not of 
exploitation but of independence and achievement, and it is an attempt of some 
psychological complexity which it is difficult for us to appreciate fully.’ Bernardo 
argued that the renunciation of overtime payment is another form of voluntary 
labour. From late 1967 this was fazed out so that by the second half of 1969, 
overtime pay had been eliminated.84 However, this and other measures were 
introduced after Guevara’s departure from Cuba, and the consequences or results of
O f
such policies should not be considered to reflect directly on him. However, 
Guevara made a decisive contribution in introducing, fostering and institutionalising 
voluntary labour and socialist emulation. For Guevara these were tools to embed the 
concept of work as a social duty within the BFS. They are tools which remain 
integral to Cuba’s socio-economic and political infrastructure.
REHABILITATION CENTRE AT GUANAHACABIBES
The Rehabilitation Centre at Uvero Quemado, in Pinar del Rio province in the east of 
Cuba, was on the Guanahacabibes peninsula, the name by which the Centre became 
known. There are two important characteristics about the Centre. First, only EC 
directors and other ministry management personnel were sent there, not 
administrators of production units, nor the production workers. Second, going to the
81 Silverman, Socialism, 19.
82 Bernardo, Incentives, 58.
83 Kaye, Jacqueline (ed), The New Man in Cuba, London: The Britain-Cuba Association, November 
1969,1.
84 Bernardo, Incentives, 1964.
85 See introduction to Part 4.
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camp was optional; those who did not accept the reprimand could reject it by leaving 
MININD. Given the voluntary nature of the camp, and its political education 
function, Guanahacabibes is assessed as one of the policies formulated within the 
BFS which aimed to raise consciousness. It was a kind of moral disincentive.
The roots of Guanahacabibes lay in the hard labour camp set up by the Department 
of Education of the Rebel Army on Cayo Largo in 1959 for soldiers under 
reprimand. Guevara was involved with Cayo Largo in his capacity as head of 
training for the Rebel Army. Cayo Largo is a sandy, mosquito-plagued island of 32 
kilometres long, a maximum of 800 metres wide and three metres above sea level. 
200-300 members of the Rebel Army were sent there instead of to prison for 
undisciplined behaviour or pretty crimes. They worked on construction. Cayo Largo 
was not considered safe for civilian projects because of the threat of military attack; 
it is close to the Playa Giron where the Bay of Pigs invasion took place in April 
1961.
After the Department of Industrialisation was set up, Guevara sent Jorge Ruiz, a 
leading member of the 26 July Movement and an architect, to assess the camp. Ruiz 
recalled the tough conditions:
‘The soldiers remained armed due to prevailing myths created during the 
revolutionary process that no-one could be disarmed. There were no 
. women, no drink, you had to be in the water between 5-10pm because the 
air changed and the mosquitoes would eat you... Cayo Largo was very 
primitive; those in charge had the capitalist world as their frame of 
reference. There was a rock that jutted out 300 metres and the directors at 
Cayo Largo would make soldiers sit on the rock for four days to punish 
them. It was very bad, lots of mistakes were made.’
Edison Velazquez, head of Inspection in the Department of Industrialisation, became 
the first director Guevara sent to Cayo Largo, following a complaint that he had
86 Jorge Ruiz Ferrer, interview, 5 April 2006.
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abused his authority by harassing a female colleague. The story illustrates an 
important characteristic of Guevara, that he was most demanding on his closest 
collaborators. The complaint was anonymous, but Guevara insisted it could not be 
ignored because Velazquez’s role demanded absolute moral infallibility. Velazquez 
denied the accusation. He said:
‘We could argue with Che. We were both revolutionaries. We were both 
annoyed. He said that this undermined the trust they had placed in me.
This was unjust. I continued this polemic with him for many years. I 
. always held a grudge about it. He sent me to Cayo Largo, where I 
worked in construction and did guard duty, while the crocodiles walked 
right past. A plane came once a week with correspondence and to take 
away the sick.’87
When Velazquez sent a note to Enrique Oltuski, a colleague on the Management 
Council of the Department, Oltuski spoke to Guevara who said that he was very 
pleased Oltuski had raised the issue as he had discovered a new quality in him, 
solidarity. Guevara told Oltuski that he could replace Velazquez there if he wanted.88 
Guevara was intransigent about the need for discipline and accountability.
Ruiz’s recommended that the camp at Cayo Largo be closed down and that inmates 
either be given licence to return to the armed forces, sent to goal to finish sentences 
for crimes committed, sent to school, or just released. Cayo Largo was gradually 
transformed from a punishment centre into fishing centre and tourist resort, which it
Q Q
remains today. However, during this process, Ruiz said that Guevara got so
87 Edison Veldzquez, interview, 19 January 2006.
88 Veldzquez, interview, 19 January 2006. Needless to say, Oltuski declined the offer. On return for 
Havana, Veldzquez was substituted as Head of Inspections. A few months later, Guevara nominated 
him as the Department’s delegate of Las Villas province. It was a sign of confidence given the 
political problems in that province. In 1963, Veldzquez became Director of EC of Nickel, an industrial 
sector which Guevara prioritised. Veldzquez had regained Guevara’s trust, but Veldzquez’s bitterness 
is evident in his arguments with Guevara in the MININD bimonthly meetings.
89 ‘First we built a school of fisheries. In the north of the Cayo we put industry to tin and salt the fish. 
Later, when the military situation was less precarious, we turned the east of the island into a tourist 
centre with a hotel and wooden cabaflas. Thus, I converted it into a centre of awards. At one point all 
of the national schools of Cuba sent people there for the weekend as an award.’ Ruiz, interview.
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annoyed with the people in charge there that he wiped his hands of the issue.90 
Meanwhile, he sent Ruiz to find an alternative venue for a rehabilitation camp for 
MININD which would have an educational function. Ruiz chose the Guanahacabibes 
peninsular.
Before the Revolution this territory belonged to a US logging company and after 
1959 a foundation of farm workers was set up there to replant trees; pines, eucalyptus 
and fruit trees. Directors sent from MININD provided a labour force to assist them 
and to build the infrastructure, including a landing strip for Guevara’s plane. Initially, 
the men slept in the open air. Then they made tents, then wooden huts, then houses of 
cement and iron. Gradually in addition to MININD directors, military personnel were 
also sent there and students who had abused foreign scholarships and been expelled 
from the socialist bloc countries where they were studying.91 Arcos calculated that 
there were between 60 and 80 people there, most of them for three or six months 92 
In setting up the Centre, Ruiz said: ‘We had learned from our revolutionary 
principles about the errors committed in Cayo Largo. You have to understand 
Guanahacabibes as part of an integral system in MININD. It was physically tough 
but it was more moral than physical.’93 There was no legislation to send people to 
Guanahacabibes, it was an initiative introduced by Guevara, which some of the 
Revolution’s leadership did not approve.
Guanahacabibes was for those who had committed administrative errors. Those 
accused of criminal activity were sent to a normal criminal court. Initially, Guevara 
himself determined the punishment for administrative failings, such as adjusting 
inventories, carrying out unauthorised investments, ignoring MININD’s regulations 
and other miscalculations which jeopardised production and planning. Then the 
Administrative Disciplinary Commission (CODIAD) was set up. As Head of 
Supervision, Juan Borroto was involved in the Commission. He said: ‘When Che 
created the CODIAD he told us that he had made a mistake at the beginning by
00 __ f , ,Ruiz, interview.
91 These included Cubans expelled from socialist bloc countries for causing a scandal through sexual 
relations with the natives. Others had simply not studied.
92 Arcos, interview, 2006.
93 Ruiz, interview.
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taking unilateral decisions and he preferred they were made by the CODIAD.’94 The 
Commission’s most severe punishment for administrative errors was to recommend 
someone be sent to Guanahacabibes for between one month and one year.
When a companero was sent to Guanahacabibes they made the journey alone. This 
involved several buses, trucks and a long walk; a journey of 350 kilometres which 
took 5 to 6 hours. All of which reinforced the voluntary nature of the reprimand. 
Directors had plenty of time and personal incentive to pull out, and only a sense of 
revolutionary commitment stopped them doing so. As MININD’s Director of 
Personnel it was Arcos’ responsibility to dock the workers’ salary during their time 
there and prepare the report which directors took with them. Directors turned up and 
showed the report to Barbaro Camejero, who ran the Centre. He discussed the report 
with directors and explained: ‘why you needed to work on your character to be part 
of the revolutionary vanguard.’95 Arcos said: ‘If you live 25-35 years under 
capitalism, you retain many characteristics from capitalism. You work under 
socialism, you are a socialist and a revolutionary, but your old life has influenced 
you. If you made an investment that wasn’t approved, it didn’t benefit you, but you 
were undisciplined.’96 After the days work, there were evening study circles. Arcos 
described the first directors of Guanahacabibes, Johnson and Montalbo, as bandits 
who directed the Centre badly until they were replaced by Camejero who understood 
the educational function which Guevara assigned to the place.
In January 1962, Guevara complained that it was a conceptual mistake to regard the 
Guanahacabibes as a feudal sanction. It was a revolutionary sanction for 
revolutionaries who committed mistakes and who should know better, he said. 
Doubtful cases should not be sent to Guanahacabibes and criminal acts should be 
punished with prison, whoever carried them out: ‘To Guanahacabibes we send the 
people who should not go to prison, people with more or less serious failings of 
revolutionary morality... In other cases it is not punishment but a kind of re­
education through work. The work conditions are hard, but not bestial. And they are
94 Borroto, interview.
95 Arcos, interview, 2006.
96 Arcos, interview, 2006.
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in charge of improving those conditions themselves.’97 He acknowledged that some 
companeros considered Guanahacabibes to be an unjust reprimand, but insisted that 
people who had been sent there had a positive view:
‘I have recommended to the companeros on the Management Council of 
the ministry that they go... Among the castigated are political cadre of 
the first magnitude. A foreign comrade was there for nine months, who 
taught the others and was very good there. Of the people that I have seen 
there, none have left feeling bitter or angry. One should not have this 
concept of Guanahacabibes [as a feudal punishment] because otherwise 
you run the risk that people who go there think of it as the end of the 
world. We don’t consider it that. And people go to Guanahacabibes to 
work; it isn’t their undoing or anything like that... In addition, those who 
go to Guanahacabibes are those who want to go. Those who don’t want 
• to go leave the Ministry. No-one should go to Guanahacabibes who does 
not want to go, but they leave the Ministry and work somewhere else.
Q O
There is no opposition to this.’
Guevara pointed out that indiscipline was punished in this way in the army. Given 
that many MININD directors had been in the Rebel Army or the underground 
movement in the cities it is not surprising that they took the concept on board when 
applied to industrial management.
In the July 1962 MININD bimonthly meeting there was a detailed discussion about 
three directors, all present at the meeting, found guilty of administrative errors. Only 
one of them had been sentenced to Guanahacabibes. The cases serve to illustrate the 
kind of administrative indiscipline which occurred and how the each case was judged 
on its merits. Guevara admitted:
97 Guevara, Bimestrales, 20 January 1962, 166.
98 Guevara, Bimestrales, January 1962, 167.
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‘It is true that our justice system is applied a little elastically, reprimands 
are not the same for everyone because there are antecedents... this is 
established in the justice systems throughout the world, from bourgeois 
to socialist justice... It is evident that justice cannot be applied 
mechanically, nor do we have set squares or electronic machines to 
impose punishments in every case. We need to investigate every case... 
there is no set square Guanahacabibes.’99
The first case concerned the director of the EC of Pharmaceuticals. A National 
Commission investigating the situation of medicines in Cuba had claimed that the 
enterprise was not making use of the raw materials in its laboratories. The EC denied 
this without checking and compiled a new list of supplies it required from abroad for 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The director, Ruben Vicente, was not present when 
the Commission investigation took place, but on his return he ignored its 
recommendation that serum could be made in Cuba, which would save the country 
$500,000 annually on imports. The reprimand was applied not just because the 
director lacked knowledge of the materials in the EC storage, of which most 
managers were guilty, but because Vincente had ignored the Commission’s report 
because he objected to their attitude. As he had previously been sanctioned to one 
month in Guanahacabibes for an unrelated administrative error, he was dismissed 
from MININD. Guevara insisted: ‘We have to demand that enterprise directors have 
“sole responsibility” for the care of the enterprise. This has to serve as example to 
everyone. We have fallen into a rut of irresponsibility at all administrative levels of 
this government.’100 Claims and denunciations had to be investigated. The director 
should have asked the Department of Supervision to investigate the laboratory.101 
Vicente accepted his substitution, criticising the ministry management for not 
investigating the ECs to detect errors.102
99 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1962,264-5.
100 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1962,257.
101 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1962, 261.
102 Vincente, Bimestrales, July 1962,264.
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The second case involved Manuel Marzoa Malvezado, director of the EC of Basic 
Chemicals who was sanctioned for one month in Guanahacabibes for ‘pirating’ a 
technician from another enterprise without the appropriate vice ministerial approval. 
That meant persuading a specialist to transfer from another institution to his own. 
Guevara said this was: ‘against all the norms that we have established and discussed, 
[workers should not be pirated] from any state apparatus least of all from within the 
ministry.’103 Marzoa spoke to clarify that he was not sent to Guanahacibibes for 
‘pirating’, but for contracting an engineer for a management role without 
authorization from the vice minister. He had already served his sentence at 
Guanahacabibes and returned to his post.
Thirdly, director of the EC of Cigarettes, Agtiero, was to be replaced for an error: 
‘that was not extremely serious, but one that indicates failings in administrative 
discipline, with the antecedent of not being a brilliant director, nor of being new.’104 
Agtiero accepted the sanction and said he hoped it served as an example to other 
directors.105 In Guevara’s schema, it was vital that the director was enthusiastic and 
committed to improve production and when they no longer felt capable of sustaining 
that work they should move into a role with less responsibility:
‘To lead a revolution, to have the glory of participating in a management 
post in the construction of socialism, it is vital... to be concerned 
throughout the day with whether the enterprise is advancing or not... We 
have to revive the policy of continuously demanding. Evidently, we first 
need to have the authority to demand because we have fallen slightly into 
complacency, into peaceful co-existence with errors.’106
Again this illustrates the emphasis Guevara placed on leading by example, 
accountability for social production and on self-transformation through the process 
of revolutionary transition. Guanahacabibes was one of the experimental solutions
103 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1962,259.
104 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1962, 259. It is not clear what administrative error Agtiero had 
committed.
105 Agtiero, Bimestrales, July 1962,264.
106 Guevara, Bimestrales, July 1962,258-9.
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practiced within MININD to foster these new attitudes. Ensuring that the educational 
function of Guanahacabibes was prioritised, Guevara visited the Centre regularly, 
staying for the weekend and speaking to the workers. When one of the founding 
members of the Department of Industrialisation, Francisco Garcia Vais, known as 
‘Pancho’ was sent to Guanahacabibes, Guevara visited every weekend to play chess 
with him and ensure he understood his error.107
Velazquez and Arcos claimed that those who worked with Guevara were 
revolutionaries who accepted that he was demanding and never chose to leave the 
ministry instead of going to Guanahacabibes. In fact, said Arcos: ‘many people got 
confused and thought this was part of a test to see if they were revolutionary. Just 
like when someone goes up Pico Turquino three times, so someone else climbs up 
five times.’108 It was part of the notion that steel is forged in fire and that tough 
conditions and the spirit of sacrifice for national interest and the Revolution made 
stronger companeros. As branch director, Arcos took his enterprise directors to 
Guanahacabibes for a management board meeting, for manual work and afterwards 
to go to the beach. This was part of a team-building exercise to encourage directors 
to commit to improve the performance of the branch:
‘I organised a management board meeting in Playa Giron [Bay of Pigs],
one in Oriente where the Granma boat arrived, in the Principe prison... I
took the directors to Guanahacabibes with those whom they had
nominated as their substitutes. There were about 25 of us. We went in ’65
in the last stage of the epoch; we went in a truck to spend two days there.
After working we went to the beach. I was with them, their boss and 
>109companero.
The cases cited above of Velazquez, sent to Cayo Largo and Manuel Marzoa sent to 
Guanahacabibes provide evidence that no stigma was attached to such sentences.
107 Sdnchez, interview.
108 Arcos, interview, 2006. Pico Turquino is the highest mountain in the Caribbean, where the Rebel 
Army had a stronghold during the war against Batista. Going up this mountain is considered homage 
to the revolutionaries and a challenge of fitness.
109 Arcos, interview, 2006.
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Both those companeros returned to management positions in MININD. Velazquez 
affirmed that: ‘it was a moral sanction. Once it was completed you returned to your 
work re-vindicated.’110 Sanchez said people went with dignity: ‘because to go there 
was to pay for your mistake and when you returned to the ministry it was an 
opportunity to rectify that error.’111 Punales said: ‘if Che told us to go to 
Guanahacabibes, we went satisfied, content, and happy and returned to our post of 
work. This was the faith that we had in him as a leader.’112
There is a major issue of conception in relation to any Rehabilitation Centre, 
especially one involving hard labour and particularly given the harsh reality of labour 
camps in other socialist bloc countries. However, the voluntary character of the 
sentence at Guanahacabibes lends weight to Guevara’s claim that it was not a feudal 
sanction but one of a complex of mechanisms designed to focus directors on 
production and raise their consciousness by linking their own wellbeing to the 
progress of the enterprise they managed in the interests of the society as a whole. In 
other words, Guanahacabibes formed part of the mechanisms designed to forge the 
concept of work as a social duty.
SAN MIGUEL DE LOS BANOS
San Miguel de los Banos in Matanzas province was a holiday resort set around hot 
springs. A disused hotel there passed into the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Industrialisation. Guevara proposed it remain a hotel and that workers who were 
burned out were sent there to recuperate.113 Cueto Alvarez said Guevara took direct 
control over this facility: ‘Che regarded this policy as essential, he personally 
authorised who was sent there. He didn’t leave this job to anyone.’114 San Miguel de 
los Banos was not a moral incentive, a lever to action such as socialist emulation and
110 Vel&zquez, 19 January 2006.
111 S&nchez, Nosotros, 82.
112 Pufiales, interview.
113 Arcos, interview, 2006. Information also from Arcos interview, 8 December 2004.
114 Cueto Alvarez, interview.
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voluntary labour. Neither was it a moral disincentive, like Guanahacabibes. However 
it was one of the BFS mechanisms which placed human beings at the centre of 
production and socialist construction.
As MININD’s Director of Personnel, Arcos was responsible for processing the lists 
of workers’ names proposed by the EC management for rest and recuperation. They 
were sent to San Miguel for between three and six months, longer if necessary. All 
their costs were paid by the ministry and Arcos added: ‘There were cases when we 
would send someone’s wife with them.’115 Capitalism is concerned only with the 
workers labour power, socialism, on the other hand, must be concerned for his 
wellbeing. To this ends, Guevara dedicated ministry time and resources to look after 
the workers.
Guevara believed that social consciousness, the subjective element, could become so 
powerful a force that it constituted an objective fact. This view is evident in the 
formulation of the foco theory of struggle where the guerrilla group constitutes a 
vanguard which can create the conditions for revolution.116 This is also evident in his 
reference to the ‘spirit of October’. However, when the mass was disaggregated to 
the level of individuals more delicate tools were necessary to assess the state of 
consciousness. That was the role which Guevara assigned to psychology, a science 
which he embedded into the structure of MININD. The importance of psychology in 
evaluating individuals was particularly important given that of a handful of 
companeros took on incredible workloads and responsibilities. Such pressure 
occasionally proved to be overwhelming, to the detriment of the individual and the 
ministry. In this sense MININD’s psychologists served as a preventive measure, 
analysing the capacity of individuals before they were exposed to such intense stress. 
MININD’s psychology apparatus is examined below.117
115 Arcos, interview, 2006.
116 See Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare. London : Pelican Books, 1970.
117 This has never been written about before, hence the reliance on oral history.
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PSYCHOLOGY
‘/  think that Che’s interest in psychology was logical, he was an 
intelligent person, with an enormous cultural vision, with many 
experiences o f the world and, what’s more, from Argentina, a country 
where they work a lot on psychology. He understood that psychology was 
■ a tool for understanding the workers better, to achieve the definitive 
goal; that workers would feel better at work. Psychology was a technique 
with many elements which could achieve labour stability and give 
inexperienced leaders techniques, a methodology, to assist them. This
1 I Q
was the objective. ’
Arguably, Guevara’s interest and use of psychology originated from his Argentinian 
roots, rather than in the application of psychology in other socialist countries. 
Psychology and psychiatry had penetrated Argentinian intellectual circles far deeper 
than in any other Latin American country, particularly within the medical profession. 
Guevara graduated as a medical doctor in Argentina in 1953. Mariano Ben Plotkin 
said from the 1910s: ‘psychoanalysis was discussed in medical and cultural circles; 
but because of the prestige of French culture in Argentina, Freud was read mostly in 
French and understood usually through the filter of French psychiatry and 
psychology.’119 Alberto Granado, Guevara’s childhood friend and travelling
1 Oftcompanion, confirmed that Guevara was reading Freud in French at the age of 14. 
Guevara had set up a Psychology Group in La Cabana fortress in January 1959, well 
before his first visit to a socialist country. Emphasising Guevara’s support for 
psychology, Borrego speculated that this was influenced by his medical training and
i n i
stated that: ‘Che combined the psycho-social element a lot in management.’
118 Norma Marrera, interview, 31 January 2005.
119 Ben Plotkin, ‘Freud, Politics, and the Portenos: The Reception of Psychoanalysis in Buenos Aires, 
1910-1943’ in Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol 77: 1 (Feb 1997), 73.
120 Alberto Granado, cited by Ariet, Politicos, 30.
121 Borrego, Seminar, Diplomado: Pensamiento Latinoamericano, Che Guevara, Facultad 
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), University of Havana. 18 January 2006.
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Days after arriving in La Cabana fortress at dawn on 3 January 1959, a literacy 
school was established for the Rebel Army soldiers in Guevara’s column. Guevara 
also invited pedagogical psychologists, philosophers and other social science 
professionals, according to the psychologist Nury Cao: ‘to investigate the 
psychological and intellectual characteristics of the rebels in his column with the 
intention of figuring out or categorising these people and determining their level of 
development, in the educational and labour spheres.’122 These professionals became 
the Psychology Group which was later integrated into the Department of Training in 
INRA, in November 1959.
The protagonists were three Cubans, Dr Graciela del Cueto and Dr Gustavo Torroella 
both pedagogical psychologists, and Commander Humberto Castello, a psychiatrist 
and revolutionary combatant in the Revolutionary Directorate.123 Initially their work 
involved devising and applying psychometric tests to assess candidates for study 
scholarships abroad, to ensure that they would have the necessary commitment to 
carry through their studies for long periods of time, far from home, mainly in the 
socialist bloc, with vastly different cultures, languages and climates.
In February 1961, this group was integrated into MININD as a Section of 
Psychology. In 1963, the Section became the Psychology Department, first within 
the Office of Personnel, directed by Arcos before being transferred to the Training 
Department within the Vice Ministry of Technical Development, led by Tirso Saenz. 
They continued to employ psychometric tests for candidates for studying abroad and 
similar tests were applied to current and perspective employees for administrative 
positions in the ministry: factory administrators, EC directors, ministry directors and 
vice ministers. The tests assessed candidates’ motivation for study, communication 
skills, imagination and creativity. Given the frenzy with which administrators had 
been nominated during the nationalisations and the exodus of management and 
technical personnel, this also served as a retrospective evaluation of the new
122 Nury Cao, interview, 11 February 2005.
123 Torroella is considered to be one of the founders of psychology in Cuba. After establishing contact 
with him during the field work, Torroella agreed to meet for an interview. Sadly, however, he died 
before this took place.
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leadership. In addition, the Department advised these managers on leadership and 
communication skills. Dr Cueto headed this work and applied the test with a group of 
three helpers, which apparently did not include Torroella and Castello.124 Nury Cao 
joined MININD in 1963 as a special assistant to Dr Cueto: ‘The main tasks in which 
I was personally involved were linked to evaluation, diagnosis and guidance for the 
ministry personnel, management cadre, candidates for scholarships to study abroad
19^or in Cuba, technical cadre, innovators, and so on.’
Cueto’s team assessed workers proposed as students for MININD’s Administrators 
School, which involved an intensive one-year study with an entrance requirement of 
sixth grade. Students with second grade had been sent there to study and found they 
just could not cope. According to Guevara, Cueto complained that this showed: ‘a 
tendency to consider man as a number.’126 Enrolment at the School depended on the 
Cueto’s confirmation that the candidate could deal with the pressure of the course.
In October 1963, Guevara explained that Cueto had categorised a group of young 
workers as super-gifted, they lacked sixth grade qualifications but they were 
intelligent. A new school would be set up, he said, for those workers with the 
intention of speeding them along to sixth grade and on to pre-university level as 
quickly as possible. ‘Here the famous psychoanalysis, which is so condemned, is 
playing its role’, said Guevara sardonically, adding: ‘you all know who the
197intelligent youngsters are; they are truly interested, aware of everything’. The 
purpose of this fast-track education was to create specialists for production; to 
contribute to the development of the productive forces. Psychology was being 
applied in the interests of production.
Borrego said that along with Guevara and rest of the MININD leadership, he took the 
psychometric tests regularly. He explained:
124 All three of these protagonists have died and it has not been possible to get more details about their 
work.
125 Cao, interview.
126 Guevara, Bimestrales, March 1962, 184-5. See chapter 6 for details about the Administrator 
School.
127 Guevara, Bimestrales, 12 October 1963,407-8.
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‘...it was another way of practising by example and demystifying the 
practice of this method, because in that epoch there was a certain 
reticence from some leaders in the country. [In MININD] the use of 
psychological tests was considered to be an important aspect, but not 
definitive, in the selection of the directors; however, when the diagnosis 
of the psychologists revealed specific conditions that were limitations for 
the suitability of the cadre, these results were respected to the extent that 
the designation did not take place at all, even when the other people who 
knew them insisted on the nomination.’
Arcos admitted that he rejected the validity of the psychologist’s conclusions on 
proposed nominations. He was generally sceptical about psychology, which was 
particularly problematic because, as head of the Office of Personnel, he was in 
responsible for the Department of Psychology. When Arcos had taken the 
psychometric test he defiantly carried out the instructions in reverse. He recalled: 
‘But incredibly, when I finished Cueto did an analysis of my personality which was 
so perfect that I was shocked.’129 Nonetheless, Arcos remained dubious until an 
incident over a nominated director convinced him of the value of psychology. 
Cueto’s report suggested that the candidate was a repressed homosexual. The man 
was a colleague of Arcos, had shared a room with him and had been in love with his 
sister. Arcos fervently refuted her assessment to Guevara and refused to sign the 
report. Arcos explained:
‘Two months later a bloke from security arrived and said “last night I 
went to the cinema and this director was there and he touched-up another 
man’s penis.” I had to tell Che. When I showed him the report he started 
looking on the floor around me. I asked him “what are you looking for 
Commandante?” and Che said “I am looking for the bucket of shit that 
you need to pour over your head!” From that day on I began to believe in 
this woman.’130
128 Borrego, El Camino del Fuego, La Habana: Imagen Contemporanea, 2001, 66-7.
129 Arcos, interview, 2006.
130 Arcos, interview, 2006.
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Borrego underlined the value of the psychometric tests applied to candidates for 
management positions. He said:
‘We had schizophrenic people, with all sorts of problems. If they hadn’t 
seen the psychologist they would have caused havoc. You can’t put 
people with serious problems to manage a factory. There were people 
who appeared normal, but they had their cables crossed, they made 
tremendous speeches but they were insane.... We went through this test 
every three to four months. You think you’re fine but the stress is killing 
you. People have to be able to rest. I remember a companero, an 
extraordinarily good guy who, because of the lack of cadre, at one point 
was leading the petrol industry, the mineral resources industry and 
another enterprise, because he was extremely talented and worked hard.
One morning his wife rang me at home and said he had gone into the 
shower with his military uniform. I spoke to him and he told me he was a 
rabbit! He was completely burnt out; he spent six months in hospital.’
Borrego’s point is that individual capacity to cope with stress, sleeping little and 
handling huge responsibilities varied, and that the psychometric tests could help to 
assess this capacity. Guevara must have discussed the results of his own tests with 
Cueto. He used the psychologists’ analysis to improve his own management and 
communication skills. Cao recalled that Guevara visited the Psychology Department 
at regular intervals. She remembered one occasion when he was deeply concerned 
because a companero he had told off had attempted suicide. Many members of the 
young man’s family in Mina del Frio had been killed during the revolutionary 
struggle. Cao explained:
‘The lad had been traumatised by what had happened to his family. But 
Che was worried that the way he had spoken to the lad had driven him to 
do this. Fortunately, nothing serious happened to the lad. Not everyone 
had the ability to understand Che’s attitude. These anecdotes show the
131 Borrego, Diplomada, 18 January 2006.
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sense of responsibility that Che felt with regard to human relations and 
emotions. He got a lot of support from psychology to be a better leader 
and to have better human relations with his companeros.’132
In one bimonthly meeting, Guevara made a candid statement about his personal
weaknesses, in front of around 400 MININD colleagues. He was responding to
Velazquez who had claimed that companeros did not give their real opinions or
1 ^reveal their production problems for fear of Guevara’s reaction. Guevara said his 
explosive character was a deficiency that had been recognised, even in the Council of 
Ministers: ‘I don’t have just have an explosive character when dealing with people 
who are hierarchically below me, I am explosive. It is a defect that I am correcting 
within the Revolution, but it is not easy to correct.’134 Guevara was emphasising the 
dialectic of self-transformation through the Revolution; an anti-dogmatic view that 
human beings are capable of developing and changing through experience and 
education. Revolution was a process which transformed the psyche of people. When 
the tests revealed ‘weaknesses’ inconsistent with the paradigm of revolutionary 
leader, companeros could still take up the new management positions, but were 
encouraged to strengthen their characters through that work. Jose Luis Punales said 
his psychometric test analysed him as too self-sufficient.135 He said: ‘I worked to 
eliminate this problem.’136
Guevara argued that psychology could be applied as a tool for strengthening the 
connection between managers and the masses. Under capitalism, he said, this was 
institutionalised as industrial psychology: ‘We have Dr Cueto here precisely to 
attempt to advance this as much as possible.’ However, he complained that she 
worked in the face of indifference and distrust, sometimes of a philosophical nature:
132 Cao, interview.
133 Vel&zquez admitted that these comments were part of his polemic with Guevara since being 
sentenced to Cayo Largo in 1959, see above.
134 Guevara, Bimestrales, 10 August 1963, 371.
135 In Cuba this word has the connotation of arrogance.
136 Puflales, interview.
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‘...because of false Marxist concepts and haggard old dogmatisms that 
men are equal, that you cannot measure the intelligence or character of 
man, etc. On the other hand, this is also because people don’t like to 
have the comers of their mind probed ... However, this is a science that 
is developing, that the capitalists use in a cold way, they value it in pesos 
and centavos...’137
Guevara worked to integrate the work of psychologists with the rest of the MININD 
apparatus, particularly the Department of Supervision. Psychologists gave guidance 
to companeros carrying out inspections, investigations and audits, who, in turn were 
integrated into the function of evaluating candidates for management positions.138 
That meant that in addition to the psychometric tests, candidates were subjected to 
observation at work and integral assessment. Borroto explained:
‘The investigators had to carry out an investigation of the cadre in the last 
ten years, the inspectors had to do a functional inspection to see how the 
cadre were managing, how they gave orders, the two auditors then 
worked with the cadre for two weeks to see their approach to economic 
and political work. Afterwards they summarised the results of that work, 
explaining their conclusions and finally they made a report.’
There is little evidence that administrators or directors nominated in the frenzy of 
nationalisations had caused dismption to production by anything other than their 
incompetence. However, as the Revolution radicalised and consolidated, individuals 
could become disaffected or be recruited into the counter-revolutionary movement, 
increasingly organised and co-ordinated with US support. Mercenaries and dissidents 
employed industrial sabotage and terrorism to attack the Revolution. Arguably, these 
rigorous evaluations of cadre, both their track-record and their mental state, served to 
ensure that saboteurs did not infiltrate administrative structures in MININD. The 
following story serves as an example of how the ministry kept one step ahead in this
137 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1964, 561-2.
138 Fem&idez, interview.
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battle. In 1962, Salvador Sala Portuondo, became director of the Cuban Institute for 
Petroleum (ICP), a vitally important part of the MININD apparatus. Sala had trained 
in the US and worked for Shell in Cuba pre-1959. His leadership of the ICP was 
distinguished. One day, Guevara informed Sala that his brother, a refinery engineer, 
was a member of a group organised by the CIA. He had not been detained so that 
Cuban intelligence could collect more information about their activities. Guevara
• 11Qtold Sala to keep this a secret from his brother, which he apparently did.
The rigour of cadre evaluations by 1964 also illustrates that MININD was in a 
position to be more demanding about the technical and leadership skills of 
candidates. Standards and expectations were rising. Despite the rigour of the 
assessments, Borroto claimed that few cadre were not approved for the management 
jobs: ‘If the cadre had limitations their superiors were told in order to assist them in 
this.’140
Social psychology of work
‘ When Che was Minister o f Industries we began the social psychology o f  
work, concerned directly with the workers, not from the point o f view of  
the psyche, but to create better conditions so they would feel linked to 
their work and be more efficient, with more knowledge about what they 
produced and better self esteem. Next it was taken up in the Ministry of  
Sugar, where Orlando Borrego was Minister, and which was directly 
linked with Che. Later, many institutions became interested in the 
psychology o f social work... organisations o f the masses like the Union of  
Young Communists and the Federation o f Cuban Women began to 
integrate psychologists into their social assistance tasks' 141
139 S&enz, Ministro, 84. A few years later Sala was director of the Cuban Institute of Mineral 
Resources, he was removed from his post and then left the country on a private boat.
140 Borroto, interview.
141 Norma Marrera, interview, 31 January 2005.
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In 1964 the Section for the Social Psychology of Work was set up within MININD’s 
Psychology Department. It was headed by an Argentinian psychologist Raquel 
Hoffman who was introduced to her compatriot, Guevara, by INRA President Carlos 
Rafael Rodriguez after she arrived in Cuba offering her assistance to the Revolution. 
A request was sent to the Faculty of Psychology, set up in the University of Havana 
in 1962, for three students interested in this area of psychology to join the new 
Section. Norma Marrera, Nerada Gonzalez and Nancy Zamarra were selected 
because they were both interested in this area, as opposed to clinical psychology, and 
were members of the Union of Young Communists.142 Their task was to visit 
MININD production units around the country to observe, assess and make 
recommendations on improving workers conditions and relations with managers. 
They also gave psychology classes to cadre, teaching them about methods of 
leadership, communication and motivating the workers. Marrera described their 
projects:
‘Our work was in the factories, in the enterprises, working directly with 
the workers, observing their working conditions. We didn’t apply tests.
We did investigations. We didn’t just go to where there were problems.
In some places we investigated an area of the institution that was of 
interest. Also, a factory could request our help in understanding a 
situation, for example, between a leader and his subordinates. In some 
places they wanted to investigate the cause of rapid labour turnover. We 
assessed the material conditions, the colour, the climate, everything.’143
During the visits they interviewed workers, carried out ‘operative groups’ -  group 
discussions, and participated in management councils and trade union meetings at the 
production unit under investigation. The investigations had no time limit but usually 
took between one to three months, which meant living on site, eating in the cafeteria 
and sharing the facilities when those factories were outside of Havana. They 
observed everything from the floor level; including dawn or night-time work shifts.
142 Information from Marrera, interview.
143 Marrera, interview.
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After the period of investigation they produced a report evaluating the problems and 
making recommendations. Marrera described the kind of suggestions which 
included:
‘...better food, more attention to workers’ social and personal problems, 
ensuring work tools were in good condition, providing work clothes and 
boots for technical jobs, setting up a library and an area to relax. Most of 
our suggestions were material, but they were difficult to meet because the 
country’s economic conditions were bad. Sometimes the painting was too 
dark, so they had to repaint it, or put out flowers, find a radio, or create 
conditions for workers to sleep or for entertainment, to create social 
circles for employees and their families.’144
The psychologists would return after submitting the recommendations to evaluate if  
the situation had improved. They could also be called to return by the production unit 
itself. Marrera said that was Guevara was informed about all of their evaluations. She 
said: ‘Companera Raquel [Hoffman] informed us that the ministry leaders were 
always very receptive to the suggestions that we made and would follow them 
wherever possible. Raquel participated in Management Council meetings and kept us 
informed.’145
The Section for the Psychology of Social Work participated in the curriculum at 
Administrators’ School and the Directors’ School set up in MININD, giving classes 
in psychology. This was further formalised by the MININD’s Manual for Factory 
Administrators, which detailed management principles and different styles of 
management: practical, scientific, detailed, sectoral, generic, instructive and 
global.146 One section of the Manual: ‘Characteristics Required in the Administra­
tor’, illustrates that a layman understanding of psychology was generalised within 
MININD. For example, among the 32 personal qualities that the administrator should
144 Marrera, interview.
145 Marrera, interview.
146 Ministerio de Industrias. Manual Para Administradores de Fabricas, 10 June 1964, seccidn 7, 
asunto 2, pagina 1-11. MININD, 1 June 1964.
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cultivate, it listed: ‘have absolute control of your character, voice and gestures at 
every moment and especially during discussions or delicate situations...and always 
be sincere... Remember that all men, regardless of their educational level, have the 
innate ability to detect insincerity quickly and nothing so easily accounts for the loss 
of moral respect of others then to be categorised as insincere.’147 If a leader’s 
sincerity was doubted they would lose the ability to lead by example, a vital lever for 
increasing the consciousness of the masses.
Marrera claimed that not only did the worker-students enjoy the psychology lessons, 
but also the mass of workers accepted the psychology projects. It is important to 
recall that her experience in this field began in 1964 and the Revolution had begun a 
process of institutionalisation and most of those with a class conscious opposition to 
socialism had left the island. Marrera said: ‘The working class in general always 
supported the initiatives of the Revolution. They saw it would bring a better future. 
They didn’t have knowledge about creating socialism, but they realised that the 
Revolution was permanent, that their homes were theirs, they were treated better at 
work and everywhere, so consciousness was growing deeper every day.’ Through her 
work Marrera never encountered any issues which she foresaw as potential obstacles 
to the construction of socialism. There were individuals who were not 
‘revolutionaries’, she said, but the majority were committed to the Revolution and 
building socialism:
‘At that time there were still internal counterrevolutionary elements. At 
any moment we would have take to the streets to demonstrate that we 
were prepared to defend the Revolution. 1961 was Playa Giron, 1962 the 
October missile crisis, then the struggle against bandits. Workers kept 
their militia uniform ready. There was immense tension over when we 
would be attacked again.’148
The fervour to defend the country’s sovereignty and the socialist Revolution which
147 Manual, secci6n 6: asunto 1: pagina 1
148 Marrera, interview.
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had materially and spiritually improved the lives of the majority of workers, served 
to foster consciousness, commitment and sacrifice. This would have been reflected in 
the psychological studies of the period.
Major projects
'Che made a lot of use o f the instruments ofpsychology. But to arrive at
measurements o f the effect o f consciousness on production is difficult'1*9
In addition to the regular work of the Department of Psychology, several major 
projects were carried out under Guevara’s MININD, and under Borrego in MINAZ 
after its creation in 1964. The first project in MININD was in 1963. All employees in 
the ministry building, around 1,000 filled in a questionnaire on the same day at the 
same time. Marrera’s was still a student in the Faculty of Psychology, but she 
participated in the project with other second year students. She explained: ‘It was a 
very full questionnaire including questions to measure workers’ satisfaction, sense of 
purpose and work relationships. For example, they were asked to state the three most 
significant characteristics of their immediate boss and superior boss, their qualities 
and their deficiencies. It asked what needs they had, the quality of the food, and so 
on.’150 Most questions were tick-boxes but others allowed open answers. The 
analysis was done by the psychologists at the University, not those in MININD.151
In setting up MINAZ in summer 1964, Borrego implemented the BFS and developed 
the psychology tools which Guevara had embedded as part of the system. In 1965, 
MINAZ and the Faculty of Psychology collaborated on a project to assess the morale 
of workers in the ministry. Borrego said: ‘It was a laborious investigation of great 
scientific value from the sociological perspective, in which dozens of students and 
various professors of the university faculty participated. In the parameters of 
measurement in the inquiry was found: the standing, prestige, recognition and
149 Borrego, interview, 16 November 2004.
150 Marrera, interview.
151 It has not been possible to obtain the results or conclusions of that analysis. Marrera did not recall 
whether there were any overtly political or ideological questions.
366
Chapter 10: Consciousness and Psychology
1 ^ 9  _ ,
popularity of all the leaders of the institution in the eyes of its workers.’ This
collaboration was repeated and extended in 1967 when a similar investigation was
carried out involving every worker in MINAZ. Given the scale of the project,
students from the Faculty of Psychology were joined by others from the philosophy
and history faculties who went to every sugar mill and all other entities in the sugar
industry throughout the island with questionnaires to assess the state of
consciousness and attitudes all workers, from cane cutters to engineers and architects
in the mills. Marrera was involved in the project, which took about one month to
complete: ‘It was a sector which I didn’t know, and it was interesting to see how it
1 ^worked. It was a very hard job, with tough conditions, very interesting work.’ 
Marrera participated in similar projects in sugar mills in Nuevitos in Camaguey. 
Borrego said that the results for the second investigation showed a marked 
improvement in terms of consciousness and work morale from the ministry workers 
who had been questioned two years previously.154 By this time Guevara was no 
longer in Cuba, however the three-volume results of the investigation were sent to 
the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, where Armando Hart, was 
particularly interested in the project.155
While Borrego and other leaders continued to apply and develop the BFS and, more 
generally, Guevara’s approach to socialist construction, others took advantage of 
Guevara’s absence to dismantle much of the institutional apparatus he had created. 
According to Marrera, Hoffman was told that her services were no longer needed and 
she returned to Argentina. Marrera and her two colleagues were employed as 
psychologists, one in the Ministry of the Interior, one in the EC of Electrics and 
Marrera went to work in the central committee of the Cuban Communist Party in a 
Sociology Commission which had been set up. This was dissolved after one year and 
Marrera was transferred to work with her colleague in the electrical enterprise where
152 Borrego, Camino, 220. Vice Minister Jesus Suarez Gayol came out as the most popular leader. In 
1966 he died in Bolivia as part of Guevara’s guerrilla foco there.
153 Marrera, interview.
154 Borrego, interview, 23 November 2004.
155 Hart told me that he did not have the results of the investigation, so I have not been able to get 
access to them. Borrego himself did not keep a copy.
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she remained for the next 24 years.156 The social psychology of work, along with 
psychology of all kinds had been institutionalised in Cuba. Guevara’s contribution 
lay, particularly, in demonstrating how this tool could be applied to production. The 
premise for doing so was an understanding that human beings were at the centre of 
the productive system under socialism. The aim was to accelerate their development.
Plotkin observed that: ‘Since the 1960s, psychoanalysis has had a deep impact on 
Argentine culture, particularly in Buenos Aires.’157 By the start of that decade, under 
Guevara’s management, psychology was also making its mark in revolutionary 
Cuba. Like much of the apparatus created by Guevara as part of his approach to 
socialist construction, psychology was underexploited following his departure from 
Cuba in 1965. Today, however, it is applied at all levels of Cuban society. In the 
1980s new projects emerged to study the link between consciousness and production 
using psychology tools. Set up in October 1983 the Centre for Psychological and 
Sociological Research carried out projects to assess the relationship between 
workers’ values, their sense of belonging and ownership of Cuban society. It would 
be an exaggeration to link the study and application of psychology in contemporary 
Cuba directly with MININD’s apparatus in the early 1960s. However, the impulse 
and impetus which Guevara gave to psychology, although almost unknown, is 
unquestionable and formed an integral aspect of his comprehensive economic 
management system.
CONCLUSION
‘ Without being petulant, I  think we can already say that for the first time 
in the world we have established a Marxist, socialist system, that is 
congruent, or approximately congruent, with one that puts man at the
156 Marrera, interview.
157 Plotkin, Psychoanalysis, 45.
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centre, that speaks about the individual, that speaks about man and his
I co
importance as the essential factor in the Revolution. ’
The discussion about the Great Debate in chapter four of the thesis demonstrated that 
Guevara’s ideas about consciousness were not idealist but were integrally linked to 
his scientific, Marxist analysis of the operation of the law of value. This chapter has 
illustrated the policies formulated within MININD as part of Guevara’s BFS in order 
to affect consciousness in the transition to socialism. It has also discussed how he 
institutionalised the tools of psychology to access, and impact upon the 
consciousness of individuals.
Guevara’s conception of consciousness, as social conscience, meant a commitment 
to the social and economic justice aims of the Revolution. It meant the conscious 
integration and participation in the project of socialist transition. Guevara’s concern 
for consciousness began with his interest in philosophy, a concern for the human 
condition, which was evident through his choice of a medical career and in his 
observations about the social conditions he experienced on his travels through Latin 
America in the 1950s. Guevara’s vision of history and social development was 
human centred. Like Marx he was interested not only in the historical development 
of modes of production, but also of the changing conditions of human beings as the 
key to production. This spurred his interest in the relationship between production 
and consciousness. Under the capitalist mode of production, human consciousness 
was characterised by alienation and antagonism: alienation from production as the 
product of man’s impact on nature, and antagonism as class division, the 
relationships of production which divided society into the exploiter and the 
exploited. For Guevara, the challenge was to replace alienation and antagonism with 
integration and solidarity, developing a collective attitude to production and the 
concept of work as a social duty. As consciousness developed and workers took 
increasing control of production, work would become a social pleasure. Workers 
would value increases in production and productivity, not in terms of personal gain, 
but as increasing the benefits for society. Guevara criticised the lack of emphasis on
158 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1964, 561-2.
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consciousness and education in existing socialism, arguing that new attitudes and 
values must be created simultaneously with the productive forces.
Most important is the fact that Guevara was in a position to concretise these ideas by 
- formulating policies as Minister of Industries. The process was one of searching and 
experimentation. Ideas were developed in a dynamic environment, often emerging 
spontaneously from workers and managers devising ad hoc solutions to concrete 
problems which were then institutionalised, as has been demonstrated in the case of 
voluntary labour. The key to raising productivity and efficiency was in the incentive 
system. In addition to material incentives which Guevara deemed as a necessary evil, 
were moral incentives, particularly socialist emulation and voluntary labour. The 
Rehabilitation Centre at Guanahacabibes was an example of a moral disincentive and 
San Miguel de Los Banos was affirmation in the need to care for the human beings 
on whom production depended.
Psychology was a tool for measuring consciousness at the level of the individual. It 
was also a mechanism for evaluating their ability to cope with the stress of important 
responsibilities and to lead by their own example. This was particularly important 
given the scarcity of personnel with management abilities. Psychology had a 
pedagogical function, assisting individuals to become better leaders, improving the 
link between managers and workers, improving workers productivity by improving 
their conditions and sense of ownership of the means of production. Additionally, the 
imposition of psychology assessments could also serve as a safeguard against 
saboteurs. Both consciousness and psychology, elements which Guevara embedded 
in MININD as part of the BFS, remain vitally important in today in Cuba.
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PART FOUR 
Conclusions
Prologue
"Che had accepted his role in the Ministry o f Industries to work with 
Fidel until the Revolution was established and organised. He covered 
this stage brilliantly but after that he went to fight in other countries 
because his vocation was to combat what he had seen in America, the 
situation of the miners and the indigenous, and with the blacks in Africa, 
not to stay here in comfort. Che was an internationalist. He was not a 
revolutionary because he wanted to be a minister, but to fight for the 
poor.'1
In April 1965, Guevara left Cuba to lead a secret mission of Cuban military 
assistance to the guerrilla struggle in the Congo. The timing and motivation for 
Guevara’s departure have been the source of much speculation. It was made clear by 
everyone interviewed for this thesis that Guevara had premised his involvement in 
the Cuban revolutionary struggle on the condition that he would leave following 
victory. After 1959, he frequently spoke of his intention to leave and continue the 
revolutionary struggle elsewhere insisting that: ‘I will not die as a bureaucrat. I will 
die fighting in the mountains.’2 In 1962 Guevara’s companeros from the Sierra 
Maestra sensed he was preparing to leave. In 1963, Guevara sent Juan Alberto 
Castellanos, among others, to Argentina to prepare conditions for his arrival with the 
intention of initiating a guerrilla struggle in concert with the urban movement. It 
was another two years before Guevara left Cuba and it is arguable that he postponed 
his departure, not just to wait until conditions were adequate for combat overseas, but 
also until he considered the Budgetary Finance System (BFS) to be adequately 
institutionalised and able to be sustained without his physical presence in Cuba. 
However it is evaluated, Guevara’s decision to renounce his position in the Cuban
1 Edison Velazquez, interview, 21 January 2006.
2 Guevara cited by Tirso Sdenz, interview, 7 January 2005.
3 Alberto Castaflellos, interview, 1 March 2006 & Harry Villegas, interview, 22 March 2006.
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government and return to armed struggle overseas is perhaps less striking than the 
fact that he had stayed so long as part of the Revolution’s leadership.
At the time of his departure, Guevara was convinced that the BFS constituted a major 
advance in socialist political economy. The Ministry of Industries (MININD) was a 
huge apparatus and it had already begun to be divided. In June 1964 the Consolidated 
Enterprise (EC) of Sugar was split off to create the Ministry of Sugar (MINAZ). 
Over the next three years the food stuffs branch passed into the jurisdiction of the 
National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA), the Vice Ministry of Light Industry 
became the Ministry of Light Industry and a new Ministry of Electricity was created. 
By 1967, the remaining apparatus of the MININD became the Ministry of Basic 
Industry. Orlando Borrego, Guevara’s deputy since 1959, said that Guevara had 
advised his Management colleagues that MININD should be divided in this way. 
Guevara hoped that other ministries would adopt the BFS although he was aware that 
members of the government did not approve of his system. Borrego, who 
implemented the BFS in MINAZ, said:
‘I think that if Che had lived many other ministries that came of out 
MININD would have applied the BFS. But it lacked its strongest 
defender. The BFS was novel and audacious in socialism. There were 
more conservative people who wanted to follow the experience of 
. Europe.’4
After Guevara left the island, MENIND’s First Vice Minister, Arturo Guzman 
Pascual substituted him as minister. From October 1967, after Castro read Guevara’s 
farewell letter making his departure official, Joel Domenech Benitez became the new 
minister. Domenech dismantled many of Guevara’s structures and control 
mechanisms.5 To cite one example, the Department of Scientific-Technical 
Information was closed as part of the Campaign Against Bureaucracy, accused of 
having ‘too many papers’. Maria Teresa Sanchez, who had been its director, pointed
4 Borrego, interview, 2 April 2006.
5 There is no record of these events.
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out the illogicality of the action, given that they had no computers: ‘We had to work 
with papers and sometimes we didn’t even have paper!’6 Also in 1965, the Ministry 
of Finance, which Guevara argued could replace the National Bank as the key 
financial institution under socialism, was dissolved. While all this may have 
appeared as a rejection of Guevara’s BFS, paradoxically, in 1967, the Central 
Planning Board (JUCEPLAN) instructed all Cuban ministries to implement a new 
Registry System which President Osvaldo Dorticos apparently believed was 
consistent with Guevara’s ideas on economic management. In reality, it abandoned 
•vital key premises of Guevara’s system; cost control as a means to increase 
productivity and efficiency.
The Registry System eliminated cost accounting. From April 1967, all charges and 
payments between ministries and enterprises were abolished and replaced with a 
system of ‘economic records’.7 The correlation between work effort and 
remuneration was severed, and the last forms of taxation abolished. Inevitably, this 
created numerous problems. The annual budgets could not be monitored or 
controlled, which partly explains why the mass mobilisation for the campaign to 
harvest ten million tons of sugar was so detrimental to all other sectors of the Cuban 
economy; the lack of control mechanisms and records meant there was no awareness 
of the disruption which was being caused.
As Minister of Transport, Faure Chomon Mediavilla was instructed by JUCEPLAN 
to implement the Registry System:
‘Everyone made their own interpretation of how to apply the basic 
elements of the System. Many interpreted it incorrectly deciding that they 
could produce without concern for costs.... At that time we did not fully 
understand Che’s ideas and the companeros who proposed the System
6 Maria Teresa Sanchez, interview, 8 March 2006.
7 Fidel Castro Ruz, Report o f the Central Committee o f the CPC to the First Congress, La Habana: 
Department of Revolutionary Orientation, 1977, 149-152. Apart from Castro’s passing comments, 
little had been written about this economic management system, the details of it structure and 
mechanisms. Orlando Borrego will shortly publish a review of the seven economic management 
systems implemented in Cuba since 1959, including the Registry System.
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did not prepare specialists in the productive and services sectors of the 
country. It was pure idealism in which, logically, Che’s absence was 
felt.’8
Alfredo Gonzalez Gutierrez, a member of JUCEPLAN at that time, said that to 
associate the Registry System with Guevara: ‘is a great historical injustice, because if  
there was someone in this country who was concerned for costs and for efficiency it 
was Che.’9 The resultant lack of economic control and the consequent fall in 
production and productivity, lead ultimately to the adoption of the Soviet Planning 
and Management System in 1976.
Whilst the Cubans struggled to achieve a uniform economic management system, 
Guevara continued to develop his theoretical positions whilst overseas, making his 
most important contribution to socialist political economy from 1965-66. Hence Part 
Four of the thesis serves as a concluding part -both Guevara’s conclusions and those 
of the thesis. Chapter 11 details Guevara’s preliminary notes for a critique of the 
Soviet Manual of Political Economy. Written after six years of experience working 
in the Cuban government, it shows how Guevara concluded that capitalism would 
return to the socialist bloc and the analytical consistency which led him to predict 
this. Chapter 12 concludes the thesis analysis of his contribution to socialist political 
economy and economic management in Cuba.
8 Faure Ch6mon, interview, 16 February 2005.
9 Alfredo Gonzalez Gutierrez, interview, 1 February 2006.
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CHAPTER 11
Critique of the Soviet Manual of 
Political Economy
i After the Congo, Che began a critique o f the Soviet Manual o f Political 
Economy and predicted 20 years ahead that the Soviet Union was going 
to return to capitalism. This demonstrates his genius; without being an 
economic scientist, or a brilliant economist he was capable o f getting to 
the root o f the problem. He based himself on Marxist theory. What the 
USSR was doing was taking them away from Marx and Engels' 
conceptions about the construction o f socialism. He was capable o f  
penetrating the issue because he was so studious.'1
Guevara’s critique of the Soviet Manual o f Political Economy is extremely 
significant for this thesis because it demonstrates that by 1966 Guevara had sufficient 
conviction in his theory of socialist transition and confidence in his alternative 
economic management system to initiate a project which would challenge the status 
of the Manual and the position of the Soviet Union as guiding light of the socialist 
world. If Guevara had completed his alternative manual or seminal work on socialist 
political economy, it would have been by implication a major challenge to Soviet 
dominance and would have offered an alternative model of transition for socialist 
countries and emerging revolutions.
In addition, the notes he wrote to initiate the project permit an assessment of how 
Guevara’s ideas had changed or developed following his practical experience as 
Minister of Industries. Examination reveals that there is remarkable consistency 
between the arguments Guevara developed once he had left Cuba and those 
theoretical positions of his which have already been examined in this thesis, and 
which were expounded in the Great Debate and concretised in the Budgetary Finance
1 Edison Vel&zquez, interview, 21 January 2006.
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System (BFS). Rather than changing, his analysis deepened and was strengthened. 
This is a significant discovery which further refutes the prevailing myth that Guevara 
left Cuba because of the relative failure of his economic policies.
Guevara’s theoretical analysis had been publicly disseminated during the Great 
Debate while the experimental formulation of the BFS was also open to scrutiny and 
emulation in Cuba and outside. Guevara was granted free reign to develop his ideas 
and practice within MININD, however, there was also clearly a need for sensitivity 
to the real politik of relations between the USSR and Cuba. While Guevara publicly 
opposed the Soviet economic management system, he did not publicly articulate his 
conviction that the AFS threatened to reintroduce capitalism in the socialist 
countries. Guevara recognised that he could not speak as an individual; his total 
integration into the Revolution’s leadership, the autonomy granted to him to develop 
his ideas and practice in MININD, and the fact that he represented Cuba throughout 
the world, meant that his own analysis could be taken as a Cuban government 
position. His scientific methodology and candour compelled him to analyse and 
search for solutions, but he was also careful not to jeopardise fraternal relations, and 
more importantly, the enormous financial and important political assistance which 
Cuba received from the Soviet bloc.
Guevara was cognisant of the value of Soviet assistance and had great respect for the 
feats of USSR. It is vitally important to understand that his criticisms were intended 
as constructive. Guevara believed that by carrying out a scientific analysis of the 
AFS he would be able incontrovertibly to highlight the dangers inherent in an 
‘hybrid’ system: socialism with capitalist mechanisms. He hoped to convince the 
other socialist countries to reverse the prevailing trend towards market socialism. He 
compared them to an aeroplane that was lost and instead of returning to find the 
correct path, it continues on its journey.2 Orlando Borrego, his closest collaborator 
from 1959-1965, testified that Guevara hoped that his theoretical critique, backed up
2
Emesto Guevara, ‘Reuniones Bimestrales’, 5 December 1964, in Ministerio de Azucar. El Che en la 
Revolucion Cubana: Ministerio de Industrias, tomo VI, La Habana: MINAZ, 1966, 570.
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by the practical experiences of implementing the BFS in Cuba, would convince the 
socialist countries to correct their mistakes. The work which Guevara embarked upon 
with his critique of the Soviet Manual would consolidate these efforts.
In some ways what most irritated Guevara was the absence of a forum for an 
international debate on the political economy of socialist transition. The Sino-Soviet 
split formed a vociferous backdrop which reverberated through communist parties 
around the world, particularly in Latin American, compounded existing divisions 
between so-called Troskyists and Stalinists. Within Cuba, debate and comparative 
experimentation had been encouraged. But outside Cuba, Guevara’s critical analysis 
had led to accusations that he was variously a revisionist, a Trotskyist and a Maoist, 
something which he regarded as dangerous politicking, machinations aimed to 
disrupt the tenuous fraternity of socialist countries and censure debate. Guevara told 
MININD directors one of the most annoying sources of these accusations was from 
Trotskyists claiming there were aspects of his analysis which reflected Trotsky’s 
criticisms. Guevara distanced himself from Trotskyism:
‘There are some useful things that can be taken from Trotsky’s ideas. I 
believe that the main things on which Trotsky based himself were 
erroneous and that later his behaviour was wrong and even obscure in the 
final period. The Troskyists have contributed nothing to the revolutionary 
movement anywhere and where they did most, in Peru, they ultimately 
failed because their methods were bad. Comrade Hugo Blanco was 
personally a man of great sacrifice, but because of a set of erroneous 
ideas they necessarily failed.
On the other hand, Guevara admitted that: ‘In many aspects I have expressed 
opinions that could be closer to the Chinese: guerrilla warfare, people’s war, in 
development of all these things, voluntary labour, to be against material incentives as 
a direct lever, a whole set of things which the Chinese also raise...’4 Consequently,
3 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1964, 566. Blanco was a Troskyist leader in Peru.
4 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1964, 567.
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explained Guevara, he was accused of factionalism, in an environment in which 
different interpretations had become a bitter and violent fight, which refused to 
recognise different opinions: ‘I no longer discuss the budgetary finance system [with 
the Soviets]. What’s more, I represent the government when I travel and I am very 
disciplined and strictly represent the opinion of the government. So they would have 
to call the government Trotskyist, which is impossible.’5 The political situation was 
indeed delicate.
For Guevara it was imperative to initiate a serious study of the political economy of 
the transition to socialism, without the political machinations: ‘It is impossible to 
destroy opinions with beatings, that is precisely what kills development, the free 
development of intelligence.’6 The more people involved in collective debate the 
more comprehensive and solid would be the theory which emerged. He appealed to 
MININD directors to take up this challenge: ‘Then there is a need for help, you 
should help more, think more, collaborate, read all the fundamental texts we have in 
our reach.’ Study and analysis were essential to facilitate the resurgence of creative 
and dialectical Marxism to shatter the dogmatism and mechanistic imposition in the 
USSR, which had turned the Manual, not Marx’s Capital, into the Bible.8 He 
explained that: ‘The theory is failing because they have forgotten that Marx and the 
whole epoch before them existed and they base themselves on nothing more than 
Lenin; we should say, on one part of Lenin, from 1920 onwards, which are just a few 
of his years, because Lenin lived many years and studied a great deal.’9 The 
reference to Lenin from 1920 onwards is a reference to the implementation of the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) which was introduced as a practical solution to 
concrete problems and openly articulated by Lenin to be a major concession to 
capitalist mechanisms and a step backwards for socialist construction.
5 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1964, 567.
6 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1964, 566,
7 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1964, 567.
8 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1964, 566.
9 Guevara, Bimestrales, December 1964, 569.
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Guevara outlined his ideas in a letter to Fidel Castro which serves to identify his 
concerns and his focus for the critique on which he later embarked. The relevant part 
of the letter the letter is paraphrased below:10
In the Critique o f the Gotha Programme, Marx described a period of 
socialist transition under which commodity categories are suppressed.
Later Lenin contributed his theory of unequal development, and the 
weakest link, and the proof of this theory in die Soviet Union imposed a 
new stage: the period of transition to socialism. The Soviets and the 
Czechs claim to have passed this first stage. Objectively this is not true 
because of the existence of private ownership. The important point is that 
the political economy of this period has not been studied and facts about 
Soviet society have been presumed as laws of socialist society. When 
Lenin, forced by circumstances, introduced the NEP it meant the return 
of old capitalist relations of production. There was an intermediary 
period in which Lenin had not yet retracted the theoretical conceptions 
that had guided his action until the Revolution, but from 1921 onwards 
Lenin’s actions led to the NEP that created relations of production that 
configured what he called state capitalism, but in reality in respect to 
economic relations could also be called pre-monopoly capitalism. In the 
last period of Lenin’s life he observed a great tension; he criticised 
payments and profits made between enterprises. It is probably that if  
Lenin had lived he would have promptly introduced changes to the 
relations established by the NEP.
The entire legal-economic scaffolding of Soviet society originates from 
the NEP, maintaining old capitalist relations and capitalist categories: 
commodity, profit, bank interest, material incentives. But the relations 
are from pre-monopoly capitalism, lacking the concentration of capital 
and management techniques of today’s big trusts and without the 
competition of capitalism to foster development. Individual material 
interest, an excellent arm under capitalism, had limited effectiveness as a 
lever, because exploitation is not permitted. Man does not develop his 
productive capacities or his consciousness as a constructor of a new 
society. The law of value does not operate freely because of the absence 
of a free market. Its revolutionising effect on production is lost. Soviet 
technology is stagnant relative to the US in most economic sectors 
because they have not implemented new laws where there is no market.
With no substitute for competition, technology has stopped driving social 
development. The exception is in defence where the norms of profit do 
not operate. The Soviets lacks the integration which exists in capitalist 
countries between the defence sector and production sector, where
10 Published for the first time in February 2006, in Ernesto Che Guevara, Apuntes Criticos a la 
Economia Politico, Centro de Estudios Che Guevara, La Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 2006.
380
Chapter 11: Critique of the Soviet Manual o f Political Economy
military technology gains are incorporated into the civilian production, 
significantly increasing the quality of consumption goods.
These mistakes, excusable in the USSR, the first country to experiment 
with socialism; have been transplanted to different and more developed 
countries, leading to a dead end and provoking reactions. The first to 
revolt was Yugoslavia, then Poland, now Germany and Czechoslovakia. 
They turn against the system without searching for the source of the rot. 
They blamed bureaucracy, excessive centralisation and the enterprises 
struggle for independence, similarly to capitalists within the bourgeois 
state, as the law of value increasingly becomes the measure of efficiency 
and factories are closed for inefficiency and workers migrate to Europe.
Our system [the BFS] combines two main lines of thought that should be 
followed to reach communism: consciousness and technology. The 
possibility of reaching communism cannot be measured in income per 
capita. Communism is a phenomenon of consciousness. Development in 
production means increasing use of technology, which signals the 
increasing concentration of fixed capital. This phenomenon is produced 
by capitalist development, in imperialism, which contains the 
technological seeds of socialism much more than the AFS -  a system 
inherited from a form of capitalism that has been surpassed, but which 
they have taken as a model for socialist development. Our system aspires 
to take the most advanced capitalist techniques, productive technology 
and organisational structure, and therefore it tends towards centralisation. 
We try to eliminate capitalist categories. In existing socialism, when they 
have noted the serious technological failings, they have looked around 
and discovered capitalism, not its techniques. The gap in our system is in 
achieving the integration of man with his work so that it is no longer 
necessary to use, what we call, material disincentives; how to make each 
worker feel the vital necessity to help their revolution and at the same 
time feel that work is a pleasure, as we leaders feel.
Those who criticise the BFS conclude that the lack of worker enthusiasm 
is due to the lack of material incentives. Their solution is for workers to 
manage the factories and be monetarily responsible, have incentives and 
disincentives in accordance with the management. Clearly some worker 
has to lead the production unit as a representative of them all, but not in 
antagonism with the state. Centralised planning must rationally use all 
elements of production and cannot depend on one workers’ assembly or 
on the opinion of one worker. However, practice has taught us that one 
technician can have more effect on production than all other workers, or 
one management cadre can change a factory by enthusing and involving 
all the workers. We do not yet fully understand this process, it needs to 
be studied. The answer has to be closely linked with the political
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economy of this period and the treatment of these questions should be 
integral and coherent with political economy.11
Written in April 1965, Guevara’s letter to Castro appears as a leaving speech, 
explaining why he had felt it necessary to develop the BFS: its aims, an evaluation of 
its strengths and weaknesses, a call to others to keep up the good work. That same 
month, Guevara left Cuba to engage in a secret mission of Cuban military assistance 
-to the guerrilla struggle in the Congo. The guerrillas were defeated, but Guevara 
remained in hiding in Tanzania and Prague in the Czech Republic between 1965 and 
1966 where he took up the challenge of expounded a comprehensive critique of the 
political economy of socialist transition. He began planning an ambitious and 
comprehensive work, to begin with a biography of Marx and Engels, which he 
completed, an explanation of their method, followed by an overview of pre-capitalist, 
capitalist and imperialist modes of production. He then aimed to deal with the period 
of transition to socialism and finally the problems of socialism. The topic coverage 
was so comprehensive that, even given Guevara’s talent for being concise, the 
completed work would have rivalled the Soviet Manual o f Political Economy in size 
and scope.
In preparation for this work Guevara took notes on the Soviet Manual. This practice
was consistent with the methodological approach to study adopted since his 
10teenage. Many works of theory have taken the form of a critique of existing ideas,
including Marx’s Capital. Guevara’s critique applied his theoretical positions
expounded in the Great Debate to the Manual and expanded on themes dealt with
fleetingly in the MININD bimonthly meetings. However, it is vital to remembered
that these notes were not written for publication, nor brought together as text. They
were comments written in response to specific paragraphs of the Manual: notes to
1 ^
himself, including indications of areas for further study. It would be disingenuous 
to present these private commentaries as a comprehensive critique, rather than the 
preliminary sketch of a more long-term study. Guevara demonstrates awareness of
11 Guevara, Apuntes Criticos a la Economia Politico, Centro de Estudios Che Guevara & Ocean Press. 
La Habana: Ciencias Sociales, 2006, 7-17
12 See chapter 10 for details.
13 Guevara’s notes directed him to the work of Paul Sweezy, Lin Piao and Xhinuy.
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the relative historicity of both the Manual and his own critique. Readers of the notes 
should do likewise.
What stands out is that after six years of leading industry in Cuba, and four years of 
developing and implementing the BFS, Guevara’s theoretical positions had not 
changed, but had become sharper and more profound. His analysis of the operation 
of the law of value under socialism, the role of money, finance and banking under 
socialism and the use of incentives, expounded in the Great Debate, were 
reeinphasised in his critique of the Soviet Manual. He continuously highlighted the 
deficiencies of the Soviet theory and pointed out new areas where investigation was 
imperative.
CRITIQUE OF THE SOVIET MANUAL OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY
Guevara’s notes begin with an introduction explaining the need for such a critique.
This is paraphrased below:
Marx’s Capital is a monumental theoretical work, which serves 
revolutionaries by explaining the mechanisms of the capitalist system and 
the internal logic which will lead to its own destruction. Some of Marx 
and Engels’ predictions have not occurred for various reasons. Lenin 
analysed the new imperialist form of capitalism and saw the possibility of 
breaking the weakest link in the imperialist chain. While the founders of 
Marxism left behind many theoretical works, since their death few new 
contributions were made leaving only the works of Stalin and Mao Tse- 
Tung to testify to the creative power of Marxism. In his last years, Stalin 
was worried about the lack of theory and ordered a Manual about the 
political economy of socialism to be written in a form accessible to the 
masses. We have so many differences with the Manual that we have been 
through it with as much scientific rigor and honesty as possible, which is 
so vital because this study criticises the USSR, a position which serves 
opportunists who attack it from the extreme left to the benefit of the 
reactionaries. We will not hide our opinions for tactical reasons, but our 
conclusions will have logical rigor and we will propose solutions.
The intransigent dogmatism of Marxism has been succeeded by 
inconsistent pragmatism. With daring, respect, admiration and 
revolutionary motives we say that Lenin is the ultimate culprit. Our thesis
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is that the changes produced by the NEP have become entrenched in the 
USSR. The capitalist superstructure influences the relations of production 
and the hybrid system [socialism with capitalist elements] provokes 
conflicts which have been resolved in favour of the superstructure. It is 
returning to capitalism.
This work is a cry out from underdevelopment. The Cuban Revolution 
introduced the first socialist adventure to take place in a small, isolated 
country without big markets.
. Some will see this book as a rabid anti-communism disguised as 
theoretical argument. However, many will feel the breath of new ideas, 
explained and given backbone. This book is written for them, and Cuban 
students who go through the painful process of learning ‘eternal truths’ in 
publications, mainly from the USSR. For those who distrust this book out 
of loyalty to the socialist countries, we warn that the inability of 
bourgeois economics to criticise itself, pointed out by Marx at the 
beginning of Capital, is seen today in the economic science of Marxism. 
Humanity faces many shocks before final liberation, but we cannot arrive 
there without a radical change in the strategy of the first most important 
socialist powers.14
As with the previous chapter on the Great Debate, the intention here is to explore 
Guevara’s analysis. The thesis contribution is in the selection, interpretation and 
thematic presentation of the critical notes. For clarity and to avoid simply 
reproducing the notes as they were annotated, the chapter has been organised into 
five themes: capitalism and imperialism, the Kolkhoz agricultural cooperatives in the 
USSR, socialism, class relations and international relations. A summary of Guevara’s 
critical analysis of each theme follows.
CAPITALISM AND IMPERIALISM
Guevara complained that the Manual adopted a classical Marxist conception of class 
relations between the bourgeoisie and the working class, without considering the 
effects of imperialism. While the Manual argued that capitalists attack the standard
14 Guevara, Apuntes, 25-28 & Orlando Borrego Diaz, El Camino del Fuego, La Habana: Imagen 
Contempordnea, 2001, 381 -383.
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of living of the working class who therefore resist, Guevara argued that in the 
imperialist countries:
‘...the tendency of modem imperialism is to share with the workers the 
crumbs of their exploitation of other peoples. On the other hand, the 
tendency to increase production demands an increase in consumption, 
that is only achieved in a stable form by making new articles form an 
essential part of the workers life, in that they form part of the formation 
of the value of labour power (radio, television, cinema, domestic 
equipment, etc).’15
Guevara repeated this point in relation to salaries, stating that Marx’s analysis of the 
tendency for salaries to fall is controversial: ‘It seem to me that this needs to be 
studied in three parts: the tendency of capitalism to lower the average salary; the 
need to increase the sale of products that tends to increase the value of labour power; 
imperialism as a world system that tends to pauperise countries while sharing out 
crumbs to its working class.’16 The latter explains why: ‘the mass of workers in the
17imperialist countries have stopped being the vanguard of the world revolution.’ 
Guevara’s principle concern here was the effect of imperialism on the working class 
in advanced capitalist countries. He pointed out that a high proportion of those 
workers achieve a higher standard of living at the expense of the poor in the 
exploited nations. He touches on the contentious issue of the dichotomy between the 
need to increase the consumption levels of sections of the working class and the 
general need to decrease the value of labour power globally.
Guevara is not just referring to the labour aristocracy, but to the whole working class 
within the imperialist countries who benefit from the imperialist exploitation and the 
technological progress of monopoly capitalism. In response to the Soviet Manual's 
assertion that capitalist machinery increases the intensity of work without increasing 
pay, Guevara adds that the tendency of monopoly capitalism is towards automated
15 Guevara, Apuntes, 59.
16 Guevara, Apuntes, 64.
17 Guevara, Apuntes, 67.
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production, where the machinery imposes the rhythm and there can be little variation 
to the work norm: ‘The tendency of modem production makes man’s work less 
physically demanding.’18
Chapter 14 of the Manual deals with economic crises, claiming that capitalist crises 
demonstrate that the development of the productive forces of capitalism have 
surpassed bourgeois relations of production, which obstruct their further 
development. ‘How is it possible to tell the story of crises going back two hundred 
years by making a statement of this type?’ questioned Guevara, adding that: ‘there is 
a crisis of growth that leads to the monopolistic concentration of capitals. The 
problem is that the meaning of the crisis has not been adequately studied by Marx 
and they have continued with the generalities he expounded.’19
Guevara also pointed out that the result of the arms race had not been scientifically 
analysed, nor its relation to crises. Following the Manual's assertion that the arms 
race leads to an increase in workers’ exploitation and monopoly profits, he-stated that 
it decreases unemployment and creates a relative prosperity: ‘I don’t understand the 
mechanism well but it must be a short term phenomenon that inevitably leads to war 
and crisis. It is said that war prevents the crisis. We need to study cycles to see if the
Oftwar does not prevent the crisis.’
Finally Guevara cautions against Lenin’s characterisation of imperialism as
capitalism which was dying, not just monopolistic and parasitic. He said: ‘a middle
aged man cannot undergo more physiological changes, but he is not dying. The
capitalist system reaches its total maturity with imperialism, even then it has not fully
exploited all of its possibilities in the current moment and it has great vitality. It is
more precise to say “mature” or express that it has arrived at the limits of its ability
01to develop... we are not so close to the definitive day of revolution.’
18 Guevara, Apuntes, 63.
19 Guevara, Apuntes, 77.
20 Guevara, Apuntes, 80.
21 Guevara, Apuntes, 83-4,
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Guevara fully appreciated the enormity of the productive, military and political 
strength of capitalism. This reality could not be ignored in the aspirations to socialist 
transition. The power of the capitalist world provides the context to the struggle for 
socialism and it was recognition of this that made Guevara so adamant that transition 
from the capitalism to socialism was a process which had to be both conscious and 
violently forced.
KOLKHOZ
The Kolkhoz was a form of collective farm established in the late 1920s in the Soviet 
Union, in which members of the farm, kolkhoznics were paid a share of the farm’s 
product and profit according to the number of workdays they had invested. 
Kolkhoznics were entitled to hold an acre of private land and some animals, the 
product of which they owned privately.
Guevara has two principal points of contention in relation to the Manual's 
formulation about the Kolkhoz. First, he insisted that the Kolkhoz system is: 
‘characteristic of the USSR, not of socialism’,23 complaining that the Manual: 
‘regularly confuses the notion of socialism with what occurs in the USSR.’24 Second, 
he argued that cooperatives are not a socialist form of ownership and that they 
impose a superstructure with capitalist property relations and economic levers.
The Manual states that the Kolkhoz are free from exploitation and antagonistic 
contradictions. Guevara refers to denunciations in the Soviet press of a Kolkhoz 
which contracted manpower for specific harvests, and questioned: ‘whether this is 
considered to be an isolated case or if you can maintain this occasional exploitation 
of manpower within a socialist regime?’ For Guevara the Kolkhoz structure itself 
created antagonism in the relations of production, because: ‘the Kolkhoz system
22 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to detail the history and significance of the Kolkhoz farms.
23 Guevara, Apuntes, 166.
24 Guevara, Apuntes, 140.
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allows a form of property that necessarily clashes with the established regime, and 
even with its own Kolkhoz organisation, as the peasant works for himself and he will 
try to deduct from the collective for his own benefit.’25
Guevara cited Lenin’s statement that the peasants generate capitalism. The Manual 
itself quotes Lenin that small production generates capitalism and the formation of a 
bourgeoisie, constantly and spontaneously. However, Guevara concluded that the 
Manual is not able to deny that the cooperatives generate capitalism: ‘Although it has 
collective tendencies, it is a collective in contradiction to the big collective. If this is 
not a step towards more advanced forms, a capitalist superstructure will develop, and
Oftbring about contradictions within society.’ The ‘big collective’ is the nation and 
reflects Guevara’s view that under socialism, the means of production in different 
enterprises and sectors should be considered as parts of one big factory. There can be 
no commodity exchange between them, as there is no transferral of ownership, thus 
the law of value is undermined.
The Manual quotes Lenin that: ‘The regime of cooperative cultivation under social 
ownership of the means of production, under the triumph of proletariat over the 
bourgeoisie, is the socialist regime.’29
Guevara stated that this was one of the greatest mistakes of socialism: ‘To begin with 
a semantic question...what is a cooperative? If it is considered as a grouping of 
producers, owners of their means of production, it is an advance in contrast to 
capitalism. But in socialism it is a setback, as it places these groupings in opposition 
to society’s ownership of the other means of production. In the USSR the land is 
social property but not the other means of production that belong to the Kolkhoz, not 
to mention the small kolkoznic property which supply growing quantities of basic
25 Guevara, Apuntes, 55.
26 Guevara, Apuntes, 55.
27 Manual, Apuntes, 57.
28 Guevara, Apuntes, 104.
29 Lenin, cited by Manual, Apuntes, 107.
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foodstuffs and deepen the gap between the society and the kolkoznics, if not 
financially, then ideologically.’30
According to Guevara even if private property within the Kolkhoz was eliminated 
there is a contradiction between individual collective ownership and the social
'X 1ownership of all the people. As evidence of this, the Manual outlines contradictions 
which arose between the Kolkhoz and the Machine and Tractor Stations (MTS), 
which lent equipment to the cooperatives. As kolkoznics monetary incomes 
increased they were able to purchase tractors and other agricultural machinery, which 
created pressure on the MTS to sell technical equipment to the Kolkhoz. The MTS 
were consequently reorganised as repair centres for the equipment.32 Guevara stated 
that: ‘this is a palpable example of the antagonistic contradictions that emerge 
between social property and that of the individual collective. The MTS could have 
had many vices of bureaucracy, but the superstructure imposed its solution: greater 
autonomy and more of its own wealth.’33 The superstructure was the Kolkhoz.
The Kolkhoz had fixed salaries for cooperative workers whose employment was 
guaranteed. In addition they received monthly bonuses -  in money or in kind -  
according to their work days contributed. For Guevara: ‘this, and the reasons pointed 
out as advantageous, indicates the backward character of the Kolkhoz system, a 
compromise solution by a state that constructed socialism alone and surrounded by 
dangers. The superstructure created gained strength with time.’34 Guevara is 
extremely cognisant of the concrete conditions which made the formulation of the 
NEP and consequent economic management systems necessary. However, his 
concern is that these measures be openly understood to be concessions to those 
problems, not paradigms for socialist transition. Noting that the Kolkhoz has 
differential incomes according to their size and productivity, Guevara commented: 
‘One has the right to ask them self, why? Is it essential? The answer is: no.’35
30 Guevara, Apuntes, 108.
31 Guevara, Apuntes, 168.
32 Manual, Apuntes, 168-9.
33 Guevara, Apuntes, 169.
34 Guevara, Apuntes, 170.
35 Guevara, Apuntes, 171.
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Guevara concluded that: ‘it would be better to consider the Kolkhoz as a pre-socialist 
category, of the first period of transition’, insisting that ‘cooperative ownership is 
not a socialist form.’
For Guevara, the major challenge of socialist transition was precisely: ‘how to 
transform individualised collective property into social property.’ This was the crux 
of the problem and it was not being confronted in existing socialism. Without solving 
this contradiction, the class antagonism would remain, impeding the transition to 
communism, a classless society. The Manual describes the Kolkhoz peasants and the 
working class as two classes in socialist society with amicable relations, but different 
positions in social production. Guevara responded that: ‘if the Kolkhoz peasants are 
considered as a separate class it is because of the type of property they have; property 
that should not be considered as a characteristic of socialism but rather of Soviet 
society.’ The Manual concluded that: ‘the relations of production of the Kolkhoz 
cooperative form fully respond to the needs and the level of development of the 
current forces of production in the countryside. Not only have they not exhausted 
their possibilities, but they can serve for a long time during the development of the 
forces of production in agriculture.’40 But Guevara believed that a confrontation 
between this collective form and social ownership of the means of production was 
inevitable, and he warned that: ‘when they clash (and it could be in the not too 
distant future) with the superstructure, they will have the strength to demand more 
“freedom”, that is to say to impose conditions; it is worth saying, to return to 
capitalist forms.’41
In addition to his theoretical arguments about contradictions in property relations, 
Guevara also contested the Soviet’s claim to have a superior form of agricultural 
production to capitalism, the biggest and most mechanised in the world. ‘North 
American productivity is higher, due to the investments carried out in agriculture’, he
36 Guevara, Apuntes, 116.
37 Guevara, Apuntes, 119.
38 Guevara, Apuntes, 180.
39 Guevara, Apuntes, 182.
40 Manual, Apuntes, 187.
41 Guevara, Apuntes, 187.
390
Chapter 11: Critique o f the Soviet Manual o f Political Economy
asserted adding that the Soviet’s statement seemed like a mockery: ‘after the 
enormous purchases of wheat, it is a joke or an attempt to cover up the truth with 
words.’42
Guevara’s position is clear; cooperative ownership and the Kolkhoz system generate 
a capitalistic superstructure which clashes with state ownership and socialist social- 
relations, increasingly imposing its own logic over society. The Kolkhoz system was 
progressive in relation to capitalist forms of ownership, but would also retard the 
development of socialist forms.
SOCIALISM
The Manual seemingly contradicted itself on the question of the parliamentary road 
to socialism in the capitalist countries, first stating that a socialist economy: ‘cannot 
arise in the entrails of bourgeois society, based on private property’ and then stating 
that ‘there is the real possibility that, in one or another of the capitalist countries or 
those coming out of colonial domination, the working class could arrive at power 
peacefully, through parliament.’43
Guevara was dismissive: ‘Not even the Italians believe this song about parliament 
and they have no other god.’44 For him, the transition from capitalism to socialism is 
never without struggle and he challenged the Soviets to prove the opposite.45
With the development of socialism, claimed the Manual, a fundamental economic 
law of socialism emerges: Production is carried out to raise the material well being 
and cultural level of the workers, achieved by means of rapid and uninterrupted 
extension of industry and full application of advanced technology 46 Guevara replied:
42 Guevara, Apuntes, 111. In 1963, the USSR was forced to purchase wheat at world market prices 
from the US because of a domestic production crisis.
43 Manual, Apuntes, 96 & p98.
44 Guevara, Apuntes, 98. Possibly a reference to Gramsci.
45 Guevara, Apuntes, 90.
46 Manual, Apuntes, 101.
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‘For me, this is the weakest point of the so-called socialist political 
• economy. If there was a fundamental law it would be of the moral order, 
placing itself at the head of the political programme of the proletarian 
government, but never economic. On the other hand, what would this 
fundamental economic law be, if it does exist? I believe that it does exist 
and that it should be considered to be planning as such. Planning should 
. be understood as the first opportunity for humans to govern economic 
forces. This would mean that the fundamental economic law is that of 
interpreting and managing the economic laws of the period.’47
The extracts selected by Guevara in his notes include nine economic laws of 
socialism, according to the Manual. Guevara contests each law, serving to undermine 
the scientific claims of the Manual, as follows:
Manual law 1: The necessary correspondence between relations of production and 
the forces of production.
Guevara: This contradicts the Manual's statement that countries without fully 
developed capitalism can reach socialism.48
Manual law 2: Uninterrupted production -  because production is free from crisis. 
Guevara: This is idealist and recent problems in Eastern Europe and the wheat crisis 
demonstrate that there can be interruptions in production. This law is based on 
Stalin’s claims that demand is below supply in the construction period. Khruschev 
refuted this and life has proved him right, but it was the errors in production which 
led to crises and stagnation in production.49
Manual law 3: Harmonic (proportional) development of national economy.
Guevara: Correct, but vague, and does not define harmonic development. 
Armaments conflict with laws of satisfaction of consumption goods and there are
47 Guevara, Apuntes, 102.
48 Guevara, Apuntes, 99-100.
49 Guevara, Apuntes, 89 & 179.
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differences between autarkic countries and those using the proper international 
division of labour. This law is simply an element of planned development.50
Manual law 4: Constantly rising worker productivity.
Guevara: This is an outrage. It is the tendency that has driven capitalism for 
centuries.51 To set out to increase productivity by individual incentives is to fall 
lower than the capitalists. They do increase exploitation in this way, but it is the 
technology that allows the great leaps in quality in relation to productivity.52
Manual law 5: Socialist accumulation demands systematic investment of part of 
national income in the increase of production funds.
Guevara: Another capitalist law dressed up differently.53 Cannot put goals of ‘bread 
and onions’ to reach communism; a determined (elastic) level of development of the 
productive forces with the new level of consciousness of the masses will reach 
communism.54
Manual law 6: Distribution (remuneration) according to work invested.
Guevara: Vague and inexact in relation to today’s reality and begs the questions, 
how much work does a major general, a teacher, a minister or a worker invest? Lenin 
made a proposal in State and Revolution, to equalise the salaries of administrators 
and workers which he later reversed, probably incorrectly.55
Manual law 7: Satisfaction of growing material needs of the people
Guevara: They combine the ends, an ethical attitude, with the law and from which
emerged this runt -  the famous ‘fundamental’ law.56
50 Guevara, Apuntes, 103.
51 Guevara, Apuntes, 103.
52 Guevara, Apuntes, 198.
53 Guevara, Apuntes, 126.
54 Guevara, Apuntes, 128.
55 Guevara, Apuntes, 103.
56 Guevara, Apuntes, 125.
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Manual law 8: End of antagonistic contradiction between accumulation and 
consumption.57
Guevara: It might not be antagonistic, but the contradiction remains important and 
must be considered in the plan every year. Armaments play a big role in this 
contradiction.58
According to the Manual, the masses compete to surpass the plans of development. 
Guevara disputed that this had been achieved in the USSR or Cuba, or anywhere 
else. The Manual advocates the use of money and credit to assure investments for 
completion of the plans of production. Credit, profit and accumulation were used to 
overcome anti-planning tendencies, by the use of material incentives.59 Guevara 
argued the process should be reversed. The masses should participate in devising the 
plan but once finalised it was their duty to complete it, as mechanically as possible 
with the process dominated by technology.60 He complained that the Manual does 
not conceptualise the plan as an economic decision of the masses, conscious of their 
role. Instead:
4.. .they give it a placebo, where economic levers determine its success.
This is mechanistic and anti-Marxist. The masses should have the 
opportunity to direct their destiny, resolve how much goes to 
accumulation, how much to consumption, the economic techniques 
should operate with these data and the conscience of the masses assures 
its completion. The state acts over the individual that does not complete 
his class duty, penalising him, and awarding in the opposite case. These 
are educational factors that contribute to the transformation of man, as 
part of the larger educational system of socialism. It is the social duty of 
the individual that compels his behaviour in production not his stomach. 
Education attends to this.’61
57 It is not clear whether this is cited as a law or a tendency.
58 Guevara, Apuntes, 128-9.
59 Guevara, Apuntes, 130-132.
60 Guevara, Apuntes, 131-2.
61 Guevara, Apuntes, 132-3.
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Guevara added that annual plans are a hindrance in Cuba, with factories performing 
brilliantly one year and disastrously the next, because of the lack of raw materials: ‘If 
the system is bad in neighbouring socialist countries, with great interdependence, in 
Cuba, thousands of kilometres away and with permanent payment problems, it was 
disastrous.’62 Clearly, the planning mechanism had to be improved, both in its 
democratic function and in fulfilment.
Throughout his critical notes Guevara repeated his criticisms of the Auto-Financing 
System (AFS), also called ‘economic calculus’, expounded in the Great Debate, for 
the use of capitalist categories as economic levers to development: material 
incentives, profit, credit, interest, bank logins, commodity exchange, competition, 
circulation tax, money as payment, financial control and the operation of the law of 
value. ‘All the residues of capitalism are used to the maximum in order to eliminate 
capitalism’, complained Guevara. ‘Dialectics is a science not some joke. No-one
fkXscientifically explains this contradiction.’
For Guevara the problem of a hybrid system began with the NEP which should have 
been reversed, not entrenched following Lenin’s death. The Manual states that the 
NEP ensured the triumph of the socialist economy over capitalism in the USSR. 
Guevara retorted that the NEP:
‘...constitutes one of biggest steps backward taken by the USSR. Lenin 
compared it to the peace of Brest-Litovsk. The decision was extremely 
difficult and, to judge from the resulting doubts in Lenin’s spirit at the 
end of his life, if he had lived a few years longer he would have corrected 
its most reactionary effects. His followers did not see the danger and it 
remained as the great Trojan horse of socialism, direct material interest 
as an economic lever. The NEP was not installed against small 
commodity production, but at the demand of it.’64
62 Guevara, Apuntes, 133. It is open to speculation as to whether Guevara’s use of the past tense was 
because he felt those problems were overcome or whether it reflected the distance he already felt from 
the economic situation in Cuba.
63 Guevara, Apuntes, 188.
64 Guevara, Apuntes, 112.
395
Chapter 11: Critique of the Soviet Manual o f Political Economy
The Manual criticised Stalin’s thesis that mercantile circulation under socialism 
represents a break on the development of the productive forces leading to the need 
for direct exchange between industry and agriculture. Stalin, it stated, failed fully to 
appreciate: ‘the operation of the law of value in the sphere of production, in 
particular as far as concerns the means of production.’65 Despite Stalin’s 
responsibilities for embedding capitalist levers, Guevara still regards him as less 
reactionary than the Manual:
‘In the supposed errors of Stalin is the difference between a revolutionary 
and a revisionist view. He saw the danger in commodity relations and 
attempted to pass over this stage by breaking those that resisted him. The 
new leadership, on the contrary, give in to the impulses of the 
superstructure and emphasise commercial activity, theorising that the 
total use of these economic levers will take them to communism.’
That few voices oppose this, added Guevara, demonstrates Stalin’s great historical 
crime: ‘to have underestimated communist education and instituted an unrestricted 
culture of authority.’66 Guevara asserted that it was a serious failing of the Soviet 
system to relegate moral incentives.67 The Manual said that material incentives were 
used to combine individual interests with society’s needs, without even mentioning 
moral incentives. Guevara compared the Manual's approach to that of the worker 
under capitalism whose interest in their work varied with their pay.68 Man does not 
work for himself under socialism, stated Guevara, he works for the society he is part 
of, because it is his social duty:69 ‘The mistake is to take material incentives only in a 
capitalist sense and then castrate them.’70 Guevara repeated that the challenge is to 
use moral incentives through education to link workers to the project of socialist 
construction and use economic punishments for incompletion and material and moral 
awards for over-completion.
65 Manual, Apuntes, 195.
66 Guevara, Apuntes, 195.
67 Guevara, Apuntes, 155.
68 Guevara, Apuntes, 118.
69 Guevara, Apuntes, 135.
70 Guevara, Apuntes, 136.
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For Guevara salaries should be considered as society’s recognition that individuals 
complete a society duty. The Manual revealed that are special economic zones where 
workers are better paid, which Guevara pointed out contradicts its economic law of 
distribution according to work. He concluded: ‘This is all the result of the failure of 
moral incentives; it is a defeat for socialism.’71 In response to the Manual’s citation 
of Lenin’s call to use the: ‘enthusiasm awakened for the revolution, but based on 
personal interest, personal benefit, taking economic calculus as the base’,72 Guevara 
wrote: ‘It was a crucial moment in the USSR coming out of a long and costly civil 
war when Lenin, anguished about the general situation, reversed his theoretical 
conceptions and began the long process of hybridisation that has culminated in 
today’s changes in the structure of economic management.’73
Guevara also criticised as mechanistic and arbitrary the Manual’s approach to 
emulation, the goal of which it claimed was completing and surpassing the economic 
plan and ensuring uninterrupted socialist production. He argued that emulation was: 
‘in essence a sporting process, collectivised to the maximum by education, it should 
have as little contact as possible with payment so it is really soaked in what is 
missing: in the consciousness of the masses.’74
The Manual cited Lenin again to argue that it is possible in specific historical 
conditions for backward countries, under the leadership of the working class, to 
develop in ‘non-capitalist ways’, from the economic and social perspective. Without 
passing through capitalist development, they could gradually enter socialism as the 
democratic-bourgeois revolution gave way to the socialist revolution. Guevara 
queried whether Lenin used the term ‘non-capitalist ways’ demanding: ‘If it is not 
capitalist what it is? Hermaphrodite? Hybrid? Facts have demonstrated that is only 
during a short period of political struggle before the way has been defined, but it will 
be capitalist or socialist.’75
71 Guevara, Apuntes, 152-3.
72 Lenin, cited by Manual, Apuntes, 156.
73 Guevara, Apuntes, 157.
74 Guevara, Apuntes, 139.
75 Guevara, Apuntes, 99.
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Guevara labelled as ‘debatable’ the Manual's claim that there is no danger of 
capitalism returning to the USSR; that socialism has triumphed fully and definitively. 
He said:
‘The latest economic revolutions in the USSR reassemble those that 
Yugoslavia took when it chose the path which will gradually take it back 
to capitalism. Time will tell whether this is a passing accident or a 
disposition towards a definitive reactionary current. This is all part of an 
erroneous conception of wanting to construct socialism with capitalist 
elements without really changing their meaning. This results in a hybrid 
system that arrives at a dead end with no exit, or with an exit that is 
difficult to perceive, that obliges new concessions to economic levers, 
that is to say retreat.’76
Against the Manual's assertion that the USSR has entered a phase of transition from 
socialism to communism, Guevara stated that this is against Marxist theory and 
contemporary logic: ‘First, in today’s conditions, with the development of the world 
market, communism would be made on the basis of exploitation and forgetting the 
people who whom they trade with. Second, the enormous quantities of resources 
destined to defence do not allow the full development of communism.. ,’77
Guevara believed that the use of capitalist categories and the relegation of moral 
incentives and education had created a hybrid system in the Socialist bloc where the 
capitalist superstructure clashed with the socialist infrastructure and impeded 
socialist development and the transition from socialism to communism. The drain on 
resources implied by military expenditure, necessary for defence from imperialism, 
was a further impediment to socialist transition.
76 Guevara, Apuntes, 112-3.
77 Guevara, Apuntes, 114.
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CLASS RELATIONS
Guevara complained that the Soviets failure to distinguish between pre-monopoly 
and monopoly capitalism led to an incorrect understanding of class antagonisms 
between the working class and the bourgeoisie. He noted the analysis of Lin Piao and 
the Chinese view that the principle contradictory relations were between oppressed 
and oppressor nations.78
Against the Manual's formulae for class struggle, Guevara argues that:
a) In dependent (oppressed) countries, foreign investment turns the working class 
into relative beneficiaries compared to the dispossessed peasant class, preventing
<70
their alliance.
b) Although historically the national bourgeoisie did play a progressive role in the 
national liberation struggle, today national capitalists make an alliance with
• Jinimperialism, particularly in Latin America and Africa.
c) The working class in developed countries do not unite with national liberation 
movements in a common front against imperialism. They receive crumbs from 
imperialism. The authentic miserable ones in most countries are the landless 
peasants who constitute the truly revolutionary force.81
d) In China, Cuba and Vietnam the revolution was not led by a revolutionary 
proletariat aligned with the peasantry. In Cuba it was a multiclass movement 
which radicalised after taking state power.82
e) Under socialism, relations between the working class and small peasants (the 
generators of capitalism) are economically antagonistic, even though the conflict 
is mediated politically.83
f) There is little evidence in USSR or the People’s Democracies that socialism 
eliminates contradictions between the city and countryside. The aim should be
78 Guevara, Apuntes, 58.
79 Guevara, Apuntes, 74.
80 Guevara, Apuntes, 82.
81 Guevara, Apuntes, 83.
82 Guevara, Apuntes, 87.
83 Guevara, Apuntes, 101
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fusion, not alliance, because socialism is not a multiclass dictatorship, but the 
dictatorship of the proletariat and in preparation for the abolition of classes.84
g) The imperialist working class strengthens in cohesion and organisation, but less 
so in consciousness. Imperialism has created a dichotomy in their attitude: 
greater organisation and consciousness of the domestic working class, but 
without proletarian internationalism externally, which is why, for now, they are
O f
no longer the revolutionary vanguard.
h) Opportunism has won over an immense layer of the working class in the 
imperialist countries, in respect to their relations with the dependent countries: 
‘Today we could qualify as the labour aristocracy the mass of workers in the
O f
strong countries with respect to the weak ones.’
Guevara refuted the Manual's claim that under socialism trade unions are important 
organisations of the masses with the right to monitor the state on completion of work 
and protection legislation. Cadre could fulfil these roles, he said:
‘Trade unions appear anachronistic, without meaning, above all in the 
way they are organised nationally, which is nothing more than the result 
of a special situation in the USSR, in a particular historical moment, 
copied later in the rest of the socialist countries. In a society where the 
proletariat has taken power, this organ of class struggle should disappear, 
transform itself. Sustaining it has bought out two things: on one side the 
bureaucratisation of the workers’ movement, on the other, the difference 
between workers, as the social support they provide depends on the
R7. wealth of each trade union and from these the different salaries exist.’
For claiming the dictatorship of the proletariat is not necessarily violent class war, 
Guevara accused the Manual of opportunism: ‘The dictatorship of the proletariat is a 
regime of violence against the bourgeoisie; it is clear that the intensity of the struggle
84 Guevara, Apuntes, 113.
85 Guevara, Apuntes, 61-2.
86 Guevara, Apuntes, 86.
87 Guevara, Apuntes, 123-4,
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depends on the resistance of the exploiters, but it will never be a regime of rose
QO
water, or it will be devoured.’ The term ‘democratic centralism’ he said, was a 
sonorous phrase, which encapsulates the most dissimilar political structures and,
OQ
therefore, lacking any real content.
While the Manual talked about conscious and fraternal worker discipline, Guevara 
stated that work discipline is imposed by force in class society, including socialism, 
which uses compulsion helped by education until discipline becomes spontaneous: 
‘To be consistent, here they should have put the lever of material interest as a 
disciplinary factor, which it certainly is, but that also goes against communist 
education, in the way it is currently applied.’90
Finally, the Manual concluded that even under communism the state will remain 
necessary, in order to defend the USSR and the other countries of the Socialist bloc 
against imperialist aggression. A statement which Guevara replied was irreconcilable 
with the present theory:
‘First, can communism be built just in one country? Second, if it is 
necessary for the State to defend the country, this should complete the 
function of the dictatorship [of the proletariat], or it is something else, or 
change the theory. Problems like these cannot be posed (and not 
resolved) in one isolated paragraph, whatever Manual it may be. There 
are many statements in this book that appear in the formula of the Holy 
Trinity; they are not understood but faith will resolve them.’91
Guevara’s analysis of class relations focuses on the effects of imperialism: in the 
oppressor nation, the oppressed nation and between the oppressed and oppressor 
nations, which undermines the mechanistic and orthodox Marxist formulae in the 
Manual. His acute understanding of socialism being the dictatorship of the proletariat
88 Guevara, Apuntes, 100.
89 Guevara, Apuntes, 123.
90 Guevara, Apuntes, 138.
91 Guevara, Apuntes, 184.
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and communism being the abolition of classes leads him to deride the apologetics of 
the Manual which attempts to air-brush the inherent violence of class struggle.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Guevara criticised the Soviet Union’s so-called ‘Leninist thesis’ of peaceful co­
existence and economic emulation with the advanced capitalist or imperialist world:
. ‘This is one of the most dangerous theses of the USSR. It could be
approved as an extraordinary possibility, but cannot become the leit 
*
motiv of policy. Even now the masses are incapable of stopping the war 
and the demonstrations against the war in Vietnam are because of its 
bloody consequences. It is the heroism of the Vietnamese peoples’ 
struggle that imposes the solution; the policy of appeasement, on the 
other hand, has reinforced Yanki aggression.’92
Where the Manual claimed that war is no longer fatally inevitable, Guevara retorts: 
‘It would be good to determine what it is that these people call war.’93
Moving on from peaceful co-existence to economic emulation, Guevara agreed that 
communism presupposes abundance, but against the Manual's assertion that 
communism necessarily has much higher productivity than capitalism, he argued that 
strict comparison with capitalism was not necessary:
‘To make communism a quantitative and changing goal, that should 
match capitalist development which continues progressing, is 
mechanistic on the one hand and defeatist on the other. Not to mention 
that no-one has, or can, establish rules for peaceful emulation with 
capitalism, which is a universal aspiration, noble in a superficial sense,
92 Guevara, Apuntes, 91-2.
93 Guevara, Apuntes, 92.
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but dangerous and selfish in a serious sense, as it morally disarms the 
people and obliges socialism to forget other peoples left behind in order 
to continue with emulation.’94
This echoes Guevara’s criticisms espoused in international forums that the most 
advanced socialist countries were failing to provide disinterested support to 
underdeveloped countries and basing their trade on the law of value.95 For Guevara 
the challenge for socialism is not to win in emulation with capitalism, but to resolve 
the contradiction created by the existence of private means of production, for 
example, collective farms, and to ensure communist education. Economic emulation, 
he said: ‘is the thesis of an inferiority complex, with eyes permanently fixed on the 
imperialist model.’96 The Manual stated that peaceful coexistence and economic 
emulation strengthens the Socialist bloc against the capitalist world, drawing 
dependent countries towards the socialist path through fraternal relations and 
economic assistance and fair trade. Guevara denied that there is evidence to support 
this statement. For example, successes in Brazil and India were due to capitalist
97investment.
In response to the ManuaVs claim that economic planning and mutual assistance 
between Socialist bloc countries are a characteristic of the socialist state in regards to 
economic organisation, Guevara stated that while this is true in theory, in reality: 
‘internationalism is replaced by chauvinism (of big powers or little powers) and 
submission to the USSR, thus maintaining the discrepancies between the other 
democratic peoples (CAME). How should all this recorded? It is difficult to say 
without a profound analysis and documenting the motivations of every attitude taken,
94 Guevara, Apuntes, 185-6.
95 ‘There should be no more talk about developing mutually beneficial trade based on prices forced on 
the backward countries by the law of value and the international relations of unequal exchange that 
result from the law of value... The socialist countries have the moral duty to put an end to their tacit 
complicity with the exploiting countries of the West.’ Guevara, ‘At the Afro-Asian conference in 
Algeria’ in David Deutschmann, (ed), Che Guevara Reader: Writings on Guerrilla Strategy, Politics 
& Revolution. Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1998 (2nd edition), 303.
96 Guevara, Apuntes, 179.
97 Guevara, Apuntes, 90.
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but what is certain is that it commits an outrage against all the dreams of the world’s 
honest communists. ’98
The Manual also claimed that economic development in the socialist countries 
strengthens relations between them, in direct opposite to capitalism. Guevara said: 
‘The theory could raise the problem of unequal development also for socialism. The 
practice has posed the problem of irreconcilable contradictions, sometimes of an 
ideological character, that always have a material, economic base. From them stem 
the positions taken by the USSR, China, Romania or Cuba in problems apparently 
unlinked to the economy.’99 Guevara cited the most explosive examples of conflicts 
as between USSR-Albania, USSR-China and China-Cuba to undermine the 
Manual's claims. He added that: ‘There are many more but for tactical reasons or 
fear they have not erupted openly.’100
For Guevara, the example of CAME exposed as a lie the claim of mutual socialist 
assistance between equal states. This is because the base of the trade price is the 
international market which is distorted by unequal exchange, enriching the 
industrialised country and detrimental for the exporters of raw materials.101 Just as he 
opposed interest being charged to state enterprises within Cuba, Guevara objected to 
the imposition of interest between socialist countries. It is immoral, he said: ‘to 
charge interest for capital, the amount of interest is secondary.’ However, he added 
that: ‘The USSR and China have most consistently followed a policy of proletarian 
internationalism in this regard.’102 This was recognition of the vital support received 
by Cuba from both those socialist powers. Guevara impelled the Socialist bloc to 
equalise trading relations: ‘It is necessary to create indexes of productivity that 
oblige the more developed country to provide goods cheaper and accept goods more
1 mexpensive from the less developed countries’. This was necessary to balance
98 Guevara, Apuntes, 130. CAME was the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, an economic 
organisation for trade and cooperation between the socialist countries, 1949-1991.
99 Guevara, Apuntes, 189.
100 Guevara, Apuntes, 189. See K. S. Karol, Guerrillas in Power, trans. Arnold Pomerans. Britain: 
Jonathon Cape. 1971 for an explanation of Cuba’s relations with the USSR and China.
101 Guevara, Apuntes, 193.
102 Guevara, Apuntes, 192.
103 Guevara, Apuntes, 173.
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growth between the advanced and backward countries. For Guevara, such 
disinterested internationalist solidarity was the highest expression of socialist 
consciousness and Cuba had already begun to practice it by the mid-1960s, a 
characteristic of the Revolution which was to expand into massive military, 
educational and medical assistance to poor countries around the world, from Angola 
to Venezuela.
There appears to be a contradiction in Guevara’s position, in that he criticised 
peaceful coexistence, but also pointed out that the arms race is an obstacle to the 
transition from socialism to communism. This suggests Guevara did not believe that 
it was possible to reach communism until at least the big powers had become 
socialist.
CONCLUSION
Guevara concluded that modifications to Soviet political economy encapsulated in 
the Manual were: ‘changes imposed by pragmatism and the lack of scientific 
analysis.’104 The violent shake up provided by the 20th Congress of the USSR 
Communist Party following Stalin’s death disturbed the lethargy in relation to 
political economy of socialist transition, but did not it propel it forward: 
‘Compromised by the exhaustion of the possibilities for development because of the 
hybrid economic system and under pressure from the superstructure, the Soviet 
leaders took a step backwards that complemented the new organisation of industry. 
Lethargy replaced repression, but both maintained the same dogmatic 
characteristic.’105 Here was Guevara’s principal concern, that the lack of theoretical 
analysis meant that the dialectical processes underway could not be properly 
analysed and therefore, contradictions could not be resolved. Or rather, that they 
were being resolved, but increasingly in the form of concessions to the law of value
104 Guevara, Apuntes, 120.
105 Guevara, Apuntes, 194.
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and capitalist mechanisms which threatened the restoration of a capitalist mode of 
production.
Guevara’s critique of the Soviet Manual o f Political Economy constituted a 
preliminary step taken by him to contribute to the formulation of a theory of 
transition to socialism which would facilitate the search for solutions to the problems 
cited. Vitally important is the fact that his theoretical ideas had been developed in the 
concrete reality of Cuba’s Revolution and transition to socialism and through his 
daily practice as Minister of Industries. As stated, although Guevara criticised from 
the left, it was intended as constructive.
Guevara sent these notes to Borrego from Prague before returning to Cuba briefly in 
preparation for the guerrilla campaign in Bolivia. Even there, in the mountains of 
South America, he continued his theoretical investigations, preparing a similar 
manuscript of philosophical notes, which is yet to be published. It is difficult to 
speculate about the impact of Guevara’s critique of the Manual although his 
companero Edison Velazquez pointed out that Borrego passed the notes on to Castro, 
who had already received the letter cited above in 1965 at the time of his departure 
from Cuba. Velazquez affirmed: ‘Fidel is not stupid and he had a lot of affinity with 
Che. He began to prepare for events. He couldn’t say it publicly because we were 
receiving everything from the Russians, but he prepared financial reserves for when 
the Soviets disappeared, otherwise we would not have been able to survive the 
collapse.’106 The legacy of Guevara’s theoretical and organisational structures in 
Cuba is an area for further investigation. It is needless to say that Guevara’s 
prediction was correct, capitalism has returned to all the Soviet bloc countries. This 
chapter and the previous theory chapter in this thesis have illustrated the scientific 
method of analysis which led Guevara to forewarn that that collapse was inevitable.
106 Vel&zquez, interview, 21 January 2006.
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CHAPTER 12
Assessment and conclusion
‘It might be that some o f Che’s ideas are closely linked to the initial 
stage o f the Revolution... But many o f Che’s ideas are absolutely 
relevant today, ideas without which I  am convinced communism cannot 
be built, like the idea that human beings should not be corrupted; that 
they should never be alienated; the idea that without a consciousness, 
simply producing wealth, socialism as a superior society could not be 
built, and communism could never be built... Had we known, had we 
learned about Che’s economic thought w e’d  be a hundred times more 
alert... I ’m absolutely convinced that ignoring those ideas would be a 
crime... Che was also a revolutionary, a thinker, a person o f doctrine, a 
person o f great ideas, who was capable with great consistency of 
working out instruments and principles that unquestionably are essential 
to the revolutionary path... Che is a figure with enormous prestige. Che 
is a figure whose influence will grow.'1
For forty years since his death, the world has laid claim to Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara. 
He has been adopted variously as a figurehead of anti-imperialism, as a symbol of 
rebellion, as a hero of armed struggle and his image has been globally merchandised. 
Yet whether he has been revered or derided, the persona that has been appropriated is 
but a shadow of the real Guevara. His most important contributions, to socialist 
political economy and economic management in Cuba 1959-1965, have been 
neglected. Consequently, the lessons of those contributions have not been exploited, 
either within Cuba or outside. This thesis has served to restore the complex and 
multifaceted man to his full dimensions.
1 Fidel Castro, ‘Speech by Fidel Castro on October 8, 1987’ in David Deutschmann (ed) Che: A 
Memoir by Fidel Castro, Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1994, 151-3.
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In detailing Guevara’s work as head of the Department of Industrialisation, President 
of the National Bank and Minister of Industries, the thesis has rescued the rich and 
dynamic history of those institutions, documenting the work of his colleagues, 
highlighting the concrete circumstances of the first years of the Revolution and 
contributing significantly to the understanding of the economic history of Cuba. In 
analysing Guevara’s study of Marx’s Capital, his critique of Soviet political 
economy and his recourse to the technological and managerial advances of capitalist 
multinationals, the research offers an invigorating new contribution to the field of 
socialist theory. Most important, it connects his theoretical and practical work, 
demonstrating how Guevara’s Marxist analysis of the law of value was integral to the 
policies created as part of the BFS. The BFS was Guevara’s solution to the challenge 
of increasing productive capacity and labour productivity, in conditions of 
underdevelopment and in transition to socialism, without relying on capitalist 
mechanisms.
Part One of this thesis demonstrates how the existing literature on Guevara has 
placed blinkers on history, by emphasising Guevara’s military exploits and focussing 
on his childhood and travels in Latin America. The period of Rectification from 
1986, when Cuba pulled back from the Soviet model, initiated a tentative 
examination of Guevara’s economic ideas, but the literature failed to detail how 
Guevara strove to concretise this analysis through his policy formulations. Thus an 
essential aspect of Guevara’s methodology was lost; the test of theory in practice and 
experience as the basis for theoretical development. This neglect has been corrected 
in this thesis. Part One also highlighted the polemical nature and political bias of 
Cuba studies, focussing on economic history and the controversy over statistical 
analysis. As stated, the approach adopted here is predicated on assessing Guevara’s 
aims and objectives on their own terms. His emphasis on consciousness and efforts 
to create a technological base and administrative control of the economy, without 
recourse to the law of value, cannot be measured in terms of GDP. Furthermore, 
Guevara’s economic management system, the Budgetary Finance System (BFS), was 
original and evolving, developed in the context of the US blockade, CIA sponsored 
invasion and the threat of nuclear conflagration, over a period of just four years.
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There are too many variables to consider for a useful comparison with the economic 
management and results in other ministries operating under alternative systems. 
Therefore, there is little utility in applying such statistical analysis.
Part Two of the thesis demonstrates Guevara’s centrality in driving the structural 
changes which transformed Cuba from semi-colonial underdevelopment to 
independence and integration into the socialist bloc between 1959 and 1961. His 
experiences in the military, political and economic spheres: purging the old army, the 
Agrarian Reform Law, forging unity between internal revolutionary forces, leading 
the first overseas mission to expand trade and relations, his observations about 
economic management in Yugoslavia, as head of the National Bank and Department 
of Industrialisation during nationalisation; all fed into the structures of the BFS 
which emerged as a practical measure to solve concrete problems. Part Two also 
describes the theoretical base which the BFS was given as Guevara immersed 
himself in the study of Marxism, leading him to open debate with proponents of the 
Soviet system of economic management in the Great Debate 1963 to 1965. The 
chapters in Part Two provide the essential historical and theoretical background 
necessary to understand Guevara’s solutions detailed in Part Three.
The BFS combined budgetary control with an ideological paradigm. Guevara bridged 
the gap between the critical distance of ‘free’ Marxists, critical of existing socialism, 
and the pragmatism of ‘state’ Marxists. His theoretical analysis had concrete 
consequences. Guevara’s challenge was to demonstrate that socialist political 
economy could construct a system which developed the productive forces 
simultaneously with socialist consciousness, thus preparing for the transition to 
communism. Part Three has examined the organisational structures and control 
mechanisms Guevara created in MININD, demonstrating how they link to his 
Marxist formation. In the process this thesis has provided the first record of 
Guevara's role in several critical areas: promoting education and training; 
establishing administrative control, based on accounting, investment and supervision 
systems; forging workers’ participation in management; founding research and
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development institutions to apply science and technology to production; and 
formulating policies to raise consciousness and commitment to the Revolution, 
whilst institutionalising psychology as an economic management tool. The thesis 
findings are summarised below.
Chapter 6 details Guevara’s three approaches to tackle the low educational, political 
and skills levels of the Cuban population, following the exodus of professionals: 
education as culture, political education and education for production. It shows the 
administrative mechanisms developed to achieve these ends: sixth grade exams, the 
School of Administrators, directors’ exams, education for the unemployed and 
technical training. It illustrates how Guevara aimed to break the link between work 
and remuneration at the heart of the capitalist mode of production, undermining the 
law of value and decommodifying labour, to convert work into a social duty and 
equate self-improvement with social development. The policies developed in 
MININD were reflections of an educational drive underway throughout Cuban 
society. Guevara’s particular contribution lay in linking education to production and 
forging a commitment to superacion [self-improvement] which turned the ministry 
into a giant school.
For Guevara, the plan and the law of value were alternative mechanisms for 
determining production and consumption levels. The plan applied administrative 
compulsion, while the market applied financial compulsion. Chapter 7 details 
Guevara search for levers to implement administrative control of the economy. 
Centralised production budgets were the first step towards this. Accounting systems 
had to be unified and data analysed in real time to facilitate cost control as the basis 
for increasing productivity and efficiency. Guevara aspired to implement the most 
advanced, capitalist techniques even while tackling innumeracy and the absence of 
an accounting culture among new administrators in MININD. Supervision was a tool 
to monitor and enforce administrative control, while investment, necessary to expand 
production, would be determined by political priorities rather than the profit motive. 
Success in this sphere was relative. MININD established a functional system of
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accounting and data analysis. The system of inventory and cost control and the 
supervision apparatus were adequate to prevent production bottle necks and to deter 
or detect thieving and corruption. These were important contributions which were 
under-utilised in the following period. Indeed, Guevara’s ambitious projects for 
computerised accounting and automated economic analysis could make little 
progress, due to technological backwardness. The significant achievement, however, 
was that Guevara articulated this paradigm of automated administrative control, 
linking it to his analysis of socialist construction.
At the heart of Guevara’s BFS was a conception of Cuba as one big factory. 
Workers’ management meant workers’ ownership over the means of production so 
that surplus value was transformed into surplus product and production for exchange 
into production for use. Chapter 8 details the policies which Guevara devised to 
promote workers’ participation in production: factory visits, Committees for Spare 
Parts, the Movement of Inventors and Innovators, Advisory Technical Committees, 
Production Assemblies, the Campaign to Construct Your Own Machine, Committees 
for Local Industry, the Plan of Integration, Hygiene and Safety procedures, policies 
to tackle absenteeism and the Personal Records. These aimed to harness the 
experience and creativity of the working class to resolve production problems, raise 
productivity, and to foster workers’ identification with the production process. They 
were mechanisms to equip the working class for increasing decentralisation and 
direct control over production. This was vital for the transition to communism as 
well as to overcome the practical problems. The integration of the Cuban population 
today in organisations of the masses and work-based associations testifies to the 
success of the principle of integration in general. However, while the obstacles which 
Guevara faced, economism and hierarchical notions, have been overcome, 
continuing economic and military attack against the Revolution have limited the 
feasibility of decentralising control over production to the Cuban masses.
Chapter 9 details Guevara’s recognition that technological innovation is the key to 
revolutionising the productive forces. Communism implies a highly productive and
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efficient mode of production. Therefore, socialism was a phenomenon of technology, 
as well as consciousness. The challenge was to foster the application of science and 
technology to production without recourse to the law of value manifested through 
competition under capitalism. To this ends he set up research and development 
institutions within MININD. In addition to fostering development in four strategic 
sectors: metallurgy, naval construction, electronics and sugar cane derivatives, the 
institutes served immediate goals: to substitute imports, increase the value added to 
primary materials, create a mechanical base and produce spare parts. The 
backwardness of Cuban industry and human resources limited the progress of these 
institutes and their economic impact. However, there were tangible results, 
particularly in metallurgy and machine production, and Guevara was arguably the 
protagonist behind the project to mechanise the sugar cane harvest. His real 
achievement was to introduce a methodology for applying science and technology to 
production, to force that agenda onto the national development strategy and lay the 
foundations for the technical and scientific training infrastructure which is so strong 
in Cuba today.
For Guevara the importance of consciousness is that it replaces capitalist 
mechanisms as the lever to action. Consciousness was understood as social 
conscience, a commitment to the social and economic justice aims of the Revolution. 
Guevara was concerned about the human condition. He believed that changes in 
relations of production were reflected in human psychology. He sought to replace the 
alienation and antagonism under capitalism with integration and solidarity under 
socialism. The process was one of searching and experimentation. Chapter 10 
demonstrates Guevara’s insistence on the dialectical relationship between 
consciousness and production, in which incentives were the key to raising 
productivity and efficiency. Socialist emulation and voluntary labour were policies to 
institutionalise moral incentives, while other mechanisms served as moral 
disincentives, forging the concept of work as a social duty. Psychology was a tool for 
measuring consciousness at the level of the individual. It was also a mechanism to 
evaluate the ability to cope with the responsibility of management, to improve 
leadership qualities and the link between the workers and management. The total
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identification of Guevara with the project of forging socialist consciousness and 
sacrifice testifies to his achievement in this area. However, what has been neglected, 
until now, is his utilisation of psychology as a tool to accompany this. This thesis has 
filled that gap.
There is an apparent paradox between Guevara’s paradigm for socialist development 
and the historical reality. On the one hand Guevara aspired to the automated control 
of production and administration, to have technical specialists in every branch and to 
develop the world’s most complex industries in Cuba. On the other hand was the 
reality of underdevelopment, the chaos incurred by the nationalisation of industry, 
the US blockade and military aggression, the exodus of management professionals, 
and the inadequate training and experience of the new managers, the low educational 
level of the workforce in general and the relative backwardness of imported socialist 
bloc factories. However, Guevara insisted on the need to prepare an infrastructure 
and introduce a methodology integral for future developments, even while struggling 
to overcome the immediate deficiencies. In this he was successful. Furthermore, 
Guevara’s closest collaborators continued in key management roles in the Cuban 
economy long after his departure. In many cases these individuals subsequently 
pursued specific policies or general principles that Guevara developed as part of his 
BFS. This, in turn, contributed to Guevara’s impact on the theoretical and 
organisational structures in Cuba over the last 40 years.
In Guevara’s search for solutions to both the theoretical problems of socialist 
transition and the concrete problems of Cuban economic history, key themes stand 
out. First, Guevara’s conception of Cuba as one big factory. There should be no 
commodity exchange between enterprises and ministries because there was no 
change of ownership. Second, engaging the working masses with daily production 
problems, the process of learning by doing, trial and error, making corrections sobre 
la marcha [on the move] and promoting the view that commitment to production was 
a revolutionary act. Third, the importance of criticism and open debate, responsibility 
and accountability for leaders. This was part of his determination to get to the root of 
problems in order to solve them. Fourth, working with experts regardless of their
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ideological affiliations, harnessing their expertise in the interests of socialist 
production and integrating them into the revolutionary process. Fifth, adopting the 
most advanced technology available, from management techniques to means of 
production, and laying the groundwork for technological advances even while 
struggling to overcome backwardness. Sixth, a flexible approach to the questions of 
control, decentralising to encourage initiative and centralising to ensure control.
Following Guevara’s departure from Cuba in 1965, MININD was divided into 
separate ministries and much of his apparatus was dismantled. Meanwhile, Guevara 
continued to develop his theoretical contribution, applying his interpretation of 
Marxism to a critique of the Soviet Manual of Political Economy. Chapter 11 
illustrates the scientific method of analysis which led Guevara to forewarn that 
capitalism was returning to the socialist bloc.
Guevara had been convinced that the BFS was a major advance for socialist political 
economy, but the tools he left behind were underutilised. This limited his legacy. 
Nonetheless many his policies had been embedded in Cuba society, as was his 
methodological approach to problems of production and social-relations. It is 
impossible to attempt to qualify precisely which mechanisms operational in Cuba 
today were personally created by Guevara. As an individual he operated within an 
historical context, a dynamic moment in which his own theory and practice bounced 
off society in general and other leaders in particular. Not only was Guevara shaped 
by his personal experience prior to joining the revolutionary struggle in Cuba, but he 
was also influenced by the character of that struggle and by Fidel Castro and other 
protagonists’ vision of revolution. Guevara’s BFS was a product of both his 
intellectual and practical experiences. But much of these experiences were collective 
and many individuals and intellectual paradigms contributed towards their formation.
Guevara’s outstanding contribution was to devise a system of economic management 
that integrated his general theoretical analysis of socialist political economy with the 
particular reality of Cuba and its level of economic development. The specificity of
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the BFS mean that blanket copying the system would limit its effectiveness and 
contradict the dialectical methodology Guevara applied. However, there are key 
principles and premises encapsulated in the BFS, a methodological approach to 
socialist transition that has general applicability.
Twenty years ago Castro had predicted that: ‘Che is a figure whose influence will 
grow.’2 This has proved to be true, not just in Cuba where school children daily 
pledge ‘to be like Che’, but also throughout Latin America. On May Day in 2005, 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez Frias said: ‘Che was more than just a martyr, 
more than just a heroic guerrilla fighter, he was also a Minister in the Cuban 
government and developed many ideas on how to build the new socialist society...we 
must study and learn from his thoughts.’3 In December 2005, newly elected President 
of Bolivia, Evo Morales also laid claim to Guevara’s legacy. The prevalent leftward 
trend throughout Latin America has generated further potential for a critical 
evaluation and reassessment of his work, one which includes the ideas and policies 
developed in Cuba 1959-1965. To paraphrase Guevara: in detailing his contribution 
to socialist political economy and economic management in Cuba 1959 to 1965, this 
thesis provides flesh and clothing to the skeleton formed over the last forty years in 
the popular image of Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara.4
2 Castro, Speech, 151-3.
3 Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez Frias. Speech on May Day 2005.
4 ‘The skeleton of our complete freedom is already formed. The flesh and clothing are lacking; we will 
create them.’ Guevara, ‘Socialism and Man in Cuba’ 1965, in Deutschmann, David (ed); Che Guevara 
Reader: Writings on Guerrilla Strategy, Politics & Revolution. Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1998 (2nd 
edition), 213.
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APPENDIX 1
Organigram of Ministry of Industries
Ministry of Industries: Organigram
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Nb-This should be considered a snapshot of the ministry struc­
ture, as the aparatus underwent constant reorganisation.
The organigram shows the consolidated Enterprises. It does not 
include the production units which were grouped within them.
APPENDIX 2
Standard interview questions
Employees of the Ministry of Industries.
1 ^Cual fiie su participation en el proceso revolucionario de Cuba en los anos 50?
-  What was your participation in the revolutionary process in Cuba in the 1950s?
2 i Quq position mantuvo entre el triunfo de la Revolucion y 1970?
-  What positions did you hold between the triumph o f the Revolution and 1970?
3 ^Que le llevd a sostener ese papel o posiciones?
-  What qualified you to take up these roles or positions?
4 ^Cuales fueron los principios de su interaction con Che y con que frecuencia 
sucedio?
-  What was the origin o f your interaction with Che and how frequent was it?
5 El caracter socialista de la Revolucion fue anunciado en Abril de 1961. Sin 
embargo, la propiedad estatal de los medios de production y la planificacion 
estatal se introdujeron con anterioridad. ^Cuando y como se hizo obvio para usted 
que para el Che, el Departamento de Industria y posteriormente el Ministerio de 
Industria jugarian un papel esencial en la construccion de la sociedad socialista- 
como oposicion al simple desarrollo capitalista nacional en un pais 
subdesarrollado?
-  The socialist character o f the Revolution was announced in April 1961. However, 
state ownership o f the means ofproduction and state planning had been 
introduced before that. How and when did it become obvious to you that for Che, 
the Department o f Industrialisation and later the Ministry o f Industries would 
play an essential role in the construction o f a socialist society -  as opposed to 
simply national capitalist development in an underdeveloped country?
6 ^Como se hizo consciente de que Che estaba envuelto en la polemica teorica 
respecto a la construccion del socialismo? Si es asi, cuales entendio en ese 
momenta eran las diferencias fimdamentales entre los oponentes en el Gran 
Debate?
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-  How did you become aware that Che was engaged in the theoretical polemic 
concerning the construction o f socialism? If so, what did you understand at that 
time as the key differences between opponents o f the Great Debate?
I  En ese momento, cuanto entendi6 del sistema presupuestario financiero del Che? 
^Cual fue su conception sobre sus fines teoricos y su opinion sobre su estructura 
organizativa?
-  At that time, how well did you understand Che’s Budgetary Finance System?
What was your conception o f it theoretical aims and your view about its 
organizational structure?
8 ^C6mo fue informado de la teoria y estructura organizacional del sistema 
presupuestario financiero?
-  How were you informed about the theoretical and organisational structure o f the 
Budgetary Finance System?
9 Con la perspectiva actual y mirando hacia atras, como describiria las distintas 
posturas adoptadas en el Gran Debate?
-  Can you assess the different positions adopted in the Great Debate with hindsight, 
from your current perspective?
lO^Cual fue la contribution mas importante que el Che hizo a la revolucion 
socialists en Cuba?
-  What was Che’s most important contribution to the socialist Revolution in Cuba?
II ^Hay algo mas que le gustase anadir?
-  Is there anything you would like to add?
Participants in the Great Debate and members of the revolutionary 
government.
1 ^Cual fue su participation en el proceso revolucionario de Cuba en los anos 50?
-  What was your participation in the revolutionary process in Cuba in the 1950s?
2 lQu6 position mantuvo entre el triunfo de la Revolucion y 1970?
-  What positions did you hold between the triumph o f the Revolution and 1970?
3 ^Que le llevo a sostener ese papel o posiciones?
-  What qualified you to take up these roles or positions?
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4 ^Cuando y como se hizo clara la existencia de puntos de vista opuestos en el 
gobiemo revolucionario respecto a la construccion del socialismo en Cuba?
-  How and when did it become clear that there were opposing views within the 
revolutionary government concerning the construction o f socialism in Cuba?
5 lEn aquel momento, cuales fueron las principales diferencias teoricas que advirtio 
entre el sistema presupuestario financiero y el sistema de autofinanciacion?
-  At that time, what did you perceive as the key theoretical differences between the 
Budgetary Finance System and the Auto-Financing System?
6 ^Cual fue su contribution personal al Gran Debate? Por ejemplo con articulos o 
discursos, y si fueron publicados. ^Como llego a la posicidn que mantuvo? Con 
quien colaboro y que puntos de vista representaron?
-  What was your personal contribution to the Great Debate? For example articles 
or speeches -  and were they published? How did you come to the position you 
took? Who did you collaborate with and which point o f view did you represent?
7 ^Cual fue la reaction al analisis critico del Che sobre la politica economica 
sovietica?
-  What was the reaction to Che’s critical analysis o f  Soviet political economy?
8 ^Para usted, hasta que punto el Che tuvo exito en influir en las estructuras teoricas 
de la Cuba entre 1960 y 1970?
-  In your view, to what extent did Che succeed in influencing the theoretical 
structures in Cuba?
9 ^Para usted, hasta que punto el Che tuvo exito en influir en las estructuras 
organizativas de la Cuba entre 1960 y 1970?
-  In your view, to what extent did Che succeed in influencing the organisational 
structures in Cuba between 1960 and 1970?
lOMuchos comentaristas fiiera de Cuba han explicado la partida del Che, en 1966, 
como resultado de su frustration por el relativo fracaso de sus politicas 
economicas o para atraer a otros ministerios a su sistema presupuestario 
financiero. ^Cual es su punto de vista respecto a esto?
-  Many commentators outside o f Cuba have explained Che’s departure from Cuba 
in 1966 as the result o f his frustration at the relative failure o f his economic 
policies or his ability to win other ministries to his Budgetary Finance System. 
What is you view on this?
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11 ^Desde la perspectiva actual y mirando atras, podria describir las distintas 
posiciones que se tomaron en el Gran Debate?
-  Can you assess the different positions adopted in the Great Dehate with hindsight, 
from your current perspective?
12 ^Cual es la contribution mas importante que el Che hizo a la revolucion socialista 
en Cuba?
-  What was Che’s most important contribution to the socialist Revolution in Cuba?
13 ^Como describiria la position de Fidel Castro en lo relativo al Gran Debate?
-  How would you describe Fidel Castro’s position in regards to the Great Debate?
14 ^Hasta que punto la influencia teorica del Che se manifesto en el periodo de 
Rectification desde mediados a finales de los 80? ^Pueden dar ejemplos?
-  To what extent was Che’s theoretical influence demonstrated during the 
Rectification period from the mid to late 1980s? Can you give examples?
15 ^Hay algo que le gustaria anadir?
-  Is there anything you would like to add?
Example of specific questions: Juan Borroto
1 Usted fue director de supervision en el MININD. ^Puede usted explicar la 
importancia que dio el Che al control administrativo, la supervision y la auditoria. 
^Que puede contarme usted sobre su trabajo en esta direccion?
-  You were Director o f Supervision in MININD. What can you tell me about the 
importance that Che gave to administrative control, supervision and audits? What 
can you tell me about your work in this office?
2 La direccion de supervision tenia tres departamentos: inspection, auditoria e 
investigaciones. ^Puede usted explicar las responsabilidades y estructuras que 
tern'an estos departamentos?
-  The Office o f Supervision had three departments: inspection, audits and 
investigations. What can you tell me about the responsibilities and structures o f  
those departments?
3 La direccion de supervision fue encargada de supervisar los inventarios. ^Usted 
me puede explicar la importancia dada en el ministerio de limitar y controlar los 
inventarios? En la reunion bimestral de enero 1962 el Che dijo que los fondos de 
las empresas estaban controlado para limitar los inventarios. ^Como fue esto?
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-  The Office o f Supervision was responsible for supervising inventories. Can you 
explain the importance the ministry gave to limiting and control inventories? In 
the bimonthly meeting o f January 1962, Che said that the enterprise funds were 
controlled to limit inventories. How was this so?
4 ^En la reunion bimestral, marzo 1963, el Che dijo que la tarea de hacer 
inventarios habia caido en manos de las direcciones de las empresas consolidadas, 
^quien tenia este tarea anteriormente?
-  In the bimonthly meeting o f March 1963, Che said that the task o f making 
inventories hadfallen into the hand o f the Consolidated Enterprise management. 
Whose task was this previously?
5 ^Como director de supervision, usted participo en las reuniones de la circular . 
(38/43) 90?
-A s  the Director o f Supervision, did you participate in the meetings for Circular 
(38/43) 90?
6 En los primeros anos del departamento de industrialization y de MININD, habia 
un serio desconocimiento de estadisticas y contabilidad. ^Hasta que punto fue 
resuelto este problema antes la salida del Che en 1965?
-  In the first years o f the Department o f Industrialisation and MININD, there was a 
serious lack o f knowledge o f statistics and accounting. To what extent was this 
problem resolved before Che left in 1965?
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